









THE LIFE

OF

COLIN CAMPBELL, LORD CLYDE



# THE LIFE

OF

## COLIN CAMPBELL, LORD CLYDE

ILLUSTRATED BY EXTRACTS FROM HIS DIARY  
AND CORRESPONDENCE

BY

LIEUT.-GENERAL SHADWELL, C.B.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

*WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS*



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## CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

### CHAPTER XII.

	PAGE
Advance to Alum Bagh—Organisation of the force—Letter to Miss Campbell—Flank movement upon the Dil Khooshah and Martiniere—Skirmish—Halt—Reconnaissance—Advance along right bank of Goomtee—Attack and capture of the Secunder Bagh and barracks—Attack on the Shah Nujif—Bivouac of the force—Attack on the mess-house—Motee Mahul carried—Meeting of Sir James Outram and General Havelock with Sir Colin—Preparations for evacuation of Residency—Withdrawal of garrison—Death of Havelock—Sir James Outram left with a force at the Alum Bagh—Sir Colin sets out with the convoy for Cawnpore—Anxiety for that post—General Windham's position—Sir Colin hurries to Cawnpore—Letter to Lord Canning describing passage of the Ganges—Despatch of convoy—Battle of Cawnpore—Letter to Lord Canning—Pursuit of enemy's left wing by Hope Grant, . . . . .	1

### CHAPTER XIII.

Measures for restoration of authority in the Doab—March of column from Delhi—Movement of Walpole's column to join it—Letter to Lord Canning—Lord Canning's letter on reading the Lucknow despatches—Réply—Sir Colin moves on Futtehghur—Movement of detached columns—Affair of the Kalee Nuddee—Brilliant charge of the cavalry—Futtehghur and Furrukhabad occupied—Halt—Correspondence as to future course of operations—Lord Canning decides on the siege of Lucknow—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge, . .	46
---	----



## CHAPTER XIV.

Preparations for siege of Lucknow—Advantageous position of Futtehghur—Sir Colin communicates measures to Lord Canning—Letter to Sir James Outram—Letter to Lord Canning—Discussion with Sir James Outram as to point of attack—Operations in Furrukhabad district—Headquarter column marches to Cawnpore—Distribution of army of Oudh—Correspondence regarding selection of officers—Army echeloned between Cawnpore and Alum Bagh—Narrative of events elsewhere—Pause in operations—Sir Colin waits for Jung Bahadoor—Progress of columns in Central India and Rajpootana—Walpole moves up Trunk Road—Hope Grant's movements in Oudh—Sir James Outram's position attacked—Delay of Jung Bahadoor—The Queen's message to Sir Colin—Letter from the Queen forwarded by the Duke of Cambridge—Colonelcy of 93d Highlanders—Sir Colin's reply to her Majesty—Sir Colin leaves Cawnpore—Letter to Sir J. Lawrence—Dr W. H. Russell, . . . . .

## CHAPTER XV. ✓

Headquarters at Buntera—Strength of army—Reasons for operating from both sides of the Goomtee—Sir Colin moves upon the Dil Khooshah—Occupies it—Bridges thrown across the Goomtee—Sir James Outram crosses with his force—Establishes batteries to enfilade enemy's outer line of works—Martiniere—Enemy's outer line of works carried—Outram bombards the Kaiser Bagh—Banks's house carried—Approach to enemy's second line of works—Arrival of Jung Bahadoor—His reception by Sir Colin—Assault of Begun's palace—Correspondence with Lord Canning regarding succession to command—Assault of the Imambara—Capture of Kaiser Bagh—Sir James Outram crosses the Goomtee and takes the Residency and other buildings—Plunder by troops and camp-followers—Letter to Lord Canning—Lord Canning's congratulations—Moosa Bagh carried—Failure of combined movement to intercept rebels—Review of operations—Hope Grant's expedition to Koorsee—Measures for occupation of Lucknow—Force despatched to Azimgurh—Correspondence with Lord Canning,

## CHAPTER XVI.

Progress of columns under Rose, Whitlock, and Roberts—Necessity for the establishment of communications between the columns operating in Bundelcund and the headquarter army—Arrangements for defence of Lucknow and for the operations in Rohilcund—Letter to Lord Canning—Sir J. Outram succeeded by Mr Montgomery—Sir Colin visits the Governor-General at Allahabad—Hope Grant marches to Bitthowlee—Letter from Sir James Outram—Plan of operations in Rohilcund—Walpole's check at Rhoodamow—Letter to Lord Canning—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Lord Canning's reply—Sir Colin leaves for Rohilcund—Joins Walpole—Death of Sir William Peel—Operations in Rohilcund—Action at Barcilly—Arrival of Brigadier-General Jones's force—Jones sent to relieve Shahjehanpoor—Sir Colin congratulates Lord Canning on success of Rohilcund campaign—Publication of the Queen's message to the army—Sir Colin hastens to assist Jones—Suffering of troops from heat—Sir Colin's manner with his troops—Anecdote—Brigadier Coke joins the force—Lord Canning's congratulations—Sir Colin returns to Futtehghur, . . . . . 186

## CHAPTER XVII.

Sir Colin Campbell halts at Futtehghur—Sir H. Rose's operations in Bundelcund, Koonch, Calpee—General order—Sir Colin's reasons to Lord Canning for coming to Futtehghur—Preparations at Allahabad for accommodation of headquarter staff—Sir E. Lugard's operations against Koer Singh—Mutineers seize Gwalior—Flight of Scindiah—Sir H. Rose takes Gwalior—Napier pursues rebels—Sir Colin sums up the situation in letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Lord Derby announces bestowal of peerage—Letter from the Duke of Cambridge—Sir Colin replies—Hope Grant at Nawabgunj—Letters to the Duke of Cambridge, Sir H. Rose, and General Whitlock—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Anticipations of Lord Canning's policy verified—Condition of Goruckpoor and Behar—Letter from Duke of Cambridge—Sir Colin reviews the situation in two letters to H.R.H.,

## CHAPTER XVIII.

Organisation of police—Sir Colin waits to commence operations on a large scale—Hope Grant relieves Maun Singh—Sir Colin's report to the Duke of Cambridge—Commands in Central Asia—Pursuit of Tantia Topee—Maun Singh—Bundelcund—Demand for more troops—General order regarding interior economy of regiments—Sir. F. Currie announces grant of annuity to accompany peerage—Lord Derby unable to alter title—Congratulations from Sir J. Lawrence—Letter to Sir James Outram—Reply—Congratulations from Sir Patrick Grant—Reinforcements—Notification of approaching campaign to the Commissary-General—Summary of measures—Movements of columns—Behar—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Plan of campaign—Proclamation announcing Government of India by the Crown—Discretionary power vested in Lord Clyde—Lord Clyde joins his camp—Disposition of troops—Lall Madho summoned, . . . . .

279

## CHAPTER XIX.

Discontent of local Europeans on transfer to the Crown—Correspondence thereon—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Surrender of Lall Madho—Amethce—Advance to Shunkerpore—Its evacuation—Hope Grant marches to Fyzabad—Lord Clyde, joined by Brigadier Eveleigh, follows Beni Madho—Beni Madho routed at Doundea-Khera—Clearance of Baiswarra—Settlement of country—Lord Clyde marches to Lucknow—Subsidiary operations—Byram Ghât—Fyzabad—Letter to Lord Canning—Health of troops—Hope Grant's and Rowcroft's operations—Baraitch—Burgidiah—Rout of enemy—Accident to Lord Clyde—Anecdote—Musjidiah—Action at Bankee—Rebels driven across the Raptée—Toolseepore—Defeat of Bala Rao—Completion of Lord Clyde's operations—Results—Column left to watch rebels—Lord Clyde marches back to Lucknow, . . . . .

326

## CHAPTER XX.

Lord Canning's congratulations—Claims of local European troops—Lord Clyde's reply—Correspondence with Lord

Canning—Report to the Duke of Cambridge—Illness—Horsford enters Nepaul—Location of headquarters—Horsford re-enters Oudh—Letter from Lord Canning—Measures against irruption of rebels into Tirhoot—Lord Clyde proceeds to Simla—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Notification of resignation to Lord Canning—Jung Bahadoor—Bundelcund—Gwalior—Pursuit and capture of Tantia Topee—Letter to the Duke of Cambridge—Submission of resignations—Final letter regarding the rebellion to Lord Canning—Claims of European troops decided against them—Action of the malcontents—Serious emergency—Measures to meet it—Courts of inquiry—Discharges—Correspondence with the Duke of Cambridge—Lord Clyde's reasons in favour of amalgamation, . . . . .

375

## CHAPTER XXI.

Illness—Postponement of resignation—Affairs in China—Correspondence with Lord Canning regarding troops for China—Expedition determined upon—Lord Canning decides on going to the hills—Lord Clyde congratulates Lady Canning on Lord Canning's earldom—Meets viceregal party at Cawnpore—Lucknow—Lord Canning desires to detain Lord Clyde in India—China expedition—Sir Hope Grant commands—Progress up country—Lord Clyde accompanies Lord Canning to Peshawur—Kangra—Simla—Amalgamation—Lord Clyde follows Lord Canning to Calcutta—Promises Lord Canning to sit for his portrait—Farewell order—Leaves Calcutta—Letter from Lord Canning—Reply—Paris—Colonelcy of Coldstream Guards—Reception in England—Anecdote—Vichy—Death of Lord Clyde's father—Chatham—The Mansion House—Thanks of the House of Lords—Paris—Tour in Italy—Incipient signs of ill-health—Berlin—Manœuvres—Colonel von Blumenthal—Invested G.C.S.I.—Death of Lady Canning—Illness—Affair of the Trent—Disposition of means—Visit to Northumberland—Review of volunteers at Brighton—Return of Lord Canning—Paris—Death of Lord Canning—Visit of General and Madame Vinoy—Death of Sir R. Doherty—Completion of seventieth year—Gazetted field-marshal—House in Berkeley Square, . . . . .

421

## CHAPTER XXII.

Lord Clyde's health at the beginning of 1863—He takes possession of his house—Weakness and failing eyesight—Examined by Mr Longmore—Last entry in journal—Serious illness—Visit to Chatham—Last illness—Remembers his Highlanders—The Queen's sympathetic message—Letter written by her Majesty's command to Lord Clytie—Anxiety to see his sister—Miss Campbell arrives—Death of Lord Clyde—Regret of the nation—Letter from Lord Granville—Funeral in Westminster Abbey—Inscription on tombstone—Summary of character—Letter from General Vinoy—Extract from the 'Times'—Conclusion—Memorials in London and Glasgow, . . . . .

# LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

## IN THE SECOND VOLUME.

	PAGE
RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, NOVEMBER 1857, . . . . .	<i>To face</i> 6
ACTION OF CAWNPORE, . . . . .	" 36
" KALEE NUDDEE, . . . . .	" 58
RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, MARCH 1858—	
No. I., . . . . .	" 142
No. II., . . . . .	" <i>ib.</i>
LOUDH, ROHILCUND, AND BEHAR, . . . . .	" 186
ACTION OF BAREILLY, . . . . .	" 211
CAMPAIGN IN LOUDH, . . . . .	" 312
ACTION AT DOUNDEA-KHERA, . . . . .	" 342
PASSAGE OF THE GHOGRA, . . . . .	" 349



# LIFE OF LORD CLYDE.

## CHAPTER XII.

ADVANCE TO ALUM BAGH—ORGANISATION OF THE FORCE—LETTER TO MISS CAMPBELL—FLANK MOVEMENT UPON THE DIL KHOOSHAI AND MARTINIERE—SKIRMISH—HALT—RECONNAISSANCE—ADVANCE ALONG RIGHT BANK OF GOOMTEE—ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF THE SECUNDER BAGH AND BARRACKS—ATTACK ON THE SHAH NUJIF—BIVOUAC OF THE FORCE—ATTACK ON THE MESS-HOUSE—MOTEE MAHUL CARRIED—MEETING OF SIR JAMES OUTRAM AND GENERAL HAVELOCK WITH SIR COLIN—PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION OF RESIDENCY—WITHDRAWAL OF GARRISON—DEATH OF HAVELOCK—SIR JAMES OUTRAM LEFT WITH A FORCE AT THE ALUM BAGH—SIR COLIN SETS OUT WITH THE CONVOY FOR CAWNPORE—ANXIETY FOR THAT POST—GENERAL WINDHAM'S POSITION—SIR COLIN HURRIES TO CAWNPORE—LETTER TO LORD CANNING DESCRIBING PASSAGE OF THE GANGES—DESPATCH OF CONVOY—BATTLE OF CAWNPORE—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—PURSUIT OF ENEMY'S LEFT WING BY HOPE GRANT.

THE troops were in motion at sunrise on the 12th November 1857. Midway between the camp and the Alum Bagh the head of the column encountered a body of infantry, covered by two guns, which



opened upon it from the right of the road. They were met by the cavalry and artillery of the advance-guard, supported by Bouchier's field-battery, and after a short but sharp fight, were driven off, their guns being captured in a brilliant charge of a squadron of Hodson's Irregular Horse. That afternoon the camp was pitched at a short distance in rear of the Alum Bagh, out of range of artillery-fire, to which that post was exposed. Mr Kavanagh having brought a code of signals from Sir James Outram, a semaphore was erected on the Alum Bagh, to communicate with one established in the Residency.

The force halted on the 13th to complete its preparations for the final advance. All the camp equipage was stored in the Alum Bagh, from which the effective men of the British regiments with Sir James Outram were removed and formed into two small provisional battalions. The 75th Regiment, less than 300 strong and "much harassed by its late exertions," together with some 50 men of the Sikh regiment of Ferozepore and a detachment of artillery, constituted the garrison of this post. A party was despatched against the fort of Jellalabad, on which the body of the enemy defeated by the advance-guard the previous day had retired. The fort was found to have been abandoned during the night; but as its reoccupation would have threatened the communication with the Alum Bagh, it was rendered indefensible. In the afternoon Sir Colin pushed forward a strong reconnaissance to his left front, with

the object of deceiving the enemy as to his real line of advance.

Some reinforcements having reached camp during the 13th, and in anticipation of further arrivals the following morning, the finishing stroke was given to the organisation of the force. The infantry did not exceed 3800 bayonets, divided into three nominal brigades. That commanded by the Honourable Adrian Hope was the strongest. It was composed of the 93d Highlanders—a regiment of seasoned veterans, with its full number of companies, and, judged by its Crimean antecedents, of a quality not to be surpassed; a wing of the 53d Foot, an old and acclimatised regiment; the 4th Punjab Infantry, weak in numbers, but reliable soldiers, ready to emulate their European comrades in any deed of daring; and one of the slender provisional battalions. The two other brigades were mere skeletons: one, commanded by Brigadier Greathed, was formed out of the remnants of the 8th Foot, distinguished at Delhi; the 2d Punjab Infantry, which had also rendered good service there, though its numbers were greatly diminished; and a battalion of detachments. The headquarters of the 23d Fusiliers—a regiment of great renown, but which, owing to the severity of its losses in the Crimea, had none but young soldiers in its ranks—together with two companies of the 82d Foot, made up the other, which was placed under the command of Brigadier Russell.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Sir David Russell, K.C.B.

The artillery comprised Peel's naval brigade, consisting of six 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and two rocket-tubes; the sixteen field-guns which had accompanied Greathed's column; a heavy and a light field-battery of Royal Artillery, and one half field-battery of Bengal Artillery; a mortar battery manned by Royal Artillery; and two Madras native horse-artillery guns,—in all, thirty-nine guns and howitzers, six mortars, and two rocket-tubes. Upon this admirable and apparently disproportionate force of artillery, Sir Colin depended for the clearance of the formidable obstacles which interposed between him and the garrison he had come to relieve. The cavalry was the same as had formed part of Greathed's column, supplemented by the addition of the detachment of the military train, organised as two squadrons of cavalry. The little brigade of engineers comprised a company of Royal Engineers, a company of Madras sappers, a few Bengal sappers who had taken part in the siege of Delhi, and two companies of Punjab pioneers.

When all the arrangements were completed, Sir Colin's final act was to write to his sister, with whom he had occasion to communicate regarding his private affairs, in case of any accident befalling him. "I march"—so runs his letter—"to-morrow to a position from whence I purpose to act against the part of the city which is nearest to the place wherein our countrymen and countrywomen are surrounded. My force is high and powerful in spirit

and courage, but our numbers are not so many as might be desirable. Our friends in Lucknow have food only for five or six days, and the effort must be made to save them at every cost, and I hope to succeed."

At 9 A.M. on the morning of the 14th, the column of route having been formed under Sir Colin's eye, the flank movement to the Dil Khooshah commenced. As the rear-guard moved off, the expected reinforcements joined it. Passing over a plain of cultivated ground between the Char Bagh and the fort of Jellalabad, the force met with no opposition until it neared the Dil Khooshah park, when a long line of musketry-fire opened upon it. The advanced-guard was immediately reinforced; and whilst our skirmishers advanced against the palace under cover of artillery-fire, some of the cavalry and horse-artillery, pushing through a gap in the park-wall, menaced the retreat of the enemy, who quickly abandoned the building and made for the Martiniere College, situated at the foot of the plateau, a short distance from the Goomtee. The enemy having apparently recovered his surprise, opened some guns from the Martiniere on our cavalry, as it approached the edge of the plateau on which the Dil Khooshah stands; but they were immediately silenced by the fire of two of Travers's heavy guns and the light field-batteries. The 8th Foot and the 1st battalion detachments skirmished down the hill and drove the enemy from the Martiniere through its garden and park across the canal, the squadrons of Punjab cavalry join-

ing in the pursuit. The Dil Khooshah was occupied, and the headquarters established in the Martiniere. Hope's brigade was posted in the wood of the Martiniere, opposite a bridge over the canal, flanked on the high ground to the left by two of Peel's guns and Bouchier's field-battery. About an hour before sunset, just as Sir Colin had completed a survey of the panorama from the top of the Martiniere, on which a semaphore had been established, and by means of which some messages had been exchanged with Sir James Outram, the enemy attacked the position from the suburb on the farther side of the canal with some guns and a considerable body of infantry. Checked by the 93d—formed opposite the bridge—and succumbing to the superior artillery-fire brought to bear upon him, he was speedily driven from the cover he occupied by a spirited movement of the 53d and 4th Punjab Infantry across the canal.

A force having been posted for the defence of the Martiniere and Dil Khooshah, the troops bivouacked on the ground with their arms beside them. A halt was now made for twenty-four hours, to admit of the rear-guard closing up. It had been perpetually engaged with the enemy on the previous day, and did not reach the Dil Khooshah till late on the morning of the 15th. The troops were completed with a supply of small-arm ammunition, and rations were served out to be cooked and carried with them. A field-hospital and the headquarters of the commissariat were established at the Dil Khooshah, in which all the

baggage was deposited, the defence of the post being committed to a mixed force, including the 8th Foot, half of the cavalry, and five guns, which were placed under Brigadier Little,<sup>1</sup> commanding the cavalry brigade. When this detachment was deducted, the strength of the force available for the actual operation against the Residency did not exceed 4200 men.

In the afternoon an attack on the pickets on the extreme right of the position was repulsed by the cavalry and horse-artillery, two guns of the Madras native troop of horse-artillery being prominently engaged.

From the Martiniere a metalled road crosses the canal by the bridge which had been defended by the 93d the previous day. This road leads through suburbs and gardens up to the Begum's palace. From the Begum's palace are two roads,—one running down the Huzrut Gunj and in front of the Kaiser Bagh; the other, branching off at right angles and passing between the barracks and the suburbs, leads direct to the Secunder Bagh. The latter was the route taken by Havelock. It was also the road recommended by Sir James Outram in the memorandum previously referred to. There was clear evidence that the enemy occupied the suburbs in force; and there was every reason to fear that the hospital, the Begum's palace, the barracks, and other buildings, would present formidable obstacles to the advance. Sir Colin could not afford to run the risk of compromising his

<sup>1</sup> General Sir A. Little, K.C.B.

scanty means, already diminished by the detachments he was obliged to leave behind him. He therefore resolved to make a detour to his right, and approach the Secunder Bagh from the open ground adjacent to the Goomtee. To lead to the supposition that the advance would be made in the direction of the suburbs, he made a reconnaissance in the afternoon. The artillery was massed on his left front, the pickets drawn in from the right of the position, and a constant fire of mortars kept up during the night on the Begum's palace and the barracks. During the reconnaissance Sir Colin satisfied himself that the ground on the right or near bank of the Goomtee was open, and favourable for the advance of the column.

On the morning of the 16th the force moved from its right, and fording the canal not far from its junction with the Goomtee, proceeded up the right bank of the river, till it struck a cart-track which led through some gardens into a village. As the advanced-guard, consisting of a strong body of cavalry, Blunt's troop of Bengal horse-artillery, and a company of the 53d, made a sharp turn to its left, it was received by a heavy fire of musketry from some huts and enclosures on its right flank. Through an opening in the street, the Secunder Bagh could be seen 150 yards distant. The moment was one of considerable danger; for the movement in advance was checked, whilst the cavalry, jammed up in the narrow lane, impeded the passage of the artillery and infantry to the front. Under the personal direc-

tion of Sir Colin, the company of the 53d lined the enclosures to its right; and a gun, run through a gap in the bank, opened on the Secunder Bagh. A party of sappers loopholed the huts facing that building, and the way was cleared by the adroit movement of the cavalry into some side lanes. Then Blunt's troop of horse-artillery, dashing up the steep bank to its right, advanced at a gallop under a heavy cross-fire, till it reached the open space between a large square enclosure or serai at the end of the lane and the Secunder Bagh. Here this gallant officer unlimbered and opened fire in three directions, with difficulty maintaining his position; for he was not only within easy musketry-range of the Secunder Bagh, but cannon opened upon him from the Kaiser Bagh, and his men and horses were falling fast from a galling fire directed upon him from the serai and other cover in close proximity to his left. Simultaneously Hope's brigade came into action and drove the enemy out of the loopholed village to the left of the lane, as well as from the serai. Whilst superintending these movements, Sir Colin was struck on the thigh by a musket-ball, which had previously passed through the body of a gunner of Blunt's troop. Fortunately, the wound was not sufficiently severe to oblige him to dismount. Two of Travers's 18-pounders having been brought up and a way cut through the bank by the sappers, they were hauled up with great labour, and opened within sixty yards of the south-western bastion of the Secunder Bagh, the infantry, under cover of an embankment, keeping



up a brisk fire on the defences of that building. In the meantime some parties of the 93d and 53d, aided by two of Blunt's guns, drove a body of the enemy from the position they held on our left front. Pursuing them across the plain, the 93d seized and held the barracks,—the 53d, in skirmishing order, connecting this post with the main attack.

The Secunder Bagh is a large brick building 150 yards square, with walls 20 feet high, and a circular bastion at each corner. It was loopholed, and the roofs of the rooms constructed between the bastions formed an admirable rampart for defence. In about an hour and a half the fire of the 18-pounders had breached an opening in the wall of the bastion sufficiently large to admit two men abreast. The place was then stormed by the 93d, 53d, and 4th Punjab Rifles, supported by Barnston's battalion of detachments. In their eagerness to reach the breach, an exciting race took place between the Highlanders and the Sikhs. The foremost climbed in through the narrow aperture in the wall; a larger number, passing to the left, made for the gateway, and overcoming its obstructions, streamed into the building; whilst the 53d broke through a window on the right. Then ensued a scene which baffles description. The enemy, caught in a trap and finding escape impossible, fought with the courage of despair. The conflict raged for hours. From the rooms above a galling fire was maintained on our troops; but the Sikhs forced their way with indomitable

courage up the staircase, using the bayonet with deadly effect, and hurled the bodies of the mutineers into the enclosures below." The carnage was frightful. Ultimately, when the building was cleared of its ghastly contents, no less than 2000 of the enemy were found to have been slain.

The afternoon was well advanced before the movement towards the Residency recommenced along the road which runs from the Secunder Bagh across a narrow but open plain. Passing a village on its left, which was cleared and occupied, the forces advanced a short distance against the Shah Nujif, a large white domed tomb, standing 100 yards to the right of the road, and surrounded by high loopholed walls. The approach to the tomb was almost hidden from view by some huts with enclosures and a fringe of jungle which intervened between it and the plain. The mortars and Peel's guns being placed in battery, opened upon this building, the defence of which proved to be most obstinate. Not only from the Shah Nujif, but from the enclosures in its front, the enemy maintained an incessant fire of musketry. A gallant attempt made by Barnston's battalion of detachments to dislodge him from the latter failed. The Sikhs, however, were successful in carrying the Kuddum Russool, a building on the right of the road. From the other side of the Goomtee a gun opened with great effect, blowing up one of the ammunition-waggons of the naval brigade, and crossing its fire with that from the enemy's batteries at the Kaiser

Bagh. The musketry-fire was causing Peel serious losses. The attack had lasted nearly three hours, yet no impression had been made on the building. The aspect of affairs was becoming serious. A retreat under the circumstances was out of the question. There remained no alternative but to fall back on the bayonet to restore the ebbing fortune of the fight. Turning to the 93d, Sir Colin directed them to prepare for the assault, and intimated to them his intention of conducting them in person. As the 93d, in eager response to the call of their favourite chief, advanced, with Barnston's battalion of detachments in support, Middleton's light field-battery was brought up, and passing in gallant style under a withering fire of musketry from the mess-house, unlimbered and opened with grape in close proximity to the building. The 93d, with Sir Colin at their head, approached the Shah Nujif, but, unable to effect an entrance, halted at its foot. The wall, 20 feet high, was still intact, and there were no means of escalading. All that could be done was to open a musketry-fire to cover Peel's guns, two of which were dragged up in the most daring manner, and opened within a few yards of the massive stone walls. But the solidity of the masonry resisted even this heroic attempt to breach them. Meanwhile the fire of the enemy was telling with fatal effect upon the assailants. Of Sir Colin's personal staff, two,\* the brothers Alison, were struck down ;<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The elder, Major (now Major-General) Sir A. Alison, Bt., K.C.B.,

and many of the mounted officers, including Hope, his aide-de-camp, and his brigade-major, had their horses shot under them. The aspect of affairs had become very grave. The day was far spent, and the advantage rested with the enemy. To cover the removal of Peel's guns, the rocket-tubes were brought up, and discharged their contents into the building. Allgood,<sup>1</sup> the assistant quartermaster-general with headquarters, returned to Sir Colin, who was back in the open superintending matters, and reported the result of the attack. He was desired to inform Hope that he was not to retire till he had collected all his dead and wounded. The order was given and duly carried out. Whilst this was being done Hope, turning to Allgood, remarked, "This is very mortifying: let us take 50 men and try and look into the place before we retire." They did so, and the two friends (they had been schoolfellows) crept stealthily through the brushwood to the right of the building, and there discovered a narrow opening in the wall, up which, not without difficulty, they scrambled by each other's help. On looking into the place, they ascertained that the enemy were abandoning it. The rest of the Highlanders, coming up, were pulled through the gap, and whilst Allgood went back for a company of sappers, Hope secured the gateway, and the place was won. "Never," remarked the

lost his left arm. The younger brother, Lieutenant (afterwards Lieutenant-Col.) F. Alison, was only slightly wounded.

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Allgood, C.B.

former in a letter written a few days after the event, "was I the bearer of more joyful news." Thus, at the critical moment, by this fortunate and unexpected turn of events, the doubtful struggle of this hard-fought day was brought to a happy conclusion. Seldom has the fickleness of Fortune in war been more strikingly exemplified.

The Shah Nujif was occupied by the 93d. Headquarters were established in that building, and the road between the Secunder Bagh and barracks held by a strong body of infantry. In this order of formation, ready to repel any attack, the wearied troops, cold and comfortless, snatched what sleep they could. Before dawn the beating of drums and ringing of bells manifested indications of an attack. The troops stood to their arms, but the foe did not venture into the open. He limited himself to the occasional discharge of round-shot, directed against our field-hospital, established at the serai near the Secunder Bagh.

Incalculable were the advantages resulting from the hardly-won triumph of the previous day. By the capture of the enemy's stronghold on the plain, freedom of action was guaranteed to our arms. Though the obstacles which still lay in the line of advance were formidable, it was hoped that under the fire brought to bear upon them from the Residency, as well as from the artillery of the relieving force, the enemy's resistance would collapse. The *morale* of the troops was at its highest, and their

confident bearing augured well for the successful completion of the enterprise.

The next object of attack was the mess-house, a large stone building situated on the left front of the line of advance. It was fortified with a ditch 12 feet broad, escarped with masonry, with the addition of a loopholed mud-wall behind. Upon this post a heavy cannonade was directed on the morning of the 17th. Whilst Peel's guns were thus employed, some important operations were conducted against that part of the enemy's position which lay between the left rear of the barracks and the canal, threatening our left flank. The rest of the barrack-square fell into our hands, and the roads leading from the Secunder Bagh to the Begum's palace, and from thence to the canal bridge, with the adjacent suburb and gardens, were cleared of the enemy. Banks's house, an advanced position near the canal, was captured, and held by a party of the 2d Punjab Infantry,—not without loss and expenditure of time; for the enemy's fire on the extreme left from the Begum's palace and the hospital was very severe. Colonel Biddulph was killed, Brigadier Russell badly wounded; and it was not till the 18th that the measures for giving comparative security to the left flank of the force were completed.

The steady fire from the heavy guns, which had continued without intermission since the morning, had by 3 P.M. subdued the enemy's musketry-fire from the mess-house sufficiently to justify the infan-

try being launched against it. It was carried with a rush by a company of the 90th under Captain Wolseley,<sup>1</sup> and a picket of the 53d, supported by Barnston's battalion of detachments. A colour was planted on a tower of the building, but was twice carried away by the enemy's artillery-fire from the Kaiser Bagh. Only one building, the Motee Mahul, now intervened before Sir James Outram's position was reached. An advance towards it had been made on the 16th by the garrison, who unmasked a battery and carried the steam-engine-house and Hiran Khana, on both of which buildings the British flag was seen to be flying. After the mess-house was stormed, the infantry pursued the enemy towards the Motee Mahul, lining the wall which formed the enclosure of that building. From thence, with the assistance of the sappers, who made openings in the wall, the troops poured into the Motee Mahul. The enemy, placed between two fires, offered but slight resistance. He was quickly driven out; and before the action was at an end, communication with the garrison was established. Running a gauntlet of fire poured from the Kaiser Bagh upon the open space intervening between the garrison and the relieving force, Outram and Have-lock, not without danger to themselves and their staff, three of whom were wounded on the way, crossed over to the mess-house compounds and ex-

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Quartermaster-General of the Forces.

changed greetings with their deliverer. As soon as the enemy had been cleared out of the Motee Mahul, that building as well as the mess-house was held with strong detachments; and in order to guard against a sudden irruption upon the latter post from the Kaiser Bagh, the Tara Kothi, or observatory, which stood between them, was seized and occupied.

Such was the glorious issue of this prolonged contest, which, notwithstanding his anxiety to save his troops, cost Sir Colin the loss of 45 officers and 496 men. But only half of the design had been accomplished. Firm in his determination to withdraw the garrison and its encumbrances from Lucknow, he rejected the counsel of those who would have preferred an attack on the town, and in his first interview with the generals made his arrangements for the prosecution of his original design. To effect the retreat in security required the utmost vigilance on the part of the troops, and the greatest nicety in their handling; for the foe still held his position in overwhelming numbers, and the long line which had to be traversed by the garrison and its unwieldy convoy was exposed to artillery-fire not only from the Kaiser Bagh and the city, but also from the other side of the Goomtee. The troops were distributed in fractions, holding the numerous posts requiring occupation between the Residency and the Dil Khooshah, so that practically no reserve existed to meet the contingency of an attack in force. Notwithstanding the success of the operations on the



left flank, there existed the possibility of the enemy cutting in upon the extreme rear of the position; and so menacing did his attitude become in the direction of the Dil Khooshah, that it was considered necessary to strengthen that post by a portion of the 75th Regiment from the Alum 'Bagh on the arrival of some reinforcements from below.

Five days were occupied in making preparations for the evacuation of the Residency. During this time the troops, who were constantly exposed to the enemy's fire, maintained the positions they held on the night of the 17th. In short, the force constituted a huge "outlying picket," from which no man could be relieved until the retrograde movement had been effected. On the evening of the 18th the enemy was repulsed in a vigorous attack made on the centre of the line. The only available reserve, consisting of a company of the 53d and one of the 23d, was immediately brought up in support; whilst Remington's troop of Bengal horse-artillery, dashing into the jungle in brilliant style, and aligning itself with the skirmishers, opened fire with a rapidity and precision which elicited the special commendation of Sir Colin, who superintended the affair.

To protect the women and children from exposure to fire whilst crossing the open space between the engine-house and Martin's house, a flying sap was constructed; and on the night of the 19th, their removal, together with the sick and wounded, to the Dil Khooshah, was accomplished in safety. Peel's

heavy guns were established in battery near Martin's house, and opened on the 20th against the Kaiser Bagh. Under cover of their fire, which gradually assumed the character of a bombardment, the treasure, serviceable guns, stores, &c., were removed from the Residency. Such guns as were not worth the bringing away were burst. Three breaches now yawned in the walls of the enemy's stronghold. His fire had been sensibly subdued; and as there appeared to be every indication of his attention being concentrated on the defence of the place, in anticipation of an impending assault, it was determined to seize the opportunity, and withdraw the garrison on the night of the 22d. Every arrangement was completed, and by 9 P.M. the roads by which the several detachments were to retire were reported clear of all impediments.

The movement commenced at midnight. Amidst the deepest silence the garrison filed out from the Residency and passed through the advanced posts to the rear. The advanced posts then fell back upon the next body, which, when its front was clear, retired also in like manner, until all in succession had abandoned the ground as far as the Secunder Bagh, where Hope's brigade with 15 guns were drawn up and held in hand by Sir Colin, in readiness to fall on the enemy in case he ventured to molest the retreat. As soon as the lanes in rear of that building had been passed by the remainder of the troops and it was evident that the enemy had

no intention of interfering with the movement, the rear-guard fell back ; and simultaneously with it, the troops holding the barracks and positions on the extreme left were withdrawn by the roads leading across the canal, Sir Colin remaining behind with some infantry until every gun had passed by and been reported clear of the villages in rear.

Before dawn the whole of the force had reached the ground assigned to it at the Martinicre and Dil Khooshah. But once during the operations was there any cause for alarm. The enemy opened fire whilst the rear-guard was commencing to fall back, but ceased on Peel discharging a few rockets into the Kaiser Bagh. So completely deceived was the enemy, that he not only did not follow up the retreat, but continued to fire for many hours on the posts which had been abandoned. On the afternoon of the 24th, the relieving force under Sir Colin reached the Alum Bagh with its unwieldy convoy, the movement being covered by Outram's division, which closed up on the following day.

Thus terminated in complete success these difficult operations, not the least remarkable feature in which was the steadfast adherence to the original design elaborated by Sir Colin. Admirably planned and skilfully executed, it showed what a handful of disciplined men could effect against overwhelming odds and in difficult ground, under the guidance of a leader who, together with great experience in war, possessed the confidence of his troops.

The daring courage necessary to overcome the stubborn resistance at the Secunder Bagh and Shah Nujif, the patient endurance of fatigue on continuous outpost-duty under the harassing fire of the enemy, the intelligence and perfect discipline exhibited in the delicate movement to the rear, are qualities never wanting in the ranks of the British army; but it is the part of the general to call them forth and direct them. Most conspicuously were they displayed in the relief of Lucknow; and it was with a natural feeling of pride in themselves and their commander that the troops could point to the fact that on the withdrawal of the garrison not a single life of its members, European or native, had been sacrificed.

A melancholy interruption, however, to the rejoicings of the force, was occasioned by the death of Havelock. The hardships and anxiety of the campaign had told on a frame enfeebled by a life-long service in India; and though conscious that the object for which he had so pertinaciously and gallantly striven was attained, and that his services had not been overlooked, he was called away before it was permitted him to enjoy the full measure of the rewards which his sovereign and country were anxious to lavish upon him. An accomplished soldier, an earnest Christian, he met his end with the same calm fortitude which characterised his bearing on the field of battle, and by his death conferred additional lustre on the roll of gallant men who

had already rendered up their lives in the struggle for the existence of our Indian empire. He found a resting-place in the square of the Alum Bagh, where his chief, than whom he had no more sincere admirer, assisted in paying the last respects to his honoured remains.<sup>1</sup>

A halt was made on the 26th, to make the necessary arrangements for the equipment of a strong column—about 4000 men, with 25 guns and howitzers, and 10 mortars—which was to remain at the Alum

<sup>1</sup> As soon as the Government of India had expressed in official form its sorrow at Havelock's death, Sir Colin seized the occasion to convey to the army, in the following general order, his tribute to the memory of this gallant and deeply lamented officer:—

“HEADQUARTERS, CAWNPORE, 17th December 1857.

“The Governor-General in Council has expressed his deep feelings of grief at the demise of the late lamented Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B., who died a martyr to duty two days after he had left the Residency at Lucknow.

“The Commander-in-chief would fain join in that expression of heartfelt sorrow.

“During a long Indian career the late Major-General was ever distinguished. The campaigns of Burmah, of Afghanistan, of Gwalior, of the Sutlej, and lastly, of this eventful year, testify to his constant presence wherever hard service was to be done and honour was to be gained.

“But his march of this year from Allahabad to Cawnpore, his frequent victories gained over immensely superior numbers, when he was nearly without artillery and cavalry, and almost destitute of the means of feeding his troops, under the sun of July and August, with cholera and fever in his camp, concluded, as it was, by the onslaught on and forced entrance into Lucknow, have established a renown which will last as long as the history of England.

“Such is the glorious heritage he leaves to his children. Such a life and such a death leave recollections pregnant with the brightest example to the armies of her Majesty the Queen and of the Honourable Company.

Bagh, under command of Sir James Outram, with a view of keeping Lucknow in check until such time as the reduction of that important city could be undertaken at leisure.<sup>1</sup>

In a letter addressed from the Alum Bagh to his brother Colonel Henry Eyre, Major Vincent Eyre, who commanded the artillery of Sir J. Outram's division, thus narrates his first interview with Sir Colin: "On the arrival of Sir C. Campbell to our aid, I was sent by Outram to communicate with him on sundry matters. I found him at 8.30 A.M., in a very primitive dishabille, by the roadside making his toilet for the day. As soon as my name was announced by one of the staff, he came forward *in statu quo* with eagerness, and bade me welcome for my brother's sake." Again, in allusion to Sir Colin's operations for the succour of the garrison, the writer remarks: "Sir Colin's relief of Lucknow was admirably managed, and must itself render his name famous. The removal of some 600 women and children, and 1000 wounded and sick, without a single accident or loss, in the face of a besieging enemy four times his own in numerical strength, and their safe transfer to Cawnpore, was a feat far more difficult in warfare than the defeat of an enemy in the field. Sir Colin, too, showed great judgment in resisting the efforts that were made to induce him to assault

<sup>1</sup> This arrangement was determined upon after a reference had been made by Sir Colin to Calcutta and the Governor-General's sanction to the proposal had been obtained.

the city. This, even if successful, must have cost many valuable lives, have occasioned great delay, caused the expenditure of much ammunition, and perhaps imperilled the lives of 'those wives and daughters of England' whom he had come to save. He had a powerful enemy in his rear still unvanquished, and with 40 guns. As it was, he arrived back at Cawnpore not one hour too soon. In fact, the result has abundantly justified his course, and I hope to live to see him a peer."

It was not till late in the forenoon of the 27th that Sir Colin, gathering up the sick and wounded of his own and Outram's force, the ladies and families rescued from Lucknow, together with the treasure and artillery and engineer parks, was enabled to put the remainder of the column in motion towards Cawnpore. The convoy, swelled by the addition of some 2000 people whom it was necessary to carry, covered an immense extent of ground, rendering the march extremely tedious. Late in the afternoon, camp was pitched two miles in advance of Bunnee bridge, the rear-guard not closing up till midnight. On reaching Bunnee, the sound of heavy firing in the direction of Cawnpore caught the ear. The cessation of all communication with that place for several days had already given rise to considerable anxiety on Windham's account; and this fact, coupled with the ominous cannonade which the officer commanding the post at Bunnee reported as having attracted his attention on the previous day, pointed

to but one conclusion. It was evident that the contingency of which Sir Colin had never lost sight, and which had influenced him in limiting his operations at Lucknow to the withdrawal of the garrison, had arisen, and that Cawnpore had been attacked by the Gwalior contingent. The slender force at Windham's disposal, and the disastrous consequences that, it was foreseen, must ensue in the event of his inability to hold his ground against the superior numbers, which it was known could be brought against him, gave rise to the most serious apprehensions. Cawnpore and the bridge of boats in the hands of the enemy, the situation of the British force in Oudh would have been gravely compromised. To abandon the charge of the convoy was impossible. It therefore became necessary to press forward to the scene of action without a moment's delay. Preceded by the artillery and cavalry, the force resumed its march on the following morning. All doubts as to the cause of the cannonade, the incessant roar of which grew louder as the column advanced, were shortly resolved. Several notes from Windham, despatched by native messengers, who were met on the way, revealed the real and extremely critical state of affairs at Cawnpore.

General Windham, following the instructions he had received, had left no stone unturned to complete the defences of his position, and had with commendable promptitude sent forward the several detachments as they reached Cawnpore, to reinforce the



Commander-in-chief—the more so as the intelligence received through his spies regarding the movements of the Gwalior contingent led him to apprehend that advantage would be taken of the opportunity when the main body of our forces were operating at a distance, to attack his position. It is true that this belief was not shared by many officers of local experience, who imagined that the object of the enemy was to cross into Oudh and join their brother insurgents in that province. It had, however, become necessary to provide for the contingency. Authorised by the chief of the staff to detain detachments for his own use, Windham, by the 25th of November, had brought up his force to a strength of 1700 effective men. By this time the enemy—who, since the middle of the month, had been gradually closing in on Cawnpore, and who on the 19th held two advanced positions within fifteen miles of that place—left no doubt of his ultimate intention. Unfortunately, at this juncture all communication with the headquarters was interrupted. The authority which Windham demanded, to enable him to attack the detached bodies of the mutineers before their main body could support them, never reached him. He was therefore compelled to act on his own judgment. Accordingly, on the 26th November he moved out from his camp with his small force of 1200 infantry, 100 Sikh cavalry, and 8 guns, and attacked the advanced-guard of the enemy, drawn up on the bank of the Pandoo Nuddee, a dried-up river eight

miles west of Cawnpore. The position was carried with a rush, the mutineers abandoning in their flight two howitzers and a gun. Finding that he had now the main body to deal with, and that an engagement with such overwhelming numbers, backed by a formidable artillery, was not justified by the size of his force, Windham fell back leisurely, and encamped across the Calpee road, on the plain immediately outside Cawnpore. Late in the morning of the 27th, the enemy advanced under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, and attacked the camp in front and on its right flank. For five hours our troops gallantly maintained their ground in this unequal contest. At length, on its being ascertained that the enemy had penetrated the town, whereby the safety of the bridge was imperilled, the force fell back upon the intrenchment. This retrograde movement involved the loss of the camp, including a number of tents, which were burnt by the enemy. Reduced to the defensive, Windham still held, with a body of troops under Colonel Walpole<sup>1</sup> of the Rifle brigade, the open ground to his left, beyond the canal, he himself remaining in the centre to protect the portion of the town nearest the Ganges, and to support Walpole in case of need. A third detachment, under Brigadier Carthew,<sup>2</sup> was posted in advance of the Assembly Rooms on the Bithoor road, to guard the approaches on the right, supported by a picket at the Baptist

<sup>1</sup> The late Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Walpole, K.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> General Carthew, C.B., of the Madras army.

chapel. In this position the forces awaited the attack, which was delivered on the following morning. That on the left was successfully resisted by Walpole, who captured in a bayonet-charge two 18-pounder guns; but the same good fortune did not attend the efforts of the troops on the right. A gallant attempt to seize the guns in Carthew's front resulted in failure, with the loss of Brigadier Wilson and many men. By nightfall the troops had fallen back from the outposts to the intrenchments, on which the enemy, who had gained complete possession of the town, maintained an incessant fire.

Leaving the convoy and heavy guns in charge of the infantry, with instructions to relax no effort in pressing forward, Sir Colin proceeded in advance with the cavalry and horse-artillery, arriving at sunset on the plain of Mangalwar, where the camp was ordered to be pitched. Thence, attended by his staff, he galloped on to Cawnpore. As the bridge was neared, the party was accosted by an officer, who reported that "the garrison was at its last gasp." Angered exceedingly at the desponding tone and statement of the officer, Sir Colin spurred his horse across the bridge, which had hitherto fortunately escaped damage, and made straight for the intrenchment. As he entered, some soldiers of the Rifle brigade who had assisted in the defence of Balaklava recognised his well-known form. A cheer was raised, which became deafening as the troops rapidly passed the word that the Commander-in-chief was amongst

them. All doubt, all anxiety, vanished. It was felt that, in the very height of, the crisis, the position was saved.

Remaining a short time with Windham, to satisfy himself as to the exact state of affairs, Sir Colin returned to camp, which the rear-guard, with the tail end of the convoy, did not reach till sunrise the following morning. How gravely he regarded the situation may be inferred from a letter addressed to the Governor-General, in which he narrates the measures he took for effecting the passage of the Ganges.

“CAWNPORE, 1st December 1857.

“MY DEAR LORD CANNING,—Your hearty letter of congratulation, dated November 21st, has just been put into my hands with Lady Canning’s very kind note. Pray accept my sincere thanks for so much kindness. When I have the time, I shall have the honour of writing to her ladyship also. I believe the arrival of the force under my immediate command at Cawnpore on the 28th ultimo was not a moment before it was wanted. I found that on the previous day at 5 P.M. General Windham had fallen back to his intrenchment from a position he had taken up on the southern side of the city, which was consequently left open to the enemy. In executing this retreat he was so unfortunate as to lose his camp equipage. Half an hour after I had entered the intrenchment, my force being still three hours’ march from the left bank of the Ganges, it

was reported to me that Brigadier Carthew had abandoned a most important post, which gave the enemy the command of the river-side, put the bridge in the greatest jeopardy, and surrendered the Assembly Rooms, which was a great store-house, containing all the property of the regiments which had advanced at different times to the relief of Lucknow.<sup>1</sup> The consequence of this disastrous step was, that the Assembly Rooms were burned, and with them, I fear, the clothing and property of some eight or ten of her Majesty's regiments. It was necessary to turn our attention to saving the bridge. At an early hour on the 29th all the heavy guns with me were placed in battery on the left bank, and directed to keep down the fire of the enemy. This was well done by Peel's 24- and 18-pounders. The force was then ordered to move over the bridge. For about thirty hours the stream of men, animals, and carts, the latter carrying the wounded sick and families, went slowly on, occasionally blocked and obstructed, but finally making its way. The camp has its right resting on the old dragoon lines, and its left stretches round the new barracks, across from General Wheeler's position. Until I am disencumbered of the women and wounded, 2000 in number

<sup>1</sup> At the time this letter was written, Sir Colin was under the impression that Brigadier Carthew had retired from his post without orders, and that no discretionary power had been given him. Subsequent inquiry proved this impression to have been ill founded. Sir Colin thereupon lost no time in expressing to Government his sincere regret that such an erroneous impression "should have been detrimental to Brigadier Carthew, and have given pain to that meritorious officer."

of helpless creatures, I can hardly do anything more than stand still; but I hope, to clear out the place thoroughly. If the enemy does not go off altogether, it is evident he will not do much more than stand on the defensive. Your letter announcing your new policy with Jung Bahadoor has come safe to hand, and I am much obliged to you for the very important information. A very careful selection of the officers whom it is proposed to send to him shall be made.

“General Outram’s proposal to retire close to the bank of the Ganges to Mangalwar should not, I think, be entertained on any account. I was always against it, but I am now convinced that such a movement would be impolitic. It is my own opinion, and your lordship must not attribute more importance to it than I do myself, that Sir James Outram, as soon as I can provide him with carriage, should be directed to redeem all the country in his rear, collect revenue, and proceed exactly as if he were installed in instead of before Lucknow. He, I understand, says it is of no use, would cost more than it is worth, and that nothing is to be done without the capital. If it be so, it appears to my imperfect judgment that the province of Oudh is different from the rest of India; besides which, at this moment it is not mere cost, but the apparent restriction of authority and government wherever we have troops, which is the paramount consideration. I am assured, there would be little difficulty, should the force

left with Sir J. Outram be used with judgment and activity. I venture to put all this to your lordship; for, although it may perhaps be beyond my province, I shall make a poor return for all your kindness if I did not convey my own opinions on what I think may be for the advantage of your lordship's Government,—a matter I have so sincerely at heart. Just while I am closing my letter, your message showing the stoppage of troops at Benares has been put into my hands. This is very serious, as, in consequence of the numbers of wounded and women, I am precluded from acting strongly against the people who are holding Cawnpore. It may compel me against my will to send for the force under Sir J. Outram. I have been expecting some troops from Futtehpore, to pass the women, &c., to the rear. They have not arrived, and I cannot detach or do anything here till they come, although the numbers of the enemy are increasing around me."

Lord Canning's letter of congratulation referred to above, was in acknowledgment of the telegraphic message conveying the announcement of the relief of the garrison at Lucknow.

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA,  
*November 21, 1857.*

"MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I have never offered thanks more sincere and earnest than those which I beg you to accept from me for your invaluable success. It is impossible to describe the relief which

the certainty of safety to that long-suffering garrison brings with it. All other remaining cares feel small, now that they have been snatched from destruction; and heartily do I congratulate you upon having the glory and happiness of accomplishing this. I trust that your wound is really slight, as it is reported to be. But what business had you to put yourself in the way of it?

“Your message of yesterday reached me this afternoon, and was answered immediately. That which I sent to you on the 17th, and my letter of the 19th, will show you that your proposal of a movable division is all that I expected or desired in the present condition of affairs elsewhere. Provided that we make it quite clear that we are not going to loose our hold of the province, I think it of little importance whether the resubjugation of it commences a little earlier or a little later. The worst that will happen will be, that the rebels will be better prepared to receive us when we do come; but that is not to be set against the clearing of our communications on the other side of the Ganges, and afterwards between Cawnpore and Agra. Besides, now that we are to have the Goorkhas, there will be some gain in putting off active operations on the one side of Oudh until they can support us on the other. . . .

“I hope Major Alison’s wound will not be serious. His brother, I am happy to see, comes off with ‘slightly.’ Pray remember me to them all.—Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, sincerely yours, CANNING.”



The restoration of the line of communication with Futtehpore and Allahabad, interrupted by the events of the 27th, was the immediate consequence of the occupation of the ground taken up by the force on its crossing the river. The forward movement of the reinforcements, many of which were on the road, was therefore at once resumed. In the meantime the camp, especially that portion of it where the headquarters were established, lay exposed to annoyance from the enemy's artillery. On the 1st December he opened some guns from the edge of the canal; but these were met by Peel with a 24-pounder and a rocket-tube, the fire of which soon compelled their withdrawal. On the following day the enemy opened such a smart cannonade on the camp as to oblige the ordnance parks to be moved to the rear, out of the reach of shells. On the night of the 3d, the convoy, consisting of the families and half the wounded, was despatched under a strong escort to Allahabad. Relieved of this anxiety, which had pressed so sorely upon him, Sir Colin was free to strike; but he stayed his hand until the convoy was sufficiently far on the road to be clear of danger from the possible movements of the Gwalior contingent when attacked by him, and until the reinforcements, which were arriving daily, had recovered the fatigue of their march. On the 4th the enemy made an unsuccessful attempt to burn the bridge by means of fire-rafts. On the afternoon of the 5th a vigorous attack on the pickets on the left, near

the Cawnpore and Delhi road, with the apparent object of turning the British flank, was repulsed by artillery. This was the last effort of the foe. The following morning the avenging blow fell heavily upon him.

The enemy occupied a position having his left strongly posted in the old cantonments, situated between the town and the Ganges, the quarter from whence his main efforts had been directed against the bridge and the intrenchment. With his centre he held the town of Cawnpore, the principal avenues of which had been rendered defensible by barricades; whilst that portion of it abutting on the Ganges canal, and immediately opposite the position taken up by the advanced posts in front of the British camp, was thickly lined with troops. His right was prolonged behind the canal into the plain, some distance beyond the angle formed by the Great Trunk Road and the canal. Two miles in rear of this point the camp of the Gwalior contingent was established, so as to cover the Calpee road.

Thus the forces of the enemy, amounting to 25,000 men and 40 guns, formed two separate bodies, each having its own line of retreat: that of the left and centre, consisting of the Nana Sahib's followers, the remains of various mutinous corps, and four regiments from Oudh, on Bithoor; that of the right or Gwalior Contingent, on Calpee. To fall on one of these bodies, and to prevent assistance being rendered to it by the other, was the idea which governed Sir

Colin in his project of attack. On every account, tactical as well as strategical, the right offered the greatest promise of success. The position of the left and centre was formidable, from its difficulty of approach. The obstacles were numerous, and the defences of such a nature as to involve the risk of serious loss in overcoming them. On the other hand, the attack on the right would be made in an open plain, with only the canal—no serious impediment—intervening. The walls of the town would prevent the movement of troops from the left and centre in support of the right, at the same time that they afforded cover to the attacking columns; whilst the retreat of the Gwalior Contingent, with its guns and *matériel*, would be compromised by the occupation of the plain, through which ran the road to Calpee. Sir Colin therefore determined to throw the whole weight of his force upon the enemy's right, strike at the camp of the Gwalior Contingent, establish himself upon its line of retreat, and separating it from the Bithoor force, effect the discomfiture of both bodies in detail. The troops at his disposal amounted to 5000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 35 guns.

By 8 A.M. on the 6th December the tents were struck, and, together with the baggage, were collected in a place of safety near the river's bank, protected by the fire of the intrenchment. Just as the action was about to commence, Sir Colin's heart was gladdened by the announcement by telegraph that the convoy had arrived safely at the rail-

way station, twenty miles from Allahabad, which place, it was expected, would be reached in an hour or two more. At 10 A.M. Windham opened fire from the works with all the heavy artillery at his disposal, with the view of attracting the enemy's attention to that quarter and masking the real object of attack. In the meantime the troops were formed in order of battle on either side of the Delhi road (see plan), having in their front buildings and other obstacles, which completely screened them from the enemy's view. When the cannonade, which had lasted for some time, began to slacken, Greathed, advancing upon the line of the canal, engaged the enemy in his front with a heavy fire of musketry, so as to keep him in check at this point whilst the attack along the remainder of the line was in course of development. Then Walpole, with his Riflemen and the 38th Regiment, crossing the bridge immediately on Greathed's left, took the direction of the city-wall, and, whilst guarding his flank and rear from any attempt at molestation from such parties of the rebels as ventured to issue from the town, brought his right shoulder forward, and pressed onwards across the plain. Simultaneously Hope's and Inglis's columns, taking ground to the left, wheeled into three parallel lines fronting the canal, under cover of the heavy and field artillery, to whose fire the enemy responded with considerable animation. The cavalry and artillery made a still further detour to the left, and seized unopposed a bridge.

over the canal, whence they were in a position to cut in on the enemy's rear. As soon as the formation in line was complete, Hope, followed by Inglis, and preceded by the Sikhs and 53d in skirmishing order, advanced against some mounds and brick-kilns which covered a bridge over the canal, and were strongly held by the enemy. These were carried in vigorous style by the skirmishers, the enemy falling back on the bridge, from which the assailants were met by a heavy fire. Nothing daunted, the skirmishers made a rush upon the bridge, when Peel's sailors, dragging up a 24-pounder gun as if it had been a light field-piece, crossed with it to the other side, and immediately brought it into action. Excited to the highest pitch by this gallant deed of arms, the troops pressed eagerly forwards. Passing the canal either by the bridge or fording it, they quickly resumed their order of formation, and advanced upon the enemy's camp, driving him before them in utter confusion. A battery, galloping to the front, unlimbered within short range, and poured round after round of grape into the tents, which were speedily cleared. By 1 P.M. the enemy had abandoned the camp and were in flight along the road to Calpee. Meanwhile Walpole, who by his skirting movement had effectually paralysed the enemy's centre, had aligned himself with Hope's infantry on his left. So demoralised was the foe, that Bouchier's field-battery, the Commander-in-chief's staff, and the per-

\*sonal escort of cavalry which attended him, were sufficient to keep the fugitives going; for the cavalry, which had been intended to swoop down and cut off the enemy's retreat, had been misled by a guide, and did not come up till the pursuit had been continued for some miles. Little expecting the attack from the quarter whence it came, the rebels had been taken unawares. The condition in which the camp was left afforded every indication of surprise. Neither the sick nor the bullocks had been removed; indeed many of the mutineers were engaged in preparing their meals, which were found on the fire. The result of the action fully justified the plan of attack conceived by Sir Colin. By reducing the enemy's centre to inaction, the full force of his blow fell upon the right, which in its isolated position was unequal to the shock. The Gwalior Contingent had become a wreck.

The camp having been secured, the 23d Foot and a wing of the 38th were left to guard it; whilst Walpole's Riflemen, to which were added the 93d Highlanders, Longden's heavy battery, and Middleton's light field-battery, proceeded under General Mansfield to execute a separate movement upon the Subadar's tank, situated on the left rear of the enemy's position in the old cantonments, with the view of compelling him to evacuate the town. Then Sir Colin followed up the fugitives along the Calpee road with the cavalry, the horse-artillery, and the remainder of the infantry, pressing them so hotly,

that by the time the fourteenth milestone had been reached, 17 guns with their ammunition-waggons, besides the whole of their baggage-carts—in short, all the *matériel* which the Gwalior Contingent had had with it on the right of the position—had fallen into the hands of the victors. To avoid the onslaught of their pursuers, the rebel infantry disencumbered themselves of their arms and accoutrements, and disbanding themselves, dispersed in all directions. So complete was the rout, that when the halt was sounded at a late hour, the road in front was quite clear of the enemy. It was not till midnight that the troops returned to the vicinity of the spot previously occupied by the camp of the Gwalior Contingent, and bivouacked on the ground with little food or covering—Sir Colin, as usual,<sup>1</sup> setting the example in this respect. To the knowledge that their leader shared their privations with them, was owing in no small degree that large measure of confidence which his troops never hesitated to accord to him in the hour of trial.

In the meantime General Mansfield, with the Rifles in skirmishing order, followed by the 93d Highlanders in reserve, had advanced against the enemy's position in the old cantonments, the movement being covered by the fire of Longden's heavy guns and Middleton's light field-battery. The enemy

<sup>1</sup> During the operations for the relief of Lucknow, notwithstanding quarters had been prepared for him both in the Martiniere and Shah Nujif, Sir Colin refused to avail himself of them, preferring to bivouac on the ground with his men.

'gradually' fell back till the village was reached, when Middleton dashed through it at a gallop, and unlimbering close to the Subadar's tank on his right, opened fire on some guns which were being withdrawn along the Bithoor road, before the Rifles, who were pressing forward, had come up to his support. The position was then occupied ; but the enemy, finding his retreat compromised, brought up some guns from the plain in the opposite direction and disputed possession of the ground. Prudently refraining from an advance amongst the enclosures and houses in his front, which would have involved serious loss, General Mansfield contented himself with holding what he had won, and threw out pickets in the direction of the enemy's line of retreat. As night fell, large bodies of the rebels were observed making a detour round the left of the position, and moving in full retreat along the Bithoor road. During these occurrences an attack upon the captured camp was repulsed by the 23d and 38th, who succeeded in taking two guns. Early on the following morning the town was patrolled by two squadrons of cavalry and found to be quite clear of the enemy.

In a letter of the 8th December to Lord Canning, Sir Colin indicated the measures he intended to take in consequence of his recent victory.

"My telegram of the 7th instant will have informed you of the satisfactory result of the attack made on the Gwalior Contingent and its allies the day before yesterday. I never saw a more complete



roul. After the long pursuit and consequent bivouac of the night of the 6th-~~1~~th, no baggage having reached me till late on the 7th, it was impossible to throw any one forward before the 8th; but I have sent on this day Brigadier-General Grant, with a strong detachment composed of the three arms, to inflict punishment at Bithoor and take post at Sheorajpore, pursuing the rebels, if he can come up with them, in that direction. This I hardly expect. I have also directed General Outram to open out his communications between his position and Cawnpore. Brigadier Grant's detachment is the first move in advance to clear the road towards Agra and Meerut, as the brigade sent forward will not return here. The brigades left here will close on him. I hope in the course of a fortnight to have restored the communication effectually with Agra. These affairs at Jaunpore and Azimghur have indeed a very dark appearance. I have put two brigades of infantry at Colonel Franks's<sup>1</sup> disposal, and a powerful artillery. Cavalry I have none to give him. Would it answer to send to him Major Richardson's volunteer cavalry? I must leave it to your lordship to decide. I am of opinion that Colonel Franks should be restricted to the defence of our frontier—clear that as much as he can—but that he should by no means venture beyond. An Oudh campaign hereafter must be undertaken on a considerable scale. For the present, I take it, we have enough on our hands, without thinking more

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General Sir T. H. Franks, K.C.B.

of Oudh than that it is one of our possessions to be reduced to order at our convenience. But upon this point I shall be very glad to hear from your lordship. It appears that there are still some 17 untaken guns with the remnant of the Gwalior Contingent. It would not, however, I think, be advisable to turn off from the main line towards Agra and Meerut to pursue that body into Bundelcund. The greater portion of their ammunition—far more important than the mere guns—must be in our hands. It has put our artillery officers quite at their ease as regards their own supplies. . . . I am afraid that a long interval of time elapsed between the first telegram announcing the relief of Lucknow and the receipt of letters and full account of the campaign. But in truth, we were quite cut off by the enemy closing in the road to Cawnpore; and until we reached the latter place, it was necessary to carry all our despatches with us. When I finally arrived at Cawnpore, nothing could be more vexing than having to submit to the necessity of arrangements before clearing the enemy out of it. But there was nothing for it but patience, so your lordship must excuse me for any apparent deficiency in affording you full information.”

On the afternoon of the 8th, Hope Grant, taking with him Hope's infantry brigade, increased by the addition of the 42d Highlanders, 400 cavalry, and 11 guns, set out in pursuit of the enemy towards Bithoor. Empowered to use his discretion, he changed

the direction of his march in consequence of information obtained on the way, and proceeded to Serai Ghat, a ferry on the Ganges 25 miles above Cawnpore, for which point he had reason to believe the enemy was making with his artillery. Having halted and fed his men, he resumed his march at nightfall, reaching Sheorajpoor, distant three miles from the ferry, shortly before daylight on the 9th. Here he collected his baggage, and placing it under a guard, pushed forward to the river. He was just in time, for as he neared the bank he came upon a large force of the enemy engaged in preparations for the embarkation of the very guns in quest of which he had come. The rebels opened a heavy cannonade, and made an attempt with their horsemen to capture our guns, which experienced great difficulty in moving along the heavy road and quicksands under the bank. They were beaten off by the cavalry under Little, and the artillery overcoming with great perseverance the difficulties of the ground, came into action and opened at close range. In half an hour the enemy's artillery was silenced and the rebel masses were in full retreat, having abandoned the whole of the guns—15 in number. Strange to say, notwithstanding the closeness of the enemy's range, Hope Grant achieved his success without a single casualty, not a man of the force being even wounded.

The result fully justified the happy conception of attacking the separate bodies of the enemy; who, beaten in detail, were forced to adopt eccentric lines

of retreat, with the loss of 39 out of the 40 guns with which they had so confidently advanced against Cawnpore.<sup>1</sup> Not the less satisfactory was Sir Colin's reflection that he had thus disposed of 25,000 enemies, including the formidable Gwalior Contingent, at a cost of only 99 casualties amongst the troops he had led to victory.

<sup>1</sup> Of these 40 guns, 3 had been captured by Windham at the affair of the Pandoo Nuddee, 2 by Walpole on the 27th November, 19 by Colin Campbell's force at the action of Cawnpore, and 15 by Hope Grant's column at Serai Ghat, leaving 1 gun unaccounted for.

## CHAPTER XIII.

MEASURES FOR RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE DOAB—MARCH OF COLUMN FROM DELHI—MOVEMENT OF WALPOLE'S COLUMN TO JOIN IT—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—LORD CANNING'S LETTER ON READING THE LUCKNOW DESPATCHES—REPLY—SIR COLIN MOVES ON FUTTEHGHUR—MOVEMENT OF DETACHED COLUMNS—AFFAIR OF THE KALEE NUDDEE—BRILLIANT CHARGE OF THE CAVALRY—FUTTEHGHUR AND FURRUKHABAD OCCUPIED—HALT—CORRESPONDENCE AS TO FUTURE COURSE OF OPERATIONS—LORD CANNING DECIDES ON THE SIEGE OF LUCKNOW—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE.

RID of the enemy in his front, Sir Colin found himself at length free to turn his attention to the measures necessary for the restoration of authority in the Doab, and the opening out of the communications with Agra and Delhi. To effect this object, it was requisite not merely to clear the ground by a rapid advance of troops sweeping everything before them, but 'to proceed leisurely in the re-establishment of order, so as to insure the systematic and permanent pacification of the country. The Gwalior Contingent had been beaten, but not destroyed—their numerical loss, owing to their rapid flight, being very inconsiderable. The chances were therefore in favour of their scattered bodies reuniting, as is the

habit of Asiatic troops similarly circumstanced, and of their reappearance in the field at some future time as an organised force, there being no lack of artillery still remaining in the hands of the numerous insurgent bodies in Central India. Why therefore, it may be asked, did not Sir Colin, acting on purely strategical grounds, follow up and effect the destruction of the rebels he had just defeated, instead of leaving them to gather on his flank, and expose himself to the possible chance of annoyance whilst engaged in the operations he was about to undertake in the Doab? A moment's consideration will suffice to show how wisely he judged in adhering to his long-conceived plan of confining his attention to the pacification of the country lying between the Jumna and the Ganges. The complete re-establishment of British authority in the extensive regions situated between the Indus and the Ganges, and comprising some of the richest and most important portions of our Indian empire, could only be attained by the restoration of the communications with Delhi and the Punjab. To have followed up the Gwalior Contingent would have necessitated a movement across the Jumna—an eccentric, and at the same time tedious, operation, which in all probability would have eventuated in a fruitless raid on Central India, and have effectually played the game of the rebels, who would have profited by the withdrawal of Sir Colin's force to strengthen their position in Oudh, Rohilcund, and the Doab.

Regarding, therefore, the uninterrupted possession of the Great Trunk Road as the first step towards the paramount object of the restoration of order in the North-west Provinces, Sir Colin made his preparations for clearing the Doab, Futtehghur being selected as the objective point on which the movable columns destined for this operation were directed to converge. The possession of this place, from its position on the Ganges, midway between Allahabad and Delhi, was of strategical importance on several accounts. Situated close to the town of Furrukhabad, the native potentate of which was an active participator in the rebellion, it possessed a floating bridge over the Ganges at the point of junction of Oudh and Rohilcund, from which hostile territories the enemy was at liberty to issue, and by operating upon the line of the Great Trunk Road, intercept the communications with Agra, Delhi, and the Punjab. By its occupation, on the other hand, the fourth side of the Doab would be commanded—Agra, Delhi, and Allahabad, which from their respective positions dominated the other three, being already secured to the British power.

In the month of November, Colonel Seaton left Delhi in command of a column composed of a squadron of Carabineers, Hodson's Irregular Horse, a wing 1st Bengal Fusiliers, the 7th Punjab Infantry, a troop of horse-artillery, and two companies of sappers and miners, numbering some 1900 sabres and bayonets. An enormous convoy, covering 17

miles of road, and comprising carts, camels, and elephants, which were laden with tents, stores, and ammunition for the supply of headquarters, accompanied him. Moving in a south-easterly direction, and being joined at Allygürh by a small force from the Agra garrison, he continued his march on the 13th December towards Mynpooree, at which place Greathed had recovered some treasure on his march to Cawnpore in October. Surprising a body of the insurgents on the 14th December at Gungeree, Seaton captured several guns in a brilliant charge of cavalry, and following them up along the road to Futtchghur, came up with them at Puttiallee on the 17th, where he signally defeated them after a sharp action, in which he took 13 guns and all their camp equipage and ammunition. He then moved to and took possession of Mynpooree, an important point near the junction of the roads leading to Agra, Delhi, and Cawnpore. On the 16th December, Brigadier Walpole was detached from Cawnpore with a column over 2000 strong, including amongst his troops two battalions of the Rifle brigade, and a proportionate amount of artillery and cavalry, to sweep by means of a semicircular movement the western portion of the Doab, and, taking the direction of Akbarpoor and Calpee, move up the left bank of the Jumna by Etawah, and join Seaton at Mynpooree. As soon as these two columns were united, they were to advance upon Futtchghur, to



which point Sir Colin, with the headquarter column, about 5000 strong, was to move along the Great Trunk Road, clearing the right bank of the Ganges as he advanced. Thus it was hoped that these columns, sweeping the country as they converged on one point, would clear the Doab of the insurgents, who, flying across the Ganges into Oudh and Rohilcund, could be dealt with at a later period. The force to be left at Cawnpore under Brigadier Inglis was sufficient to guarantee the security of the line of communication in the lower Doab, between that post and Allahabad; whilst the defeat sustained by the Gwalior Contingent rendered it improbable that that body would be in a condition to reappear in the field for a long time to come. Its extinction was an ultimate certainty, consequent on the advance of the Bombay and Madras columns, which, in conformity with the general plan of campaign determined on in Calcutta, were destined to restore authority in Central India, and by distracting the attention of the insurgents in that quarter, obviate the risk of annoyance to the main army under Sir Colin whilst engaged in the reduction of the Doab, Rohilcund, and Oudh.

Owing to the want of transport, the movement of the headquarters division was delayed till the beginning of the last week in December. The deficiency of this requisite, a constant difficulty since the commencement of the operations for the suppression of the revolt, was caused in the present instance by

the enormous quantity temporarily abstracted for the carriage of the huge convoy of the families, sick, and wounded, despatched to Allahabad, leaving carriage barely sufficient for the use of two brigades. As the ground to be traversed by the brigade directed to make the semicircular movement by Akbarpoor, Etawah, and Mynpooree, required more time to reach Futtehghur than the headquarter column moving direct upon that point, and as the ultimate success of the combined operation was calculated upon the precision of its execution, Sir Colin was obliged to postpone his departure until Walpole had got well on his way.

On the day that Walpole started, Sir Colin addressed the Governor-General on the subject of the operations in question :—

“I hope your lordship will approve of the movements I have already announced by telegraph with a view to clearing up the Doab, as well in the Futtchpoor and Cawnpore districts as at Mynpooree and Futtehghur. I really do congratulate you and Lady Canning on the prospect of your lordship’s great labours meeting with their reward in the gradual pacification of this country, and the rescue of it from the most horrible crisis by which the action of Government was ever paralysed in any part of the world. Few know, as I do, what those labours have been, and the unbending courage with which they have been prosecuted in the face of disaster, over which for the time you had no control, and

the exaggerating fears of the community surrounding you.

“I am truly glad to see the view taken of Sir James Outram’s position by your lordship’s Government, and that the political, and, as I conceive, the proper military views of the question involved in his request tally so thoroughly. But whatever there might be on Sir James’s side of the question before, the march of the 9000 Goorkhas quite settles the matter. But as that stroke of policy is in the communications made to Jung Bahadoor—viz., that we accept his kindness now that our strength has been again proved to the world, while it was rejected till the notion of our weakness should be swept away—it cannot but have a good effect. Jung Bahadoor’s division will be very useful in making the final advance and sweep through Oudh.” After recommending to Lord Canning’s protection Major Vincent Eyre of the Bengal Artillery, “who distinguished himself so much at Arrah, and in his march with Sir James Outram,” Sir Colin thus concludes: “Much ought to be done for the officers of the Bengal Artillery. It is a most brilliant and effective service. It is impossible to conceive better officers than some of the men I came across—such as Turner,<sup>1</sup> Blunt,<sup>2</sup> Remmington,<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Now General J. Turner, G.B., Royal (late Bengal) Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> Now Major-General C. H. Blunt, C.B., retired, Royal (late Bengal) Artillery.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel J. F. Remmington, died 22d August 1868.

Bourchier,<sup>1</sup> besides Tombs,<sup>2</sup> of Delhi celebrity, whom I knew formerly."

In the meantime the despatches announcing the relief of Lucknow had reached Calcutta. The effect of them on the mind of the Governor-General may be inferred from Lord Canning's unofficial acknowledgment of them :—

"G.H., CALCUTTA, *December 14, 1857.*

"MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I cannot express to you the admiration which your operations at Lucknow have excited in me. The masterly conduct of the whole was evident enough from the despatches ; but I have just had Patrick Stewart here for two hours hearing from him the proceedings step by step from the 14th. I never spent two hours of greater interest. Your account tells the moves very clearly, but it says nothing of one half of the difficulties. The march of the 16th round the high grass to the north side of the Secunder Bagh, the device of the covered-way, and the pounding of the Kaiser Bagh, as if you had come there to do nothing else, are what I most envy you. I did not understand, until I saw Stewart, the full force of your expression that the garrison had been withdrawn in the face of the enemy. I must add, my dear Sir Colin, that when I speak of admiration of your achievement, I do not express my own

<sup>1</sup> Now Major-General Sir G. Bourchier, K.C.B., retired, Royal (late Bengal) Artillery.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Major-General Sir Henry Tombs, V.C., K.C.B., died 2d August 1874.

sentiments alone. There is but one voice respecting it. I wished to write to you two days ago, but you know that my days are not often long enough for their work; and I do not think that you will suspect me of being slow to feel what I owe to you, though my letter is behind its time. I have a good deal to say on other matters—Goorkhas especially—but I fear it must wait till to-morrow.—Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, ever sincerely yours,

CANNING.

“Lady Canning had the first sight of your Lucknow despatches, being in my room when they arrived. When she came to the end of the second, I heard her say to herself, ‘Well, that’s workmanlike.’”

Sir Colin, writing from Cawnpore the 19th December 1857, replied: “I am indeed in your debt for your very friendly note of the 14th, and the no less hearty general orders which you published on receiving my despatches. As your lordship knows well, the very agreeable manner in which you have permitted me to carry out my views for the advantage of the service, has caused me the truest and most unaffected satisfaction. Ah, my dear lord, what a happiness it is for a general thus to work with the head of a great Government! The extraordinary personal kindness with which you have honoured me from the very first moment of our intercourse, can never be forgotten by me. Its immense value no one can estimate but myself.

Pray tell Lady Canning that, I would rather have her *sotto voce* epithet, after reading the despatches, than anything else which could be said. I am terribly in her ladyship's debt. I do not know what to say, in my excuse. She must take the will for the deed, and I will behave better in future. . . ."

The carriage despatched to Allahabad having returned thence to Cawnpore on the 23d December, Sir Colin commenced his upward movement with the headquarters column on the following day. From Arroul, a brigade under Windham was detached on the 28th to destroy the palace of the rebel Rajah of Thutteca. A halt was made on the 29th and 30th, to admit of Hope's brigade rejoining the headquarters from Bithoor, to which place it had moved after the capture of the remainder of the guns belonging to the Gwalior contingent at Serai Ghat. After completing the destruction of the Nana Sahib's residence, and recovering a large amount of treasure concealed in a deep well, Hope Grant left on the 24th December with his cavalry and guns for Mynpooree, leaving Hope to search the neighbouring ferries across the Ganges, and destroy as many boats as possible. At Chowbeypoor, Hope Grant joined the column from Cawnpore. On the 31st, Sir Colin marched to Goosaigunj, where a metalled road branches off to Futtehghur. At this point, Windham's brigade joined the headquarters camp on the 1st January.

On the same day Hope, taking with him a

squadron of cavalry, the 53d Regiment and 93d Highlanders, 4 light field-battery guns, and a company of Engineers, marched about five miles, to the spot where the road to Futtehghur crosses the Kallee Nuddee river by a fine iron suspension-bridge. From this bridge a body of the enemy in the service of the Nawab of Furrukhabad had removed the planks, and had otherwise injured the structure, under cover of an advanced picket from Furrukhabad posted at Khoodagunj, but which had retired on its main body the previous day. On the morning of the 2d January, when Hope, with the assistance of Nicholson and his Engineers and a party of Peel's sailors, had completed the repairs of the bridge, the enemy, who had reoccupied Khoodagunj during the night, brought down some guns and infantry from the acclivity on which the village stood, and opened fire, with the evident purpose of disputing the passage of the river. It so happened that a few minutes previously Sir Colin, accompanied by General Mansfield, appeared on the scene, having ridden forward from Goosaigunj to inspect the repairs of the bridge, and observing the hill crowded with natives moving to and fro, had at first mistaken them for the inhabitants of the village. The dropping fire of musketry, followed by the roar of artillery, at once undeceived him. Sending back orders for the troops at the headquarters camp to push forward as rapidly as possible and concentrate at the bridge, Sir Colin made his dispositions to meet

the enemy's attack, which was rapidly developed. The 53d was pushed across the bridge to reinforce the pickets, one wing of the 93d being brought up behind the bridge to act as a reserve, whilst the other was detached to hold a ford three miles down stream for the purpose of securing the right flank of the force. At the same time, the field-battery which had accompanied Hope was brought up, and replied to the enemy's guns. Strict injunctions were given to forbid any advance until the arrival of the main body from Goosaigunj. In the meantime, the Nawab's force, consisting of about four battalions of native infantry, including the 41st Bengal Native Infantry, some cavalry, and eight guns, advanced with a confident air, and running down the slope, occupied some enclosures and houses of the village, whence they opened a vigorous fire of musketry, covered by three of their guns, most efficiently served—one especially, which was placed at the toll-house between the village and the bridge, causing considerable annoyance. At length, between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy had brought a heavy gun into action, the main body of the column came up. The passage of the river, a somewhat tedious operation, was conducted under cover of the superior artillery-fire which was now brought to bear on the village, and which soon silenced the enemy's guns, the piece which had caused so much damage and annoyance having been effectually disabled by one of Peel's



heavy guns, brought into action on the left flank. Suddenly, and regardless of the order not to precipitate the attack, the 53d, which had found partial shelter under a bank, sprang forward. Under the idea that they were about to be relieved, and in spite of all efforts to restrain them, they made a dash with loud cheers at the toll-house, from which they expelled the enemy. Sir Colin, much angered at this proceeding, rode up to the regiment, which contained a large proportion of Irishmen in the ranks, for the purpose of venting his displeasure. At each attempt, however, to speak, his voice was drowned by repeated shouts of "Three cheers for the Commander-in-chief, boys!" until, finding it was impossible to obtain a hearing, the stern countenance which he had assumed for the occasion gradually relaxed, and the veteran chief turned away with a laugh.<sup>1</sup> Previous to this incident a spent rifle-ball had hit him on the stomach, happily with no ill effect beyond the momentary inconvenience of loss of breath. The force now advanced against Khooda-gunj, the 53d on the right, with the 93d in support, Greathed's brigade forming the centre and left of the line of infantry, on the outward flank of which moved the cavalry under Hope Grant, in readiness to cut in on the enemy's line of retreat. The village was carried with little or no opposition, the enemy, who abandoned the guns he had posted

<sup>1</sup> 'Incidents in the Sepoy War,' from the Journals of General Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B.

in it, retiring with the remainder of his artillery in good order along the road to Futtehghur.

But for Hope Grant's able conduct of the cavalry, the enemy would probably have succeeded in carrying off all or most of his guns. Making a wide detour to his left, and dispersing the rebel horsemen in his front, he pursued a course parallel with the enemy's line of retreat, screened from their view by groves of trees and high-growing crops. Then suddenly wheeling to the right, he charged in echelons of squadrons right down upon the flank of the insurgent force as it moved with a narrow front along the highroad. Taken completely by surprise, and unprepared to meet the shock, the mutineers broke their ranks, flying panic-stricken before this terrible onslaught of cavalry, which, committing frightful havoc with the lance and sabre, followed them up in pursuit for several miles, capturing all their guns, ammunition-waggon, and carriage of every description. So demoralised was the foe, that he did not even venture to draw breath in his camp in the vicinity of Futtehghur, but abandoning it, made off across the floating bridge into the adjacent province of Rohilcund. Towards evening the camp of the victorious column was pitched in advance of the village of Puttee, two miles beyond Khoodagunj. The return of the cavalry has been described by an eyewitness as "a stirring scene of war." "The 9th Lancers came first, with three standards they had taken waving at their head; the wild-looking Sikh

cavalry rode in their rear. As they passed Sir Colin, he took off his hat to them and said some words. The Lancers waved their lances in the air and cheered; the Sikhs took up the cry, shaking their sabres over their heads; the men carrying the standards spread them to the wind. The Highland brigade, who were encamping close by, ran down and cheered the victorious cavalry, waving their bonnets in the air. It was a beautiful sight, and reminded me of the old days of chivalry. When Sir Colin rode back to camp through the Highland brigade, the cheering and enthusiasm of the men exceeded anything I ever saw."

Early on the following morning Sir Colin pushed forward with the force to Futtehghur, which, as well as the town of Furrukhabad, about three miles distant, was found to have been abandoned by the rebels. Fortunately, the fort of Futtehghur, which contained the gun-carriage factory, with its plant and valuable stores of wood, had been left uninjured. To the panic engendered by the defeat sustained at the Kalce Nuddee this was attributable, as was also the preservation of the bridge of boats across the Ganges, over which the last remnant of the rebel body was observed to be crossing as the British force entered the fort. The bridge was immediately secured, and a picket established on the left bank of the river to watch it. Furrukhabad and Futtehghur were both occupied—the palace of the Nawab, who had been notoriously distinguished for treachery and

cruelty throughout the progress of the rebellion, being levelled with the ground. On the 4th and 5th January, Seaton's and Walpole's columns joined the headquarters camp at Futtehghur. Sir Colin's plan had been so to regulate the movements of his own force that Seaton and Walpole, when united, should advance on Futtehghur simultaneously with himself; but the affair of the Kalee Nuddee had precipitated matters, and, as often happens in war, had disarranged the intended combination. As it turned out, however, the result had exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The reconquest of the Doab was complete, and the restoration of the direct communications with the Punjab *via* Agra and Delhi had been successfully accomplished.

Seaton, after routing the enemy at Puttiallee, had moved on Mynpooree, where he found a body under the rebel leader Tej Singh awaiting him outside the town. Falling on the mutineers with vigour, he defeated them by means of a skilfully executed flank movement, capturing six guns and obtaining possession of the place. A few days prior to the affair of the Kalee Nuddee, Hodson, accompanied by a few troopers of his own Irregular Horse, had, with the daring which characterised that accomplished partisan leader, made his way through the enemy's posts from Mynpooree, and, after effecting a communication between Seaton's column and Sir Colin's camp, returned with directions for Seaton to wait for Walpole, and move with the latter upon Futtehghur.

Walpole, in pursuance of his instructions, traversed the ground on the left bank of the Jumna, so long disturbed by the Gwalior contingent, and reached Etawah, whence, after tranquillising the country in the direction of Agra and Dholpoor, he moved upon Bewar, where he found Seaton awaiting his arrival. From this place the two columns, united, advanced upon Futtchghur.

A long halt now ensued. Up to this point Sir Colin had executed the plan of campaign which he himself had formulated independently of the supreme Government. To this quarter, however, prior to his advance from Cawnpore, he had turned for instructions. The necessity for giving cover to Sir James Outram's force at the Alum Bagh, in view of the approaching hot season, preoccupied his thoughts; and on the decision of the Government depended the future course of the campaign. In short, the question had to be determined whether the subjection of Oudh was to be left over for the time, and an immediate advance made into Rohilcund, with the object of reducing that province before the hot weather put an end to operations in the field—or whether the reduction of Lucknow was to be undertaken in the first instance, leaving the resettlement of Rohilcund to be dealt with at a later period.

The following correspondence deals with this matter, and exhibits in a pleasing manner the cordial relations that existed between the head of the Government and his military subordinate.

° Lord Canning was the first to approach the subject. Alluding, in a letter to Sir Colin of December 20th, to the correspondence he had forwarded regarding the Nepaulese auxiliary force, he remarks : “ Jung Bahadoor should be at Soogowlee to-morrow or the next day. Lieutenant-Colonel MacGregor<sup>1</sup> (the one who was at Jellalabad), made brigadier-general for the purpose, will join the camp in a day or two. Six officers and four or five surgeons are on their way, and more officers will be sent as soon as there are enough available. Commissariat officers and establishment have been sent from the Central Provinces. I hope that all will go smoothly up to Goruckpoor, at all events. The recovery of that place will not take long ; and allowing for the march from Soogowlee, and for what will have to be done at Goruckpoor, I reckon that Jung Bahadoor ought to be ready to advance from the latter place (where he will leave a small force as guard) some time in the second week in January. The question is, In what direction shall he advance ? and upon this I should greatly like to have your opinion.

“ Shall it be to Fyzabad, or to Azimgurh and Jaunpoor ? It should, I think, be to some point in Oudh, and with a view to operations in Oudh, not only because we shall require for that province all the force we can scrape together, but because there is a shade less of humiliation in using him against that half-digested possession than in bringing him into

<sup>1</sup> Now Major-General Sir G. H. MacGregor, K.C.B.

our older provinces across the Ganges. I should not consider this a conclusive reason against using him elsewhere than in Oudh, if there were really need to do so; but it deserves to be weighed—the more so as you will probably not like to spare much in the way of European troops to be joined with his force; and the appearance of the Goorkhas alone, or accompanied only by an insignificant show of Europeans, in Saugor, Bundelcund, or any quarter where our supremacy has been long established, would leave a very mischievous impression. This does not apply with the same force to Oudh.

“But then comes the question, What are to be our own measures in regard to Oudh? My opinion is, that next to opening communication with Agra and the country beyond it, and keeping that communication safe, Oudh is what most presses.

“The Saugor and Nerbudda territories are in a bad condition, but the last account (by telegraph) from Mr Plowden at Nagpoor speaks of the fort of Saugor and Jubbulpoor as likely to hold their own. Bundelcund is in a bad way too; but the Bundelas are more intent upon attacking one another than us.

“Rewah is important, but still of secondary consideration. Central India and Gwalior must wait till the Bombay force comes up. At Agra they will cry out lustily for help if there should be an appearance of your not pushing forward to them; but they are always more frightened than hurt. Delhi and Meerut may be left alone: Rohilcund will be a

serious job, but it can be left to itself with less danger than Oudh. There are two parties there hostile to each other, and not likely to unite against us—at least for aggressive purposes. But in Oudh they seem to be pretty much of one mind; and so long as we delay to enter the province, we shall have to watch its frontier with a not insignificant force, besides the division which keeps Lucknow in check. They will become more violent and more aggressive; and even if kept in control on the border, they are far more likely than any other enemies to turn time to account by preparing for resistance and combining. After the small fruit that our success at Delhi has produced, it is not safe to be sanguine of the results of success in Oudh; but I believe that it would spread far and wide—and certainly, so long as Oudh is not dealt with, there will be no real quiet on this side of India. Every sepoy who has not already mutinied or deserted will have a standing temptation to do so, and every native chief will grow to think less and less of our power.

“I am therefore, as things now stand, strongly in favour of taking Oudh in hand after Futtehghur, Mynpooree, &c., and the Great Trunk Road communication are made safe. What do you think of this? There may be reasons against it in favour of some other course which are not known to me, but obvious to you. I am sure you will write to me unreservedly all you have to say upon it.

“Then if we do proceed against Oudh, how shall



the Goorkhas be disposed of? They might be sent by themselves to secure Fyzabad, and march upon Lucknow from thence; or they might enter by Azimgurh or Jaunpoor, in junction with Brigadier Franks; or they might give a portion of their force to swell Sir James Outram's division, or any other division that might enter Oudh from the Ganges side. The worst of them is, they have no cavalry, and possibly their artillery may not be equal to dealing with Fyzabad if that place has been much strengthened. —Ever, my dear Sir Colin, sincerely yours,

“CANNING.”

The subjoined letter and memo. from Sir Colin, despatched two days later than the above, and which crossed it on the road, deals at large with the question raised by Lord Canning:—

“CAWNPORE, *December 22, 1857.*

“DEAR LORD CANNING,—I enclose a paper, which has been drawn up after very careful consideration. The subject of it has been for some days one of anxious consultation between Mansfield and myself. It is very possible that many of the points may have occurred to your lordship; but some of them are so purely professional, that it is likely they would escape one not bred in the army. The paper is sent, not, I beg your lordship to believe, for the purpose of hampering you in any manner, but simply in the earnest hope of rendering you some slight assist-

ance in considering a very difficult and knotty question ; and I entreat you to use it or put it aside, as it may best suit your convenience. It is strictly a confidential document as yet, and no one about me is privy to it except Mansfield and the one or two confidential officers who are employed by him in copying such important papers.

*“MEMO. of Points for consideration in the Disposition of the Forces in Oudh, by H.E. the Commander-in-chief.*

“HEADQUARTERS, CAWNPORE,  
December 22, 1857.

“Although the intentions of Government have not yet been declared with regard to Oudh, it is necessary to lose no time in considering the position of the forces at Cawnpore and in the vicinity of Lucknow, as respects the possibility of giving them cover after the cold weather shall have passed. As regards Cawnpore, the sanction of Government having already been given for the immediate roofing in of the barracks, and there being in addition a certain amount of spare accommodation to be found in the artillery and dragoon lines, which have escaped damage, it may be assumed there will be room to have a garrison equal in strength to the present one—say about 2000 men ; and it is probable that another thousand may be added to this number. But with the force in Lucknow, the question assumes a very different aspect.”

“Troops engaged in the active operations of a siege, as before Delhi, may preserve tolerable health, even throughout the hot weather and rains, as long as the excitement lasts. A standing camp, on the contrary, without the excitement of pressing an enemy, would entail death and destruction of the whole force stationed in it. It follows, therefore, that the force under Sir J. Outram, now encamped before Lucknow, must either conquer its quarters in the city, or hut itself at the commencement of the hot weather. It does not appear to me, after the experience lately gained of the stubborn spirit of the people of Oudh, that the reduction of that province may be attempted with an army of less than 30,000 men. Colonel Napier, of the Bengal Engineers, has given the deliberate opinion, in which I coincide, as regards numbers, that 20,000 men are necessary for the first operation of subduing the city. That having been performed, it will be necessary to leave a garrison in occupation, consisting of at least 10,000 men—viz., 6000 in the city, and 4000 in a chain of posts to the Cawnpore road—until the whole province shall have been conquered and the rebels driven out of their last stronghold. A siege in form will in all probability be necessary at Fyzabad, and the country must be traversed and occupied by various columns. For these latter purposes, if we are to avoid risk—which is necessary for duly impressing the native mind in Oudh and elsewhere in British India, when the undertaking is carried into execution, that the

• fulness of our strength is restored to us—the requisite force should not be less than 20,000 men, or, as stated above, including the occupation of the city of Lucknow, and the necessary posts in its vicinity, 30,000 men in all, for the due subjugation of the province.<sup>1</sup> It is for the Government to decide whether it be possible, with regard to the other circumstances of the Presidency, to effect the necessary concentration of troops for this purpose. It would appear that his lordship in Council has decided that Rohilcund demands immediate attention. That must include occupation by a sufficient body of troops, after they shall have traversed that warlike province in every direction. Sufficient garrisons must be apportioned to Agra, Delhi, and Meerut, and all the districts from Dacca upwards to Futtehghur must be reinforced; while the present condition of Bundelcund, and the impunity with which the beaten mutineers and rebels still threaten the Doab from the right bank of the Jumna, show that the same urgent necessity exists with regard to that province as to Rohilcund. Until Bundelcund be fairly put in order, excitement in the Doab cannot be completely allayed, and will render the presence of many troops necessary in it during the progress of serious operations across the Ganges. During

<sup>1</sup> “It would not be necessary that all this force should be exclusively British. On the contrary, it is desirable that the native soldiery should bear a considerable part in the operation, more particularly with regard to the occupation of the city and the formation of military posts in aid of the police.” •

the whole of the cold weather it will be found necessary to show and move troops throughout the Doab. Another point must not escape consideration. Many of the British regiments now in the field have been actively engaged since May, June, and July of this year. They are reduced to skeletons, and the men composing them are much in need of rest. There is a limit to exertion; and if the corps alluded to be much further tried, without repose after the very wearing and exciting duties to which they have been so long exposed, a demand will be made on their physical and moral energies which all experience of war shows to be an imprudence.

“The corps alluded to are—H.M.’s 8th Foot, 32d do., 64th do., 75th do., 78th do., 84th do., 90th do., the Madras Fusiliers, 1st and 2d European regiments, H.M.’s 9th Lancers, the Bengal Artillery, the Sikh corps—which have been engaged since the commencement of the war in May.

“We should also recollect that if, through exposure during the hot weather and rains of 1858, the number of British forces in India be seriously reduced,—viz., by one-third, and less than that number could not be looked for if the campaign were prolonged throughout the year—it will not be in the power of the Government at home to replace them. A great effort has been made this year, under national excitement, to meet a great crisis, but the means of recruitment do not admit of its repetition. As an

• urgent matter of policy therefore, as well as humanity, it is absolutely necessary to economise the forces of which we are now possessed. If, taking all these circumstances into consideration, the Government be pleased to decide that the subjugation of Oudh shall not take place till the ensuing autumn, the original question put in this paper remains for immediate solution—viz., how Sir James Outram's division is to be housed during the next hot season and rains. His lordship in Council has decided that it shall remain in the neighbourhood of Lucknow, as evidence to the people of Oudh of the irrefragable determination of his lordship's Government that Oudh will not be surrendered to native rule. The position at present occupied by that division is good for purposes of war and as the advanced post of an army of operations, in which view it was selected. But it is too near to the city, and too much subject to annoyance, to admit of the construction of huts, &c. In short, it would be impossible for Sir James Outram to carry such a design into execution. It is therefore expedient, indeed necessary, that an early decision should be come to on these matters, in order to choose a spot and materials at some point a few miles in rear of Sir J. Outram's position, if it be determined to adhere to the present policy of holding the city of Lucknow in check, without immediately proceeding to the conquest and subjugation of the whole province of Oudh."

“CALCUTTA, *December 29, 1857.*

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I have given the most anxious attention to the memorandum of the 22d December, in which the question of proceeding to the subjugation of Oudh is considered.

“My letter of the 20th has already indicated the tendency of my opinion upon this subject; but as you fully suppose, there are points noticed in the memorandum which had not presented themselves to me so fully and strongly as they are there brought forward. Still, I retain the opinion that Oudh, within certain limitations, should be taken in hand with the least delay possible.

“The limitations are these:—

“1st, That, foremost and above all things, the communications through the Doab should be opened and kept open; and by this I mean that not only should the road be scoured, but that any places likely to be attacked or held against us—places such as Etawah, Futtehghur, Mynpooree, or Allygurh—should be secured, either by being garrisoned, or by being occasionally visited or watched by a movable force. The communications being thus made safe, I hold that everything lying off the road, including Rohileund, is of secondary importance to Oudh.

“2d, That it should not be considered as a necessary consequence of our entering Oudh that the whole province should be subjugated. For example, it is estimated in the memorandum that 20,000 men (of

which 15,000 Europeans) are 'needed to take Lucknow : 10,000 are required to hold it and its communications with the Ganges ; 10,000 are required to clear the rest of the province, including Fyzabad and any other rallying-point of the rebels.

"We certainly have not got 30,000 men at disposal ; but assuming it to be possible to collect a force equal to taking Lucknow and holding it, without attempting more for the present, this, in my opinion, ought to be done. Paradoxical as it may appear, I think it of more importance to re-establish our power in the centre and capital of Oudh, which has scarcely been two years in our hands, than to recover our older possessions. Every eye in India is upon Oudh, as it was upon Delhi. Oudh is not only the rallying-place of the sepoys—the place to which they all look, and by the doings in which their own hopes and prospects rise or fall—but it represents a dynasty : there is a king of Oudh seeking his own. Few people care for him, it is true ; but his existence, and the position he has assumed, gives to our success or non-success in Oudh an importance in the eyes of the native powers which they do not attach to our measures in our older districts. Anarchy in Rohilcund or elsewhere in the North-west Provinces will be bad enough ; but it is a matter of police. If we cannot put it down, it will of course be obvious that our civil government is deplorably weakened, and that for the moment we have not troops to give for the purpose ; but there



will be no triumph to any defined or well-known party. In Oudh, on the other hand, we are supposed to be in the presence of a recognised enemy—a rival Power has set itself up. Oudh and our dealings with it have been in every native's mind for the last two years. The attention of all native chiefs is drawn to see whether or not we can retain hold of what we have taken. This will be especially the case in a Mohammedan State such as Hydrabad; but the interest extends to all. It is true that some chiefs, such as Scindia and Holkar, would see that if we were doing nothing in Oudh, we were showing vigour and power elsewhere in our older territories. But this would not be appreciated in Southern or Northern India. It would only be known there that the Government was not coping with its rebellious subjects and mutinied army in their stronghold, and that little or nothing was being done towards the punishment of the worst and boldest offenders. I look with alarm to the effect of such a conviction, if it once establishes itself in the native mind.

“I grant that, as with Delhi, so with Lucknow, we may find ourselves disappointed of a very widespread and immediate effect from its capture. We may find that the revolt in Oudh will not collapse because Lucknow is taken. Still, I hold that the active mischief which will result from leaving it untaken will be incalculable and most dangerous—just as a retirement from Delhi would have been so, and scarcely less in degree.

“I also grant that by attending to our old provinces first, we should be discharging a duty to those who have stronger claims on us than the inhabitants of Oudh, and that we should be consulting more effectually our revenue interests; also that the shame of leaving unreclaimed and unprotected many districts, where order and our authority have been respected for years, is very great. Still, I think that broad considerations of State require that our power should be felt in Oudh sooner than in those districts, wherever it is necessary to choose between the two.

“This is my chief reason for pressing that Oudh should be dealt with; but other considerations come in aid. Oudh, and especially Lucknow, is the place in which the rebels will most strengthen themselves with time. They are reported to be doing so already. It is probably the only remaining focus of revolt in which artillery is collected. I have heard of none in Rohileund, and you have well accounted for the Gwalior guns. If the rebels in Oudh are left to themselves, it is almost certain that they will become aggressive, and trouble the Central Provinces. It is quite certain that we shall have to employ a considerable force as a cordon to keep them from aggression—larger probably than would be necessary after dealing them a heavy blow in the heart of the province. The auxiliary force from Nepal is more readily available against Oudh than in any other quarter; and I should be sorry to make it clear to Jung Bahadoor that we are obliged for

a time to pass by anarchy and insurrection, where they are most formidable and raging immediately under his own hills, and to take him off to other distant parts, where no such serious struggle awaits us. I do not mean that in besieging Lucknow it would be necessary that Jung Bahadoor should join us in that particular operation, but only that he ought not to see us shirk Oudh. I also think (as I said in a former letter) that it is better to employ the aid of an ally in a new and unsettled province than in an old one. But I do not hold it to be necessary, in order to secure the best part of the effect which would follow from dealing at once with Oudh—or rather, to avoid the effects which would follow from not dealing with it—that all Oudh should be swept by our troops.

“If Lucknow be retaken and held, order established immediately around it, and the communications with Cawnpore kept open and safe, I should care comparatively little for the congregating of the rebels in the western part of the province and beyond the Ghogra. Fyzabad is the only place of note which they could seize and hold; and from what I can learn, I believe that a very moderate siege-train would suffice to knock them out of it. But with Jung Bahadoor in the field against them, I do not believe that they will attempt a stand there. They will know how easily Goorkhas can be poured down upon that part of the province, and they will see that if once that is done by the Nepaulese Durbar,

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their retreat into the Terai forests will be effectually cut off.

“Delhi has taught us not to be too sanguine of the effect of a single crushing of the revolt in any one place. But I have from the beginning considered Lucknow to be quite as much the stronghold of rebellion as Delhi, and sure to succeed to it in point of dangerous importance. I know no third place which can succeed to Lucknow, unless it be Jhansi, or some fortified post west of the Ganges. But that is far away from the sepoy country; and should any mutineers obtain possession of the place, rebellion could not be kept alive there. However, as I have already said, even should the capture of Lucknow not be a finishing blow to the revolt, I think that still it should be accomplished.

“I do not underrate the importance of recovering and pacifying the whole province as soon as may be; but I estimate the early possession of Lucknow as of far greater value—of value far and wide, from one end of India to the other. Of the rest of the province, I would say, as of Rohilcund, that the bringing of it into subjection again may be looked upon as a matter of police, and one in which a little more or less expedition is not of such great moment.

“There is one more point. Until we get Lucknow and establish ourselves in Oudh, we cannot hope to make any real advance towards bringing the mutineers to punishment. Those that are not killed in opposing our troops fly to Oudh; and if

we leave them there in impunity, the credit of the Government of India will be greatly impaired, and I should expect England to go mad with impatience. If it were only for the sake of establishing a commission of punishment in the heart of the disaffected province, supported there by the presence of a European force quartered in the city, and ready to deal with such prisoners as may be brought to them, there would be a great gain in possessing Lucknow.

“I need say no more to show why I set such store upon recovering Lucknow. But the question remains, Have we the means? I do not gather anything to the contrary from the memorandum.

“If Rohilcund is left alone, or watched to prevent excursions against Meerut, Delhi, or the places west of the Ganges; if no addition is made to the Delhi force; if Agra can be made safe with a very trifling reinforcement (which I fully believe it can),—I should hope that your force, with Sir James Outram’s added to it, and increased by some of the troops which were on the move upwards when you wrote (79th, 7th Hussars, a few of the 88th, &c.), would be strong enough to form the European portion (15,000) of the army which will be necessary for siege. It will, *a fortiori*, be strong enough to leave the force which is to occupy Lucknow.

“For native troops, those which Sir John Lawrence is sending to Rohilcund would be available; and then there are the Goorkhas, nearly the whole of whom, probably one-half (say 4000), could join the

besieging army, leaving the rest to watch the Ghogra. Meanwhile additional regiments of cavalry have been asked for from the Punjab some time since, and more regiments of infantry are now asked for—to be used in the North-west Provinces or Oudh, as may be needed when they arrive. The 80th Regiment, from the Cape, may be here any day. A letter which I received a day or two ago from the Governor, promises more of what he calls ‘veteran troops’ as soon as he receives drafts, which he is expecting from England. Of drafts for India, I was assured three mails ago that after November recruits would be sent out at the rate of 1000 a-month overland, but divided, I presume, between the three Presidencies; also, that as soon as some of the Mediterranean regiments could be relieved by newly-raised corps (militia, I suppose), they will be sent on. But how soon that may be, I am not told.

“Then as regards Bundelcund, and the country west of Allahabad and Benares. The Bombay column is being organised, and will move up there, without having, so far as appears at present, much to detain it. I cannot think that any enemy on that side will be aggressive upon the Doab, or upon the country near to the Trunk Road between Allahabad and Benares, to such an extent as not to be repressible by detachments stationed, as you now have them, between Benares and Cawnpore.

“Continued disorder within Bundelcund must be expected, and in our own districts it will be long

before we shall get things into a creditable condition. This would be done more quickly by leaving Oudh alone, and devoting our force entirely to our older territory. But I believe that we should run great risk of paying dearly for this in the end.

“It is with these views that I so much wish and hope to see Lucknow disposed of. If this can be done, the question of Sir J. Outram’s position settles itself,—excepting, indeed, that I have thought it right to tell him that considerations of policy alone must not prevent his withdrawing to Benares or elsewhere, if any day it should become prudent to do so upon military grounds.

“I shall be most anxious to hear whether you think that the obstacles to acting against Lucknow are so formidable as to override the considerations in favour of it.—Ever, my dear Sir Colin, sincerely yours,  
CANNING.”

“HEADQUARTER CAMP, MEERUN-KE-SERAI,  
December 30, 1857.

“DEAR LORD CANNING,—My telegraphic messages will have kept you *au courant* of our proceedings, and of the deliberate manner in which the attempt is now being made to rough out the ground fair, and to enable the civil magistrate to go on with his work. It is necessary that this fact should be ever kept present to the mind, that throughout these districts it is not merely restoration, but almost reconstruction, of government which has been effected.

I do not think the strength of this fact can be estimated by any one who has not had an opportunity of observing personally the state of affairs from Allahabad upwards. That which has been the normal condition of Oudh from the time of Warren Hastings, has been formally organised in this Doab, if I may apply the word organise to so irregular a proceeding. The petty rajahs have put their forts into a state of defence; and they, as well as the chiefs of greater eminence, have set to work in the most systematic manner to extend their territories and mature their influence. What the Nana did in the district of Cawnpore, has been done much more efficiently by the Nawab of Furrukhabad, whose officers and troops were spread over the country from the Ganges to the Jumna—the revenue having been collected and authority maintained on his behalf after the most approved fashion, by many of the very men who were our own native official agents at the commencement of the troubles. So well was all this effected, that the march of Brigadier-General Grant's slender column in the month of October last only disturbed the new occupants for a few days, and the insurgents closed up round his rear immediately after his troops had passed. The punishment of many rebellious subjects has ensued on the advance of the force under my immediate command; but of course far larger numbers, including the leaders and the most dangerous agents of the revolt, have escaped across the Ganges on the



one side, and the Jumna on the other. Thus the Rajah of Thutteea, whose fort is in course of being razed, and whose villages are now being visited by the magistrate, is himself on the left bank of the Ganges, where he is said to give out that he is making levies to undo our work in these parts as soon as he has advanced. His intention may or may not be truly reported, but it is one that we ought to expect. Though the flight of the majority of the Nawab's people from Furrukhabad is asserted, and in all probability with truth, we must look upon this flight as a retreat to avoid immediate danger to their persons. It cannot be held to be a total abandonment of the usurpation which has been successful for six months. The Nawab and his followers know that such a practical avowal of total failure would involve the ruin, and in all probability the death, of every man concerned. His retreat on Rohilcund thus is a very different thing from the troubles of that province, described by your lordship as a matter of less pressing necessity than many others. Let us not overlook, also, that the condition of Bundelcund is a direct menace on the whole Doab from the Jumna side, against which it must be well guarded if our forces be seriously engaged across the Ganges in any district. The guns have been taken, and the rebels of the Gwalior force were dispersed. But they still occupy the right bank of the Jumna, and even Calpee. Letters from the Nana to the Rajah of Mynpooree were

found in the house of the latter, in which the Nana regrets the failure of the Gwalior force, but says that they were gathering again at Calpee, and that he hoped they would soon be at Cawnpore. The junction of the force I have here with Colonel Seaton's column will effectually open the roads from Cawnpore to Agra and Meerut. That having been done, it is, as your lordship observes, of the first importance that there may be no further chance of the road being again closed. The maintenance of that great artery of communication free from all interruption is doubtless of the greatest consequence.

“Your lordship being of opinion—in which I entirely concur—that the preservation of the roads is of permanent importance, it remains to be considered how that can be secured. After much thought upon the facts mentioned above, and the inferences to be drawn from them being well weighed, it appears to me, on the whole, advisable to follow up the movement now made by this force by advance into, and occupation of, Rohilcund—to root out the leaders of the large gatherings of insurgents which we know to exist there, to seize their guns, and re-establish authority, as is now, I hope, being effectually done in the Doab. It seems to me that if we halt in this course to direct the only force at our command in these parts to another object, we run no slight risk of seeing the results of our late labours wasted, and of an autumn, perhaps a

summer, campaign on the same ground, to rescue the garrisons which would have to be left in Futtéhghur and Mynpooree. Our late experience of the siege of Cawnpore might in such case be disagreeably repeated. The very fact of the retreat of the insurgents without a good beating renders this contingency so much the more probable if they be not followed up with a will throughout the province of Rohilcund, where they are falling back on the rebel forces reported to be massed at Shahjehanpore and Bareilly.

“ In stating this opinion frankly, I trust your lordship will believe that it is not with the preference of one duty to another which has caused me to adopt this view, but what I really conceive to be demanded for the safety of the entire Presidency west of Cawnpore, in the Sikh cis-Sutlej States, as well as for the Punjab, and to prevent troubles again arising during the coming season in the neighbourhood of Oudh. My own private wish would naturally tend to the larger campaign. In the cis-Sutlej States we have had no troops since ~~the~~ first outbreak. I understand (for I have no returns) there are now at Umbala but 200 infantry. It might be dangerous to trust too much in that quarter, considering the long tract between Umbala and Delhi. I venture to include the Punjab and the cis-Sutlej States in the reasoning, in consequence of the reported great anxiety of Sir J. Lawrence for the freedom of the Great Trunk Road,

which would tend to increase the security of his own government. Agra can hardly be left to itself in any case, and another interruption of communication might in all probability put that city in a state of siege.

“I am very much afraid that the reasonings and conclusions advanced will be at variance with your lordship’s wishes. But you have been so good as to desire me to express my opinion without reserve; and I am convinced you will give me credit for having but one object in view—viz., the fullest success of your lordship’s Government. One point I do believe to be quite certain. There are not sufficient means at hand to undertake the conquest and subjugation of Oudh, not even the retention of Lucknow only, and at the same time to put such columns and establish such posts in other provinces as to insure the object which is absolutely and imperatively necessary—viz., the safety of the Trunk Road. By a movement against Oudh, disaffection would be enabled to break out again in our own comparatively peaceful provinces; but if we keep a strong guard of the latter for this season, all the rebels will be obliged to resort to Oudh as their last place of refuge, and can be there shut in, I think, without much difficulty.

“I come therefore, unwillingly, to the conclusion that Oudh ought to wait till the autumn of 1858, when, with the countries occupied in strength all around it, the proper subjugation of rajahs and people

might be expected without risk and without much loss. An operation at the present time would entail much of both ; while our anxieties for the road and the provinces lately the seat of war, might, to say the least, prove very disagreeable. One other point must also not be forgotten—the safety of the British residents at Nynce Tal. If Rohilcund be left untouched, could they be trusted solely to their Goorkha guard ? Such, my dear Lord Canning, are the conclusions at which I have arrived, after the most careful consideration of the whole subject. I need not assure you that, if your opinion should eventually differ from mine, every energy I possess shall be devoted towards the execution of your wishes. I repeat again, I have none but for your entire success. But whether it be Oudh or Rohilcund, or elsewhere, that your lordship may ultimately decide on, the chances must be well calculated beforehand, and the requisite forces properly estimated. The force mentioned by Sir John Lawrence as sufficient for the march into Rohilcund is not so in my opinion, considering the information we possess, of which he must be ignorant. This entire force would in the first instance be necessary till the rebels should be broken up, and Shahjehanpore and Bareilly occupied.”

“ CALCUTTA, *January 7, 1858.*

“ MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I have had a press of business upon me all day, which has prevented

me from writing at length, as I wished to do, in answer to your clear and full letter of December 30th.

“Many thanks for it; and do not think me perverse if I still hold that Lucknow, and as much of Oudh as Lucknow carries with it, is of an importance to us in the present state of the country far exceeding that which belongs to Rohilcund.

“I have not many reasons to urge in support of this, but those which I gave in a former letter become more and more cogent. I must, however, put off saying more upon this until to-morrow, as the post is just going; but I do not like to leave you an unnecessary twenty-four hours without an answer in substance to your letter.

“Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, when I tell you how I value the kindly spirit of it.—Ever sincerely yours,  
CANNING.”

“CALCUTTA, *January 8, 1858.*

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—You may be sure that your letter of December 30th has led me to reconsider carefully all that I had thought and written to you as to the point to which our next operations should be directed. I have done so with a keen sense of the importance of the decision which has to be taken, and with a very anxious desire to make my own view accord as much as possible with that which your letter so clearly expresses. But I am obliged to say that I still think that those operations should

be directed against Lucknow at no long interval. That it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of showing ourselves to be masters of Lucknow is really no figure of speech. I believe it to be impossible to foresee the consequences of leaving that city unsubdued. I believe that we should see them rise up all around us.

“The Nana is said to be meditating an attack through Bundelcund upon the Saugor territories. Inaction in Oudh, and no force nearer to him than the Cawnpore and Allahabad garrisons, will encourage him greatly. He is also intriguing with the Mahrattas of Western India. If he can point to Lucknow as wrested from us, his appeal will have a dangerous force, and one which would not be counterbalanced by any reassertion of our power in Rohilcund.

“The reports from Pegu of things in Ava are, that news of Lucknow is anxiously looked for. Major Phayre,<sup>1</sup> who knows our Burmah neighbours well, and passed through Calcutta on his return to his post at Rangoon a few days ago, attached the greatest importance to success at Lucknow. He thinks that unless deterred by a notoriously complete turn of the tide in our favour, the king of Ava will be down on our provinces. This may be so or not; but it is a fact that the king has collected 20,000 men at Amarapoora, and that more are in course of collec-

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Phayre, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., C.B., at this time Commissioner in Burmah.

tion. The wing of the 29th, as you know, is gone back to Rangoon; and the 69th will go there from Madras. In a few days I hope to send a corvette and two gunboats to Rangoon river.

“Then there is that most formidable of all lurking-places of danger and revolt, Hyderabad,—especially Mahometan, and deeply sympathising with Oudh, because fearing, however unreasonably, the same fate. The recovery of Oudh would be of the greatest value to us there; whilst the penetrating into Rohilkund, leaving Oudh untouched, would be little thought of. It will become a question for early consideration, in the event of our not acting against Lucknow, and of General Outram having to withdraw from it, whether a part of Brigadier Whitlock’s Madras column should not be halted at Secunderabad, to guard against all contingencies in the Nizam’s dominions. I should not like to ask Madras for another man, out of her own proper territories.

“Nothing can be more satisfactory than the first start of the Nepaulese auxiliary force. But its leader is high-spirited and sensitive, and anything like inaction or a campaign of blockade would certainly not content him. He is thirsting to distinguish himself amongst us; and if Oudh be left alone, we must either leave him to observe it, or at best, leave a large portion of his force to do that work, and invite himself to join us in active operations elsewhere, shorn of a great part of his strength. He will not like this; and I am strongly of opinion that



it is no more than fair to Jung Bahadoor, as well as politic for ourselves, to render his freely-given service as congenial to him as we can make it. I would try to give active employment to as large a part of the Nepaulese army as possible.

“In Oudh itself, General Outram reports that attempts at overtures are being made by the Begum, and that there is no doubt that the rebels are becoming disheartened. These are golden moments for our purpose at Lucknow. It is true that against this report is to be set that which you lately received through Mr Glynn, of the determined preparations for resistance which are being made at Lucknow; but we have a right to distrust Mr Glynn’s informant. He talks of an attack upon General Outram’s position by 25,000 men being arranged to take place from the 18th December; but we know that nothing of the kind had occurred up to the 22d, when General Outram assumed the aggressive, and beat a force that was moving round his flank. Since when, up to the 2d January, all had been quiet around him.

“I fear I assumed too much as to the paucity of artillery in Rohilcund; and that, as you say, the force mentioned by Sir John Lawrence is not enough for a march into Rohilcund. But may it not be sufficient, or be gradually made sufficient, for dealing with that province pretty much as you suggest deal with Oudh? That is shutting in our enemies, or at least guarding against or checking any aggression

on their part. From the latest information that has reached me, it seems that the districts of Bijnour and Mooradabad are well disposed, and might be held (if it be necessary to hold them) with a small force. Not so Bareilly and Shalijehanpore; and these, as we cannot reduce and occupy them, must be held in check. I write mistrustfully upon these points; but I should hope that it might be possible to do this, if not effectually, at all events in such manner as to make it very hazardous for the rebels at those places to attempt a descent upon any part of the Trunk Road: and although I put the clearing of that great artery of communications as the first of all our objects, I should be content to forego something of perfect safety and completeness if it should be necessary to enable us to get to Lucknow. I would, for the sake of this, compound for an occasional marauding or other insult coming upon us from the other side of the Ganges.

“I have a letter from Sir John Lawrence of the 24th December, saying that he has arranged to send you reinforcements of cavalry to the extent of 2000 sabres or more, of which 700 had started, and 700 were then starting; the rest to follow shortly.

“I rejoice to hear it, for I have had no news from Agra of the progress of Captain Meade’s levy, which ought to have made way by this time.—Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, sincerely yours, CANNING.”

It has been deemed advisable to quote this corre-

spondence in full, at the risk of taxing the patience of the reader, not only because it places in a clear light the military reasons on which Sir Colin's views were based, but because it is just to his memory to vindicate it from the aspersions which were liberally heaped upon him by a large portion of the Indian press, which clamoured at what it chose to deem unwarrantable inaction on the part of the Commander-in-chief. Nor could the troops understand the cause of the delay, at a moment when the successful progress of the operations justified the hope of a brilliant termination of the campaign, which up to this point had been conducted with a rapidity of execution characteristic of their leader. The tone of the letters, though expressing divergent views, is a pattern of the temper in which the interchange of opinions between the civil and military chiefs of a great Government should be carried on; and if no other proof were forthcoming, they bear ample testimony to the mutual respect and esteem which the writers entertained for each other.

In a letter of the 13th January to the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Colin informed his Royal Highness of the Governor-General's decision. After stating briefly his own opinion in favour of the Rohilcund campaign, he remarks: "On the other hand, there are, I believe, reasons of policy with which I am but little acquainted, more particularly the march of the Goorkhas under Jung Bahadoor. I am quite ready to acknowledge the superior judgment of the Gov-

ernor-General, and should indeed be sorry if an imperfect opinion of mine should entail a greater responsibility on his lordship. His means of information are far larger than any which I can possibly possess, and I have the greatest and most sincere respect for his opinion. We are now hard at work to carry out his lordship's wishes, and, if possible, to ward off the risks of which I deemed it my duty to give him notice. I am sorry to say I have as yet received no report of the movements of the columns from the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, but I presume we shall hear very shortly of their advance into and through Central India. The Punjab remains very tranquil; and Sir John Lawrence has been asked, and has promised, to part with a good deal of native cavalry and some Sikh infantry to help us down here. Of the affairs of lower Bengal, which some short time ago gave much alarm, I have lately heard but little; so I assume that the tranquillity of those districts has not been disturbed since the Chittagong<sup>1</sup> mutiny. Active measures are being taken for securing cover for the troops in all directions. I have a confident hope that whenever it may be convenient to the public service to put them in quarters, they will find ample accommodation. When that may be, I can assure your Royal Highness it is impossible for any man to tell. A great improvement has been made in their distribution, and I have succeeded to

<sup>1</sup> This occurred on the 18th November 1857.

a great extent in bringing corps together all over the country. . . .

“Judging from a passage in the last letter which your Royal Highness was pleased to write to me, I fear there have been alarms at home that I should divert the troops destined for Madras and Bombay to this Presidency. I can assure your Royal Highness my anxiety for the two former has been as keen as for that entailing an immediate responsibility on myself. Two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry were, at my suggestion, sent to Madras after they had arrived at Calcutta, and I begged in addition that the left wing of the 29th Foot might be sent back to Burmah to ease Madras. When taking all this trouble, I did not, of course, forget that Bengal was in open insurrection from one end to another, while there had not been a shot fired at Madras. We must remember, also, that Madras received full regiments in place of very weak ones, with which she had parted before. I trust the authorities are now satisfied. Lord Canning and I have worked hard for them; but I have noticed considerable alarm in that Presidency from the first, which has not been justified by events. Bombay also should now, I think, be satisfied; but I have had nothing to do with affording relief to that Presidency.”

## CHAPTER XIV.

PREPARATIONS FOR SIEGE OF LUCKNOW—ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION OF FUTTEIGHUR—SIR COLIN COMMUNICATES MEASURES TO LORD CANNING—LETTER TO SIR JAMES OUTRAM—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—DISCUSSION WITH SIR JAMES OUTRAM AS TO POINT OF ATTACK—OPERATIONS IN FURRUKHABAD DISTRICT—HEAD-QUARTER COLUMN MARCHES TO CAWNPORE—DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY OF OUDH—CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING SELECTION OF OFFICERS—ARMY ECHELONED BETWEEN CAWNPORE AND ALUMBAGH—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS ELSEWHERE—PAUSE IN OPERATIONS—SIR COLIN WAITS FOR JUNG BAHADOOR—PROGRESS OF COLUMNS IN CENTRAL INDIA AND RAJPOOTANA—WALPOLE MOVES UP TRUNK ROAD—HOPE GRANT'S MOVEMENTS IN OUDH—SIR JAMES OUTRAM'S POSITION ATTACKED—DELAY OF JUNG BAHADOOR—THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE TO SIR COLIN—LETTER FROM THE QUEEN FORWARDED BY THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—COLONELCY OF 93D HIGHLANDERS—SIR COLIN'S REPLY TO HER MAJESTY—SIR COLIN LEAVES CAWNPORE—LETTER TO SIR J. LAWRENCE—DR W. H. RUSSELL.

ONCE in possession of the Governor-General's views, Sir Colin Campbell lost no time in giving loyal effect to them by the adoption of active measures necessary for the reduction of Lucknow. Still keeping his own counsel, he satisfied himself as to the means which the arsenals of Agra and Allahabad could furnish in the shape of material. The supply of carriage he

urgently pressed on the attention of the chief commissioner of Agra.

Whilst engaged in these preparations, Sir Colin could not have selected a more advantageous position than Futtehghur. From that central point he was enabled to check any attempt on the part of the enemy to molest the upper Doab from either Oudh or Rohilcund. Inglis's brigade at Cawnpore afforded security to the line of communication in the lower Doab between Cawnpore and Allahabad, and was sufficient to exact respect from the remains of the Gwalior contingent, which had rallied on ten guns left behind by that force at Calpee, when it advanced to attack Windham, and which was daily being augmented by fresh recruitments in Bundelcund. With a detachment occupying Bithoor and a Sikh regiment at Meerun-ke-Serai, to keep open the communication with Cawnpore, the central portion of the Doab was rendered safe; whilst a European regiment holding Mynpooree, and a native detachment posted at Allygurh, established a secure connection with Agra and kept clear the road to Delhi. In short, Futtehghur constituted an admirable strategical centre, from which Sir Colin could radiate by the despatch of troops to any quarter seriously threatened by the enemy from Oudh, Rohilcund, or the trans-Jumna territories; whilst it effectually covered the transport of the siege-train from Agra to Cawnpore, a distance of 179 miles.

Nor during this enforced delay were the troops of

the headquarter force kept unemployed. Movable columns were sent out in various directions, clearing the villages of insurgents and reducing the rebellious districts to subjection. In a letter to Lord Canning of the 11th January, Sir Colin informs him of his proceedings: "I trust your plans may succeed as you desire; and you may be assured that no effort shall be wanting on my part to obtain the fullest execution of your wishes. We are all hard at work, and have been so ever since the receipt of your first letter. Indents and carriage to a large extent have been sent to Agra for the necessary siege-train. After a long consultation with Major Turner, R.A., and Captain Taylor, R.E., the officers best acquainted with the resources of the different arsenals, it was determined to use Agra for ourselves, and to leave Allahabad to supply General Franks<sup>1</sup> and Jung Bahadoor. The siege-train cannot be expected at Cawnpore before the first week in February at the earliest. I am trying to shape out the means of providing for the safety of the north-west while the Lucknow operation is in progress, but it is no easy matter between the present time and the arrival of the troops to be sent by Sir John Lawrence from the Punjab. One regiment will remain at Futtehghur, which is now being put in proper repair; one is at Mynpooree; and a third goes to Agra. A

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General Sir Thomas Franks, K.C.B., operating at this time with a column in the Central Provinces, and covering the movement of troops between Benares and Allahabad.



fourth regiment forms a post for the present at Meerun-ke-Serai, half-way between this place and Cawnpore. General Windham's division, therefore, is broken up, and he has proceeded to join his regular command. I think of leaving Colonel Seaton—a very experienced and good officer—to command in a district to be composed of Etawah, Mynpooree, Futtehghur, and Meerun-ke-Serai. He will be at liberty to act as he may judge best for the protection of the road and the Doab within a certain radius. I fear much, however, for that section from Meerut downwards to about 40 miles from this place. There are now, doubtless, gatherings of insurgents in that quarter on the left bank of the Ganges, and I receive daily urgent messages from the commissioner of the N.W. and General Penny<sup>1</sup> on this account. This may be serious when I am committed before Lucknow, and I invite your lordship's consideration to it. Umbala is also denuded of troops; and the officers who have lately joined me—Colonels Becher and Congreve—say the people in all the cis-Sutlej are very anxious about fresh troops, and seem utterly to disbelieve the report of their arrival. They have not seen any, but, on the contrary, are witnesses of the fresh levies in their own country, which are all despatched elsewhere. It appears that no small body of rebels has again crossed at Calpee, and that Brigadier Inglis is making arrangements to give effect to his instructions for showing troops again in the

<sup>1</sup> Commanding at Meerut.

Cawnpore district. A brigade will move to-morrow across the Ganges about twelve miles, to hold the bridge over the Ramgunga. It will be complete, with infantry, cavalry, and guns; and some British refugees who have written in from Rohilcund will, it is hoped, be preserved by their means. A very good and enterprising Civil officer will be required to accompany it, with one or two assistants. A military man with experience would perhaps be the best for the duty, but I have no one here who is fit for it. A military post will also be formed in a week's time at Oonao, twelve miles from Cawnpore on the Lucknow road. Sir J. Outram is, it appears, advancing with his police arrangements, which he was recommended to commence before my departure from Alum Bagh. I have not communicated your lordship's designs either to him or to Colonel Fraser,<sup>1</sup> having thought it better that such important intelligence should only be imparted by your lordship's Government. Besides, it appears to me that, until the time for action has arrived, it is advisable that as few persons as possible should be able to discuss the matter. But I think, when the design comes to be known, the latter will be as much depressed as the former will be elated. Mr Raikes,<sup>2</sup> C.S., has acceded to my invitation, and comes to join me; but what we want is a number of very active hands to take up the executive in its details as the troops pass along, and they are not to be found. My pres-

<sup>1</sup> Chief Commissioner at Agra.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Raikes, Esq., C.S.I.

ence here is doing good. It cannot but be a check till the force is obliged to move downwards. . . .’

Simultaneously with the movement of the siege-train from Agra, the 68-pounder guns of the Shannon, left by Peel at Allahabad, and exchanged for the 18- and 24-pounders so effectually employed at the relief of Lucknow and the subsequent operations, were ordered up to Cawnpore. The 2d Dragoon Guards and 7th Hussars, now nearly complete, at Allahabad, together with two troops of Royal Horse-Artillery, the 79th Highlanders, &c., were looked to as welcome additions to the force to be employed before Lucknow; but notwithstanding this, the drain upon his resources, owing to the very long line of communications required to be kept open, was a source of constant anxiety to the Commander-in-chief. The force under his personal command amounted in round numbers to a little over 10,000 men, diminished by at least the strength of a brigade, wherewith to furnish the posts established at Bithoor, Meerun-ke-Serai, Mynpooree, and Allygurh, the garrison of which latter place, in consequence of Bulundshuhur being threatened, it was deemed expedient to strengthen by the addition of the 64th Regiment. When it is considered that the line to Futtehghur from Calcutta was 717 miles in length, and those from Delhi and Agra 195 and 112 miles respectively, some idea may be formed of how an army, under such conditions, becomes wasted. In short, the distances constituted

one of the most formidable difficulties to be encountered in the suppression of the revolt. From this will be more readily understood the reasons which actuated the Government of India in accepting the proffered aid of the Nepaulese force, some 9000 men, under Jung Bahadoor.

Matters were own sufficiently advanced to warrant Sir James Outram and Colonel Napier being called into council.

"You will be aware," wrote Sir Colin, addressing the former, "that the force with me is to be diverted from its present employment to that of laying siege to Lucknow. I received instructions to that effect on the 8th.

"I enclose a letter for our friend Napier, which kindly peruse; it will inform you of the steps I have taken to gather and have collected at Cawnpore all the means that are within my reach, to insure success to the undertaking. No one save the artillery officer (Turner), and Taylor of the Engineers, and our friend Bruce,<sup>1</sup> and Mansfield, in this camp, are aware of the orders I have received with respect to Lucknow. It will be prudent to keep the people of this place and neighbourhood ignorant as long as possible of the intention to employ the force elsewhere. When I begin to retrace my steps from hence towards Cawnpore, I

<sup>1</sup> The late Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., Bombay Army, Commandant 5th Punjab Cavalry,—at this time head of the Intelligence Department.

am thinking of sending a strong brgiade, with a due proportion of artillery and cavalry, by the left bank of the Ganges, and to join you near to Alum Bagh. Do you see any risk or difficulty likely to attend a column moving by that route from this? We hear of people collecting occasionally on the left bank a little lower down than this, and threatening to cross to the right bank to plunder the neighbourhood. But the subject of moment just now is the affair of Lucknow. I should be glad to have your opinion as to the point of attack. Our forces will scarcely prove sufficient to encircle the place in any effectual manner—I mean, including General Franks's force, and the Goorkhas under Jung Bahadoor. As soon as the siege-train has begun to move from Agra, I think of going down to see you, in advance of the troops. But I shall be much obliged to you to let me hear from you in the meanwhile about this attack on Lucknow. I propose to send you some cavalry, and I have desired three companies of the Rifle brigade—about 360 men—to be placed at Oonao, a spot between Cawnpore and Bunnee. If Napier should desire to go to Cawnpore to make arrangements for this siege, will you kindly allow him to go?"

On the 19th January, Sir Colin, in reporting the progress of affairs to Lord Canning, still further unfolded his views:—

"I feel that I ought to write to let you know in detail exactly how matters stand in this quarter.

It has appeared to me necessary, owing to the very disturbed state of the country, to keep up as long as possible the delusion that I am about to operate in Rohilcund. For this purpose a brigade was sent to take position on the Ramgunga river, about ten miles on the other side of the Ganges. Materials have been collected to bridge the stream, and a considerable gathering of the enemy has taken place to oppose our progress towards Bareilly.

“It seems, from all the reports, that this hostile force on the Ramgunga is increasing daily, and that it now amounts to about 8000 men, with 8 guns. At the same time, the rebels threaten opposite to Anoopshuhur on the Ganges, which is not far from Allygurh. Many calls have come to me for assistance from Allygurh and Meerut on this account. Bareilly is also reported to be full of hostile Pathans, to the number, it is said, of 30,000 men, with from 30 to 40 guns. There is doubtless a very large gathering there. To the northward at Roorkee, and to the southward towards Mozuffurnuggur, there is also alarm. I hope that my continued presence here till the time has arrived for throwing off the mask, will have the effect of keeping the rebels massed together to resist my supposed advance. I have directed 600 irregular horsemen, called the Jowanna Horse, to be halted at Meerut, to be at the disposal of Major-General Penny. The 64th Foot has been sent towards Agra *via* Allygurh. A battery coming from the Punjab has been directed

to halt at Umbala, and it has been suggested to Sir John Lawrence to send one of his sickly English regiments to that station. A troop of artillery coming from the Punjab has been ordered to halt at Meerut.

“I have had a project of sending a very strong brigade — indeed a division — down the left bank of the Ganges towards Lucknow, on account of the good effect that such a march would have in the province of Oudh. Besides that, it would leave the Great Trunk Road and the Cawnpore bridge free for the passage of the heavy train. I cannot, however, yet make up my mind as to whether it would be prudent to do that, in consequence of the swarms of horsemen by which Rohilcund is known to be tenanted, as well as the very uncertain temper of the Doab. All along the left bank of the Jumna, the disaffection of the people and their rebellious spirit have resisted the punishments which have been inflicted, while the Oudh rabble is constantly crossing over: the week after a movable column has passed along, insurrection again raises its head, and our new police posts are overwhelmed. Mr Hume at Etawah cries urgently for help; and it is evident that, whatever the calls elsewhere, a column must remain permanently on the banks of the Jumna. I enclose for your lordship’s perusal a few notes as specimens of the feelings of officials in these parts.

“Our great project advances favourably. The siege-

train will be in movement on the 22d from Agra, and I hope soon to see everything in order. But I must not conceal from your lordship that a certain combination is apparent amongst all the rebels in the provinces contiguous to the Doab. They show a greater liveliness than usual, whilst Sir J. Outram has been attacked twice—viz., on the 12th and 16th. There have been threatening symptoms along the whole line of the Ganges, including Oudh and Rohilcund. On the Jumna the same thing occurs at Tara Ghat and Calpee at the same time. A considerable activity is visible, and we hear of parties of rebel troops moving towards Goruckpoor, Roy Bareilly, and Allahabad. Reports to this effect are probably exaggerated; but I think we may say that combination is traceable, and that a good stand is now being made. I am in communication with Sir J. Outram, who strongly recommends me to pursue the march down the left bank of the Ganges; but as I said before, I am not clear that it is prudent, with regard to all the circumstances. The fort at this place is being put into a state of defence. Three hundred and fifty irregular horse, raised as police by Colonel Fraser, and put at my disposal by that officer, were this morning sent back from this camp to assist Mr Hume, and generally to aid the convoys to Agra, &c. I trust these precautions may keep the roads safe; but I confess to having fears on the subject, when my back shall be turned. Captain Bruce has just returned, 20th January,



and reports the most satisfactory progress at Agra. Brigadier Campbell having for the time left Allahabad for the purpose of taking the field, Brigadier Bradford has been directed to take command of that station, and Colonel Longfield, 8th Foot, to assume the command of the Delhi station, as a temporary arrangement. The Oudh campaign concluded, it will be necessary for all these officers to proceed without delay to their proper commands.

“The Madras column, moving by Nagpoor on Saugor, must be very near, if it has not actually reached, the latter place. If your lordship were to suggest that it should continue its march to Bandah, it would cause the mutineers and other rebels collected in that district, and at Calpee and other places along the left bank of the Jumna, to break up.”

The details of the force to be left behind for the occupation of Futtehghur having been determined, Sir Colin selected Colonel Hale, commanding the 82d Foot, for the command, losing no time in conveying to that officer his recommendations regarding the precautions necessary for the defence of the post, in anticipation of his own departure, when the command of the brigade would devolve on Colonel Seaton. The following letter is quoted to illustrate the care with which Sir Colin looked to all military details of an important character, leaving nothing to chance or the course of ordinary routine, and supplementing the usual official instructions by a few words of counsel personally tendered.

“FUTTEHGHUR, *January 16, 1858.*

“MY DEAR COLONEL,—I shall be glad to see you in the course of the afternoon. I hope you are getting forward with the arrangements of the stores and provisions which are to be lodged in the fort for the use of your garrison, by placing them in the most convenient situation, and the provisions so arranged that they may be got at daily without difficulty. You must turn carefully over in your mind the best manner of distributing your little force for the defence of your post, taking care to hold in hand a certain portion, or a reserve. I would hope that you are not likely to be molested after the force may be ordered to leave this; but an officer in your situation, and having reference to the state of the country, should so prepare himself and his post for every possible contingency. Look to the careful storing of your ammunition, and afford every assistance to the engineers with fatigue-parties to assist in improving the defences: these fatigue-parties to consist of one or more (if necessary) distinct companies, with the captain and other officers and non-commissioned officers invariably present, superintending their men when at work, and to be made responsible that their men work zealously. No party to be employed on any fatigue without the presence of an officer; and when possible, the officer and men should be of the same company. In fact, you should arrange that duties of every sort should be performed by companies. If

the work or duty be imperfectly performed, the discredit will fall on the captain of the company. You will have much to think of in command of such a post as the one you are charged with, and it will be prudent to give it your early attention:—Yours  
&c.,  
C. CAMPBELL.”

In the meantime, the preparations for the siege were rapidly advancing. On the 22d January, the siege-train and a large convoy of ammunition and stores, escorted by a detachment of about 3000 troops, left Agra for Cawnpore. Taking advantage of the protection thus offered, a number of ladies accompanied it on their way to Calcutta. During this period an active correspondence had been initiated between the Commander-in-chief and Sir James Outram, relative to the best point for approaching Lucknow during the forthcoming operations. It will be sufficient to give the two following letters on this subject:—

“FUTTEGHUR, *January 28, 1858.*

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have delayed answering your letter of the 17th instant till now, owing to my expectation of a detailed memo. from Colonel Napier on the subject of its contents. Having heard from him this morning that the expected memo. is not yet ready, I will delay no longer. In the first place, it now appears to me to be imprudent to march a single brigade down the left bank of the

Ganges from hence. A large force could not be afforded for such a detached duty, and I should be unable to support it, if it should get into an unexpected difficulty. Rohilcund is so rebellious, and there are such swarms of horsemen only watching an opportunity of giving annoyance and of plundering in that province, that a brigade so detached might become involved, and consequently unable to keep time for the execution of the intentions of Government. That idea may therefore be abandoned.

“In the second place, I do not think it will do to attack the Moosa Bagh (situated on the W. side of the Residency) first. We should, if we were to pursue that line, be implicated in a great mass of suburbs. Although your engineer talks lightly of troops being only liable to musketry-fire in this or that locality, I have the strongest objection to their being so annoyed in streets and suburbs. Such was the reason which caused me, before I left Calcutta, to select the roads in the neighbourhood of the Goomtee by which I proposed to myself to come to your relief at Lucknow, and which, after a personal reconnaissance of the ground, led me to the rejection of your plan. In the latter, if you recollect, you wished me to cross the canal bridge, or the canal a little below it, and fight through the suburbs to the barracks. I thought it safer to keep to the open, and first to attack the Secunder Bagh, and thus avoid all street-fighting. I have always been

strongly impressed with the danger of that sort of struggle, but in this particular case my personal attention was directed to it by General Havelock's description of the perils you all incurred on the occasion of your entry into Lucknow, which has since been even more strongly shown in one of your own last letters.<sup>1</sup> When I came to your help, I had previously made up my mind to make the most liberal use of the sapper and heavy artillery; and so I hope to be able to carry out our next operation, and thus economise life. I will not risk more in suburbs and streets if I can help it, till the road is so far clear as to enable the soldiers to be supervised by their commander, and to feel their own mutual support. It will, of course, be impossible for me to decide finally till I am again on the spot; but I suspect that all the reasons given above will be conclusive against the line of the Moosa Bagh, independent of our utter inability, for want of numbers, to spread our camp all around the city, as suggested in your letter of the 17th. . . .—Yours, &c.,  
“C. CAMPBELL.”

“CAMP, ALUM BAGH, *January 29, 1858.*

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—When I wrote to your Excellency on the 17th instant, I was not informed what the strength of the Goorkhas and Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Sir Colin, so far from imputing blame to Havelock on this account, has recorded his deliberate opinion that Havelock's conduct was “the prudence of a brave man overtaken by an unexpected difficulty.”

Franks's columns would be, nor did I know what the strength of your own force would be. I had supposed that your own column would not fall far short of 10,000 men, exclusive of this division; and in the hope that your means would suffice for effectually investing the whole city, I suggested a point of attack under that assumption, in accordance with your request that I should do so.

“Since then I have been informed by Captain Taylor that your Excellency's forces will be much weaker than I had anticipated, and that the entire investment of the place may not be practicable; in which case you will turn your first attention to the capture of the Kaiser Bagh, and from thence conduct operations against the remainder of the city. It is my belief that, the capture of the Kaiser Bagh once effected, the city will be evacuated by the rebels—the quarter towards Moosa Bagh being free for their egress; and in that case we shall not inflict so heavy a blow as if the main attack was from the Moosa Bagh side, hemmed in as the enemy would be on this side, and on the other side by the Goomtee.

“The mere capture of the Kaiser Bagh can be most easily effected from this side, I have little doubt,—not, however, by the route you formerly followed—for every possible obstruction in their power has been prepared on the river front of the Kaiser Bagh—but by forcing the canal about half a mile or so above Banks's house (between it and the Char Bagh bridge),

where there is a considerable extent of open ground on the other side of the canal, and a tolerably wide street penetrates into the city from thence to the Kaiser Bagh ; by operating in which direction we should turn the defensive works which the enemy have prepared on the direct approach from Dil Khooshah, as well as those on the main street leading from the Char Bagh bridge to the Residency : and I do not anticipate much difficulty in penetrating from house to house, and holding all that intervenes between the said open ground (where batteries might be erected, the play of which would expel the enemy from the intermediate houses) and the south-western angle of the Kaiser Bagh, which possesses no defences in that quarter that I can hear of. If there are guns at all in that direction, as reported, they must be outside, in the houses and streets leading to the Kaiser Bagh. No works in the Kaiser Bagh itself have been there prepared for artillery, I believe.

“ The principal advantage I contemplated by operating from Moosa Bagh along the river side of the city, was the fire of your heavy artillery from the other side of the Goomtee, held by the Goorkhas and Franks’s column ; and any of your artillery necessary for that purpose could readily have been transported from Moosa Bagh to the other side by a bridge of boats, for which we have nearly or quite sufficient means in the large flat-bottomed river-boats which General Havelock brought with him.

“ Had your Excellency sufficient forces to afford

both attacks, of course simultaneously penetrating from both sides would be most effectual and speedy; but if not sufficiently strong to invest the whole city while penetrating from Moosa Bagh, then I think the speediest and easiest way of getting Kaiser Bagh would be by the way I have indicated. But the Kaiser Bagh does not command the city, and the moral effect of its occupation does not cause the evacuation of the city, which we may reasonably expect it would do, egress towards Moosa Bagh being open to the rebels. Then we should have to prosecute the capture of the rest of the city by degrees; whereas, I believe that, once in possession of the Imambara, Shishmahal, Doulut Khana, and Muchee Bawun from the Moosa Bagh side, the entire city would be at your mercy; but if the Kaiser Bagh still held out, its capture could as easily be effected afterwards from that side as from this quarter above mentioned.

“With the view of turning the proposed feint from this side into a material diversion in support of the main attack from the Moosa Bagh direction—should your Excellency approve it—I had, before Captain Taylor’s arrival, instituted secret inquiries through Captain Hutchinson, Chief Engineer of this division, as to the possibility of a direct advance on the Kaiser Bagh I thus contemplated submitting to your consideration, and the result of these inquiries appears to have satisfied Colonel Napier and Captain Taylor that this would be the best direction for the main



attack, should complete investment not be practicable.—Believe me to be, &c., JAMES OUTRAM.”

Twice during the month of January, Brigadier Adrian Hope had been detached with a body of troops into the district of Furrukhabad, for the purpose of punishing the insurgents and restoring order. On the second occasion, a force consisting of a troop and a field-battery Bengal artillery, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the headquarters of Hodson's Horse—brought specially from the Ramgunga for the purpose—the 42d and 93d Highlanders, and the 4th Punjab Rifles, proceeded in the direction of Shumshabad, where it was known a considerable body of rebels had assembled. After a long night's march, Hope succeeded in coming up with the body he was seeking—which, it was believed, included two of the regiments that had mutinied at Bareilly. He was received by a well-directed discharge of round-shot; but he soon silenced the enemy's guns by a fire opened on their flank, and then advancing with his infantry, carried the rebel camp with a rush. The mutineers fled discomfited across the Ganges, losing many of their numbers, and abandoning several guns, together with much ammunition, in the pursuit which followed.

The siege-train having passed Futtehghur on its way to Cawnpore, and the force collected in the Punjab, for the protection of the territories which were exposed to the possible incursions of the rebels from Rohilcund, being expected to reach Umbala by

the 1st February, the time had arrived for Sir Colin to throw off the mask and put the headquarter column in motion, for the purpose of co-operating in the projected movement against Lucknow.

Orders were therefore given to recall Walpole's force from the Ramgunga. The 1st Bengal Europeans, followed by a squadron of the Lahore light horse, were the first to leave Futtehghur. On the 1st February Sir Colin, accompanied by a troop of Bengal horse-artillery, the 9th Lancers, and a squadron of Bengal cavalry, proceeded by forced marches to Cawnpore, which he reached on the 4th. A few hours later Hope Grant, taking with him the headquarters of the cavalry and artillery, together with Hope's brigade of infantry, set out for the same destination, with directions to effect the movement by the usual marches. Walpole had orders to remain at Futtehghur for three days; after which interval, if unmolested by the enemy, he was to follow Hope Grant towards Cawnpore, leaving the 82d Foot, a light field-battery of Royal Artillery, a few sappers, and a body of police cavalry, to hold Futtehghur.

Two good bridges of boats, constructed at Cawnpore, about half a mile apart—one opposite the intrenchment, the other lower down below the junction of the canal—materially increased the facilities for the passage of the troops, stores, and baggage about to be thrown into Oudh. On the morning of the 4th February, the 7th Hussars, Anderson's troop

of Royal Horse-Artillery, and the 79th Highlanders, under Brigadier Campbell, crossed the river Ganges and encamped at Oonao. Hope Grant reached Cawnpore on the 7th February, on which day Sir Colin left that place to meet Lord Canning at Allahabad, whither the Governor-General had repaired, as a more convenient centre, from whence to direct the Government during the military operations about to be undertaken in Oudh and the adjacent territories. Sir Colin remained one day with Lord Canning, returning to Cawnpore on the 9th.

On the following day a general order was issued announcing the formation of the army of Oudh into brigades and divisions.

Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, of Delhi celebrity, was nominated to the command of the artillery division. The brigade of Engineers was confided to the charge of Brigadier R. Napier of the Bengal Engineers. The cavalry was placed under Brigadier-General Hope Grant. The infantry was distributed in three divisions—the first under Major-General Sir James Outram, the second under Brigadier-General Sir E. Lugard,<sup>1</sup> the third under Brigadier-General Walpole. This force was exclusive of the column under Brigadier-General Franks, about to advance from the S.E. frontier of Oudh simultaneously with the movement of the

<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Lugard had accompanied Sir James Outram as chief of his staff in the Persian expedition of the previous year—now General the Right Honourable Sir E. Lugard; G.C.B.

Nepaulese force under Jung Bahadoor from Goruck-poor upon Oudh.

The selection of some of the divisional officers made by Sir Colin Campbell on this occasion produced much unfavourable comment at the time, and led to a great deal of hostile criticism upon the motives which, it was believed, actuated him in the appointment of so many junior officers, to the prejudice of their seniors, who, serving in the country, not unnaturally felt aggrieved. The reasons which prompted him to act as he did are fully set forth in a letter he addressed to the Duke of Cambridge, and are quoted in vindication of the gallant old soldier, who had no thought but for the good of the service and the success of the cause intrusted to his charge :—

“I beg your Royal Highness to receive the profound acknowledgment of my gratitude for the support afforded me in your letter of the 17th ultimo, and most particularly with regard to the licence given to me for the selection of officers to be appointed to command.

“I can assure your Royal Highness it is impossible for any one to appreciate this favour more highly than I do, and I am convinced that it is the surest means of bringing success to H.M.’s arms with the greatest possible economy to the State, both of life and other resources. Acting upon it, I have selected the officers to command divisions with the greatest possible care, having found that an officer inex-

perienced in war in this country cannot act for himself, but must for a time be at the mercy of staff officers or gentlemen of the civil service who may be associated with him. Until a man has passed some time in India, it is quite impossible for him to be able to weigh the value of intelligence. In like manner he cannot judge what are the resources of the country, and he is totally unable to make an estimate for himself of the resistance the enemy opposed to him is likely to offer. Acting on this opinion, I have deemed it right to make Colonel Lugard a brigadier-general and put him in command of a division. Colonel Walpole of the Rifles, who during the last three months has had great opportunities of gaining experience, and of which he has taken much advantage, has also been promoted in the same manner. . . . Brigadier-General Grant has also been continued in command of the cavalry division, although Colonel Campbell, 2d Dragoon Guards, a most admirable officer, but without the great experience of Brigadier-General Grant, is his senior. To this arrangement Colonel Campbell has acceded in the handsomest manner. I trust hereafter it may be in my power to make such a return as his disinterested conduct merits. . . .

“Your Royal Highness is aware that as soon as the siege of Lucknow is brought to a close, the dispersion of columns will take place instead of their concentration in one body. Then the command of each division—indeed of each brigade—becomes of vital conse-

quence. A man thoroughly acquainted with Indian warfare makes no mistakes, and, as a general rule, incurs no loss. We have had many examples of this during the last six months. On the other hand, a general who, from inexperience, is obliged to put himself in the hands of a young staff officer or a civilian, either goes on too fast or not fast enough. In the former case, he loses men without necessity ; or in the latter, sits down to lay siege to a place from which the enemy has retired or is about to retire, simply from want of appreciation of the value of intelligence. Of such officers we have also had more than one instance during the late campaigns. I do not wish to undervalue the merits of general or other officers lately arrived from England, but merely to indicate to your Royal Highness the difficulties against which they have to contend. What is more, the state of things at present does not permit of trusting anything to chance, or allowing new-comers to learn, except under the command of others. . . .”

Hope Grant having crossed the Ganges on the 8th with a troop of Bengal horse-artillery, the 9th Lancers, and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, marched to Oonao, the force already at that place being pushed on to Busseerut-gunj. Peel's heavy battery and the artillery park followed in a few days, escorted by further detachments. The passage of the troops, and of the enormous convoy of *matériel* and stores which accompanied them, necessarily occupied considerable time. It was computed that the siege-train alone ex-

tended over a distance of at least twelve miles. Nor was it necessary to hurry the troops across at once, inasmuch as a large convoy of ladies was *en route* from Agra to Allahabad, and it was deemed prudent to assure their safety by keeping a large force on the right bank of the Ganges until they had passed Cawnpore.

By the 15th of February the main portion of the army destined for the siege of Lucknow had crossed the Ganges, and was echeloned along the road between Cawnpore and the Alum Bagh. The siege-train was collected at Oonao. In the meantime, no pains had been spared to improve the position at Cawnpore, the works of which had been much augmented and strengthened, in view of the possible contingency of attack from the side of Calpec, whence the Gwalior Contingent had assumed a threatening attitude.

Leaving the army of Oudh for a short time to itself, it may tend to give the reader a better idea of the general plan of the forthcoming operations, if a brief summary be sketched of the events which had been occurring elsewhere since the relief of Lucknow, and of the march of the various columns which had been put in motion, for the purpose of co-operating in the attempt about to be made for the subjugation of Oudh and Rohilcund, as well as for the pacification of the semi-independent States of Central India.

Since the end of November, Sir James Outram had stoutly maintained his own against enormous odds at the Alum Bagh, notwithstanding the repeated at-

tempts of the enemy to interfere with his communications and prevent his obtaining supplies. On the 22d December he sallied forth from his position in order to intercept a force of the rebels, which had moved out to Ghylee, with the view of molesting his communications with Bunnee. The main body of the enemy, finding their rear attacked, retreated by a detour into the city, but not before Outram was enabled to inflict on them a sensible loss, besides capturing four of their guns and much ammunition, as well as baggage, &c. On the 12th January, when a larger portion than usual of the British force was employed in escorting a convoy from Cawnpore, the enemy seized the opportunity to attack him. With his available force of 1500 men he moved out to meet a body computed at not less than 30,000 men. The rebels failed at every point, and abandoned the attempt utterly discomfited, besides suffering a heavy loss. Outram's casualties were trifling. A few days later, the enemy made an attack upon the pickets between the Alum Bagh and Jellalabad, which was attended with the usual result. Saving some minor demonstrations on the part of the foe, matters remained comparatively quiet till the middle of February.

On the eastern frontier of Oudh, Goruckpoor, an important city, which had for many months passed from British control, was recovered by the Nepaulese force, with hardly any loss, in the first week of January. This body, amounting to 9000 men, with 24 field-guns, was composed of Goorkhas



commanded by Nepaulese, acting under the advice of English officers specially attached,—under which arrangement good service was rendered to the British cause. This result was mainly due to the tact and ability displayed by Brigadier-General MacGregor,<sup>1</sup> who was at Jung Bahadoor's side to advise him on the expulsion of the rebels. Active measures were taken for the re-establishment of civil authority in the adjacent districts.

Farther to the eastward, a small column under the command of Colonel Rowcroft<sup>2</sup> of the Sarun field-force, including a naval detachment under Captain Sotheby<sup>3</sup> of H.M.S. Pearl, had been operating from Tirhoot in the north of Behar, along the Gunduk, in the direction of Goruckpoor. On the 26th December, Rowcroft, who had been reinforced by a Nepaulese battalion, attacked and carried a strong position held by a body of rebels at Sohunpoor, on the Chota Gunduk. He then advanced to Burhut Ghât, on the Ghogra, where he halted pending instructions from Brigadier-General MacGregor, under whose orders he had now been placed.

Since the end of November the command of the troops in the districts of Azimgurh and Jaunpoor had been confided to Brigadier-General Franks. The instructions he received from the Governor-General had been “to protect Benares against attack or insult,

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Sir G. Hall MacGregor, K.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> The late Lieutenant-General Rowcroft, C.B.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral Sir E. S. Sotheby, K.C.B.

to prevent the rebels from crossing the Ganges near Benares, to drive them to a distance from Benares, and to recover any district which they may have occupied." On the 23d January this able officer, who had been reinforced for the occasion by some cavalry and horse-artillery from Allahabad, captured and destroyed a strong position held by the rebels at Nusrutpoor, not far from that station. Favoured, however, by the jungle and the difficulties of the ground, the enemy succeeded in carrying off all but three of his guns.

Thus had the preliminary measure of clearing the districts bordering on Oudh been accomplished. Franks held himself in readiness to advance as soon as he heard that Jung Bahadoor was in movement to Lucknow. Jung Bahadoor set out from Goruckpoor on the 14th February. On the 19th, Rowcroft's force, which had embarked on board a fleet of boats, and had ascended the Ghogra, reached a point a few miles below the Nepaulese position on the left bank. Rowcroft crossed to the right bank, and being joined by a Nepaulese brigade on the 20th, advanced against Phoolpoor, the point where it was intended the Nepaulese force should cross, and defeated a body of the enemy at that place, capturing three guns. Three days previously, Captain Sotheby, whilst escorting boats up the Ghogra, had captured the fort of Chundeeipoor, on the left bank of the river. The boats were then brought up; and a bridge having been constructed, the main body of the Nepaulese effected the passage.

On Jung Bahadoor's advance into Oudh, Colonel Rowcroft was left behind with a mixed force to afford protection to Goruckpoor.

In the middle of February, Franks's column, comprising three regiments of British infantry (the 10th, 20th, and 97th Foot), with six regiments of Goorkhas<sup>1</sup>—in all, 5500 men and 20 guns—was at Budlee-poor, *en route* from Jaunpoor to Sultanpoor, in Oudh. On the 19th he crossed the frontier, when he ascertained that a large body of the enemy was in his front. Attacking them in detail—for their leader, Mehndee Hussein, had divided his forces—Franks obtained an easy victory at Chanda, and on the same evening a second at Amecrapore, the rebels beating a retreat with a loss of 600 or 700 men killed and wounded. From this point it was an object of equal importance to both Franks and his opponent to gain the pass and fort of Budhayan. In this attempt Franks out-manœuvred him and effected his purpose. On the 23d, Franks made a march of ten miles, turned the enemy's position, and having got into his rear, defeated him after a brilliant action. The rebels suffered severely, abandoning 20 guns, as well as their camp, baggage, and ammunition, all of which were captured.

In the regions of Central India, important pro-

<sup>1</sup> This force had been despatched by Jung Bahadoor from Nepaul to aid the British Government in July of the previous year, and since that time had rendered excellent service in the defence of the Azimgurh and Jaunpoor districts, which had continued to remain in a state of turbulence.

gress was being made by the Bombay column, under Sir Hugh Rose,<sup>1</sup> known as the Malwa, and eventually as the Central India field-force. Prior to Rose's appearance in the field, a column, commanded by Brigadier Stuart,<sup>2</sup> which afterwards formed the first brigade of Sir Hugh Rose's force, had been operating in conjunction with a field-force of the Hyderabad Contingent in Malwa and the borders of Rajpootana. In a series of engagements, between the 21st and 24th November of the previous year, Stuart had defeated the enemy near Mundesore and had raised the siege of Neemuch. He then marched to Indore. Rose reached that place in the middle of December, accompanied by Sir Robert Hamilton,<sup>3</sup> who had resumed his appointment of agent to the Governor-General for Central India. Rose at once marched north-west with his second brigade from Sehore through Bhopal to Saugur.

In the last week of January, Sir Hugh Rose captured Ratgurh, an important stronghold of the insurgents, situated on the confines of the Saugur territory. He then marched to Saugur, for which point General Whitlock,<sup>4</sup> in command of the Madras column, was also making. In the meantime, Stuart's

<sup>1</sup> Field-Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

<sup>2</sup> The late General Sir C. S. Stuart, G.C.B.

<sup>3</sup> During Sir Robert Hamilton's absence in England, Colonel (the late Major-General) Sir Henry Marion Durand, C.B., K.C.S.I., had been acting as the Governor-General's agent for Central India, and it was under his able direction that the operations of Brigadier Stuart had been conducted to so successful an issue.

<sup>4</sup> The late Lieutenant-General Sir George C. Whitlock, K.C.B.

(the first) brigade of Rose's force had been detached from Indore to move upon Goona, and clear the Great Trunk Road leading from Bombay to Agra. From that point he was to effect a junction with Sir Hugh Rose during that officer's march to Jhansi, in Bundelcund, the reduction of which important fortress and focus of rebellion demanded the undivided strength of Rose's force.

Saugur was relieved by Rose on the 3d February, Whitlock, with the Madras force, reaching Jubulpoor on the 6th. Thus these columns were, in accordance with the general plan of the campaign, steadily pursuing the object in view, and sweeping before them the numerous bands of rebels towards the line of the Jumna. Great anxiety was felt on this point, and on the necessity for securing the rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army—so much so that, in a letter to Sir Colin, Lord Canning states: "I have written to Sir R. Hamilton and Sir Hugh Rose, in the sense of your instruction to the latter, impressing upon them, that if for any reason, whether as being too strong for him, or from any other cause, it should be politic to pass by Jhansi for the moment, there is plenty of work for the Nerbudda field-force in the neighbourhood of the Jumna."

Far away to the west another column, under General Roberts,<sup>1</sup> had advanced into Rajpootana, and was operating from Nusscerabad, in Ajmeer, against the various rebel bodies infesting that territory.

<sup>1</sup> The late General Sir H. Roberts, K.C.B.

During the preliminary operations for the final conquest of Lucknow, Roberts was preparing to attack Kotah, an important fortress on the Chumbul.

Whilst the troops sent across the Ganges were collecting in Oudh, matters in the Doab had assumed a disquieting appearance. An inroad of the rebels had been made from Calpee. This, however, was successfully met by Colonel Maxwell of the 88th, who with a small detachment watched the district between Akbarpore, on the Cawnpore and Calpee road, and the Jumna. About the same time, a small body of insurgents—accompanied, it was believed, by the Nana and his brother—crossed the Ganges above Cawnpore and took the direction of Sheolie and Secundra. A gathering of insurgents between Futtehghur and Cawnpore having caused further alarm, Brigadier Walpole, with three regiments of infantry, 500 sowars, and 12 guns, was directed to fall back to Chowbeepoor, some twenty miles up the Great Trunk Road, in order to combine with Colonel Maxwell, who had moved from Akbarpore to Sheolie for the purpose of intercepting any large body attempting to cross from Oude. Thus the Commander-in-chief's anticipations, that the opportunity, when the main body of the forces were withdrawn for the operations before Lucknow, would be seized by the rebel leaders to foment fresh disturbances in the Doab, were to a great extent verified. So seriously did Brigadier Seaton regard the condition of things, that he deemed it necessary to stop for a time the

convoy of ladies and families which was on its way from Agra.

Simultaneously, a strong movable column under Hope Grant proceeded to make a circuit in Oude, and sweep from the left bank of the Ganges to the westward such bodies of the enemy as were known to be hovering near the fords. This duty was successfully accomplished, though the rebels made a determined but fruitless stand at Meeangunj, where Hope Grant killed and captured a large number of them, with an inappreciable loss to his own troops, as was usually the case in any affair intrusted to that able and painstaking officer, one of Sir Colin Campbell's most trusted lieutenants in the field. The result of this operation was, that the Nana, finding his left flank and rear threatened by Grant's force, made off in a north-westerly direction to Rohilcund.

Barring some minor demonstrations on the part of the enemy, matters at the Alum Bagh remained comparatively quiet till the middle of February. In the meantime some reinforcements had reached that post, and the enemy had become disquieted by the gathering of Sir Colin's army. On the 15th an attempt to intercept a convoy was frustrated; but symptoms of uneasiness which for several days had been apparent, culminated on the 21st in a serious effort. The attack was directed round both flanks of Sir James Outram's position, whilst at the same time the whole length of it was threatened. A Sunday had been selected, in the belief that the troops would be en-

gaged at church parade, and when his cavalry force had been much reduced on account of convoy duty. Met by the artillery-fire and the cavalry opposed to them on either flank, the rebels gave way and abandoned the attempt, having suffered heavy loss. Their final and most desperate attempt was reserved for the 25th, and was made under the eye of the Begum and her prime minister. But Outram was well prepared. He had now additional troops wherewith to deal an effectual counter-stroke. The principal attack having been directed against his right, Outram moved out against a column which, supported by heavy masses in rear, had opened fire on Jellalabad. Checking a demonstration of the enemy's reserve against his left, Outram advanced. By a skilful use of the cavalry on his left flank, which was pushed forward, at the same time that he sent another body of his cavalry by a detour to his right to act on the rear of the rebels, he menaced their retreat. They quickly gave way, and their retrograde movement was converted into a rout as soon as they found themselves attacked on both flanks by the British horsemen. Whilst the enemy was in full flight, the military train dashed into them and captured two guns. Later in the day the enemy made a determined attack on the left of the position. The rebels suffered severely. Outram's losses did not exceed five men killed and thirty-five wounded. He was not molested again. Right worthily had this gallant officer, by his resolute maintenance of the posi-



tion at the Alum Bagh, discharged the trust reposed in him.

For some time it had been a question with Sir Colin whether he should delay the operations against Lucknow till Franks and Jung Bahadoor had joined him. To solve the difficulty, he addressed Lord Canning on the 12th February as follows: "I send you the enclosed official letter addressed to Colonel Birch, that your lordship may see at a glance exactly how we stand. From that, you will observe that we shall be ready to commence operations from Buntera, which is six miles from the Alum Bagh, about the 18th instant. It is a question, however, whether we shall begin so soon. Jung Bahadoor and General Franks cannot, under the most favourable circumstances, be at Lucknow and able to take part in the fray before the 27th instant. Together they muster 12,000 infantry. Thus, with their forces united to mine I should have 22,000 infantry, and without them 10,000, for the actual siege of Lucknow. The position which that force—I mean Jung Bahadoor's and General Franks's—would take up on the left bank of the Goomtee would render our battering operations comparatively easy in front along the line I propose to attack. The loss on our side should in such case, as a matter of course, be small in comparison with what it would be if we were to attack with the force now under my immediate command only. Another advantage would be found in time being afforded for putting matters in a more com-

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 fortable state as regards the threat against the Cawnpore district, itself not an unimportant matter. I shall halt the heavy train at Oonao until I hear from yourself as to which course you would prefer—the immediate operation against Lucknow, or to wait with patience till Jung Bahadoor is able to take an active part in co-operating. Other causes strike me for being in favour of the delay. It would give time for your lordship's proclamation to take effect on the public mind of Oudh; and our Goorkha ally might feel hurt if we were to appear to shut him out from participating in the grand operation. In conclusion, I beg to assure your lordship that we are able to take the strong positions of the city without him, and that I am perfectly ready to follow your lordship's wish with the greatest willingness, whatever may be the course you prefer."

Lord Canning's answer was prompt and decisive. "I wish," he wrote on the 15th, "the pause in the operations against Lucknow could have been avoided; but I am sure that, as matters stand, we do better to accept the necessity, and wait for Jung Bahadoor. It would drive him wild to find himself jockeyed out of all share in the great work of the campaign. He has been looking forward to it, with General MacGregor's encouragement, from the beginning. We are in chief measure to blame that he is not farther on his road, the ammunition and carriage having lagged at Benares; and if we now disposed of Lucknow without him, there would be no noticeable feat

with which his name would be associated. His great object in coming to help us is to make a reputation as a soldier; and if the best chance of this were taken unexpectedly from him, it would try his temper dangerously. I am convinced that he would break with us and go back to his hills within a week. The loss of this help would be very inconvenient, but to find ourselves on bad terms with him would be much more so. I am therefore quite reconciled to a little delay; but I shall let General MacGregor know that we cannot wait an unlimited time, and now that all the Jung's wants have been supplied, he must make the best of his way. It will be a good thing if the intervening time can be turned to account against the Nana's people. It is pretty certain that the Nana himself has not moved,—at least not across the river. . . . As to the proclamation, the delay of operations till the 27th makes me glad that it was not put forth. Unless its issue were followed immediately by some very noticeable effect (which I should not expect), there would be an appearance of waiting purposely through a long interval for some result; and failing to obtain any, I think this would damage our cause. The last news from the Doab is that 10,000 men and 14 guns were collecting to cross the Ganges at some place opposite to Allygurh. I hope General Penny will be able to check them."

Sir Colin, allowing for delays, had reckoned on

Jung Bahadoor's force reaching the neighbourhood of Lucknow about the 17th February, and in anticipation of this, had arranged to be encamped beyond Bunnee by the 23d February. But this intention was defeated, owing to Jung Bahadoor's inability, for the reasons above mentioned, to carry out his portion of the plan by the specified date. News, however, at that moment having been received to the effect that the passage of the Ghogra was imminent, Sir Colin put the best face he could on the matter, and for a short time longer deferred his departure from Cawnpore, notwithstanding the heat of the advancing season was already beginning to tell on the health of his troops. It may be imagined how the anxious old soldier chafed at these delays, which appeared interminable. As a solace to this disappointment, letters from England expressive of the effect produced at home by the news of the successful operations for the relief of the heroic garrison at Lucknow, had reached the headquarter camp at Cawnpore. The first was from Lady Canning, written from Barrackpore on the 6th February :—

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I must tell you of the Queen's last joyful letter to me, after hearing of your rescue of Lucknow,—news which filled their hearts with joy, and gave them all the happiest Christmas that ever was. Her letter begins with

this, and ends by these words,—‘I hope and trust dear old Sir Colin is not seriously hurt. Say everything, pray, most flattering and kind to him from us on his success, which is such a blessing!’

“It is a duty to write you this, or I would have scruples at troubling you with a single word. You must be very busy with your great preparations; and the more you prepare, the more the enemy will lose heart, for I trust they begin to know you very well by this time, and not to like what they have to look forward to in the next great encounter.

“I have come for a few days to Barrackpore, which is looking more peaceful and flowery than ever.

“The telegraph only tells me of Lord Canning’s arrival at Allahabad. I think his journey will be a wholesome and pleasant change, besides of much use in the way of business.

“I am quite content to wait patiently until I am sent for, and told I shall not be ‘in the way,’ as I wish to set a good example to other wives.

“The idea prevails here that only the civil authorities disapprove of the ladies going ‘up country,’ and that you are far more kindly disposed, and would willingly see them arrive, or at least go to stations within reach of their husbands. With all your kindness and chivalry, I think it is a mistake. I hope you are well, and take a little more care of yourself.—Believe me yours very sincerely,

“C. CANNING.

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 “Pray remember me to General Mansfield.

“I hope Major Alison has nearly recovered. I admire his spirit so much in remaining at his post.

“All your great deeds are well appreciated at home. They are indeed a great joy there.”

Such a gracious message from her Majesty was a favour which Sir Colin, with his characteristic sense of gratitude for any personal kindness shown him, did not fail to estimate at its full value; but it was only a prelude to the highest honour a subject could receive at the hands of his sovereign. The Duke of Cambridge, who had been his constant correspondent since he left England, and whose unfailing support Sir Colin acknowledges in warm terms in nearly every one of his numerous letters to his Royal Highness, wrote on the 25th January:—

“MY DEAR COLIN CAMPBELL,—I have no further accounts from you, the mails not having as yet arrived, and the telegrams bring nothing of any great importance, though you are evidently adopting the wise military policy of concentrating your forces and securing your lines of communication, both towards Calcutta and Delhi. I therefore have little or nothing to write to you about by this mail, and have only the pleasing duty of sending to you a letter which has been placed in my hands by her Majesty, who was anxious to express to you in person her sense of the great services you have per-

formed for her and for the country. You already know my opinion of them ; and I can therefore add nothing more to what I have said before, than to assure you again and again that all England is proud of you, and nobody more so than England's Queen, as you will see by her own letter on this subject. . . .”

This letter has recently been given in the fourth volume of Sir Theodore Martin's ‘Life of the Prince Consort ;’ but as that interesting work may not have reached some of the readers of this biography, and as her Majesty's words will assuredly bear repetition, it is hoped that its insertion in this volume may not be considered inappropriate, its object being to make known as widely as possible her Majesty's personal estimation of the brave, yet simple, old soldier, to whose keeping she had intrusted the honour of her arms in the supreme effort England was making to crush the widespread revolt, which had shaken her Indian empire to its foundations:—

“*January 19, 1858.*

“The Queen must give utterance herself to the feelings of pride and satisfaction with which she has learnt of the glorious victories which Sir Colin Campbell and the gallant and heroic troops which he has under his command have obtained over the mutineers.

“The manner in which Sir Colin has conducted all these operations, and his rescue of that devoted

band of heroes and heroines at Lucknow (which brought comfort and relief to so many, many anxious hearts), is beyond all praise.

“The Queen has had many proofs already of Sir Colin’s devotion to his sovereign and his country, and he has now greatly added to that debt of gratitude which both owe him. But Sir Colin must bear one reproof from his Queen, and that is, that he exposes himself too much: his life is most precious, and she entreats that he will neither put himself where his noble spirit would urge him to be, foremost in danger, nor fatigue himself so as to injure his health.

“In this anxious wish the Prince most earnestly joins, as well as in all the Queen’s previous expressions.

“That so many gallant and brave and distinguished men, beginning with one whose name will ever be remembered with pride—viz., General Havelock—should have died and fallen, is a great grief to the Queen.

“To all European as well as Native troops, who have fought so nobly and so gallantly, and amongst whom the Queen is rejoiced to see the 93d, the Queen wishes Sir Colin to convey the expressions of her great admiration and gratitude.

“The Queen cannot conclude without sending Sir Colin the congratulations and good wishes of our dear daughter the Princess Royal, who is in a fortnight to leave her native land.



“And now, with the fervent wish that the God of battles may ever attend and protect Sir Colin and his noble army, the Queen concludes.”

On the same day that the Duke of Cambridge forwarded her Majesty's letter, his Royal Highness added a short note:—

“One line in addition to my letter addressed to you this morning, to say that, in consequence of the coloneley of the 93d Highlanders having become vacant by the death of General Parkinson, I have recommended the Queen to remove you to the command of that distinguished and gallant corps, with which you have been so much associated, not alone at the present moment in India, but also during the whole of the campaign in the Crimea. I thought such an arrangement would be agreeable to yourself, and I know that it is the highest compliment that her Majesty could pay to the 93d Highlanders to see their dear old chief at their head. . . .”

Sir Colin's reply to her Majesty, despatched a few weeks subsequent to the fall of Lucknow, was couched in the following terms:—

“LUCKNOW, *April 13, 1858.*

“Sir Colin Campbell presents his humble duty to the Queen, and ventures to give expression to his deep feelings of respect and gratitude towards her gracious Majesty.

“Sir Colin Campbell has received the Queen's letter, which he will ever preserve as the greatest

mark of honour it is in the power of her Majesty to bestow.

“He is happy to be able to assure the Queen that her Majesty’s gallant army, to which he is so much indebted for this great proof of her Majesty’s favour, is in good health and condition, and ready to undergo whatever fatigues the present service may render necessary.

“He will not fail to execute the most gracious commands of her Majesty, and will convey to the army, and more particularly to the 93d Regiment, the remembrance of the Queen.”

The time had now arrived for the grand movement towards Lucknow. By the 27th February, Walpole’s force returned to Cawnpore, giving escort to the convoy of families from Agra. Together with him marched Tombs’s troop of horse-artillery and the 2d Punjab Cavalry, which had joined him on the way. The remainder of the army was echeloned on the Lucknow road at Oonao, Busseerutgunj, and Bunnee, to protect the parks and vast convoys of stores. The artillery park moved in three divisions on successive days from Oonao towards the Buntera plain (four miles beyond Bunnee), at which place the army was to assemble. The 2d (Brigadier-General Sir E. Lugard’s) division was the first to reach the rendezvous.

Sir Colin having seen the last detachment of the army put in movement, made a forced march from

Cawnpore to Buntera on the 27th. Prior to leaving his camp, he addressed Sir John Lawrence as follows: "I have seen your letter to Mansfield of the 23d instant. The siege-train has been on the other bank of the Ganges since the 9th instant. It is now in movement towards Lucknow, and will be collected to-morrow at Buntera, six miles from the Alum Bagh, when I shall join it in the afternoon. The troops I hope to have in their first positions before the city by the 2d or 3d proximo, and that Brigadier-General Franks will effect his junction by the 4th or 5th. The movements of Jung Bahadoor appearing to be uncertain, I begged the Governor-General to allow me to proceed, and to leave Jung Bahadoor to follow, or rather our friend MacGregor. The latter has led me to hope that he may be able to effect his passage of the Ghogra about this date, and that he will push on with all convenient speed to Lucknow. Franks defeated a very large force of the enemy on the 23d instant, two miles on the Lucknow side of Sultanpoor. He took 20 guns, their camp, and everything in it, causing them a loss in killed and wounded of 1800 men. The loss in men may be exaggerated, but the loss of 20 guns and the dispersion of the whole force is undoubted. The enemy attack Outram's force frequently. They came within grape-range of his big guns on the last occasions, and suffered severely. I should hope that, after we break ground, a fortnight will put us in possession of it [Lucknow], and that we may then be able to help your advance into Rohilcund. Until

that has been accomplished, however, we shall not be able to spare you assistance (European) from this. Your estimate of the number of regiments of infantry and cavalry which you think it would be advisable to allot to the care of the Punjab, supposing no diminution of the force in Bengal were to be ordered by the home authorities, appears to me a fair proportion of the whole number employed in Bengal at present, and certainly not more, in my opinion, than you should have, even with your iron grip, to keep the people of the Punjab in a wholesome state of order and subjection. I have heard of occasional remarks, made in a good-natured manner, of Sikh soldiers in the hearing of our officers, which lead to the suspicion that all hope of the recovery of their country is not entirely abandoned. Mansfield will send you the return of the number of European troops demanded by Madras and Bombay for their respective Presidencies. If we are fortunate enough to settle Lucknow speedily, and that troops can be spared to go to Rohilcund, I will endeavour (with the sanction of the Governor-General) to accompany them myself, sending all the headquarter staff round by the Trunk Road. I may in such case have the pleasure of seeing you, which would be a very great one to me.

“*P.S.*—When I found I must wait for Jung Bahadoor, I turned time to account by detaching a considerable force through the country to the northward, on the left bank of the Ganges, clearing all the small gatherings of Numsib Ally and the

Nana,—both these gentlemen decamping from the retreats they have so long occupied, and causing a general stir and certain amount of uneasiness throughout the district; while the movement of this force gave security to the convoy of women and children on their way from Agra by the Trunk Road to this place and Allahabad. Besides carrying by assault the fortified town of Meeangunj, in which there were some 2000 sepoys, some 500 of the enemy were killed and 4 guns taken. All this will also contribute to the security of our line of communication between the Alum Bagh and Cawnpore.”

In the Commander-in-chief's train followed Dr W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent of the 'Times,' who had been at Cawnpore since the second week in February. He had now become an acknowledged entity at headquarters. On condition that he would not mention in camp any information that might be imparted to him, or let it be known in any way except in his letters to England, Sir Colin engaged to take him into his confidence and keep him supplied with authoritative intelligence.<sup>1</sup> Dr Russell, who became attached to headquarters, and was made a member of the headquarters staff mess, most honourably fulfilled his part of the contract, the result being the series of brilliant letters which filled the columns of the 'Times,' and narrated in glowing words the fall of Lucknow and the progress of subsequent events.

<sup>1</sup> 'My Diary in India.'

## CHAPTER XV.

HEADQUARTERS AT BUNTERA—STRENGTH OF ARMY—REASONS FOR OPERATING FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE GOOMTEE—SIR COLIN MOVES UPON THE DIL KHOOSHAIH—OCCUPIES IT—BRIDGES THROWN ACROSS THE GOOMTEE—SIR JAMES OUTRAM CROSSES WITH HIS FORCE—ESTABLISHES BATTERIES TO ENFILADE ENEMY'S OUTER LINE OF WORKS—MARTINIÈRE—ENEMY'S OUTER LINE OF WORKS CARRIED—OUTRAM BOMBARDS THE KAISER BAGH—BANKS'S HOUSE CARRIED—APPROACH TO ENEMY'S SECOND LINE OF WORKS—ARRIVAL OF JUNG BAHADOOR—HIS RECEPTION BY SIR COLIN—ASSAULT OF BEGUM'S PALACE—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD CANNING REGARDING SUCCESSION TO COMMAND—ASSAULT OF THE IMAMBARA—CAPTURE OF KAISER BAGH—SIR JAMES OUTRAM CROSSES THE GOOMTEE AND TAKES THE RESIDENCY AND OTHER BUILDINGS—PLUNDER BY TROOPS AND CAMP-FOLLOWERS—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—LORD CANNING'S CONGRATULATIONS—MOOSA BAGH CARRIED—FAILURE OF COMBINED MOVEMENT TO INTERCEPT REBELS—REVIEW OF OPERATIONS—HOPE GRANT'S EXPEDITION TO KOORSEE—MEASURES FOR OCCUPATION OF LUCKNOW—FORCE DESPATCHED TO AZIMGURH—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD CANNING.

ON the afternoon of the 27th February, Sir Colin established the headquarters of the army on the plain of Buntera, at which rendezvous, as has been stated in the last chapter, the 2d division, under Sir E. Lugard, had already arrived. On the following day, the troops which had been operating on de-

tached duty under Sir Hope Grant, as well as those employed similarly under Brigadier-General Walpole, joined the camp.

The effective force at Sir Colin's disposal for the undertaking in hand may be calculated at 18,708 men;<sup>1</sup> but in addition to these, he could reckon on Franks's column, and eventually on the Nepaulese force under Jung Bahadoor,—making, in all, something like 31,000 men, with 164 guns.

The information which for some time past Sir Colin had collected concerning the fresh works prepared by the enemy, as well as the formidable numbers assembled for their defence, had led him to the conclusion that it would be impossible, with the means at his disposal, to invest the city, the circumference of which was not less than 20 miles. Weighing these considerations, he was of opinion that, having regard to the economy of life, he had no alternative but to operate from both sides of the Goomtee. By so doing, he judged he would be able to enfilade the enemy's triple line of works with artillery-fire, and thus weaken the resistance to the advance of the troops directed upon the line of the canal and the approaches to the Kaiser Bagh. No

<sup>1</sup> Naval Brigade,	.	.	.	.	.	431
Artillery,	.	.	.	.	.	1,745
Engineers,	.	.	.	.	.	865
Cavalry,	.	.	.	.	.	3,169
Infantry,	.	.	.	.	.	12,498

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Total, 18,708

—From the Field State of the 14th February.

clearer idea of the system of the enemy's defences can be conveyed to the reader than by the words of Sir Colin's despatch reporting the fall of the city : "The series of courts and buildings called the Kaiser Bagh—considered as a citadel by the rebels—was shut in by three lines of defence towards the Goomtee, of which the line of the canal was the outer one ; the second line circled round the large building called the mess-house and the Motce Mahul ; and the first or interior one was the principal rampart of the Kaiser Bagh, the rear of the enclosures of the latter being closed in by the city, through which approach would have been dangerous to an assailant. These lines were flanked by numerous bastions, and rested at one end on the Goomtee, and the other on the great buildings of the street called the Huzrut Gunj, all of which were strongly fortified, and flanked the street in every direction."

The amount of artillery with which it was believed the enemy defended these works was set down at 131 guns. Various estimates were made of the numbers of the insurgent troops ; but it is not beyond the mark to reckon that, in addition to the normal population of Lucknow, which was known to contain 280,000 inhabitants, the rebel leaders had at their disposal not less than 100,000 armed men, including mutineers of the sepoy army, the Oudh force, irregular regiments, retainers of different disaffected chieftains of the province, and levies collected by them.



To enable troops to be thrown across the Goomtee, and to maintain the communication between both banks, casks, wherewith to form floating bridges, had been collected and put together in the Engineer park, ready for use.

All being in readiness, Sir Colin—taking with him three troops of horse-artillery, four heavy guns of the Shannon's Naval brigade (under the personal command of Captain William Peel), the headquarters of the cavalry division, Little's (the 1st) brigade of cavalry, and Lugard's (the 2d) division of infantry—moved on the 2d March upon the Dil Khooshah. The route lay along the Lucknow road to Outram's camp at the Alum Bagh; thence through the flat cultivated country, past the fort of Jellalabad, which was held by a detachment from the former post, and formed the extreme right of Outram's position. In this fort were collected commissariat stores, fascines, gabions, and other articles belonging to the Engineer park. As the advanced-guard debouched into the open plain in front of the village of Kurkha, a strong picket of the enemy, posted at the village of Ghylee (see plan No. 1 of the operations against Lucknow), opened fire from their guns. This picket was immediately driven in by the horse-artillery and cavalry, who captured a gun. The Dil Khooshah palace, as well as the enclosure of the Mahomed Bagh, was occupied without any further opposition. As the columns in rear closed upon the advanced-guard, a heavy fire was directed upon them from several

guns in position along the canal or outermost line of works. Establishing advanced pickets on the right in the Dil Khooshah, on the left in the Mahomed Bagh, Sir Colin encamped his troops behind the park-wall of the Dil Khooshah, as far removed from the effects of the enemy's fire as the ravines in rear would permit—the right resting in a wood a short distance from the Goomtee. Heavy guns were placed in battery at both the advanced pickets, to reply to the enemy's artillery. The troops bivouacked on the ground,—the infantry with their arms by their side, and the artillery horsed, in readiness to repel any attack. The fords in the Goomtee were carefully watched. Having thus secured an excellent base for further operations, Sir Colin waited in the position he had taken up until the remainder of his force had closed upon him, and until everything was in readiness for the attack upon the insurgents' stronghold.

An examination of the enemy's works, which had been materially increased and strengthened since the end of November, confirmed Sir Colin in his resolution to prepare the way for his infantry by a lavish use of his heavy artillery. The siege-train was therefore ordered up from Buntera, and, escorted by Walpole's division, occupied the two following days in closing upon the position at the Dil Khooshah. The Engineer park accompanied it. On their arrival, the British camp extended to Beebeepoor and the Goomtee on the right, having its left in the direction of the Alum Bagh. The interval between

the left of the position and the fort of Jellalabad, a distance of two miles, was occupied by Hodson's Irregular Horse, which were encamped midway between these points, for the purpose of protecting the commissariat stores conveyed into camp. Brigadier Campbell, with a brigade of cavalry and horse-artillery, secured the extreme left, and swept the country in a north-westerly direction. Sir Colin was already in communication with Franks, whose column, now constituted as the 4th division of infantry, had successfully made its way across the kingdom of Oudh, defeating, as has been seen, several bodies of the insurgents, and executing his movement with remarkable punctuality. On its arrival in camp on the 5th March, it took up its position in the second line, in rear of the Dil Khooshah position. Heavy guns were placed in battery on the edge of the plateau, in advance of the Dil Khooshah palace, to keep down the fire of the enemy's guns from the Martiniere, which maintained a constant fire towards the British camp, up to which they ranged, causing some, though very slight, loss. Heavy guns were also brought down to the river-side behind the Dil Khooshah park, to flank the enemy's guns at the Martiniere, and to prevent any possible annoyance to the camp from the left bank of the Goomtee.

On the same day two bridges formed of casks were prepared and thrown across the Goomtee near Beebeepoor (see plan). The river in the vicinity of this place averages about 100 feet in width, and

possesses one or two deep fords practicable for cavalry, but which were not used by the attacking army. The enemy, apparently jealous of the works of the bridge, showed in considerable force on the left bank, but refrained from making any real attack when they discovered that a disposition of troops with heavy guns was being made to oppose them.

The honourable task of operating separately from the left bank of the Goomtee had been confided to Sir James Outram. For more than three months, as has been shown, that gallant officer had held the Alum Bagh and kept the city of Lucknow in check, notwithstanding the repeated though fruitless efforts of the enemy to dislodge him from his position. He was now about to reap the reward of his endurance by the assumption of the most important command it was in Sir Colin's power to bestow on his distinguished lieutenant. Handing over the force over whose fortunes he had so long and efficiently watched to Brigadier Franklyn, who was directed to remain stationary at the Alum Bagh and keep open the Cawnpore road, Outram joined the head-quarter column and received his instructions from Sir Colin. Taking with him a detachment of engineers and sappers, three troops of horse-artillery, two light field-batteries, the 2d Dragoon Guards, the 9th Lancers, a body of Punjab cavalry under Watson and Sanford, and the 3d (Brigadier-General Walpole's) infantry division, Outram crossed the Goomtee by the newly-made bridge about 2 A.M.

on the 6th March, and following the route indicated by the dotted line on the plan, struck the Fyzabad road near Ismaelgunj. The enemy showed but feeble symptoms of resistance. On perceiving a column of troops established on the left bank of the river, a body of the rebels moved out to attack it, but were speedily driven back into the town by the field-guns and cavalry. In this skirmish Major Percy Smith of the 2d Dragoon Guards lost his life. Outram then occupied a position across the Fyzabad road, having the Chukur Kothee, a circular building, rather more than a mile in his front. Strong pickets were posted on the edge of the high ground overlooking the stream of the Kokrel Nuddee; whilst the camp equipage and baggage, which had been left ready-laden on the right bank of the Goomtee, were brought up to the column. Franks's force occupied the space left vacant by the 3d infantry division. Meanwhile Sir Colin remained on the defensive. Until the plan of attack on the left bank of the Goomtee had been sufficiently developed, he was content to assume a passive attitude under the enemy's fire, which was incessantly maintained from the Martiniere, but happily, owing to the inexperience of the enemy's gunners, without occasioning any serious loss to the besieging force.

Early on the morning of the 7th, Outram's advanced pickets were attacked, though in a desultory manner, the enemy retiring with his guns on fire

being opened by the skirmishers and three troops of horse-artillery, protected by the cavalry. Consequent on a reconnaissance made by Sir Colin the next day, Outram was instructed to prepare batteries during the night for the reception of 22 heavy pieces of ordnance, which had been sent across the river on the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of bombarding the Chukur Kothce, the key of the enemy's position on the left bank of the Goomtee. All being in readiness, the batteries opened at daybreak on the 9th. By 7 A.M. the right column of infantry had with great spirit driven the enemy from the close cover he occupied, and cleared the gardens on the Fyzabad road, its right flank being protected by cavalry and horse-artillery. Then bringing its right shoulder forward, it occupied the Fyzabad road, and advancing in concert with the left column of attack against the Chukur Kothce, carried that position in gallant style, whereby the enemy's line of intrenchments on the right bank of the Goomtee was turned. Pressing the rebels vigorously through the gardens and suburbs, a portion of the force reached the Badshah Bagh, a large garden enclosure, which was seized and occupied. Having accomplished the primary object of his movement, Outram established near the village of Jugrowlee, at the extreme left of his line, a battery of heavy guns, wherewith to enfilade the enemy's outer line of works along the canal. Another battery of two 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers was placed

near the river to keep down the fire from the town.

Dispositions were in the meantime being made by Sir Colin for carrying the Martiniere. Early in the afternoon a column, composed of a troop of horse-artillery, the 42d and 93d Highlanders, the 4th Punjab Rifles, the 53d and 90th Regiments, was formed under the command of Sir E. Lugard in rear of the Dil Khooshah palace. For some two hours prior to the assault a heavy fire of shrapnell, in which the naval brigade took part, was directed upon the Martiniere.<sup>1</sup> This was replied to with occasional shots from a battery at the corner of the Martiniere, and with a wild fire of musketry. As, however, Hope's brigade, covered by skirmishers, descended the slope, the rebels abandoned the Martiniere, and, with but slight resistance, fell back upon their first line of works, from which they opened a sharp fire of grape and musketry upon the Martiniere garden. Sir Colin having directed the occupation of a village situated near the Goomtee, and opposite the extreme left of the enemy's exterior line of defence, Major Wilde<sup>2</sup> was ordered to advance with his Punjabees, supported by the 42d Highlanders, and effect an entrance near the Goomtee, which post was found to have been abandoned by the enemy, as a con-

<sup>1</sup> Some time before the attack on the Martiniere began, Peel, who had been superintending the fire of his guns on that building, was disabled by a musket-shot, which struck his thigh.

<sup>2</sup> The late Lieutenant-General Sir A. T. Wilde, K.C.B., C.S.I., Member of the Council of India.

sequence of Outram's turning movement and the enfilading fire from his guns. This fact had been established some time previously by Lieutenant Butler of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, who, having failed to attract from the other side of the Goomtee the attention of our troops on the right bank, had, with consummate bravery, swum across the river, and had remained exposed to the fire of the enemy in possession of this portion of the enemy's works until relieved by the arrival of Wilde's troops. For this deed of daring, Lieutenant Butler was rewarded with the Victoria Cross. Once established in the works, the Punjabees and Highlanders advanced along the line of defences, sweeping everything before them, till they reached the vicinity of Banks's house, when night put an end to further operations. The position which had been won was occupied in strength by the troops which had first entered, and by the 53d Regiment. Thus had the first part of Sir Colin's plan been successfully accomplished; and this result had been attained with little loss, owing to the feeble resistance offered by the enemy, when he found his defences were searched by Outram's flanking fire from the opposite side of the Goomtee.

The following day, the 10th, was employed by Outram in strengthening the ground he occupied, and in placing his heavy guns in battery to play on the mess-house and the Kaiser Bagh, on which latter building a battery of five mortars, construct-



ed during the previous night, had already opened. Whilst thus engaged, Hope Grant reconnoitred and patrolled with his cavalry the ground lying between the Goomtee and the old cantonments. On the right bank of the river, the enemy, apparently in ignorance that the line of defences captured on the previous day were held in strength by their opponents, made a demonstration in some force at an early hour of the morning, with the view of re-occupying them, but were driven off by the first discharge of musketry. At the same time, Lugard made arrangements for the attack, with heavy guns and infantry, of Banks's house, which, after a breach had been made in the high walls surrounding it, was captured at noon and converted into a military post.

With the systematic deliberation which characterised Sir Colin's proceedings in these operations, he now set about the execution of the second part of his plan. In the execution of this, the paramount object he held in view was the effectual expulsion of the enemy from his stronghold, with no more loss to his own force than the ordinary risk of such a service would justify. All his instructions, all his measures, conduced to this end. Such care in economising the lives of his troops was fully appreciated by them, and will perhaps serve more than anything else to enshrine his memory in the grateful recollection of his countrymen.

Arrangements were now made for prosecuting the advance on the Kaiser Bagh. On the 11th the camp

was moved in advance of the Dil Khooshah, and some 68-pounders and heavy howitzers were placed in battery near Banks's house. In approaching the enemy's citadel, Sir Colin designed to use the great block of houses and palaces on the right and left of the Huzrut Gunj, and profiting by the advantage of this cover, take in reverse the enemy's second and third line of works, instead of sapping up to their front; whilst they were, at the same time, enfiladed on the right by Sir James Outram's advance. A gradual approach was made towards the Begum's palace, and several of the gardens and a portion of the suburbs in that direction were occupied by the troops. The Secunder Bagh was also taken possession of without resistance. Early on the same morning Outram had pushed his advance with great spirit on the left bank of the Goomtee, having captured the suburbs up to the iron bridge, the head of which was occupied,—not, however, without determined resistance by the mutineers, who continued to hold the other end till it was ultimately taken in reverse. He also established a battery to sweep the iron bridge. In approaching the head of the stone bridge, he met Hope Grant's cavalry and horse-artillery, which had been covering his advance on the extreme right; and with their assistance, he surprised the camp of the 15th irregular cavalry, which fled in all directions across the plain, abandoning their standards and two guns, and were pursued and cut up

by Grant's horsemen. On the right bank of the Goomtee, the operation, to use Sir Colin's words, "had now become one of an engineering character," under the direction of Brigadier Napier, the chief engineer, who ably seconded Sir Colin's endeavours "to save the infantry from being hazarded before due preparation had been made."

By the afternoon, matters were sufficiently advanced to admit of the assault on the Begum's palace being delivered. Before that event, however, occurred, Sir Colin was reluctantly summoned from the scene of action to receive a visit of ceremony from Jung Bahadoor, who had just arrived, after interminable delays, with his army of Goorkhas at the Dil Khooshah. Doffing his working dress—which was of the plainest kind, and consisted of a blue patrol-jacket, brown corduroy breeches, high boots, and a pith-hat—for the scarlet, gold-lace, and cocked-hat of a general's uniform, Sir Colin, punctual to the moment, awaited with undisguised impatience the arrival of the Nepaulese chieftain, whose dilatoriness in joining the British force had necessitated the commencement of operations without him. Whilst the two chiefs were engaged in the exchange of formal compliments, an exciting scene occurred, in consequence of the arrival of a staff officer with the report that the Begum's palace had been successfully stormed. Thereupon Sir Colin, who entertained an abhorrence of ceremonial, and whose thoughts were far removed from its attendant page-

antry, seized the occasion to bring the interview to a close, and after announcing the news to his distinguished guest, took his leave, and hurried back to resume his duties in the field.

To Sir E. Lugard had been intrusted the assault on the Begum's palace. About 4 P.M., Napier having reported the breach practicable, Lugard made his dispositions for the attack. The storming brigadè consisted of the 93d Highlanders, the 4th Punjab Rifles, with some Goorkha troops in support, under the command of Adrian Hope. Under cover of a battery established across the Huzrut Gunj road, the 93d led the way. The fighting for some time was very severe; for the place was strongly intrenched, with a deep ditch in front, and the enemy showed a determined resistance. It was, according to Sir Colin's official testimony, "the sternest struggle of the siege;" but though the mutineers fought with desperation, they were no match for the hardy veterans opposed to them. When the contest ended, and the palace and adjacent buildings, including the barracks, were occupied, it was computed that the enemy had left 600 or 700 dead bodies in the place. The British loss was necessarily very severe. Amongst those who fell on this occasion was the gallant Hodson, whose name for chivalry and daring had become a household word in India. He had accompanied his friend Napier the engineer in the attack on the Begum Kothee, and received a mortal wound from a bullet. In a few touching

words of sympathy, Sir Colin was the first to communicate the fatal news to his widow, and assure her that "the whole army, which admired his talents, his bravery, and his military skill, deplored his loss, and sympathised with her in her irreparable bereavement."

No sooner was the capture of the Begum Kothee effected than a battery of mortars was opened upon the Imambara, the next great building interposing between the first-mentioned palace and the Kaiser Bagh, but not to be confounded with the great Imambara situated between the Muchee Bawun and the Moosa Bagh, close to the Goomtee.

At this point it becomes necessary to pause in the narrative of the siege, in order to set before the reader a correspondence which, during this eventful period, had been taking place between the Governor-General and Sir Colin relative to the succession to the command in the event of any contingency rendering it vacant.

"There is a matter," writes Lord Canning on the 7th March, "upon which I must write you a few words—the fewer the better, for it is not a welcome one—and upon which I beg you to give me a line in reply. If you should be disabled, to whom, in your opinion, should the conduct of the army in the field be intrusted? The question is separate from that of the succession to the commandership-in-chief of Bengal, or might be made so if this should be desirable; but I should like to know your views

upon both points, no matter how briefly stated. The commandership-in-chief of Queen's troops in India settles itself by rule, as you know. I pray to God that I may be asking idle questions, and that you may be enabled to fill up your full measure of duty and honour unharmed. God knows this, my dear Sir Colin. God bless you !”

“I got your note marked ‘private’ of the 7th March,” wrote Sir Colin in reply, three days later, “just as we had established ourselves with scarcely any loss in the Martiniere and on the left of the enemy's defences along the canal. . . .

“With respect to the question your lordship alludes to, on the chance of an accident happening to me, I am bound, both by my sense of duty to my sovereign, and by a very strong and thankful feeling of gratitude to your lordship, to state my candid opinion that there is no officer in India so competent to take my place as General Mansfield. He has a perfect knowledge of both services. He has all the things which guide this army in his hands ; and from his position, as well as from his great and peculiar qualifications, he alone of all the officers in this country, with whom I am acquainted, is the man suited to the situation, not merely of commander in the field, but of commander-in-chief in India. The rules by which the commander-in-chiefship in India settles itself I do not know ; but I beg to suggest to your lordship that at this crisis rules should be overruled for the good of the service and the safety of the country.”

Lord Canning acknowledged this letter on the 14th: "Your reply to my question is exactly what I expected it to be, and accords exactly with my own judgment. If—which God forbid!—the occasion should arise, it will be General Mansfield who will take up your work, and he will have the heartiest and fullest support from me in carrying it out. I think you have not understood me as regards the commander-in-chiefship in India. The matter stands thus: I can appoint a commander-in-chief of the Bengal army, pending the decision of the Home Government; but if the officer so appointed is a Company's officer, or if he is not the senior of the Queen's officers in India, the commander-in-chiefship of the Queen's troops in India falls at once into the hands of such senior, and I have no power to rule otherwise. For instance, when, upon General Anson's death, Sir Patrick Grant was made commander-in-chief in Bengal, Sir Henry Somerset became commander-in-chief of the Queen's troops in India; and he would equally have become so if, instead of Sir P. Grant, I had appointed a Queen's officer. Sir Henry Somerset would probably interfere as little upon any future occasion as he did upon the past one; but that would be his position until the Queen's Government ordered otherwise. It is likely, however, that precautionary orders may be sent from England which will provide against any temporary routine succession." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The distinction between the Queen's and Company's troops here

On the afternoon of the 12th, Jung Bahadoor's force took up its position in the British line, and on the 13th moved close to the canal, in readiness to operate against the suburbs to the left of Banks's house, by which measure the left of the main attack was efficiently covered, and all the available means of the British force concentrated on the attack directed from both sides of the Goomtee. On the afternoon of that day, Sir Colin, escorted by a squadron of the 9th Lancers, and attended by such of the personal and general staff as could muster full-dress uniform, paid a return visit of ceremony to the Nepaulese Maharajah in his camp.

The field-telegraph was now in working order, an office having been established at the Alum Bagh, the Martiniere, and Outram's camp. On the night of the 12th, Outram, who had been reinforced with a number of heavy guns and mortars, was instructed to increase his fire on the Kaiser Bagh, whilst the bombardment of the Imambara was prosecuted without intermission from a battery of mortars established in the Begum's palace. By the afternoon of the 13th, a practicable road for breaching guns having been made to within twenty-five yards of the wall of the Imambara, a 68-pounder and a 24-pounder were placed in position, and in the course of the evening opened fire. On the right of the Huzrut Gunj road the advance progressed equally with that on the left.

referred to ceased on the passing of the Act transferring to the Crown the possessions of the East India Company on August 2, 1858.



During the night additional vertical fire was brought to bear upon the Imambara from a battery of mortars constructed at the most advanced post.

By 8 A.M. of the 14th a practicable breach had been made in the walls of the Imambara, when dispositions were effected for carrying the building by storm. Franks had relieved Lugard in the duties of holding the posts in the city, and the column of attack was confided to the troops of his division. It consisted of the Sikh regiment of Ferozepore, designated to lead the assault, with the 10th and 90th Regiments in support. The Imambara was carried without difficulty, by which operation the second line of the enemy was turned. Then Bras-  
yer's Sikhs, carried away by their ardour, pressed forward in pursuit of the discomfited foe, until they entered the Kaiser Bagh and took in reverse the third and last line of defence, without a gun being fired from it. The enemy, panic-stricken, offered but slight opposition; the supports came rapidly up; and by the afternoon the Kaiser Bagh, with its numerous courts and enclosures, was in possession of our troops. By nightfall all the other buildings in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's citadel—the mess-house, the Tara Kothee, the Motee Mahul, and Chuttur Munzil, notorious as the scenes of the hotly-disputed contests in the previous operations for the relief of the Residency—were seized and occupied. The formidable nature of the defences—for every outlet had been covered, and the

utmost care manifested in the preparation of barricades and loopholed parapets—not only confirmed Sir Colin in the opinion that every man he had was necessary for the operation he had undertaken, but revealed to him the absolute necessity that existed for making use of the sap and his heavy artillery to facilitate the advance of his troops.

With the capture of the Kaiser Bagh and the buildings included within the third line of works, Lucknow may be said to have fallen; for though much remained to be done, the principal portion of the work had been accomplished. The following day, the 15th, was employed in further securing the ground which had been won, removing powder, destroying mines, and preparing for the bombardment of the remaining positions held by the enemy on the right bank of the Goomtee and in the heart of the city. During the 14th and 15th large numbers of the enemy, taking advantage of Sir Colin's inability, from the paucity of his troops, to invest so great an extent of ground as that represented by the circumference of Lucknow, streamed out of the city in the direction, as was supposed, of Sundeela. Brigadier Campbell, who had been well posted on the left of the Alum Bagh, was sent in pursuit at an early hour on the 15th, with a strong brigade of cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery. Campbell proceeded along the Sundeela road; whilst Hope Grant, taking with him 1000 sabres and two troops of horse-artillery, started simultancously towards Seetapoor, on the

direct road to Rohilcund, with the view of intercepting any fugitives turned off by Brigadier Campbell's movement. Both these bodies resumed their former positions on the 17th.

On the 16th, Sir James Outram, taking with him Douglas's (the 5th) infantry brigade, crossed the Goomtee by a bridge of casks, which had been thrown across opposite the Secunder Bagh. Supported by the 20th Foot and the regiment of Ferozepore, Outram was instructed to advance through the Chuttur Munzil and take the Residency. This was accomplished with scarcely any opposition. Prior to the commencement of the attack, large bodies of the enemy were observed crossing the stone bridge; but as the palaces and buildings situated between the stone and iron bridges were approached, some resistance, though slight compared with that shown on the previous days, was encountered. Pressing his advance, which was covered by his heavy guns, Outram was enabled not only to take the iron bridge in reverse, thus effecting Sir Colin's principal object, but to seize and occupy the Muckee Bawun and the great Imambara, in which latter building, as the day was waning, his troops passed the night. Finding their retreat intercepted by Grant's troopers, who at this time were near the stone bridge, the flying enemy skirted the right bank of the river and escaped into the open country north-west of Lucknow. A serious attempt was made on the morning of this day by a considerable

body of the enemy against the Alum Bagh, which during the recent operations had been held in diminished numbers. Directing a large body of infantry against the front of the position, the enemy made an effort to turn the left flank with their cavalry and artillery. He was, however, kept at bay by the fire of the guns, and after some time withdrew, having failed in his purpose. Before nightfall Jung Bahadoor, at Sir Colin's request, moved to his left up the canal against that portion of the enemy which had just threatened the Alum Bagh. Executing the task allotted to him in a vigorous manner, the Nepaulese leader took the enemy's position in reverse, and expelled him, with trifling loss to himself, from the spot, whence he had so long and pertinaciously annoyed the post, capturing all his guns, which he had abandoned. Lucknow had been virtually wrested from the grasp of the mutineers.

The rapid capture of the series of vast palaces, commencing with that of the Begum on the 11th, with their stores of European and oriental luxuries, had been the signal for plunder, in which the European vied with the native soldier and camp-follower. The saturnalia indulged in by the latter, whose number may be computed at 20,000, may be more easily imagined than described. Fortunately few or no opportunities existed for obtaining liquor, so that the discipline of the European portion of the force did not succumb to the temptation of drunkenness.

As soon as the proper military measures had been taken for the security of the buildings, Sir Colin issued most stringent orders against plundering. An officer was nominated to collect all property of value that might be found; and the commandant of the town was instructed to afford him assistance, and comply with his requisitions for guards. Still, what between the love of revenge and the lust of greed, the opportunity had been too good to be neglected.

The 17th and 18th were passed in consolidating the conquest already effected, and in the first attempts to restore authority in the city, whence the inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring villages. Preparations were also made for a combined movement on the following day.

Sir Colin seized the opportunity of this interval to submit his views to the Governor-General. Writing from the Kaiser Bagh on the 17th, he says: "My telegrams will have informed you that, as we advance into the city, the enemy gradually give way and disappear before us. I think that the contest, as far as Lucknow is concerned, may be said to be at an end. The sepoys have been going off in very large numbers, mostly towards the N.W.; but our information is defective, and to what point they have directed their course we have not yet ascertained. The ground near Lucknow is so intersected with ravines and so thickly wooded, and every house and village is so strongly fortified, that I cannot

employ the cavalry without infantry, which arm cannot be spared at this moment from work in the city. As your lordship will believe, I think mostly of our army in this matter, and more particularly of the British part of it; and I am very anxious to have it under cover as soon as possible. From the beginning of April till the middle of August is the period of the year when it is desirable that no one should be exposed, excepting in case of vital necessity. We cannot expect more regiments from England; and there will be, I am afraid, the greatest difficulty in completing those we now have to their proper establishment. If we are obliged to march our troops about during the hot winds, we shall lose a great many, the excitement of the Lucknow campaign having passed away. I venture, therefore, to submit to your lordship, on these grounds, the expediency of issuing some notice to the sepoys, which may have the effect of dissolving the confederacy between the mutinous regiments. If something of this sort be not done, I am afraid we shall have a most serious business all through the hot weather, which will break down the troops, and will be never-ending. I do not presume to go into the political part of the question; but I think that some general notice, now that the mutineers have been forced to leave Lucknow, would have the best effect, not only for Oudh, but for Rohilcund, and other parts of the country which have not yet been visited by our troops. In this opinion I find all the authorities

unanimous, who are experienced in the effects produced in India by the breaking up of large native armies; I allude more particularly to Sir J. Lawrence and Sir J. Outram. I venture to hazard one more remark. The punishment of the native insurgent army has already been very severe. If there be no prisoners for secondary punishment, it is because all sepoys have been summarily put to death; and their number must have been very large, independent of those who have fallen in fight.

“I congratulate your lordship on the very great success which has attended the operation here. This can, indeed, be scarcely appreciated except by those who have seen the enormous defensive works constructed by the enemy, which were rendered entirely useless by the plan of operating on the left bank of the Goomtee, and thus taking the whole line of defence in reverse, depriving the enemy, in fact, of the only sort of defence—viz., one under cover—which natives can ever hope to offer against European troops. The operation on the left bank of the Goomtee turned the two first lines of defence. The third, which was in front of the Kaiser Bagh, was turned by a different flank, in consequence of our employing the large buildings between the Begum’s palace and the Kaiser Bagh as a double sap, through which we worked our way under cover into the very heart of the citadel; and thus in a week, and with small loss of life, Lucknow has been

won. We have already in our artillery park upwards of 60 of the enemy's guns."

In the meantime, a letter conveying Lord Canning's thanks was on its way to Sir Colin Campbell :

"ALLAHABAD, *March* 16, 1858.

"MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—Bouverie is just off to settle about Jung Bahadoor's visit.

"I send you by the earliest means these my sincerest and most joyful congratulations. You have indeed laid up for yourself a store of gratitude and honour. Long may you live to enjoy it is my earnest prayer.

"I can determine nothing about Lucknow and civil government until we see how the proclamation<sup>1</sup> works, and what is the temper of the people,

<sup>1</sup> This was the famous document which at the time caused so much controversy. It announced the forfeiture of the estates of all the native proprietors in Oudh, with the exception of six who had remained steadfast in their allegiance throughout the rebellion. On the receipt of the proclamation and the letter of instructions accompanying it, but before the explanatory despatch reached England, Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control, wrote the celebrated secret despatch of April 19, 1858, in which, in the name of the Secret Committee, he condemned the tone of the proclamation, and conveyed an unqualified reproof to the Governor-General. This despatch, though entitled secret, was made public in England some weeks before it reached the head of the Government in India. Lord Canning replied in a tone of dignified remonstrance, repudiating the idea of abandoning the trust imposed upon him, until he had submitted to the authorities responsible for the administration of Indian affairs in England the grounds on which he had acted, and until his policy had been declared by them to be erroneous. The matter became the subject of Parliamentary discussion, and assumed the charac-



except that it is necessary that General Outram should remain there (at Lucknow) for the present, as head both of civil and military affairs. I would ask you, therefore, to place the garrison and all the troops in the province under him. He will not remain there long—indeed he cannot do so ; but a change to a civilian (and I have got no military man) would be most inopportune just at this moment.

“I shall be glad to hear that there are no symptoms of a stand being made at Fyzabad or elsewhere. Bouverie will tell you of one or two things on which I have not had time to write.—Ever, my dear Sir Colin, yours most sincerely, CANNING.”

Though it was known that the largest portion of the mutineers had been expelled from Lucknow, there still remained a considerable body of them who seemed disposed to make a stand at the Moosa Bagh. In this large building, with its numerous courts and enclosures, situated on the right bank of the Goomtee, and distant in a north-westerly direction about four miles, were collected several thousand insurgents. To expel them from this their last stronghold, Sir Colin made the following dispositions :—

On the 19th, a column under Sir James Outram

ter of a party fight. The result was, that Lord Ellenborough resigned office, and a resolution was passed by the Court of Directors expressive of its continued confidence in Lord Canning.

—composed of a light and heavy field-battery, a detachment of sappers, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, and an infantry brigade (Douglas's), consisting of the 23d Fusiliers, the 79th Highlanders, and the 2d Punjab Infantry—was instructed to make a direct attack on the Moosa Bagh, whilst Hope Grant cannonaded it with his horse-artillery guns from the left bank of the Goomtee. The brigade of cavalry and horse-artillery which had been posted on the left of the Alum Bagh, and to which had been added two infantry regiments, the 5th Fusiliers and 78th Highlanders, had received directions to move at 2 A.M. from its position to intercept the retreat of the enemy when dislodged from the Moosa Bagh.

As soon as the attack was developed, the mutineers, who appear to have been completely demoralised, abandoned their strong position without a contest, and fled in a north-westerly direction. Their retreat was effected with comparative impunity, owing to the force which had moved round the western side of the city from the Alum Bagh having reached its ground too late to bar the flight of the rebels by the only exit open to them. The squadrons, however, of the 9th Lancers, led by Captain Cole, a good and prudent officer, pursued the fugitives for some miles, destroying a considerable number of them and capturing six guns, but with the loss of Captain Hutchinson of the same regiment, who was mortally wounded.

Though the combination had failed in accomplishing the entire destruction of the rebels in the Moosa Bagh, as originally designed, the occupation of that building gave Sir Colin complete possession of the entire line of defences established by the enemy on the right bank of the Goomtee, and confirmed him still more in his hold on Lucknow. Yet in the heart of the city there lingered a band of fanatics, who, under the leadership of the Moulvie of Fyzābad, still made a determined stand. They were effectually dislodged from the position they held in an enclosed *serai*, by a body of troops under the direction of Sir E. Lugard, on the 21st. To overcome their resistance, it was found necessary to employ the sappers. They left 150 of their number dead behind them; and on their retreating before Lugard's advance, Brigadier Campbell cut in upon them with his cavalry, pursuing them for some miles and destroying many more of them. This was the last attempt at organised opposition by any detachment of the insurgents in Lucknow.

Measures were at once taken to reassure the well-disposed inhabitants, and to invite them to return to their homes, so long abandoned to the dangerous classes of the population, who had not omitted to profit by the anarchy and confusion consequent on the overthrow of British authority. The plundering of the camp-followers was checked, steps were taken for organising a police force, and the city gradually resumed its normal condition of peace and security.

Thus terminated this remarkable series of operations, which had extended over a period of twenty days. With a force, as he has himself shown, quite inadequate to invest a city 20 miles in circumference, Sir Colin had gradually carried out his well-matured plan of turning the enemy's defensive works, and of expelling some 100,000 armed men from the formidable positions which they had prepared with so much labour and skill. To effect this under any circumstances, must have involved a certain loss; but the care which he took to employ his artillery and to avail himself of the aid of the engineer, with a view to the economy of life, is abundantly exemplified by the result shown in the return of casualties. Of officers, 19 were killed or died of their wounds, and 48 were wounded; in the inferior ranks, 127 were killed, 595 were wounded, and 13 were missing,—the total loss amounting to 802 of all ranks, exclusive of the casualties in the Goorkha force, which may be reckoned at 300. To have achieved such a conquest with so comparatively trifling a loss of life, was not the least pleasurable reflection to Sir Colin. It more than compensated him for the disappointment occasioned by the partial miscarriage of his combinations for the attack on the Moosa Bagh.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In promulgating in general orders the despatches announcing the capture of Lucknow, the Governor-General alluded to this fact in graceful terms of compliment: "That this great success should have been accomplished at so little cost of valuable lives enhances the honour due to the leader who has achieved it."

At midnight on the 22d, Hope Grant marched with a small column to Koorsee, 25 miles from Lucknow on the Fyzabad road, in quest of a large body of insurgents, who, it was rumoured, had on their retreat taken up a position at that place under their leader Jai Lall Singh. On approaching Koorsee the mutineers were discovered moving off with several guns. Thereupon Hope Grant, who had brought his cavalry round the town out of fire, directed Captain Browne,<sup>1</sup> of the frontier force, to charge with two squadrons of the Punjab cavalry and a party of Watson's horse. The order was obeyed in the most gallant style, Browne riding five times clear through the rebel ranks, killing some 200 of their number and capturing 14 guns. This was the final movement of troops in connection with the operations of the siege.

No time was lost in removing from the city such of the troops as were not required to hold it, and in establishing, with the assistance of the Engineers, the garrison appointed to remain at Lucknow in a secure military position. So efficient were the measures adopted by Colonel Napier to this end, that on their completion Sir Colin paid him the compliment of telling him, "Your work has given me 7000 men." By the end of March, the army was broken up and a complete redistribution of the

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel J. Browne, K.C.S.I., K.C.B., V.C., recently commanding the northern column of the expeditionary force in Afghanistan.

forces effected. Hope Grant was selected to command the Lucknow field-force, which included the troops available for the garrison of Lucknow and for movable operations in Oudh. It comprised three troops of horse-artillery, three light field-batteries, three garrison batteries, with siege-train, a company Royal Engineers, a company Madras Sappers, three companies Punjab Sappers, the Delhi Pioneers; 2d Dragoon Guards, one squadron Lahore Light Horse, 1st Light Cavalry, Hodson's Horse, 7th Hussars; 20th Foot, 23d Fusiliers, 38th Foot, 53d Foot, 90th Light Infantry, 2d and 3d battalions Rifle Brigade, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, 1st Madras Fusiliers, 5th Punjab Infantry, and the regiment of Ferozepore.

The main body of the Goorkha force set out on its return march to the Nepaul frontier through Oudh—Jung Bahadoor proceeding with a few of his best regiments to Allahabad *via* Cawnpore, in order to pay a visit to the Governor-General.

In the meantime reports of an alarming character had been received from the Azimghur district. In the third week of March, the field-force operating in that quarter had experienced a serious discomfiture at the hands of a body of mutineers under the direction of Koer Singh. On the 29th a body of troops—consisting of half a troop of Royal Horse-Artillery, a Madras field-battery, a heavy field-battery (including 9 field-guns, 4 heavy guns, and 4 mortars), a detachment of Engineers, two squadrons military train, the 3d Sikh Cavalry, 12th Irregular

Cavalry, one squadron the 10th, 34th and 84th Foot—left Lucknow for Azimghur. This column formed the nucleus of a force which, together with certain reinforcements furnished from Allahabad and the troops already in the district, was destined to constitute the Azimghur division, under the command of Sir E. Lugard. His orders were to proceed *viâ* Atrowleca, and take Azimghur in rear. His route lay along the right bank of the Goomtee. \*

On the completion of these arrangements and the departure of certain corps to Cawnpore, there still remained a considerable body of troops disposable. These were eventually formed into a division under the command of Hope Grant, both for the occupation of Lucknow and the operations in the province.

The direction in which a column should be employed—indeed the future course of operations generally—had engaged Sir Colin's attention the moment Lucknow fell. Between him and Lord Canning this question formed the subject of earnest correspondence. In a letter of the 24th March, Sir Colin thus unfolded his views: "I have the honour to address your lordship on what may be the most advantageous mode of employing the troops who have lately been engaged in the siege of Lucknow. I approach this subject with the greatest diffidence, the more particularly as I may appear to be stepping beyond the proper limit of my duty in adverting to subjects having a political as well as a military bearing. Having been led to believe that your lordship

wishes for my opinion on the matter above alluded to, I lose no time in putting it forward. In a statement of troops and their possible disposition which I lately sent to your lordship, it appeared that after providing for a strong garrison at Lucknow, and two regiments for Goruckpoor and Benares, about 10,000 of all arms would remain available for other service.<sup>1</sup> The question, therefore, arises as to what is the best manner of employing this part of the force. It seems that there are two modes of making use of these troops—the one being to employ them in the province of Oudh in support of the central position of Lucknow, the other being the prosecution of operations beyond the limits of the province in Rohilcund. In favour of the latter—viz., Rohilcund—it may be said that great anxiety exists for its occupation. Those best acquainted with it allege that this can be effected with but little risk; but they admit that it requires combined operations from different quarters, and a considerable body of troops. It may therefore be taken for granted that all the regiments held to be available, after the mere garrison of Lucknow had been provided for, would be demanded for such an operation, the more particularly as to proceed against Bareilly would involve a siege. The province of Oudh being still in a state of active rebellion, it becomes a matter of doubt whether any mere garrison could take care of itself,

<sup>1</sup> “This includes about 1000 sappers and miners, who are non-combatants.”



—that is to say, whether it might not be liable to be blockaded and cut off from supplies, unless the country within a certain radius be thoroughly reduced and held. To do this effectually will demand the occupation of certain points of strategic importance as regards Lucknow. The bodies holding such points should consist of a brigade of infantry, with artillery and cavalry in proportion. While holding the points, these columns, kept in a movable state, would have to reduce the country in their own neighbourhood, to raze every fort to the ground, and disarm the population—most perfect communications being at the same time maintained with the capital. As the process became more and more complete, the distance from the capital would be increased; while at the same time opportunity would be afforded to the civil authority for the institution of a police, or of other military levies, which in the coming autumn would be able to hold the country with a reduced European force, as compared with that which is now deemed necessary. I venture to submit to your lordship that the experience gained during the last six weeks has led me to entertain the plan I have put forward. I have observed that wherever our columns have marched they have literally walked over the insurgent bodies; but that directly they had passed, the rebels again formed in their rear, cut off their communications, and intercepted their supplies. The respective marches of the Maharajah Jung Bahadoor, of Brigadier-General Franks, and Brigadier-General

Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., are all convincing instances of what has been advanced. In point of fact, until the country shall have been thoroughly reduced, we may almost say that, as far as the garrison of Lucknow is concerned, the enemy is as formidable after he has been beaten as he was before. As the most recent instance of this, I would quote the advance of the Rajah Jai Lall Singh to Koorsee, within sixteen miles of Lucknow, two days after the city had fallen. When Sir J. Grant advanced on him yesterday, more than half the enemy had decamped. But what would have been your lordship's anxiety if I had gone away with the bulk of the force to Rohilcund, and this Rajah had thrown himself into the city to excite the population and recommence the annoyance of last year? Again, it is reported that there are considerable assemblages at Nawabgunj and Sundeela. It is very possible that the reports are exaggerated; but they are sufficient to show how necessary the reduction of the country has become, and that it would be hazardous to trust to the action of one movable column, which it might be possible to detach from the garrison. With respect to the garrison and the position it holds, a few remarks may not be inopportune. For the due coercion of the town, and to give cover to the troops, we are obliged to hold a line of about two miles through the range of palaces along which the late advance was made. This occupation demands at least 5000 or 6000,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "This is exclusive of the cavalry, horse-artillery, and infantry nec-

thus leaving but a slender margin for a movable column. Hereafter, when the engineers shall have been able to clear great roads through the town and to construct a commanding citadel, it will be possible to reduce the force actually in the city to a considerable extent, but not till then. A vast mass of bazaars, stretching away to the north-west from the lines held by us, cannot be occupied by troops; and if the country around the city be not watched in the first place, and reduced afterwards as proposed, we may at any time hear of large numbers of insurgents entering those quarters to annoy the garrison. They would be expelled, but their expulsion would always cost much valuable life to our own soldiers, besides destroying the peace and welfare of the inhabitants. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, I am therefore of opinion that it is more expedient to be satisfied with the affirmation of real authority without delay in this province, than to attempt another operation in Rohilcund without leaving means behind us to insure the former.

“I would prefer, therefore, to shut in Rohilcund during the next four or five months, which would allow time for the organisation of Oudh. It would then be possible, in all probability, to liberate a considerable number of the British regiments without risk, when the same process might be repeated in Rohilcund.

essary to form a movable column—the two bodies together making up one of 9000 men, which I have given as a necessary garrison. This is considerably under the strength of the Lahore garrison at the date of the first occupation of that city, and of which I was commandant.”

In the meantime, if deemed advisable, the brigade formed at Roorkee might advance to the neighbourhood of Mooradabad, and Rohilcund thus be more thoroughly shut in—the movable columns of Mynpooree, Futtehghur, and Meerut being all employed for the same purpose.

“The Cawnpore district might in such case be slightly reinforced in cavalry and infantry, and more effectually guarded, Etawah being occupied. One other reason conduces to make me look to the side of prudence and caution in these matters. I am not altogether satisfied with Sir Hugh Rose’s situation, and I believe that we should be in a condition to lend him a hand. Such, my lord, are the views which I desire to submit to you. They have come upon me as the results of experience gained within the last few weeks. I cannot but think that, if the course indicated be followed, although there may be an appearance of want of quickness in the reoccupation of an old province, we shall gain much ultimately by the certain progress, which will be made in drawing the greatest possible consequences from the late military success.

“I am sure your lordship will believe that I have stated my views thus frankly without any presumptuous wish to obtrude my opinion. My real desire is to give you the benefit of what experience I may possess to facilitate the work of your Government.”

Lord Canning’s reply, four days later, during which interval the news of the reverse at Azimghur

had been received, clearly indicated his preference in favour of operations being undertaken against Rohilcund, and his reasons for arriving at that conclusion.

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I am greatly obliged to you for the full and clear exposition of your views in regard to the further employment of the troops, as conveyed to me in your letter of the 24th. ‘

“There can be no doubt that the two chief objects now before us are the support and extension of our position in Oudh and the recovery of Rohilcund. I feel the full force of the reasons which you have urged in favour of limiting active operations in the field to Oudh for the present, and of making clean work of that province whilst we are about it; and if the political condition of Rohilcund were the same as that of Oudh, I should acquiesce at once in the expediency of devoting our strength to the complete re-establishment of authority in the latter, and of contenting ourselves with watching and checking Rohilcund from without in the manner you have proposed. But there is a wide difference between the internal state of the two provinces, which must not be overlooked.

“You will perhaps remember that my opinion of the paramount importance of dealing first with Oudh was based upon the political necessity of wresting, not the province itself, but its capital, from the rebels. This has been done; and much

as I desire to see the whole of Oudh brought under our rule again, there are considerations connected with Rohilcund, which make the presence of a force within that territory urgently desirable.

“Unlike Oudh, the inhabitants of which have, with insignificant exceptions, been wholly hostile to us, Rohilcund contains a numerous well-affected population. The Mussulmans of the province are for the most part opposed to us. The Hindoos are almost universally friendly. Their numbers are about equal; but the Mussulmans are the more active and warlike, and for long they have been using every device and threat to bring the Hindoos into hostility towards us. The loyalty of the latter is as yet unshaken; but if we do not appear amongst them, and if we attempt no more than to hem in the province, cooping up the two parties together for four or five months, we must be prepared for one of two evil results,—either the loyalty of the Hindoos will give way, whereby disaffection will take deeper root in Rohilcund itself, and perhaps spread beyond it; or they will succumb to their stronger neighbours, and we shall incur the reproach of having withheld effective aid from them throughout their need.

“We should become open to this reproach not merely from our own subjects, but from the chief and people of Rampoor, whose little State, isolated in the centre of our province, has been threatened by one of the Mahomedan leaders for some time past,

and has barely been held against the rebels. This is a reproach that we can ill afford to incur, now that we are supposed to have gathered together our strength, and to be able to command success. We have quite recently been exposed to it in the case of the Chikaree Raja, overborne before any aid could reach him ; and if we give further ground for a like imputation in the case of half a province full of our own loyal subjects, contenting ourselves with looking on, whilst they are harassed and spoiled, it is impossible that the good name and authority of the Government should not suffer grievously.

“ As I have said, it would be very different if Oudh instead of Rohilcund were in question. Lucknow and its communications with the N.W. Provinces once secured, it would matter little if the rest of Oudh were left to itself, until we had leisure to deal with it. Its condition could not become worse, and there is not a man in it who has any title to our protection. By blockading it, and so keeping its mischief within itself, we should do enough for the moment.

“ Whether, with the amount of force at our disposal, it is possible to combine the retention of a secure hold upon Lucknow and its communication with these provinces with an effective movement into Rohilcund, I will not pretend to say. But if it can be done, I am of opinion that we ought to do it, leaving the unreclaimed parts of Oudh and those of Rohilcund for later treatment.

“ I do not give implicit confidence to the estimates

which local officers form of the facilities for success, but it is certain that we shall find in Rohilcund a large part of the people in sympathy with us, and possibly we may have aid from them; whilst the character and resources of the rebellion in that province are undoubtedly less formidable than in Oudh.

“I do not know whether a siege of Bareilly will be necessary—we ought of course to be prepared for it; but if this should cause difficulty, or much delay in moving into Rohilcund, I would prefer to see our troops march over the other parts of the province, putting down opposition and raising up the friendly portion of the population in support of the Government, whilst Bareilly should be left till all else was disposed of.

“I think it in the highest degree improbable that an organised resistance, such as we found at Lucknow, should spring up at Bareilly. There are not the same reasons for it, or the same facilities.

“Since this letter was begun, the account of the reverse at Azimghur has become more serious, and a brigade with 18 guns will now be moved from Lucknow in that direction. This reduces considerably the means of operating in Rohilcund, but I do not know that it need preclude operations. I hope that these may still to some extent be undertaken, and that if it should be necessary to postpone measures against Bareilly, this necessity need not extend to the open country of Rohilcund.—Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, yours very sincerely, CANNING.”



## CHAPTER XVI.

PROGRESS OF COLUMNS UNDER ROSE, WHITLOCK, AND ROBERTS—NECESSITY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE COLUMNS OPERATING IN BUNDELCUND AND THE HEADQUARTER ARMY—ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW AND FOR THE OPERATIONS IN ROHILCUND—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—SIR J. OUTRAM SUCCEEDED BY MR MONTGOMERY—SIR COLIN VISITS THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT ALLAHABAD—HOPE GRANT MARCHES TO BITTHOWLEE—LETTER FROM SIR JAMES OUTRAM—PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN ROHILCUND—WALPOLE'S CHECK AT RHOODAMOW—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—LORD CANNING'S REPLY—SIR COLIN LEAVES FOR ROHILCUND—JOINS WALPOLE—DEATH OF SIR WILLIAM PEELE—OPERATIONS IN ROHILCUND—ACTION AT BAREILLY—ARRIVAL OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JONES'S FORCE—JONES SENT TO RELIEVE SHAHJEHANPOOR—SIR COLIN CONGRATULATES LORD CANNING ON SUCCESS OF ROHILCUND CAMPAIGN—PUBLICATION OF THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE TO THE ARMY—SIR COLIN HASTENS TO ASSIST JONES—SUFFERING OF TROOPS FROM HEAT—SIR COLIN'S MANNER WITH HIS TROOPS—ANECDOTE—BRIGADIER COKE JOINS THE FORCE—LORD CANNING'S CONGRATULATIONS—SIR COLIN RETURNS TO FUTTEGHUR.

At this stage it will be convenient to recur to the progress of the columns under Sir Hugh Rose, General Whitlock, and General Roberts respectively, which, during the time Sir Colin had been engaged at Lucknow, were occupied in pursuing their operations in Central India.

HAVING destroyed the fort of Garakote, Rose left Saugor on the 27th February to commence his march upon Jhansi. Making a feint to force the pass of Narut, one of the depressions in the mountain-ridge which separates the territories of Saugor and Shahghur, he made for the pass of Mudhunpore. This, though difficult, was a less formidable passage than that of Narut, which the enemy had supplemented with artificial defences at the cost of much time and labour. On the 3d March, Rose carried the pass of Mudhunpore, defended by some 600 or 700 sepoy of the 52d N.I. and other regiments, as well as by 4000 or 5000 Pathans and Bundelas, after a short but vigorous resistance. The capture of this strong position was attended with important consequences, for it enabled him to open communications with his 1st brigade, and facilitated his advance to Jhansi by the command thus obtained of the tract of level country which lay between him and that place. Taking several forts on the way, and sweeping the enemy before him, Rose continued his advance to Jhansi. In the meantime, Stuart had successfully stormed the fort of Chandairee, situated about 80 miles S.W. of Jhansi. Pushing his cavalry and artillery in advance as he neared the place—to invest, as far as his limited numbers would permit, the fortress of Jhansi—Rose appeared before it on the 21st March. A careful reconnaissance revealed the formidable nature of the position, into which the Ranee, a woman of great energy, had thrown herself,

with a garrison variously estimated at from 12,000 to 17,000 men, prepared to offer a determined resistance.

The rest of the 1st brigade having arrived on the 26th, the breaching batteries were opened on that day. By the 30th the fire of the enemy was brought under ; but as it was doubtful whether the breach was practicable, it was decided to carry the city by escalade. Before, however, this was attempted, the enemy made a determined effort to relieve the place. On the 31st March, a force under Tantia Topee crossed the Betwa from Burwa Saugor and advanced against the British camp. Without interrupting the siege operations, Rose advanced to meet his opponent. By 8 A.M. on the 1st April the enemy was routed and in full flight, being rapidly followed up by the British cavalry, who captured eighteen guns and an immense quantity of ammunition. The assault on the place was successfully accomplished on the 3d April. The mutineers, conscious of the part they had taken in the murder and plunder of the Europeans in June of the preceding year, fought with desperation. They were, however, gradually forced back, till a large portion of the city was occupied by Rose's force on the 4th. News then reached Rose that the Ranee had fled. Losing heart through the defection of their leader, the rebels forthwith abandoned the remainder of the city, as well as the fortress, which was entered without another shot having been fired. Jhansi was won ; and, to the credit of the victorious soldiery, the women and children left in the town were treated

by them with such humanity as to call forth the thanks of their gallant commander.

Further to the eastward, General Whitlock was operating simultaneously with his column of Madras troops in Bundelcund. He had frequent encounters with bodies of the enemy varying in number; and finally, on the 19th April, he met and defeated at Bhowraghur a force of 7000 insurgents, led by the Nawab of Bandah. The city of Bandah was evacuated; and Whitlock, having taken possession of it, made arrangements, on the arrival of some reinforcements for which he had applied, to lend a helping hand to Rose in his advance to Calpee.

In the second week of March the Rajpootana field-force, under General Roberts, advanced from Nusseerabad against Kotah. Meeting with no opposition on the way, he reached the Chumbul on the 22d, encamping on the north bank opposite Kotah, the fort and palace of which, together with half the city, were held by the friendly Rajah and his Kerowlie allies. Sending a detachment across the river to maintain the quarter held by these troops against the enemy, as well as to secure the ferry, Roberts followed himself with the 95th and a detachment of field-artillery. On the 29th he opened fire with the heavy guns from the fort upon the enemy's camp. On the 30th, after turning the enemy's position by a skilfully-executed flank movement, Roberts carried it with a rush, capturing fifty guns, with but trifling loss to his own troops.

These operations were gradually bringing Rose and Whitlock within the sphere of the Commander-in-chief's direct supervision, for to him they were now beginning to look for instructions in carrying out the plan, originally agreed upon with the Governor-General, of advancing to the line of the Jumna.

This point had from the first been urgently pressed upon Rose's attention ; for on the establishment of his communications with Sir Colin across the Jumna by Calpee, depended the general plan of operations which were being conducted by the latter. In short, as Sir Colin himself showed in a minute prepared by him at the close of the war, "it had become necessary to treat all the operations extending from 'Patna' in the east, to 'Central India' and 'Rajpootana' in the west, including Gwalior, to 'Oudh' and 'Rohilcund' in the north-west, as one whole, in order to afford a certain reciprocal support to the various columns. If the enormous distance be taken into account, the great number of columns prosecuting separate campaigns,—though each of them looked to him and the small body of men under his immediate command as the centre and base, to which every detached general might appeal for support and assistance,—it will be easy to conceive the care, attention, and strictness required to produce concert amongst the columns and their leaders, and to induce the whole to work with harmony towards the general result ; hence came it that while he was himself actually engaged in Rohilcund in the field, every spare

moment of his time was taken up in watching, and on occasions directing, Sir E. Lugard in Behar, Sir Hope Grant in Oudh, Sir Hugh Rose in Bundelcund, and General Whitlock, who was moving to the north-east, and on the right of Sir Hugh Rose, and who had just come within the wide circle of operation."

Since the fall of Lucknow, Sir Colin had been busily engaged in superintending the preliminary arrangements for the approaching campaign in Rohilkund, which, owing to the advance of the hot season, it had become necessary to initiate with as little delay as possible. Every exertion was made to provide accommodation for the division destined to occupy the capital, and on the 3d April he was enabled to inform H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge that "the troops were well put up, and perhaps better off than if they were in regular barracks." "I am much engaged," he added in the same letter, "in so establishing defences, that, when necessary, the garrison may be diminished without risk, and some of the troops located out of the town. This requires much consideration, and the engineers are hard at work. It is possible, when sufficient progress has been made to satisfy me, that I shall proceed to Rohilkund and superintend the operations in that country. Sir Hope Grant remains in this difficult command. There are as yet no signs of pacification in Oudh, and all his vigilance and energy will be required to assist the civil authority in the re-establishment of government and order."

On the previous day he had addressed Lord Canning: "I have received your letter of the 28th March, and have directed my best attention towards the execution of your lordship's plans. . . . It seems tolerably clear that measures of precaution for the assurance of supply to the force left at Lucknow must not on any account be overlooked; otherwise the force left at Lucknow, although too large and powerful to be shut in, as was the case of the garrison last year, would be liable to be mobbed, to have the influx of food from the country intercepted, and in other ways to be so inconvenienced, that a report would quickly get about in the province, and from thence to India at large, that the British were again beleaguered. Under these circumstances, I would propose that one of the two brigades put down as disposable after providing the garrison, should be left in Oudh. The other one, being made complete with cavalry and artillery, may march *via* Sundeela to Shahjehanpoor. H.M.'s 75th and 78th, ordered to Meerut to occupy quarters, may be placed at the disposal of General Penny.<sup>1</sup> This will give him a European brigade (64th, 75th, 78th), besides his native troops. He might, when so reinforced, cross the Ganges. H.M.'s 60th has by this time joined Coke's brigade at Roorkee, which may be moved forwards. In addition to this, when these different bodies are operating in Rohilcund, the neces-

<sup>1</sup> Commanding at Meerut.

sity for keeping Futtehghur as strong as it is at present will cease, and one regiment between that place and Mynpooree will be sufficient. H.M.'s 82d will then join General Walpole at Shahjehanpoor. I propose to send General Walpole's force hence, although he can be ill spared, on account of the ability he has evinced throughout. Such are the arrangements which I propose. If your lordship thinks that they suffice to carry out your views, will you kindly let me know by telegraph? and the instructions for the plan of campaign shall be at once communicated to the officer commanding. So much arrangement is required here to make things safe, that I think it expedient for me to remain some time longer. When it is in my power to do so, I shall be only too happy to avail myself of your lordship's kind invitation to Allahabad. Now that Sir Hugh Rose's operation seems to be assuming a determined character with regard to this part of the world, and that Sir E. Lugard's march on Azimghur will doubtless put all matters right in that quarter, it appears to me that I should proceed in person to Rohilcund, to gather up the troops there so soon as a proper combination of marches has established the communication of the various columns. This will probably be effected in the course of three weeks. In the meantime, I could remain here to keep everything right and press forward the arrangements for the future security of the province."

On the 8th April, Walpole's force—consisting of



Tombs's and Remmington's troops of Bengal Horse-Artillery, a heavy field-battery, the 23d company Royal Engineers, a detachment Bengal Sappers and Miners, the headquarters Bengal Sappers and Punjab Pioneers, the 9th Lancers, the 2d Punjab Cavalry, the 42d, 79th, and 93d Highlanders, and the 4th Punjab Rifles—the cavalry under the command of Brigadier Hagart, the infantry under that of Adrian Hope,—moved out to the Moosa Bagh previous to their departure for Rohilcund. Their route was directed *viâ* Sundeela, Rhoodamow, Sandee, and Allehgunj, on the Ramgunga river. The object in taking this line was to turn the enemy's position on the Ramgunga, and secure, if possible, the bridge of boats across that stream for the use of the siege-train, which was intended to join Walpole's column from Futtehghur. In the city and its immediate vicinity, order was sufficiently re-established by the presence of the garrison, seconded by a native police in process of organisation, to admit of Sir James Outram's removal from the civil commissionership in Oudh, whence he was summoned to undertake the higher functions of a seat in the Governor-General's Council at Calcutta. His place was filled by Mr Montgomery,<sup>1</sup> who had hitherto been discharging the duties of judicial commissioner of the Punjab. As the senior civil authority at Lahore, in

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab—now a member of the Indian Council.

the absence of Sir John Lawrence at Rawal Pindie, to whom there was not time to refer, he had boldly accepted the responsibility of sanctioning the disarmament of all the native troops at Mekan Meer, by which admirable stroke of policy the capital of the Punjab was preserved in tranquillity from the earliest stage of the revolt.

Matters were now far enough advanced to justify Sir Colin proceeding to Allahabad for the purpose of conferring personally with the Governor-General. Before setting out, however, he instructed Hope Grant to march with a portion of his division to Baree, twenty-nine miles from Lucknow in a northerly direction, in order to disperse a force which the Moulvie of Fyzabad was reported to have collected. From thence he was directed to move eastward towards the Ghogra in search of the Begum of Lucknow, who was believed to have established herself with a large force at Bitthowlee, a fort situated at the confluence of the Chouka and Ghogra rivers. Finally, he was to proceed to Ramnuggur, with a view of covering the return march of Jung Bahadoor's Goorkhas, for the safety of whom the British officer in charge had expressed much alarm. The number of the sick was large, and the amount of their carriage enormous. Sir Colin disclaimed all responsibility for their movement, which had not emanated from him; and he expressed to the Governor-General his inability, in consequence of

the recent arrangements, to spare any of his troops to assist them.

On the 8th April, Sir Colin, accompanied by Bruce of the intelligence department, left Lucknow by *dák* for Allahabad. He remained but a short time in conference with the Governor-General; for, with his characteristic energy, he returned to Lucknow on the 11th, by which time Walpole had begun his march to Rohilcund. On the 14th, the force under Hope Grant marched for Baree and Bitthowlee; and having satisfied himself that all the arrangements for the efficient maintenance of the garrison of Lucknow were complete, Sir Colin despatched the headquarter camp, in anticipation of his own departure to Cawnpore, on the next day, joining it himself, in company with the chief of the staff, three days later at that station.

A siege-train, consisting of 28 heavy guns and mortars, under Lieutenant Tod Browne of the Artillery, had left Cawnpore for Futtchghur on the 15th, escorted by a squadron of Punjab Cavalry, the 78th Highlanders, and the 2d Punjab Infantry.

In the meantime, the despatches detailing the operations which had resulted in the conquest of Lucknow, had been published in the orders of the Governor-General. These had met the eye of Sir James Outram, when Lord Canning's guest at Allahabad, on his way down country, and produced the following letter, alike honourable to the writer and its recipient :—

“BENARES, 10th April 1858.

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I cannot give expression to the feelings of gratification and gratitude with which I read your Excellency’s Lucknow despatch, which I first saw at Allahabad. My gratification is, however, if possible, exceeded by my gratitude for the high honour you did me of intrusting to me so important a share of the operations, and for the ample force and admirable troops you placed under my command, which insured my successfully carrying out your orders.

“I am deeply sensible of the great obligations conferred on me by your Excellency, first in affording me the opportunity, and then providing me with the means, of performing what you have made such honourable mention of in the despatch. The having been so noticed by you, I regard as the greatest honour I have attained throughout my military life ; and as it is too likely that Lucknow was my last opportunity of seeing service, your having so generously made use of my services on that occasion would cause me to be the more sensible, if possible, of what I now owe to your Excellency.

“I was strongly tempted to await your arrival at Allahabad, on hearing you were coming yesterday, in order personally to tender my grateful thanks to your Excellency, but I was obliged to abandon the idea, for several reasons : I occupied at Government House the only room (I suspected) suitable for your accommodation ; the *dāk* arrangements were so in-

sufficient that, had I given up my *gharry* yesterday, I might not have got another for three or four days ; and I feared that my waiting might appear as if I wished to push myself into the counsels which you will have with the Governor-General.—I beg to subscribe myself, my dear Sir Colin, your Excellency's most deeply obliged and grateful and devoted follower,

J. OUTRAM."

The plan adopted by Sir Colin for the invasion of Rohileund was based upon the advance of two columns from separate points, one in a north-westerly direction from Lucknow, the other in a south-easterly direction from Roorkee. These columns, after sweeping the country during their onward movement, were destined to converge upon Bareilly, the capital of the province, which thus became the objective point of this strategical combination.

Thanks to the activity of the energetic ruler of the Punjab, an admirable force—composed of the 60th Rifles, the 1st Sikh Infantry, Coke's Rifles, the 17th Punjab Infantry, the Moultan Horse, a light field-battery, and two 18-pounders—had been collected at Roorkee, and placed under the command of Brigadier-General John Jones,<sup>1</sup>—the infantry brigade being under that of Brigadier Coke, who, as commandant of the 1st Punjab Rifles, had gained Sir Colin Campbell's entire confidence in service against the Afreedies and in Yoosufzai, in 1850 and 1852.

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General Sir John Jones, K.C.B.

Jones began his operations on the 17th April. Crossing the Ganges, his force encountered on the same day a body of the enemy posted in the jungle a few miles from the town of Nagul. The rebels, on receiving the British attack, gave way, and were utterly routed, losing five guns and all their camp equipage. Following up this success, Jones advanced to Nugeena, where, a few days later, he came upon another body of the Bijnour insurgents, whom he again defeated, capturing all their guns—ten in number—besides inflicting a severe loss upon them in killed and wounded. During the short time the force had been on the left bank of the Ganges, it had succeeded in taking 23 guns. In the last week in April, Jones reached Mooradabad, which had been evacuated by the insurgents. Here several of the rebel leaders were captured; and confidence was restored to the inhabitants by an end being put to the pillage and fighting which had occurred in consequence of a visit made by Feroze Shah, one of the Delhi princes, for the purpose of demanding supplies and money. At this place Jones halted until Walpole had progressed sufficiently to enable him to time his arrival at Bareilly simultaneously with that of the Lucknow column.

Walpole, in the meantime, had been prosecuting his march. About fifty miles from Lucknow the column came across one of the numerous forts enclosed by a mud-wall which are frequently to be met with in the province of Oudh. Into this place,

known as Rhoodamow or Rooyah, a body of insurgents, insignificant in number, had thrown themselves. Here the column received a momentary check, during which Adrian Hope, the accomplished leader of the Highland brigade, fell while reconnoitring close up to the ditch with a detachment of the 42d Highlanders and the 4th Punjab Infantry. From the loopholed wall, which concealed the enemy, was poured a well-directed fire, to which no effectual reply could be given, and which obliged the troops to fall back after incurring numerous casualties, including amongst them Lieutenant Bramley of the 42d Highlanders, endeared to his regiment by every quality that can adorn a soldier, as also Lieutenant Willoughby of the 4th Punjab Infantry, an excellent and spirited officer. The heavy guns were then brought up to breach the wall, and in the course of the night the fort was evacuated with scarcely any loss to its defenders.

On this occasion a daring deed of gallantry was performed by Quartermaster-sergeant John Simpson, of the 42d Highlanders.<sup>1</sup> Having heard, when the troops had fallen back, that one of his officers had been left behind in the ditch, this brave man ran forward and rescued, in the face of a withering fire, first Lieutenant Douglas, and afterwards a private soldier, both of whom had been dangerously wounded. On the same occasion, Private Davis of the 42d Highlanders brought in the body of Lieutenant

<sup>1</sup> Now Quartermaster of the 87th Brigade Depot at Perth.

Bramley, performing this duty of danger and affection under the very walls of the fort. Right worthily did the grant of the Victoria Cross commemorate these noble deeds. But not even this display of gallantry could mitigate the gloom which fell on the column when the news of Adrian Hope's death became known. This feeling extended itself to the army at large. No one was more deeply moved than Sir Colin himself. Referring to this incident in his despatch, he remarked: "The death of this most distinguished and gallant officer causes the deepest grief to the Commander-in-chief. Still young in years, he had risen to high command; and by his undaunted courage, combined as it was with extreme kindness and charm of manner, he had secured the confidence of his brigade in no ordinary degree."<sup>1</sup>

From Rhoodamow, Walpole made his way to Alleh-gunj, having defeated at Sirsa a large body of the enemy. Pursuing them with his artillery and cavalry, he captured their guns and camp, and

<sup>1</sup> The youngest son of General Sir John Hope, 4th Earl of Hope-toun, who had won renown under Moore and Wellington in the Peninsula, Adrian Hope had, during his brief though brilliant career, seen much service. With the 60th Rifles he had taken part in a campaign against the Kaffirs, and accompanied the late Sir William Eyre as Major of Brigade to the Crimea. On his promotion during the Crimean campaign, he was appointed to the 93d Highlanders, and was borne on the strength of that regiment when he met his premature death. It is a melancholy satisfaction to the compiler of this memoir to be able to pay a tribute, however slight, to the memory of this accomplished soldier; for he had known him as a schoolfellow, and from early days had learned to appreciate the high qualities, which gave promise of a brilliant future.



pressed them with such vigour as to save from destruction the bridge of boats, whereby he was enabled to cross with his heavy guns to the right bank of the Ramgunga.

Immediately on his arrival at Cawnpore, Sir Colin reviewed the situation in Oudh in a letter to the Governor-General. Writing on the 17th, he remarks: "I left Lucknow this morning, having stayed there till the last moment. I confess to having uncomfortable misgivings as to the state of things. It is evident that the most influential *talookdars* [landed proprietors], with Maun Singh at their head, although he continues to remain unseen, are determined to hold out for terms. If they act vigorously and press on General Grant from two or three quarters at the same time, he will have a very difficult task. They have it in their power to show that we only hold the ground we stand upon. The case, I suppose, is of course one of combination among the rebel leaders. There is circumstantial evidence of this, I think, in the very improper letter written by Maun Singh, the large gatherings at Bitthowlee and along the Ghogra, the move of Koer Singh on Azimghur, and the very suspicious proceedings of Beni Madho Singh between Roy Bareilly and Lucknow. General Grant has therefore been ordered not to extend his movement to Bitthowlee, which would commit him to an operation beyond the Chouka, and interpose that river between him and Lucknow. He has been told to clear the country between the

Chouka and the city, and then to come leisurely back, leaving his movable column at one march from Lucknow. I trust he may not be followed, which is not, however, impossible, as the very appearance of such a move will work immensely in favour of the rebels. But his return to Lucknow is indispensable, seeing what is going on in other parts of the province. General Walpole, I am sorry to say, received a check in his attack on the fort of Rooyah on the 14th inst., losing many valuable officers and men—amongst the former, to my great grief, the gallant and distinguished Brigadier the Honourable A. Hope. He was an officer eminently fitted for a separate command, and as such his loss is irreparable. A check is always serious; but at this particular juncture, unless General Walpole has been able to carry the fort since handsomely, the consequences may be very serious—not as regards his column, but the general feeling in Oudh, and the increased boldness of the insurgent chiefs. I have been obliged to be very liberal of cavalry to Generals Grant and Lugard, the consequence being that the force proceeding to Rohilcund is ill provided in that arm. This is a matter of more than regret, as Rohilcund swarms with the enemy's sowars. If your lordship thinks you can spare the Madras cavalry corps now at Allahabad, to be divided between Futtehpoor and Cawnpore, that would release a corresponding number of sowars and be a great assistance."

Prior to his departure from Lucknow, Sir Colin

forwarded to the Duke of Cambridge the correspondence which has been given above, relative to the conduct of the operations he was about to superintend, accompanying it with a request that it might be "considered as most confidential." "I am led," he observes, "to make this request to your Royal Highness in consequence of the very friendly footing of my acquaintance with Lord Canning, and the sincere regard I entertain for him. Your Royal Highness will observe that we have differed in opinion on the mode of employing the troops after the fall of Lucknow. Lord Canning has desired that the sphere of our operations shall be still further extended; whereas I am strongly of opinion that, on the grounds of military prudence as well as policy, we should not overtax the means at our command, but settle one province before we commit ourselves to a campaign in another. At this moment we have war all around us in this province of Oudh, and the country is not ours ten miles from the city. Columns march through it from time to time, but little or no effect ensues. The columns pass, the people again reassemble, and the march has to be repeated. Just now Sir Hope Grant is out with a column towards the Ghogra; Sir E. Lugard has marched along the Goomtee to Jaunpoor, on his way to Azimghur; and General Walpole is moving eastward towards Rohilcund. But these marches will not reduce the country. It must be held; and until it be held, there will always be

uneasiness at Lucknow. I do not think that the contest can come to an end on such terms, and there is much fatigue in store for the troops. The same reasons which caused me to recommend the settlement of Rohilcund before entering Oudh, now decide me in thinking that, as Oudh has been entered and Lucknow reduced, we ought on every account to make a complete job of it before employing the troops on other duties. I fear there will be much disappointment hereafter, when new campaigns have to take place on the same ground, and it is seen how very little hold we have of the country. In the meantime, I have exerted myself to the best of my ability to carry out the Governor-General's wishes; and I shall go to Rohilcund with a division and a small siege-train, while another brigade of all arms will move down from Roorkee towards Bareilly its capital. The amount of force is not satisfactory for the duty proposed, but it is all that can be spared. Sir H. Rose, having taken Jhansi, will advance shortly on Calpee, where alarm is said to prevail, besides much desertion from the ranks of the insurgents. In conclusion, I would beg to assure your Royal Highness that, although the Governor-General and I may not agree in opinion on the points above mentioned, there is not the slightest diminution of the cordial feeling existing between us, and that I shall carry out his lordship's views with the same earnestness as if they were my own."

Lord Canning was prompt in his reply to Sir

Colin's letter of the 17th. The following day he wrote: "This check at Rhoodamow is very unfortunate, and the loss most deplorable. I deeply lament the death of Brigadier Adrian Hope, who, I know, deserved all that you say of him. . . . Your account of the state of affairs in Oudh is not reassuring. We shall, of course, have to leave alone everything beyond the Ghogra; but I hope that a good deal may still be done towards getting hold of the country west and south of Lucknow. There will be need of a stronger guard than I had reckoned for on the Goruckpoor frontier if this state of things continues, especially as the Pearl's brigade ought to be relieved as soon as may be. I hoped to be able to keep that district quiet mainly by police; but if the Gonda Rajah, and especially Maun Singh, are actively hostile, police will not suffice. Moreover, the battalion of police which is destined to go there is otherwise engaged. About 700 under Captain Berry are above Cawnpore (at Akbarpoor, I think), and 300 at Jaunpoor. The latter are filling the place of Jung Bahadoor's men, who have moved homewards; but as I see that Sir E. Lugard has put three companies of the 34th at Jaunpoor, I hope the police may be pushed on to Goruckpoor without risk. Do you think that the 700 can be spared from wherever they are?

"In a letter which I have just received from Sir Robert Hamilton, he recurs to the question of the disposal of Sir H. Rose's force [after the anticipated

fall of Calpee], and urges that the Hyderabad troops, who are two months distant from home, and very eager to return there, should be allowed to do so. I gather, too, from his letter, that by the time that one of the European regiments can return from Calpee to Jhansi, accommodation for it will be ready at the latter place. I will tell him to make sure that this shall be so.

“I had thought, until I received your last letter, of proposing to you to remain lower down than Rohilcund, and to place the conduct of operations there in General Penny’s or other hands. But I see you are anxious to go forward, and I believe you are right.”

In the meantime, the siege-train with its escort had advanced by the usual stages to Futtehghur. The headquarter camp marched from Cawnpore to that place on the 18th April, Sir Colin remaining behind that day and rejoining it on the 19th. He was escorted by a squadron 5th Punjab Cavalry, a squadron 17th Irregular Cavalry, and the headquarters of the 80th Foot, about 300 strong. On arriving within a march of Futtehghur, Sir Colin rode straight in, leaving his camp to follow the next morning, the 25th, on which day the artillery park and siege-train crossed the Ganges by the bridge of boats, commanded by the fort of Futtehghur, and proceeded a few miles onwards. The 82d Regiment, which had been garrisoning that post, accompanied the siege-train, being relieved by the wing of the

80th which had escorted the headquarter camp from Cawnpore. On the 27th, Sir Colin and his staff joined Walpole's column, encamped at Inigree, six miles in advance of Allehgunj. The advance to Bareilly began on the following morning.

This day brought sorrow to Sir Colin and to the whole army. It will be remembered that Captain Sir William Peel, whose gallant bearing and actions were inseparably connected with the operations of the last six months, had been wounded in the attack on the Martiniere at the final conquest of Lucknow. Thence he had been removed to Cawnpore. He was on the way to recovery, was gradually regaining the use of his wounded limb—he had been shot in the thigh—and was already contemplating his departure for Calcutta, when he was attacked with smallpox. His constitution, debilitated by the effects of his wound and by climate, was unequal to the additional strain of this insidious disease, and on the 27th April his noble spirit passed away. Endeared to the officers and men of his own service, he had equally won, by the effect of his example, the admiration and respect of all ranks of the army, to whose success he had so largely contributed, so that in truth his loss may be said to have been regarded as a national calamity. Sir Colin accepted it in this light; and the death of this distinguished officer, whose services he had ever been delighted to recognise, fell upon him as a heavy blow. No less affected was Lord Canning. "You

will have been shocked and deeply pained," he wrote to Sir Colin on hearing the fatal news, "by poor Captain Peel's death. It is the saddest loss we have had, and the blow to his mother, who lived for him, will be terrible."

The route of the force about to operate in Rohilcund lay by the new road which crosses the Ramgunga at Bajpoorea Ghat, and passing through the town of Jellalabad, leads to Shahjehanpoor, a large town, and formerly a civil station, which the enemy was known to hold in force. His pickets, which had been felt on the 29th, retired before the advance of the column; and on the following day positive intelligence reached the British camp that the insurgents had evacuated Shahjehanpoor, and had retired in the direction of Mohumdee. Shahjehanpoor was found to be wellnigh deserted, and every house in the cantonment except one had been destroyed. Arrangements were forthwith made for establishing a small garrison in the place. The town being long and straggling, and the difficulty of preventing its reoccupation, should the insurgents return in force, being considerable, the jail was selected as the most defensible position. Leaving two 9-pounder bullock-draught field-guns and two 24-pounders, De Kantzow's irregular horse, and 500 of the 82d Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hale of that regiment, to hold the jail and its enclosure, the column resumed its advance on the 2d May. Still continuing along the Bareilly road, Futteh-



gunj was reached on the following day. During this day's march, a force consisting of a light field-battery, a heavy field-battery, two squadrons of the Carabineers, Lind's Moulton horse, the headquarters of the 64th Foot and of the 22d Punjab Infantry, and a wing of the Belooch battalion, joined the headquarter column at Meranpoor Kuttra. In conformity with Sir Colin's instructions, these troops, which formed part of the Meerut division, had crossed the Ganges at Nudowlee, and advancing through the Budaon district, united themselves with the headquarter column during its sixth march from Futtehghur. General Penny, commanding the Meerut division, had assumed charge of this force; but this officer unfortunately lost his life in a night skirmish on the 30th April. Brigadier Richmond Jones, on whom the command then devolved, disposed of the enemy in his front without difficulty, and crossing the Ramgunga marched across country to join Sir Colin. Thus reinforced, the Rohileund column continued its advance, the enemy's pickets falling back on Bareilly, the distance from which, by the 4th May, had been reduced to one march. On the following morning the column moved on Bareilly.

The troops, who were in motion from the camp at Furreedpoor at a very early hour, halted at the sixth milestone to admit of the baggage closing up. At 6 A.M. the force was formed in order of battle, and advanced in admirable order against the enemy,

who, with an air of great confidence, had come out from the city and taken up a position on the left or near bank of the Nerkuttea Nullah, having that stream in his rear. Sir Colin advanced to attack him in two lines. The first consisted of the Highland brigade, supported by the 4th Punjab Infantry and Belooch battalion, with a heavy field-battery in the centre—the flanks being protected by horse-artillery and cavalry. The second line was destined for the protection of the baggage and siege-train—a necessary precaution against the numerous horsemen, whom the insurgents were known to have at their disposal.

The advance was covered by a line of cavalry skirmishers—those of the 2d Punjab Cavalry being on the left of the road, those of the Lahore Light Horse on the right. The 78th Highlanders followed in support along the road, flanked on either side by two troops of the 9th Lancers, as well as by Tombs's and the half of Remington's troops of horse-artillery. Next came the 42d and 93d Highlanders, with the heavy batteries marching on the road between them, and flanked and supported by the Moultan horse, Punjab cavalry, the two squadrons of Carabineers, the remainder of the 9th Lancers and the 4th Punjab Infantry, the 79th Highlanders, the 64th Regiment, and the wing of the Belooch battalion. Then followed the siege-train and baggage, guarded by the wing of the 82d Regiment, the 2d and the 22d Punjab Infantry. The tail of the column was

closed by the rear-guard, consisting of half of Remmington's troop of horse-artillery, detachments of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and the 17th Irregular Cavalry. The strength of the British column amounted to 7637 men and 19 guns, exclusive of the siege-train.

About 7 A.M., as the column was making for the bridge over the Nurkuttea Nullah, the enemy opened fire from his guns, which had been advantageously posted on some sandhills situated on either side of the road, so as to command the approach to the bridge. The cavalry, with Tombs's and Remmington's troops, thereupon trotted out from the flanks, and the artillery unlimbering replied to the enemy's fire with such precision, that in a short time he was driven from his position and fled across the stream, abandoning such of his guns as were on the near side of the bridge. In the meantime the infantry, together with the heavy field-battery, pushed rapidly forward in line along the centre. On the line approaching the nullah, the left portion of it halted on its bank in position, whilst the right crossed the bridge and continued its advance some three-quarters of a mile in the direction of the town; but it moved forward very leisurely, as the numerous dense groves of trees concealed from view the enemy's position in the cantonments and towards the town. The heavy guns were brought over the bridge, and as they successively took up their ground, opened fire on the enemy's second line, which he had formed in the suburbs.

Considerable bodies of insurgent cavalry hovered on the left flank of the British, and watched the opportunity to fall on the baggage. The advance was now checked to admit of the siege-train and baggage closing on the Nerkuttea Nullah.

In the meantime a reconnaissance was pushed round the south-west side of the cantonment. The fort was found abandoned, but the greater portion of the cantonment still remained in possession of the enemy.

About 11 A.M. a fierce onslaught, described by Sir Colin in his official despatch as "the most determined effort he had seen made during this war," to turn and break through the left, was executed by a body of Ghazees or Mussulman fanatics. The 4th Punjab Rifles, so frequently distinguished during the past twelve months, had just taken possession of the Irregular Cavalry lines, and were still in broken order, when the Ghazees, to the number of 130 or thereabouts, availed themselves of the opportunity and rushed forward. Brandishing their swords, with heads low, and uttering the wild cry of their faith, they fell with great impetuosity upon the Sikhs, and drove them back upon the 42d Highlanders. This regiment, which had been formed in support of the Punjabees by Sir Colin's directions, as soon as his practised eye had discerned the hostile movement, was barely ready to receive the attack, when the Ghazees were upon them. Cheered by the presence of their chief, who encouraged them to be steady<sup>1</sup> and trust

<sup>1</sup> According to the testimony of one present on this occasion, Sir

to the bayonet, the 42d received the charge, but not before some of these fanatics had swept round the flank of the regiment and had fallen upon its rear. A hand-to-hand struggle ensued, short but sanguinary, for in a few moments every Ghazee was killed in the very ranks of the Highlanders. Their commanding officer, Colonel Cameron,<sup>1</sup> had a narrow escape. Three of the Ghazees, in the suddenness of their onslaught, pulled him off his horse. He would inevitably have lost his life but for the gallant intervention of Colour-sergeant Gardiner, who rushed forward and drove his bayonet through the bodies of two of them. General Walpole also narrowly escaped with his life, which he owed to the promptitude with which the Black Watch handled its steel. This conflict ended, the 42d, supported by the 4th Punjab Rifles and a part of the 79th Highlanders, advanced for a mile and a half through the lines into the cantonments, where they took up their position for the rest of the day.

Simultaneously with the rush of the Ghazees, an attempt was made by a large body of cavalry to cut in on the baggage and camp-followers. This contingency had been anticipated by Sir Colin, who, on the advance of the troops from the river-bank, had left Tombs's troop of horse-artillery, the two squadrons of Carabineers, the Moulteni horse, and the Colin's exhortation was, "Keep steady, men : it is among the young soldiers I see unsteadiness ; the old soldiers are all right," or words to that effect.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Alexander Cameron died at Bareilly in August 1858.

infantry of the rear-guard, to meet any such attack. The fire of Tombs's guns told with immediate effect on the enemy's horsemen, whose rout was soon completed by the cavalry. The cavalry lines were at once retaken, that end of the cantonment being forthwith abandoned by the rebels. Shortly afterwards, the villages and groves in the direction of the civil lines were seized and occupied by the 79th and 93d Highlanders, supported by the Belooch battalion. Prudence forbade pursuit of the enemy into the dense gardens and suburbs in the direction of the town. The fort was occupied by a detachment of the 42d Highlanders.

The action had lasted six hours ; and as the troops had been under arms since 2 A.M., it was necessary to place them under such shade as was to be found on the ground which they occupied. The sun's rays were oppressive, and a hot wind intensified the heat. So severe was it, that several fatal cases of sunstroke occurred ; and the troops likewise suffered much from thirst and fatigue. The baggage being jammed up near the Nerikuttea Nullah, ground for the camp was taken up on the Bareilly side of the stream. . Hospital-tents alone were pitched, the troops bivouacking in convenient positions on the field of battle. No reliable information as to the direction in which the enemy had retreated could be obtained, but it was afterwards ascertained that the largest portion of the rebels had fallen back on Pilleebheet.

The trophies of the day consisted of seven guns,

captured during the action. Several more were found abandoned in the town when the column finally entered it. The casualties, owing to the prudence with which the troops had been handled on ground admirably adapted to the defensive tactics of the enemy, were not heavy. The total losses amounted to 18 killed and 40 wounded. Of the 18 deaths, eight were attributable to heat-apoplexy, or sunstroke.

Early on the morning of the 6th, the column made a general advance into the cantonment. During the movement the sound of artillery was heard from the opposite side of the town. These guns belonged to the force which Brigadier-General John Jones had conducted from Mooradabad. This officer had executed the instructions he had received to the letter, and having defeated on the way an insurgent body, from whom he had captured several guns, was now engaged with another portion of them who were opposing his advance upon Bareilly. These he attacked with great spirit, taking four more guns. He next occupied a building in the heart of the town, and opened a communication with Sir Colin during the afternoon. A reconnaissance was made by a troop of Lancers and a squadron of the 2d Punjab Cavalry towards the Pilleebheet road, in which direction, and that of Bissowlee, it was ascertained that the rebels had made off. They came on a large body of fugitives, and cut up between 200 and 300 of them, after a long pursuit.

On the 7th, the town was entirely occupied, a few fanatic Mussulmans, who had taken possession of a house from which they were shelled, exhibiting, as they sold their lives dearly, the last signs of opposition.

On the same day information reached Sir Colin that the small detachment which he had left behind at Shahjehanpoor to form a post, as an evidence of British authority, was, as he had anticipated, exposed to annoyance from the strong body of insurgents who, on the evacuation of that place, had retired with the Fyzabad Moulvie and the local Nawab to Mohumdee. Within twenty-four hours after the headquarter column had turned its back upon Shahjehanpoor, Colonel Hale ascertained that a large body of rebels were approaching the town. He had barely time to complete his preparations for defence, before he found himself confronted by a mass of enemies computed at 8000 strong with 12 guns, happily of insignificant calibre. Adhering strictly to his instructions to act on the defensive, he resisted the temptation to try his fortune in the open, and for eight days and nights gallantly held his own against the formidable numbers of his foe, who closely invested his position, and seized the opportunity to levy requisitions, and rob and maltreat many of the inhabitants. Sir Colin forthwith organised a column to proceed to Colonel Hale's assistance. It was placed under the orders of Brigadier-General John Jones, and consisted of a light field-battery of



artillery, a detachment of heavy guns and sappers, a squadron of the Carabineers, Cureton's Moulteni horse, the 60th Rifles, 79th Highlanders, a wing of the 82d Foot, and the 22d Punjab Infantry. Leaving Bareilly on the 8th, Jones reached the outskirts of Shahjehanpore on the 11th. The enemy came out to meet him, was encountered in fair fight, and was defeated, losing one gun. The insurgent force consisted principally of cavalry well mounted, so that little or no opportunity offered of destroying any great number of them. Jones, pressing forward, entered the town and relieved the little garrison, whose gallant defence elicited the marked approbation of Sir Colin, never backward in giving credit where it was due. Modesty in an officer he, with his quick and generally just appreciation of character, was forward to recognise. He therefore took the opportunity of conveying to the Governor-General in an official form his acknowledgment that "Lieutenant-Colonel Hale had hardly done justice to himself in his report of this defence, which was conducted by him with prudence and skill, and consequently with trifling loss."

In a letter written to one of his oldest and most attached friends on the 8th May, Sir Colin dilates on the events in which he had been the principal actor. "The siege" (of Lucknow), he remarks, "had been no sooner concluded than other operations had to be undertaken in different parts for the sup-

pression of insurrection. The task of the reconquest of the province of Rohilcund has been allotted to me. The discomfiture of the rebel force, and the capture of its capital, Bareilly, I effected on the 6th instant; but there remains much to be done and much harassing work for the troops before the insurrection can be suppressed, and the numerous bodies of the enemy within the province dispersed or expelled from it. Other provinces of the empire are in a similar state, requiring troops. Altogether we soldiers have much to command our serious attention in the kind of war in which we are engaged.

“The sun burns very fiercely at this season in these regions. The thermometer (Fahrenheit) stands at this hour, 1 P.M., in my tent at 112°. We lose more men by sunstroke, in carrying on operations at this season, than by the fire of the enemy. Can you wonder that many just now long to find themselves again in the more moderate climate of their own country, and in the opportunity of being near to those they hold in affection? and that those who have been in the field since the commencement of this war would be glad of a little rest under the cover of a house, to escape the heat to which they are now exposed? But they cannot be spared.

“In the kind of life I have been speaking of, with the business of this great army to attend to, you will, I think, find a little excuse for the delay which has taken place in replying to your note.”

Together with the despatch reporting his operations in Rohilcund, Sir Colin addressed the following note to the Governor-General :—

“ BAREILLY, 10th May 1858.

“ DEAR LORD CANNING,—I congratulate your lordship very heartily on the success of the Rohilcund campaign. The combinations, which had been projected for this purpose some time before, came off very happily and punctually, and have been, I am pleased to think, the cause of much economy of life, as the enemy was obliged to divide his forces, and so play our game. I hope to hear that the relief of Shahjehanpoor will have been effected to-morrow. I have had a strong inclination to send a brigade to take post at Seetapoor in Oudh, on account of the commanding position of that place; but after weighing the information received from day to day, the necessity of keeping some reserve in hand, and the fact that a brigade sent to that point would be shut off from all support after the first fall of rain, I have thought it prudent to abandon the project. I am obliged to send back to the Punjab the Sikh corps, which have been fighting ever since May of last year. I hope to receive in their places new corps from Sir John Lawrence; but in the meantime, till the arrival of the reliefs two months hence, I shall be crippled in native infantry. I have seen a good deal of Mr Alexander, and am doing what I can to assist his

views. Efforts are being made to secure cover for the troops, but we can hardly expect complete success in this respect before the rains. I hope soon to be on the Great Trunk Road once more, and again in telegraphic communication with your lordship."

On the same day he wrote to the Duke of Cambridge:—

"I have the honour to forward to your Royal Highness a copy of my despatch to the Governor-General announcing the capture and occupation of Bareilly. This result of the combined marches of various columns, which, as your Royal Highness is aware, have been proceeding for some weeks, has been accomplished with comparatively small loss in the field; and the troops, though unavoidably suffering from the effects of the sun at this season, have borne up wonderfully against their fatigues. Rohilcund will now be occupied by a military force as far as our means may admit of; and it is not likely that the insurgents will again assemble in large numbers in this particular province. According to my last news from Oudh, affairs remain pretty much the same in that quarter as when I left Lucknow. Sir Hope Grant is employed in moving leisurely through the country on Roy Bareilly, where, I suppose, he now is. But owing to the interruption of the post, I have no very recent information respecting him. Sir Hugh Rose should

by this time be very close to Calpee, if he be not already laying siege to it. General Whitlock remains at Bandah, and represents the state of the country to be such in his neighbourhood that he cannot leave it to co-operate with Sir H. Rose, as he was directed to do, if he thought it prudent. Thus, excepting the final reoccupation of Rohilcund, which is a source of great satisfaction to Government, the situation of affairs remains about the same as when I last had the honour to address your Royal Highness. I beg to tender my very grateful thanks to your Royal Highness for your two letters of the 24th March and 2d April. I can never be sufficiently thankful for so much kindness and support."

On the same day on which these letters were despatched, the dispersion of the Rohilcund force began. The two Punjab infantry regiments, the 2d and 4th—than which no two corps had performed better service during the last eventful twelve months—set out on their return to the Punjab. The headquarters of the Carabineers accompanied them as far as Meerut.

On the 11th, Brigadier John Coke, taking with him Hammond's light field-battery, a heavy field-battery, 100 pioneers, a squadron of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, a wing of the 42d Highlanders, the 1st Punjab Infantry, and the 1st Sikh Infantry, marched in the direction of Pilleebheet. A force, composed of Remington's troop of horse-

artillery, a heavy field-battery, the 2d Punjab Cavalry, a wing of the 42d Highlanders, the 78th and 93d Highlanders, together with the 17th Punjabi Infantry, was selected to form the garrison of Bareilly.

Having thus brought the campaign in Rohilcund to a satisfactory conclusion—so far as the occupation of Bareilly and the dispersion of the main body of the insurgents were concerned—and having thereby secured the re-establishment of British authority, which was vested in the person of Mr Alexander, the Civil Commissioner, Sir Colin committed the charge of the troops in the province to General Walpole. He next proceeded to carry out his intention of regaining the Great Trunk Road, so as to be once more in direct communication with the headquarters of Government and with the separate columns, which, though operating in various and distant parts of the country, looked to the Commander-in-chief for their instructions.

Before doing so, however, Sir Colin seized the occasion to convey to the army, in the following general order, the gracious message which the Queen had sent to the troops in the letter her Majesty wrote to him on receiving the intelligence of the relief of Lucknow:—

“The Commander-in-chief has received the most gracious commands of her Majesty the Queen to communicate to the army an expression of the deep interest felt by the Queen in the exertions of

her troops, and the successful progress of the campaign.

“Sir Colin Campbell has delayed giving execution to the Royal command, until he was able to announce to the army that the last stronghold of rebellion had fallen before the persevering attempts of the troops of her Majesty and the Honourable East India Company.

“It is impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to express adequately the high honour done to him in having been chosen by the Queen to convey her Majesty’s most gracious acknowledgments to the army, in the ranks of which he has passed his life. The Commander-in-chief ventures to quote the very words of the Queen” (*vide ante*, p. 137).

On the 15th, Sir Colin, taking with him the remainder of the Rohileund column, including Tombs’s troop of horse-artillery, a portion of the siege-artillery, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, three squadrons of Punjab cavalry, the greater portion of the 64th Regiment, the wing of the Belooch battalion, and the artillery park, marched towards Shahjehanpoor, which place he reached on the 18th. At Tilhur, on the way, the remainder of the 9th Lancers joined the column. The rebel force, which Brigadier-General Jones had encountered, having been augmented by a large portion of those who had evacuated Bareilly, had become so formidable in cavalry as to prevent his following them up, as had been originally intended. On the 15th, Jones had been

attacked in so vigorous a manner by a large body of the enemy, led by the Moulvie of Fyzabad and Fer-ozeshah, the Delhi prince, that he found himself reduced to the defensive. For this reason Sir Colin hastened to his assistance, obtaining shelter from the terrific heat for his jaded men under such *topes* or groves of trees as were to be met with on the way. Notwithstanding all his precautions, the sun told with distressing effect upon the troops. During Jones's march to Shahjehanpoor, the 60th Rifles, which had borne its full share of fighting and exposure at Delhi, and was regarded as an acclimatised and hardy regiment, suffered very severely from sunstroke. Imagination fails to realise the painful consequences of a march made under such circumstances. All honour, then, to these noble soldiers, who, sustained by the example of their veteran leader, bore up with cheerfulness and alacrity against a foe far more formidable than the enemy, whom they were straining every nerve to encounter in fair fight.

Though as much exposed as the private soldier—for on such occasions he on principle shared the fatigues and privations of his troops—Sir Colin enjoyed excellent health. The manner in which he bore the heat and the bodily exertion of riding for so many hours continuously on the march, was a marvel to the members of his staff. On these occasions he invariably had a kind word to say or a remark to make to the soldiers as he rode with the column.



Often he would crack a joke with them. One instance out of many. Riding through the camp one day, he met a Highlander with a parrot on his shoulder. "Well, my man," said Sir Colin, with a smile on his face, "are you trying to teach your bird Gaelic?" At all times and under all circumstances he was accessible to any one, European or native, seeking an interview with him. Frequently he would astonish a stickler for decorum, when, regardless of appearances, he would transact his business in his shirt-sleeves, or carry on the conversation with a visitor through the walls of his tent whilst taking his bath.

Sympathy and encouragement he was ever ready to offer on more serious occasions. On this return march, a member of his personal staff,<sup>1</sup> a Highlander, and acting in the capacity of body-surgeon to Sir Colin, believed himself to be at the point of death, in consequence of an overdose of belladonna administered by the native apothecary. In this frame of mind he sent for his chief to take leave of him. Sir Colin finding his friend, to whom he was warmly attached, in a very agitated state, caused by the peculiar effects of the poison, endeavoured to cheer

<sup>1</sup> W. A. Mackinnon, C.B. He has since served with distinction in New Zealand, as well as with the expedition to Ashantee, and is now Deputy Surgeon-General. Though belonging to the non-combatant branch of the service, this officer had manifested in the Crimea such combative proclivities as to draw from Sir Colin the remark, "Why, sir, did they not make a soldier of you? There was a good soldier spoiled the day they made you a doctor."

him, adding, "Don't be alarmed. You have gone through greater danger than this, and do not be frightened if you see the grave now open to receive you." Mackinnon recovered, and a few days afterwards was by his chief's side as some of the Highlanders were marching past. On his remarking what a fine body of men they were, Colin Campbell replied, "Yes, they are,"—adding significantly, "I can always trust them." The feeling was quite reciprocal.

The British force was encamped in the cantonment of Shahjehanpoor. The ground on the far side of the Kanaut Nuddee, and all the fords by which it could be crossed, were watched, and the town was occupied by a strong detachment of infantry. On the day of Sir Colin's arrival a strong picket with guns was posted in the village of Lohidpoor, on the left bank of the Kanaut. A bridge was completed across the nullah in rear of the Lohidpoor picket before nightfall. About 3 P.M. the enemy made a demonstration, bringing out some guns and displaying large bodies of cavalry in front of the village of Lohidpoor, as well as higher up the nullah opposite the British left. The pickets were reinforced; and as the enemy advanced, the British guns opened at long range. A desultory cannonade ensued on both sides until evening fell.

On the morning of the 22d, Brigadier Coke's force, which had proceeded to Pilleebheet, returned *via* Bareilly, and joined the headquarter column.

In the meantime the Governor-General acknowledged the receipt of Sir Colin's report of his recent operations. "I was delighted," wrote Lord Canning on the 20th, "to get your very satisfactory report of the complete success in Rohilcund. You have indeed good right to be pleased with the way in which all your combinations came off; and, so far as I hear, there are no signs that the good result of them will be marred by any after-clap, excepting that of Shahjehanpoor. The only thing I regret is, that we have not been able to lay hands upon any of that constellation of scoundrels who were collected at Bareilly."

Orders having been given to Brigadier-General John Jones to attack the enemy at daybreak next morning, Sir Colin, accompanied by his staff and a small escort, left Shahjehanpoor at midnight of the 23d, rested during the day of the 24th at Jellalabad, having accomplished a double march of 22 miles, and starting at night for Futtehghur, reached that place at 7 A.M. of the 25th, after a second double march—the most trying, from its heat, that any one with the force had ever experienced.

Jones carried out his instructions, and advanced upon the insurgents' position at Mohumdee, which fell into his hands; but the rebels beat too hasty a retreat across the Goomtee to admit of his cavalry capturing their guns. On his force returning to Shahjehanpoor, Jones detached a column under Colonel Taylor to drive the rebels out of Shahabad.

## CHAPTER XVII.

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL HALTS AT FUTTEHGHUR—SIR H. ROSE'S OPERATIONS IN BUNDELCUND, KOONCH, CALPEE—GENERAL ORDER—SIR COLIN'S REASONS TO LORD CANNING FOR COMING TO FUTTEHGHUR—PREPARATIONS AT ALLAHABAD FOR ACCOMMODATION OF HEADQUARTER STAFF—SIR F. LUGARD'S OPERATIONS AGAINST KOER SINGH—MUTINEERS SEIZE GWALIOR—FLIGHT OF SCINDIAH—SIR H. ROSE TAKES GWALIOR—NAPIER PURSUES REBELS—SIR COLIN SUMS UP THE SITUATION IN LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—LORD DERBY ANNOUNCES BESTOWAL OF PEERAGE—LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—SIR COLIN REPLIES—HOPE GRANT AT NAWABGUNJ—LETTERS TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, SIR H. ROSE, AND GENERAL WHITLOCK—LETTER TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH—ANTICIPATIONS OF LORD CANNING'S POLICY VERIFIED—CONDITION OF GORUCKPOOR AND BEHAR—LETTER FROM DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—SIR COLIN REVIEWS THE SITUATION IN TWO LETTERS TO H.R.H.

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL remained at Futtehghur till the 5th June. Having regained the Great Trunk Road and the telegraph, he was once more in direct communication with the head of the Government at Allahabad, and in a position to exercise a more active supervision over the separate columns operating in Oudh and Behar, as well as over those engaged in Bundelcund, now that they had reached the line of the Jumna.

In the last-mentioned territory important events had taken place during the progress of the campaign in Rohilcund. Jhansi, it will be recollected, had fallen early in April. At that place Sir Hugh Rose was detained till the 25th of that month, engaged in consolidating his conquest and making arrangements for the further progress of his column. His plans being laid, he was in movement the latter end of April. On the 7th May, having gathered up some detachments and reinforcements, he reached Koonch, a town where the rebels occupied a strongly-intrenched position, with the object of covering Calpee. Turning their defences by a flank movement to the N.W., and directing his attack from that quarter, Rose drove the enemy's infantry out of the woods they occupied, and stormed the town. Finding their retreat menaced, the rebels retired on Calpee. The pursuit, in the course of which eight guns and a quantity of ammunition and tents were captured, continued for eight miles, when the cavalry and horse-artillery pulled up from sheer exhaustion. The heat was intense, and the troops had suffered much from the effects of the sun. Even Rose himself was prostrated for a while, but rallied on the prompt application of restoratives, and was soon in the saddle again, completing the discomfiture of the enemy. From Koonch he continued his advance, and struck the Jumna at Goolowlec, six miles below Calpee. In combination with Rose's advance, Colonel Riddell had been directed to move with his own

column from Etawah in the Doab towards Calpee, whilst Colonel Maxwell closed with his detachment from Akbarpore on the same point. General Whitlock at Bandah guarded the territory to the southwards. Rose thus hoped to hem in the rebels, and minimise, as far as possible, their chances of escape. On the 22d, a portion of Maxwell's force having previously been ordered by Rose to cross the Jumna and join his main body, whilst the remainder assisted in the bombardment of Calpee from the left bank, the enemy moved out in great force, and made a determined attack on the British camp at Goolowlee. Finding his right flank hard pressed, Rose brought up the camel corps (part of Maxwell's detachment), which, charging with the bayonet, effected the complete rout of the enemy. On the following day the British force advanced and took possession of the town and fort of Calpee, which the rebels abandoned without further resistance. Panic-stricken, they fled in the direction of Jalaon, pursued by the cavalry, horse-artillery, and camel corps, which overtook them, capturing all their guns (eight) and ammunition, and killing many of their numbers. The pursuit, however, was checked in consequence of the heat, which was overpowering. Fifteen guns were taken in the fort, as well as several standards belonging to the Gwalior and Kotah contingents. A large quantity of powder, as well as many other ordnance stores, were captured; and the existence of four cannon-foundries, and of the appliances for the

manufacture of wheel and gun carriages, proved that Calpee was nothing less than an arsenal, which the rebels, disheartened and disorganised, had thus precipitately abandoned. Rose's first care was to organise a flying column, under Colonel Robertson,<sup>1</sup> wherewith to follow up the fugitives, who continued their retreat in the direction of Gwalior. Then, anxious to give his jaded troops rest, and in the belief that their labours were for a time suspended by the defeat and dispersion of the rebel forces in Bundelcund, he issued a complimentary order to his troops, and made his arrangements for proceeding to Bombay on sick certificate. In the more genial climate of that Presidency, he looked forward to obtaining the repose which the exposure and the anxiety he had undergone in the late harassing campaign induced him to seek.

Taking advantage of the more favourable aspect of affairs consequent on the termination of the Rohilcund campaign and the fall of Calpee, Sir Colin Campbell issued the following general order, in which he reviewed the events which had occurred since he took the field in the autumn of the previous year :—

“ In the month of October 1857 the garrison of Lucknow was still shut up, the road from Calcutta to Cawnpore was unsafe, the communications with the north-west were entirely closed, and the civil and military functionaries had disappeared altogether

<sup>1</sup> The late Colonel Robertson, commanding 25th Bombay Native Infantry.

from wide and numerous provinces. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-General, a large plan was designed, by which the resources of the three Presidencies, after the arrival of reinforcements from England, should be made available for combined action. Thus, while the army of Bengal, gathering strength from day to day, has recovered the Gangetic Doab, restored the communications with the north-west of the empire, relieved the old garrison of Lucknow, afterwards taking that city, reoccupying Rohilcund, and finally insuring in a great measure the tranquillity of the old provinces, the three columns put in movement from Bombay and Madras have rendered like great and efficient services in their long and difficult marches on the Jumna, through Central India, and Rajpootana. These columns, under Major-Generals Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., Whitlock, and Roberts, have admirably performed their share in the general combination, arranged under the orders of his lordship the Governor-General. This combination was spread over a surface ranging from the boundaries of Bombay and Madras to the extreme north-west of India. By their patient endurance of fatigue, their unfailing obedience, and their steadfast gallantry, the troops have enabled the generals to fulfil their instructions. In no war has it ever happened that troops should always contend against immense numerical odds, as has been invariably the case in every encounter during the struggle of the last year, and in no war



has constant success without a check been more conspicuously achieved. It has not occurred that one column here, another there, has won more honour than the other portions of the army: the various corps have all done like hard work—have struggled through the difficulties of a hot-weather campaign, and have compensated for paucity of numbers in the vast area of operations by continuous and unexampled marching, notwithstanding the season. It is probable that much yet remains for the army to perform; but now that the Commander-in-chief is able to give the greater part of it rest for a time, he chooses this moment to congratulate the generals and troops on the great results which have attended their labours. He can fairly say that they have accomplished in a few months what was believed by the ill-wishers of England to be either beyond her strength or to be the work of many years.”

On the 26th May, Sir Colin wrote to Lord Canning: “I arrived at Futtehghur yesterday, having left Brigadier-General Jones the task of following up the rebels from Shahjehanpoor. I felt that if I began the business myself, it would be necessary for me to remain with the force to the conclusion, and that I might be detained in consequence for ten days or so. The inconvenience which would have ensued would have been considerable, as the various columns which are in movement in other parts, stand in need of constant direction by telegraph. . . . The result

of affairs at Calpee is about what I anticipated. The rebel cavalry before General Jones is very alert, and, I am afraid, cannot fail to elude his grasp. It is beautifully mounted on horses plundered from Arab merchants and our own officials. However, I am sure that everything that man can do will be effected by Brigadier-General Jones and Brigadier Coke towards breaking it up. I assume that they were at Mohumdee yesterday, but I have not as yet received a report from that place. It is a matter of much regret to me that Colonel Clark, the Commissioner, was obliged to retire before the Moulvie and Nurput Singh from Sandee a few days ago. The truth is, the placing him there was premature, and was, I venture to think, in opposition to your lordship's views, as lately expressed in your instructions for the functionaries of Rohilcund. I fear that the unresisted march of our columns renders the Chief Commissioner too sanguine, and that he forgets that, until we are in a position to garrison the country, the attempt is vain to re-establish authority by the presence of isolated officers. I am happy to say that General Grant is acting with great prudence and discretion at Lucknow; and I think your lordship may rest assured that no mischief will arise in that quarter, although we must be prepared for many false alarms, until your lordship is prepared to undertake the thorough reduction of the country. When Brigadier-General Jones has completed his operations, H.M.'s 79th will come here, to be in

reserve for service either in Oudh or Rohilcund. The trip to Rohilcund has thrown all official work sadly in arrear; but if cover of any kind can be found at Allahabad for the headquarter establishment—I mean the clerks of the different offices—the whole shall move at once and endeavour to reach that place before the rains commence. In order to arrive more speedily at Allahabad, Mansfield will proceed by carriage-*dák*.”

On the same day that the foregoing was written, Lord Canning acknowledged by a letter a telegram Sir Colin had sent him on the subject alluded to in the concluding paragraph. “I will let you know in the course of the day by telegraph precisely how the matter stands; the post leaves too early in the morning to allow of my obtaining full details to put into this letter. But I have this morning examined the house which is in preparation for yourself and personal staff, and can report well of its progress. Six of the rooms are carpeted and punkahed, and as many more are painted. Most of the rooms are large, but three or four are very dark. Furniture is still wanting, but has been long since ordered from Benares. Upon the whole, without saying that it is a pleasant residence (the gallows are unluckily in sight of the door), I believe you would think it fairly good quarters.

“I wish to say, however, that even if the answer to your inquiry respecting cover for the departments should be satisfactory, I beg that you will have no

scruple in abandoning all thoughts of coming, if you feel that your presence in the neighbourhood of the Rohilcund garrisons is necessary. In that case I shall still probably ask you to meet me at Cawnpore on some day before the rains set in, where I would also ask the Chief Commissioner of Oudh to join us. I received a triumphant message from Sir H. Rose yesterday proclaiming the capture of Calpee. . . . I am still uneasy about Hyderabad, and have ordered the Simoom to the Cape upon the chance of Sir George Grey [the Governor of that colony] being able to give a regiment. It is not a good chance; for I have just heard from England—since I wrote to you on this subject, I think—that the young battalions upon which he was reckoning when he made the offer of more troops have not been sent to him.

“Sir E. Lugard’s work at Jugdeespoor trains on, and I cannot help him with any native force, which he most wants, from any quarter.”

The hopes of an early settlement of the disturbances at Azimghur were destined to disappointment. Unable, on the arrival of his forces at Sultanpoor, to cross the Goomtee, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge and the absence of any boats, Lugard was compelled to take the more circuitous route by the right bank to Jaunpoor. On reaching Tigra, a few miles to the north-west of Jaunpoor, on the 11th April, he ascertained that a rebel force under Golaum Hussein, which had been threatening Jaunpoor, was in his vicinity. Lugard had halted his troops to rest

them after a long march in great heat, when he heard in the evening that the rebels were moving off. He pushed on after them, and catching them up, dispersed them, capturing two guns. He then continued his advance through Jaunpoor, and appeared before Azimghur on the 15th. Prior to his arrival, a small force, consisting of the headquarters and right wing of the 13th Light Infantry and a detachment of the Queen's Bays, together with four guns which had been sent from Benares on the 2d April under Lord Mark Kerr, had, after a somewhat critical encounter with the enemy, on its approach to Azimghur, afforded opportune succour to the small British garrison threatened in its intrenched position at that place. Lugard at once attacked the rebel force, which had taken up a position covering the bridge of boats over the Tons. After a vigorous opposition, the enemy was forced back; but so well had Koer Singh provided for his retirement, that as the British crossed from their side of the Tons, his main body were observed evacuating Azimghur. Its retreat was conducted in a very orderly manner—so much so, that, when Lugard's cavalry and horse-artillery, after a lengthened pursuit, caught up the enemy, they found they had an unbroken and organised body to deal with. Beyond securing three guns and a good deal of ammunition and baggage, little effect had been produced upon the foe. Having suffered a sensible loss, the pursuing force halted and sent back to Azimghur for reinforcements. Remain-

ing at Azimghur with his main body to watch the proceedings of the rebels north of that place, and to direct the pursuit of Koer Singh, Lugard despatched on the following day Brigadier Douglas,<sup>1</sup> in command of a force including, amongst other troops, a wing of the 37th Foot, the 84th Foot, and a proportionate amount of artillery, to reinforce the pursuing column. On the 17th, Douglas attacked Koer Singh near Azimutghur and drove him from his position. The rebels retreated to Nagra, and thence to Secunderpoor, closely pursued. Douglas, on reaching Secunderpoor, ascertained the enemy's intention to cross the Ghogra. He therefore followed him up with unremitting energy, and eventually, on the 20th, came up with him and defeated him, dispersing his main body and capturing a brass 9-pounder gun, some ammunition-waggons, elephants, &c. To accomplish this, Douglas had marched nearly 120 miles in five days, the heat being intense, and the troops without the protection of their tents. Koer Singh now made for the Ganges. Cleverly evading two regiments of Madras cavalry posted at Bulliah to intercept him, he made for Sheopoor Ghat, where boats which he had had collected were in readiness for him. By the time Douglas reached that place, this wily chieftain had succeeded in transporting the greater portion of his force in safety to the right bank of the Ganges, whence he withdrew to his native jungles of Jugdeespoor. Some 200 men, the tail-end

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir John Douglas, G.C.B.

of the rebel force, a gun, and some elephants, were all that fell into Douglas's hands.

An effort to dislodge Koer Singh's force from Jugdeespoor ended in a serious discomfiture. In the hope of attacking the rebels before they could intrench themselves, some 150 men of the 35th Foot, 50 sailors of the Naval brigade, 150 of Rattray's Sikh police battalion, with two guns, proceeded into the jungle, where they encountered the enemy at daylight of the 23d April. The force appears to have got into difficulties on finding itself surrounded and fired upon. The order for retreat was sounded; a panic, which the officers vainly attempted to check, ensued; and in their flight, in which the guns were abandoned, the greater portion of the Europeans were killed or succumbed to sunstroke. The officer commanding, as also two other officers of the 35th, lost their lives.

The flames of insurrection which had thus been kindled afresh in Behar, necessitated the advance of Sir E. Lugard, in view of the initiation of operations on a serious scale in the district of Shahabad. The oldest and most valuable of the mid-Ganges provinces was threatened, and Calcutta itself was alarmed in consequence. The Bengal Government lost no time in forwarding a European regiment from Calcutta by bullock-train to Sasseram, whilst the detachments of the Shannon's Naval brigade on their way down country were detained at Shergotty. On the 25th April, Douglas crossed the Ganges, followed in the first days of May by Lugard, who, after securing

Arrah, laid his plans for attacking the stronghold of Jugdeespoor.

In this and the subsequent operations in Behar, Colonel Corfield commanding at Sasseram, and Brigadier Christie in charge of the brigade at Dinapore, were directed to co-operate with Sir E. Lugard. Avoiding the difficulties of the jungle, Lugard skirted it with the view of approaching Jugdeespoor through the open country from the western side. The insurgents, in the belief that the direct route through the jungle, which had been followed by Major Vincent Eyre and on the recent occasion, would be again taken, had expended considerable time and labour on its defences. They discovered their mistake too late; and though they attempted to bar the passage between the two jungles by which Jugdeespoor is approached from the north-west, they were taken by surprise, and were speedily driven from the position, which they had not time to strengthen. They were followed up at once, many being killed in the pursuit, and Jugdeespoor was captured on the 9th May.

Rumours had already been rife of the death of Koer Singh, who, it was reported, had been wounded in one of the recent engagements. Now it was ascertained beyond doubt that he was dead. He had been wounded by a grape-shot in the wrist, and died shortly afterwards at Jugdeespoor. He was a remarkable man—not having been bred to warlike pursuits, for which, however, he possessed no inconsiderable



aptitude. He was advanced in years when he took the field in July of the previous year, and by his physical and mental energy, as well as by the extraordinary influence he exercised over his followers, proved himself to be one of the ablest leaders and most redoubtable foes, with whom the British power was called upon to measure its strength during the course of the revolt.

Lugard now followed up the rebels; and, with the co-operation of Corfield, he succeeded during the remainder of the month in defeating and dispersing their main body. On the 27th May the guns lost by the Arrah detachment were recaptured. These successes, however, were not obtained without great fatigue to the troops, who suffered much from the heat of the jungle. It was a difficult and harassing kind of warfare; for on the approach of our troops the insurgents broke up into small predatory bands, which committed great havoc in the districts through which they roamed. No longer formidable as a military body, they kept the province in a state of anarchy and confusion, giving no rest to the troops, many of whom fell victims to the deadly effects of exposure at this season.

The first week in June brought startling news from Gwalior. The main body of the mutineers who had fled from Calpee and were pursued by the flying column under Colonel Robertson, out-distanced that officer. Preceded by Tantia Topee, who made at once for Gwalior to intrigue with the Maharajah's

troops, they reached Morar, the cantonments of the old Gwalior contingent, situated in the immediate vicinity of Scindiah's capital. Though placed in a position of great embarrassment, the young Maharah remained steadfast to the British cause. With an inferior force he moved out from Gwalior and engaged the enemy at Morar on the 1st June. The successful endeavours of Tantia Topee to tamper with his troops became too evident at the beginning of the action. A large body of them went over to the rebels, leaving no alternative to Scindiah but to seek safety in flight. Attended by a few faithful followers, he struck the Dholpoor road, and made for Agra, which he reached two days later. Gwalior was taken possession of by the mutineers, and a native government avowedly hostile to British authority established.

On the receipt of this intelligence Sir Hugh Rose resumed his command, and made his preparations for an immediate advance upon Gwalior. He recalled his detachments; and organising his force in two brigades—one of which was placed under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart, Bombay army, the other under Brigadier R. Napier of the Bengal Engineers—availed himself of such reinforcements as could be spared to him from other quarters. Colonel Smith, commanding the Sipree brigade, was directed to move towards Gwalior without delay; whilst the column under Major Orr, advancing from the south, was to join it on the way. Maxwell and

Riddell were to co-operate with their respective columns in strengthening Rose's base and communications. Pushing his troops forward with as much celerity as their strength would admit of under the terrible heats of June, Rose, on the ninth day after leaving Calpee, reached a point distant a few miles from Morar. On the following day, the 16th, as soon as he had reconnoitred the position, he attacked the insurgents, who were expecting reinforcements from other quarters, and drove them out of the cantonments, following them up with a vigorous pursuit, in which they lost many of their numbers. The next day the Siprec column, under Smith, who had been joined on the march by Major Orr with his men of the Hyderabad contingent, forced the defile of Kotah-ke Serai, about five miles from Gwalior. The enemy made a stout defence. On this occasion the Ranee of Jhansi lost her life when endeavouring to escape. On the 18th, Rose, leaving a guard to hold the Morar cantonments, made a flank movement of some miles, and joined Smith and Orr, who in the meantime had obtained possession of some hills from which they had ousted Tantia Topee. On the following day Rose advanced with the united force and attacked the heights in front of the city, prior to a contemplated assault on the lofty hill-fort, placed on a rock, on the eastern base of which Gwalior is situated, and which forms its citadel. In face of a well-sustained fire of artillery, the assaulting columns carried the heights in gallant style, charging up to

and capturing the enemy's guns, 27 in number. The struggle, though severe, was not of long duration. The rebels, seeing the ease with which the heights were won, lost heart, and fled panic-stricken across the plain. The cavalry were brought up in pursuit, whilst Rose advanced against the city. By the evening, Scindiah, who in the meantime had joined the force from Agra, found himself once more master of Gwalior. The fort was captured on the 20th by a party of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in which daring exploit Lieutenant Rose, a gallant young officer, lost his life.

Scindiah being replaced on his throne, then began what Sir Colin described in a subsequent official record as "that hunt of the rebel leaders which was finally brought to a conclusion by the capture of Tantia Topee in April 1859."

Determined to give no breathing-time to the fugitives, Rose organised on the spur of the moment a flying column, composed of a troop of horse-artillery, a troop of the 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3d Light Cavalry, a wing of the cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, and three troops of Meade's horse—about 600 men, with 6 guns—which he placed under the command of Brigadier Robert Napier.

Shortly after dawn of the day following the capture of Gwalior, Napier reached Sunnowlee, twenty-four miles from that place, and soon afterwards hit upon the enemy at Jowra Alipore. He at once resolved to attack, notwithstanding the odds against

him. Observing a disposition on the part of the foe to withdraw, he executed a movement to his right against nine of their guns, with Captain, Lightfoot's troop of horse-artillery, supported by the cavalry detachments. Lightfoot, after discharging two rounds, limbered up, and dashing forward at full speed drove the enemy from his guns. The mutineers, panic-stricken and demoralised, made no attempt at resistance, but dispersed, abandoning the remainder of their artillery, 16 guns, which fell into the hands of their pursuers. Finding himself outstripped by the nimbleness of their flight, Napier, after following up the main body of the rebels for a considerable distance, relinquished the pursuit as hopeless, and returned to Gwalior with the trophies of this brilliant achievement. The Central India field-force was now broken up, the troops which composed it being distributed at Gwalior, Jhansi, Sipree, and Goona. Right nobly had they earned the repose to which, after so many months of fatigue and exposure to the terrible heat of an Indian sun, they had become so justly entitled. Their gallant commander, after issuing a feeling address to the force, repaired to Bombay with the view of recruiting his health, which had been sorely tried during the triumphant march he had accomplished through Central India.

Sir Colin left Futtehghur on the 5th June, having made the necessary arrangements for such troops as he could spare to support Sir Hugh Rose's advance

upon Gwalior, and having satisfied himself that matters were progressing favourably in Rohilcund and the Doab. During the progress of recent events the latter territory had remained undisturbed, save by one or two hostile irruptions of rebels in the month of May. On reaching Allahabad, Sir Colin took up his quarters in the house prepared for him by Lord Canning.

Before leaving Futtchghur, Sir Colin, in a letter addressed to the Duke of Cambridge on the 30th May, summed up the military situation: "I beg leave to repeat that a very difficult and perhaps dangerous task is still before this army, although the brilliant part of the struggle is probably at an end. Every day tends to show this more and more. As soon as the troops are recruited in health after the rains, the most extensive movements will have to take place for the subjugation of the various provinces through which our marches have lately been made. Bundelcund, where Sir H. Rose now is, and Oudh, will require very serious treatment. It will be no easy matter to find the natives required to swell the several columns which will be necessary to carry out the work of reduction and subjugation. The successful marches of Sir H. Rose and General Whitlock would not have been made if it had not been in the power of Sir R. Hamilton, the Governor-General's agent, to play off certain rajahs and chiefs against each other. By such means their communications and supplies were secured. Had I not been

aware that such would be the case, it would not have been in my power to recommend the very extensive combinations, the result of which has been attended with so much success. In Oudh the game is more difficult, because we have no friends or adherents in that province. But I take it that in Oudh, Central India, and Bundelcund, it will not suit our Government hereafter to admit of such a state of things as previously existed, and which has been found to be so dangerous on the first appearance of trouble. Thorough reduction has become a necessity in many quarters in which, before, we were content to exercise political influence. Such, I venture to submit to your Royal Highness, is what we must look for throughout all the wide provinces to which I have alluded. Before leaving this subject, I wish to bring most favourably to the notice of your Royal Highness the manner in which Major-Generals Sir H. Rose, Whitlock, and Roberts have carried out the duties assigned to them. The labours undergone by their respective divisions have been very great; and we have equal reason to be satisfied with the generals and the troops under their command.

“With regard to the future constitution of this army, it is, I regret, out of my power to say anything of consequence to your Royal Highness. The Government of the country is just beginning to move in this matter, and a set of queries has been forwarded to me for my consideration. But to make a fit reply to them, I stand in need of such information

as I can hardly obtain until I reach Allahabad and am released from active field-duty. Meanwhile, I am engaged in making the final arrangements for Rohilcund. After they are completed, I shall make my way with all speed to that place, so as to be near the Governor-General. I promise your Royal Highness to give my best attention to the question of relieving some of the corps which have suffered most ; but for the next few months they must remain quiet, if the rebels will but permit them. Rest is what they all want. I confess also to a dread of parting with any of the old soldiers. The young men lately from England invariably throng the hospitals, and cannot take care of themselves."

On the 11th June, Sir Colin again wrote to the Duke of Cambridge: " Since I had the honour of addressing your Royal Highness, I have taken up my quarters at Allahabad, where I have had the pleasure of meeting the Governor-General. He, I am happy to say, has nearly recovered from a severe attack of fever. The seizure of Gwalior by the rebels who fled before Sir H. Rose is a very serious affair, and may be the cause of great trouble hereafter, not in the immediate locality only, but also in the wide Mahratta countries which stretch from thence into the very heart of the Bombay Presidency. As soon as the news reached me, I anticipated the orders of Government, and sent instant orders for the whole force which had been engaged at Calpee to march on Gwalior. A brigade has been organised to co-oper-



ate from Dholpoor on the Chumbul, which is to the north, while another has been ordered to advance from Sipree, which is to the south of Gwalior. Then Sir H. Rose will find himself at the head of a far stronger body of troops than he has yet had under his orders. I hardly expect that the resistance he will meet with at Gwalior will be really serious; but what I am afraid of is, that the rebel leaders will have been so much enriched by the plunder of Gwalior, that they will be supplied with the means of carrying on the war for an almost indefinite period in the manner most annoying to us, by which they wear down our troops, while they constantly elude our grasp. In Behar we have an instance of the same sort. Sir E. Lugard has been most actively employed for the last six weeks in chasing considerable bodies of rebels; but just when he fancies they are utterly broken and dispersed, he hears of them fifty miles off, and of their threatening such cities as Benares and Ghazepoor. In short, we are fairly engaged in the contest over an immense surface, of the extreme likelihood of which I ventured to warn your Royal Highness some months ago, when it was determined to undertake the siege of Lucknow. But it is impossible to multiply the troops sufficiently to meet the calls from all sides, more especially at a time when rest has become an imperative necessity for a large portion of them. Behar, however, on one side, and Gwalior on the other, admit of no temporising, and we are obliged to push the troops

almost beyond the limits of their endurance to meet the urgency of the necessity. . . .

“Before closing this letter, I may mention that Oudh remains in about the same state as when I last wrote. If there be a difference, it is that the rebels have rather closed in on the capital. We must remain on the defensive in that country for some months, till the return of the cool weather. There has been much sickness among the troops during the last month, but I am happy to say there is some improvement in this respect.”

Just at this period the mails conveying the replies to the despatches announcing the conquest of Lucknow reached the headquarters of the army. With them also came the Ministerial acknowledgment of Sir Colin's services, and the announcement of the rewards which the Government proposed to confer on him. When Parliament reassembled in February, Lord Derby, the then leader of the Opposition, whilst taking occasion to refer to the services of the army in India, had remarked that it was “due to the survivors in the contest, and to the House of Lords, to take the earliest opportunity of expressing its deep sense of the great exertions, the signal valour, the happy mixture of exemplary prudence and distinguished talent and military skill, which have characterised the victories of the gallant Sir Colin Campbell, who,” he added, “it is not too much to say, has vindicated, if indeed he has not raised, the high reputation which he had previously

earned." An early opportunity was subsequently taken by the Government to carry through both Houses a vote of thanks, which was duly notified to all concerned.

In the meantime the Government had changed hands, Lord Palmerston being succeeded by Lord Derby as First Minister of the Crown. Accordingly, it devolved upon the latter statesman to take the Queen's commands regarding the form in which her Majesty considered it became the country to mark its sense of Sir Colin's services.

"DOWNING STREET, *May 3*, 1858.

"SIR,—I have the highest gratification in being honoured with the Queen's commands to signify to you her Majesty's unqualified approval of the distinguished services which you have rendered to her Majesty and to the country as Commander-in-chief of the armies in India. Sanguine as were the hopes which her Majesty had entertained of the results which might be expected from your appointment to that high command, you have more than realised them all: and the judicious manner in which you have formed your plans of operation; the steadiness, patience, and perseverance with which you have carried them out; the care which you have at all times taken not unnecessarily to throw away the lives of your troops, not less than the energy and vigour with which, at the right time, you have known how to strike the decisive blow, and the

determination with which it has been struck,—have merited and have received her Majesty's most cordial approval. Your crowning success in the final capture of Lucknow, it is hoped, may be looked upon as having broken down the most formidable remnant of organised military opposition; and her Majesty deems the present a fitting moment for marking her high sense of your eminent and brilliant services by raising you to the dignity of a peer of the United Kingdom, by such title as you may think it proper to assume. Until I receive the intimation of your own wishes on this subject, I shall be unable to give directions for the preparation of your patent, which shall be done as soon as I hear from you. In the meantime, permit me to add to the gracious commands with which I have been honoured, the far less important but very sincere tribute of my own high admiration, my congratulation on your well-merited honours, and the expression of my satisfaction at being the medium of a communication which, I hope, will be as gratifying to yourself as I am sure it will be to the country at large, and especially to the gallant army which has had the honour of serving under your orders. To prevent any delay with respect to fixing the title which you may wish to assume, I may as well remind you that there is already a Lord Campbell in the House of Peers in the person of the Lord Chief-Justice.—I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

DERBY.

“General Sir COLIN CAMPBELL, G.C.B.”

No less flattering were the encomiums passed upon him by the Duke of Cambridge, to whose unfailing support Sir Colin was so much indebted, and to which in almost every one of his letters he referred in terms of profound gratitude. In a letter of the 2d April, written upon the intelligence of the advance upon Lucknow being received in England, his Royal Highness comments upon the combinations which had produced this result, and adds: "It is to you that the whole of this success is owing; and I cannot too highly compliment you on your able conduct of these great operations, which certainly rank amongst the greatest combinations in war in our day. Indeed, my dear friend, but for your talent, ability, and discretion, I know not what would have happened; and England must indeed be proud of possessing so accomplished a commander. As for myself, you are the comfort of my life; and there is nothing that I can say which can sufficiently express my admiration of your character, and of all you have done for the army and for the country."

"HORSE GUARDS, *May 10, 1858.*

"MY DEAR COLIN CAMPBELL, — Your letters of March 26th and 27th have reached me by the last mail, enclosing the interesting despatch of March 22d, which gives a full account of the whole of your proceedings in the capture of Lucknow. It is a most able despatch, giving a clear and most valuable

account of the whole course of events, and doing full justice to all the parties engaged; and I congratulate you on the success of this magnificent operation, which has been planned and executed with that ability, talent, and sound judgment for which the whole of your proceedings have been so conspicuous from the day on which you first assumed the command of the armies of India. Doubtless you have been ably seconded by your subordinates, and have to thank the gallantry and devotedness of the troops for the execution of the operations intrusted to them to carry out; but still the merit of the undertaking rests with you, and to you must be awarded that honour and those rewards which you have so nobly and so gloriously acquired for yourself and your army. . . .

“Sir Hugh Rose seems to me to have conducted his operations against Jhansi with great energy and talent; and his routing so large a force of rebels without giving up the siege of the place, upon which he was at that moment engaged, evinces a great amount of coolness and military talent, which I rejoice to see evinced in that officer, of whose talents I had always formed a high opinion. The taking of Kotah, again, by General Roberts, is an event of much importance to our position in Central India; and I trust that that very distracted portion of our possessions in the East may now be restored to some sort of order and tranquillity. . . .

“We have at length received your official re-

commendations, and I am happy to say that your wishes have been forestalled in almost every instance. Indeed we have gone, if anything, beyond what you have wished. Such promotions and honours as have not already been given shall at once be attended to.

“And now as regards yourself and the honours to be conferred on you. As a matter of course, I shall, and indeed have, recommended that your rank as full general should at once be confirmed; and I am glad to find that the Government have rightly decided to confer a peerage upon you, my dear and valued friend. I congratulate you upon this well-earned honour, and I congratulate the Peerage on being permitted to take up amongst its members so great and distinguished an ornament as yourself. But as to the title, I think, if I were you, I should wish to be called up by the title of ‘Lord Clyde of Lucknow.’ I think it would be a charming title, associated with the part of Scotland from whence you sprung, and with the great operation in the East in which you have been engaged. If, therefore, you have not already replied to Lord Derby’s communication on the subject, I hope you will do so now in the sense stated above. There are a thousand other subjects that crowd themselves on my mind, and which I could wish to write to you about; but they are not so pressing, and so to-day I will not inflict a longer letter upon you. I hear that one of my letters to you was found in the Kaiser Bagh. Is

this true? In that case I fear that several letters must have missed you. I think I wrote by almost every mail.—I remain, my dear friend, your most sincere friend,  
GEORGE."

Colin Campbell replied to Lord Derby as follows:—

"ALLAHABAD, *June 16, 1858.*

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge your lordship's letter, in which you announce to me the most gracious commands of her Majesty the Queen for my elevation to the Peerage.

"I beg the great favour of your lordship to place me at the feet of her Majesty, and to tender the expression of my profound devotion to the Queen, and of my gratitude for the extraordinary favour with which her Majesty has been pleased to regard my humble services.

"I trust your lordship will accept my sincere thanks for the very flattering and kind terms in which you have announced her Majesty's most gracious intentions. I wish I could believe that my services to the State were worthy of such high encomium.

"In answer to your lordship's inquiry as to my future title, I would ask to suggest that it should be 'Clyde.'—I have the honour to be, my lord, your most faithful and obedient servant,

"C. CAMPBELL, General."



On the previous day he had addressed the Duke of Cambridge :—

“It is with no ordinary feelings of gratitude and devotion that I have the honour to reply to your Royal Highness’s most kind and flattering letter of the 10th May, written after the Lucknow despatches had been received. The favour of her Majesty is indeed most precious to me. I have been singled out for honour in a manner which never entered my imagination, and I have been distinguished by your Royal Highness’s most friendly regard; while my duties have been lightened by the kindest countenance and protection from the moment her Majesty was graciously pleased to nominate me to the command I have the honour to hold. Few men have been so favoured, and I feel very strongly how much I owe to your Royal Highness.

“Since I wrote, no information of importance has been received from Gwalior. Sir Hugh Rose expected to have completed his concentration by the 19th instant, and I trust that a very few days will then suffice to replace our ally Scindiah in possession of his capital.

“I am sorry to say that the columns, which have been operating during the last six weeks, have suffered much—not more than was to be expected perhaps, but still in a manner to justify all our objections to hot-weather campaigns. With the exception of the force under Sir Hugh Rose, and a movable column in Oudh, which is in constant motion, the

regiments are now for the most part under cover. Sir Hope Grant had a very successful action on the 13th instant at Nawabgunj, to the east of Lucknow, and took six guns. It is hoped that this will quiet the neighbourhood of that city for some time to come. General Whitlock's operations in the neighbourhood of Bandah have been attended with much success. Sir E. Lugard has driven the rebels from the jungle of Jugdeespoor. They are still very troublesome, and cause much alarm. I am happy to say that Lord Canning has no present intention of quitting his Government. . . .

"In accordance with the gracious suggestion of your Royal Highness, I have adopted the title of Clyde. I have thought it, on the whole, advisable not to add the word 'Lucknow,' as the baronetcy of the late Sir Henry Havelock was distinguished in that manner. It might be unbecoming in me to trench, as it were, on the title of that very distinguished officer."

Strange as it may appear, Sir Colin, though conscious that he had performed good service to the State, and extremely grateful for the condescension shown him by his Sovereign and her Ministers, at first shrank from the proffered honour. This was owing to his innate modesty of character, which prompted him to retire within himself when it became a question of his own exaltation. He was, as Sir William Mansfield recorded in a letter written at this time to Sir Hope Grant, "much disposed to run

restive at being put into such strange harness ; but he is now reconciled, and, I think, very much pleased.”<sup>1</sup>

The success of Sir Hope Grant, to which Sir Colin alludes in his letter to the Duke of Cambridge, deserves mention ; for it was a spirited affair, and illustrates forcibly the difficulties, which Sir Colin anticipated would arise in Oudh, in consequence of Lord Canning’s preference to postpone the reduction of that province, until Rohilcund had been wrested from the grasp of the rebels. As an immediate result of the defection of Scindiah’s troops, a gathering of rebels took place at Nawabgunj, some eighteen miles from Lucknow on the Fyzabad road. This place is not to be confounded with that of the same name on the Cawnpore road, against which Hope Grant had operated in the month of April, and where a body of British troops were now posted. Grant, collecting a force consisting of the 2d and 3d battalions Rifle brigade, the 5th Punjab Infantry, a detachment of Engineers and Sappers, the 7th Hussars, two squadrons of the 2d Dragoon Guards, Hodson’s horse (commanded by Daly), 150 Wales’s horse, 250 of the mounted police corps, Mackinnon’s troop of horse-artillery, and Gibbon’s and Carleton’s light field-batteries, left Lucknow for Chinhut on the night of the 12th June. At Chinhut he left his baggage and supplies under charge of Colonel Purnell, who commanded a force at that place. Then pushing forward along the road to Nawabgunj, he made for a bridge across

<sup>1</sup> ‘Incidents in the Sepoy War.’

a nullah, so as to occupy the interval between the rebel force and the jungle. The bridge and ford were commanded by a few guns, which were soon silenced by the 9-pounders, thus enabling the passage to be effected. As soon, however, as the column had crossed, a pitched battle ensued, which lasted for three hours, the enemy attacking simultaneously the front, rear, and flanks of Grant's force with great spirit and pertinacity. In their ranks were many Ghazees, who fought with great determination. Even with the ample force at his disposal, Hope Grant had for some time enough to do to hold his own. Bringing up a battery, he caused four of its guns to open fire on a body of the enemy who had brought two guns into the plain in rear of the British column, and with them were causing great annoyance. The discharges of grape at 500 yards' distance told with great effect, and mowed down numbers of these desperadoes, who defiantly hoisted two green standards, and appeared determined to sacrifice their lives at their guns. They were finally dislodged by two companies of the Rifle brigade, and their discomfiture was completed by two squadrons of the 7th Hussars, led by Sir William Russell, sweeping through them and destroying every one of them. The defeat of the enemy was secured. Their force was broken up, and they fled, leaving some 500 or 600 dead on the field, many wounded, and six guns—the trophies of this desperately contested struggle. Hope Grant's loss in fair fight did not exceed 67 killed and

wounded ; but, as usual, the sun proved to be the European soldier's worst enemy, upwards of 30 men having succumbed to sunstroke, whilst many more were compelled to seek relief in hospital.

“ TO H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE,

“ ALLAHABAD, 24th June 1858.

“ The telegraph will have informed your Royal Highness of the success attendant on Sir H. Rose's advance on Gwalior, which is a subject of great congratulation. The result has been what I ventured to predict—the capture of Gwalior being easily effected. Sir H. Rose deserves the greatest credit for the manner in which he has pushed forward his troops and beaten the enemy ; and the subsequent pursuit by Brigadier-General Napier, C.B., in which the enemy lost all his remaining guns, is a brilliant sequel. Brigadier-General Napier is still in pursuit, and it was believed, according to the advices last received, would again come up with the fugitives at Jubulgurh. It is to be hoped he may have such good fortune. I trust that these successes may 'cause the fear of serious Mahratta danger to cease. In the meantime we are much troubled in the disturbed districts of Behar. The troops under Sir E. Lugard have been put absolutely *hors de combat* in consequence of the fatigues they have undergone. All the senior officers of his force, with the exception of two or three, and, I grieve to say, including himself, have been obliged to leave on

account of ill health ; consequently I have great difficulty in finding officers to conduct the operations. Sir E. Lugard is a most serious loss. The next in seniority — Brigadier Douglas, H.M.'s 79th — will command in the districts referred to.

“ I have thought it advisable not to interfere with the recommendations of Generals Sir H. Rose, Roberts, and Whitlock for promotions and rewards as shown in their despatches, on account of the great services rendered in Central India ; and I would humbly solicit your Royal Highness's favourable consideration of them. It is impossible for troops to have endured more, or to have done better, than the columns under these officers.”

“ TO SIR HUGH ROSE.

“ ALLAHABAD, 25th June 1858.

“ Your telegram of this morning, containing various queries, will be answered officially. But I may as well say that you can go to Poonah and recruit yourself as you choose. This has been telegraphed to you. I must now congratulate you most heartily on your last very successful struggle for the repossession of Gwalior, and particularly on the recapture of all Scindiah's guns. I am in hopes that this *coup* will effectually prevent the danger of any rising in the Mahratta country, which would have been very serious. Kotah, I believe, was left with many guns and much ammunition. I trust there is no chance of the fugitives seizing it. Brigadier Napier will

take charge of Gwalior and Jhansi when you go. I hope to hear that you have borne the fatigue of your journey back without much difficulty, and that the fine climate of Poonah will effectually set you up for any further exertion you may be called upon to make in the winter."

"TO GENERAL WHITLOCK.

"ALLAHABAD, 25th June 1858.

"I send you a copy in MS. of a general order,<sup>1</sup> which has gone down to Calcutta to be printed.

<sup>1</sup> "ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
CALCUTTA, 26th June.

"The Commander-in-chief congratulates Major-General Sir Hugh Rose very heartily on the successful result of his rapid advance on Gwalior.

"The restoration of the Maharajah Scindiah to his capital by the forces under the command of the Major-General is a happy termination of the brilliant campaign through which the Central India field-force has passed.

"That campaign has been illustrated by many engagements in the open field,—by the relief of Saugor, the capture of Ratgurrh, Shahgurrh, and Chandairee; by the memorable siege of Jhansi, by the fall of Calpee, and lastly, by the occupation of Gwalior.

"H.E. again offers his hearty thanks and congratulations to Major-General Sir Hugh Rose and the gallant troops under his command.

"It must not be forgotten that the advance of the Central India field-force formed part of a large combination, and was rendered possible by the movement of the Bombay army into Rajpootana on the one side, and of Major-General Whitlock of the Madras army on the other, and by the support they respectively gave to Major-General Sir H. Rose as he moved onwards in obedience to his instructions.

"The two Major-Generals have well sustained the honour of their Presidencies.

"The siege of Kotah and the action of Bandah take rank amongst the best achievements of the war.

"The Commander-in-chief offers his best thanks to Major-General

You, of course, have already received the general order which I published when I thought the campaign was over—that is, just before the outbreak at Gwalior occurred. The MS. which I send herewith refers entirely to yourself, Sir H. Rose, General Roberts, and the troops which have moved through Central India, and which have done such good service wherever they appeared. When I left Rohilcund, I was in hopes that on reaching Cawnpore I might be able to cross over to the south of the Jumna, and that possibly I might have had the pleasure of seeing you to congratulate you personally on your success, and to thank you for the care and skill you have shown, as well as for your critical attention to the orders which I thought it necessary to send to you. But I had not time. I was compelled to hurry down here. With respect to your future position in regard to our ultimate proceedings after the rains, I have to propose that you should, if you can do so, take charge of Calpee after the return of the treasure-escort from the banks of the Jumna, so as to release H.M.'s 5th Fusiliers, which is wanted for service in the district of Behar, where very serious disturbances are occurring. I hope you will find it possible to arrange this."

Amongst other congratulatory letters which had

Roberts, to Major-General Whitlock, and the various corps under their command. He is happy in welcoming them to the Presidency of Bengal."



reached Sir Colin on his arrival at Allahabad, was one from Lord Ellenborough, written shortly before that Minister's resignation of the Presidency of the Board of Control. It expatiated in warm terms on the triumphant results of Colin Campbell's operations, and dwelt forcibly on the care he had manifested in economising the life of his troops. To this communication Sir Colin replied on the 20th June :—

“I ought to have answered your very kind note sooner ; but in truth, the moment I got back from Rohilcund to the Trunk Road, I found a vast quantity of business ready for me, and the unlucky outbreak at Gwalior suddenly came on my hands. That matter is now happily settled. Since I got your note, I have been grieved at the intelligence that your lordship has thought it necessary to go out of office. This will be a great loss to the country, and to me individually. I have to thank you for your very flattering remarks on my proposed elevation to the Peerage, which is a position quite beyond anything I could ever have expected, and a reward which far exceeds the value of any service I can have rendered. I am to be Lord Clyde. With respect to the reliefs your lordship speaks of, my attention has been turned towards the subject ; but as yet I have been unable to settle anything positive. I confess the loss of sound, old, seasoned regiments will be very inconvenient ; and from the state of this country, it is too clear to me that our European troops here ought

rather to be increased in number than diminished. The inroads made on their efficiency by the late hot-weather campaign we have been compelled to make, have been very considerable indeed. The Indian papers go on buzzing and talking a great deal of trash ; and I see the 'Times' correspondent has got up a story about the facility with which we might have taken Lucknow at the time of the relief of the garrison, quite forgetting that we had no provisions, and that we should have been besieged there, besides leaving Cawnpore at the mercy of the Calpee troops, which could have driven General Windham over the Ganges, and come up to assist in besieging me in Lucknow with their 40 guns. Another great complaint is, that the garrison of Lucknow was allowed to escape. In fact, I did all I possibly could do to prevent them—for I sent a very large force of cavalry and horse-artillery, with three good battalions of infantry, the night before, with orders to go to the Moosa Bagh, for the very purpose of cutting off the fugitives ; but unluckily, from difficulties of the ground, and perhaps from some misconception on the part of the commanding officer, these troops never appeared, and were quite useless. On looking back, in place of complaining that more has not been done, it would rather seem wonderful that European troops could have made the exertions we have seen, and should have in a few months actually seized and occupied every stronghold of the enemy in Central India and the N.W. Provinces, besides holding

Lucknow with a strong garrison. The troubles in Behar are very annoying. There are two regiments of Sikhs in movement towards this district, who will reach it in about three weeks. I hope by degrees the wandering parties of rebels who are devastating these parts will be dispersed by these Sikhs—who are the only troops we have capable of marching at this season—and that by the return of the cool weather there will remain nothing to accomplish except the conquest of Oudh, which country must be penetrated and traversed in every direction by several strong columns competent to hold and occupy, as well as to pass through the province. Steps are now in progress to endeavour to break up the confederacy of the chieftains in Oudh; and I trust, if they are once satisfied, that their cases will receive every fair and just consideration, that we may persuade some of the influential leaders to make submission. Lugard's division, which has been acting in Behar, has completely broken down. General, officers, and men are all come to a stand-still, and several obliged to invalid, including among the latter Lugard himself."

Thus it will be seen that Sir Colin's anticipations of the result of the policy adopted by Lord Canning after the fall of Lucknow, had, as regards the military situation, been literally verified. To quote his own words from the minute above referred to:<sup>1</sup> "Independent of the insurrection of Oudh, we had, in consequence of the dispersion of the rebels from

<sup>1</sup> *Vide ante*, p. 190.

Lucknow and from Calpee, three campaigns on our hands at once, not one of which could be trifled with. Gwalior, the territory of our fast and almost only ally, could not wait a moment. From Behar, our oldest and most valuable provinces were threatened; Calcutta itself was much alarmed in consequence. There was a guerilla war in Goruckpoor. In Bundelcund our two or three garrisons only were safe; and the majority of chiefs in that wild province were in arms against us. The Governor-General was residing at Allahabad, and could hear from his own house the sound of the guns in occasional skirmishes, just across the Ganges, on the borders of Oudh. So hard were our resources pressed, that, when I joined him in the middle of June from Futtebhur, there was but a slender garrison of 300 British soldiers in the fort of Allahabad, at that time the centre of Government, as well as of the grand circle of military operations. . . .”

With the capture of Gwalior and the occupation of Rohilcund, “two great causes of anxiety had been removed, which had so weighed on me in January 1858, when the Governor-General decided on the siege of Lucknow in preference to other operations, which might, in my judgment, have saved Scindiah’s catastrophe, as well as the harassing war in Behar. In the meantime, the hot-weather campaign proceeded in every direction; and if certain points had been won and occupied at vast intervals from one another, the insurrection was still general

and violent, although its aim and purpose were rapidly disappearing, and its original cause was entirely lost sight of. Sir Hugh Rose's march through Central India, Sir E. Lugard's through Oudh into Behar, General Walpole's through that province into Rohilcund, Sir Hope Grant's in the neighbourhood of Lucknow, General Whitlock's from Saugor to Bandah in Bundelcund, had all been entirely successful as marches, but nothing more. The whole population was armed and hostile, and closed round the rear of each column like the sea in a ship's wake. It was the constant hunting, the never-ceasing marching and combination of different columns, the working of them all at the same time in spite of weather, sickness, and fatigue in all seasons, which finally reduced the country. Still, the most harassing part of the campaign was in store for us; although, owing to the aspect now assumed by the contest, there was no longer the possibility of achieving those exploits by which great credit is won by individual commanders in the public eye."

The district of Goruckpoor, subsequently to the siege of Lucknow, had remained in a disturbed condition, causing anxiety to the British authorities, and giving constant employment to the small force under Colonel Rowcroft.

Owing to the paucity of troops in this district, little else than demonstrations to overawe the rebels could at this time be effected. The setting in of the rains, however, and the rising of the Ghogra, would,

it was hoped, operate in some measure to damp the ardour of the insurgents ; whilst the retrograde movement of the Goorkhas exercised, in a slight degree, a tranquillising influence upon them. These troops had remained at Goruckpoor some time, resuming their march in the third week of May ; and finally, after much delay and difficulty, owing to the enormous amount of carriage which accompanied them, they crossed the river Gunduk and re-entered Nepaul in the first days of June. An attempt made at this period by the Begum of Oudh to shake Jung Bahadur in his fidelity to the British Government failed, though there was little reason to doubt that the Nepaulese chieftain returned to his country disappointed with the result of the campaign, as far as he was concerned.

In Behar matters had not improved, notwithstanding the energy displayed by Sir E. Lugard in intersecting the jungle with roads, and pressing the rebels. Though they were for the moment dispersed, their chiefs stuck to the jungle, where, in a short space of time, they rallied round them formidable bands, which, under the energetic leadership of Ummer Singh, the brother of Koer Singh, carried fire and sword into the districts through which they roamed. The pursuit of these marauders was carried on without intermission, in spite of all difficulties, till at length Lugard, succumbing to sickness and fatigue, resigned the command, and was succeeded in the third week of June by Brigadier Douglas, on

whom devolved the difficult and embarrassing duty of protecting the disturbed districts of Behar, extending, on either side of the Ganges, from Dinapore to Ghazeepoor, and through which the Great Trunk Road runs. The strength of the rebels was broken ; but until the province could be occupied in sufficient force, the task of hunting these predatory bands, and keeping open the great line of communication which traversed it, entailed an amount of fatigue and exposure on the part of the troops, which could only be justified by the necessities of the moment.

In acknowledging Sir Colin's letter from Bareilly giving an account of that action, the Duke of Cambridge, in a letter of July 8th, expresses his anxiety regarding the future. "Not as regards the enemy," he remarks, "for they are humbled, and will doubtless be subdued, however much of trouble they may yet give you, but as regards the health of our gallant and noble troops, which are beginning to suffer severely from the effects of climate, the sun, and perpetual hard work. You know that from the first I have been looking forward with much uneasiness to this period, and always dreaded your not getting into summer quarters before the heat of summer set in. How right you were in this respect in advising strongly not to attempt too much at the same time, and how constantly you objected to undertaking a fresh operation when a former one had not been in your opinion sufficiently completed ! . . . I look with confidence to your resisting effectually any

further attempts to oblige you to keep the troops longer in the field, and that you will insist on housing the men as far as possible, and in the best possible manner, at each station at which they may be posted at the present moment. As regards yourself, my dear excellent friend, I must again remind you that we cannot spare so valuable a Commander-in-chief as you are, and I have a great mind to be very angry with you for exposing yourself so constantly and so unnecessarily, as I am afraid you have been during the recent operations. It is really too bad of you to disregard my injunctions in this respect, and I must remind you of the strong expressions of her Majesty's anxiety in reference to this subject."

The following letters of the 9th and 24th July from Sir Colin to the Duke of Cambridge, set forth the condition of affairs during that month :—

"ALLAHABAD, 9th July 1858.

"I have the honour to address your Royal Highness on the disposition of the forces in this country, and what may be in store for the troops in the ensuing cold season. I am happy to be able to say that nearly all the regiments in the service of her Majesty and the Honourable Company are now enjoying rest after their long campaigns. The temporary barracks which were constructed at the old stations are for the most part occupied, and the troops in Rohilcund are nearly housed. The mov-



able columns in Oudh remain of necessity under canvas ; but measures have been taken to secure dry flooring for the tents. The brigades so situated are very healthy—indeed far more so than those still located in the city of Lucknow. I must not disguise from your Royal Highness that, although it has been in my power to canton the troops for the season, we have matter for much serious consideration in the state of the country. Your Royal Highness will have remarked in my previous letters, that in the provinces of Oudh and Bundelcund the mere march of troops is unattended by any real and substantial results. We beat the enemy in the open field with the utmost ease—we take his guns ; he appears utterly routed. A fortnight afterwards we again hear of the reassemblage of rebels at another point—perhaps at three or four points—while our movable columns have marched away to meet danger in another quarter. At present the people of Oudh are more tranquil than they have been for a long time. Of the provinces which have been the scene of war during the last six months, the only one which can be said to be occupied really in a military manner is Rohilcund. The consequence is, that authority there is quite restored, and we have no fears of seeing it again disturbed. The area of that province is small, and the people are well disposed. But two brigades were necessary for its military occupation. Oudh, on the other hand, is very extensive, and its population is most hostile. What can be done in

Rohilcund by two brigades will assuredly require at least six in Oudh, independent of the garrison of Lucknow. I am now very earnestly engaged in seeing if means can be found for two or three brigades to operate in Oudh in the month of October. More I cannot hope to make available. With the affairs of Bundelcund I am not so well acquainted ; but they are to a certain degree in the same condition as those of Oudh, though not so bad, in consequence of the presence of numerous friendly rajahs, who not only facilitate the progress of the troops and provide them with supplies, but actually on occasions turn out to fight. But in Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Central India generally, we have not troops enough to insure the collection of the revenue and a ready allegiance to our rule. I conceive it will be necessary to strengthen the hands of the commanders who are engaged in the restoration of the civil authority. From Benares, right down the line of the Ganges, it has become necessary to reinforce every post. The old provinces lying contiguous to that river give much alarm to the magistrates, and a spirited partisan war has been carried on for the last two months in Behar, on both sides of the Ganges, which, of all struggles, is the most difficult to cope with. The enemy eludes the grasp of the troops, moves in very small bodies, and keeps whole districts in great alarm. The people who show their duty to us are treated with the utmost barbarity and cruelty, and there is nothing left to us

but to form continuous chains of posts, which demand very considerable numbers of men.

“Such is the picture I have deemed it my duty to lay before your Royal Highness. There is nothing in it which we have not a right to expect; but there is sufficient to enable us to see that the troops will be again very busily employed as soon as it is prudent to put them in movement. That will be, I hope, in the first week in October.”

“ALLAHABAD, 24th July 1858.

“I have not much to report since I had the honour of addressing your Royal Highness. The partisan war in Behar still continues, and I am engaged in adding to the troops already employed in that province. A system of posts is in the course of completion, which will, I trust, eventually have the effect of bridling the whole country. Brigadier Douglas, C.B., who has been intrusted with the charge of the disturbed districts, displays much activity and judgment, and has received my entire approval for the dispositions he has as yet been able to make towards carrying out his instructions. But to reduce to quiet, from a state of chronic insurrection, such a wide province, over the whole expanse of which very numerous small bodies of desperate disbanded soldiery are moving, must be an affair of time.

“These roving mutineers declare themselves that they are desperate, and that they have no choice but

to pursue the course of plundering in which they are now engaged. One lately-taken prisoner gave expression to such sentiments. He said, 'We must cling together; for when we go to our homes, we are hunted down and hanged. We have no choice.' The unhappy man only spoke the truth. A very grave question is contained in the moral of this anecdote. We may be able to coerce Behar without the evil spreading, and I hope we shall; but, on the other hand, there is very great danger that such a result may be beyond our power, unless some measures be taken towards a general amnesty, under which the disbanded sepoys may be allowed to seek their homes without fear of molestation. This is, of course, the business of Government, and does not belong to me. But it appears to me, that if these wretched criminals be not reassured, guilty though they be, it will be impossible to predict any term to the general struggle, which has already assumed formidable proportions in a very wide province, and may be extended indefinitely—viz., wherever the mutineers may be driven to carry fire and sword with them. It therefore seems to be not merely a question of clemency and mercy, but of policy, as regards the cessation of this war. Now, if it were desirable, we cannot look for extermination of the entire remnant of the sepoy army. According to the terms on which we are now with that remnant, they look for nothing else than extermination, and we propose nothing else. What, then, can be the sequel

but a most protracted contest, in which vast sections of the population will take part against us under the disbanded sepoys? I may tell your Royal Highness that the mind of the Governor-General is much preoccupied with this most puzzling question, and the many practical difficulties with which it is surrounded."

## CHAPTER XVIII.

ORGANISATION OF POLICE—SIR COLIN WAITS TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE—HOPE GRANT RELIEVES MAUN SINGH—SIR COLIN'S REPORT TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—COMMANDS IN CENTRAL INDIA—PURSUIT OF TANTIA TOPEE—MAUN SINGH—BUNDELCUND—DEMAND FOR MORE TROOPS—GENERAL ORDER REGARDING INTERIOR ECONOMY OF REGIMENTS—SIR F. CURRIE ANNOUNCES GRANT OF ANNUITY TO ACCOMPANY PEERAGE—LORD DERBY UNABLE TO ALTER TITLE—CONGRATULATIONS FROM SIR J. LAWRENCE—LETTER TO SIR JAMES OUTRAM—REPLY—CONGRATULATIONS FROM SIR PATRICK GRANT—REINFORCEMENTS—NOTIFICATION OF APPROACHING CAMPAIGN TO THE COMMISSARY-GENERAL—SUMMARY OF MEASURES—MOVEMENTS OF COLUMNS—BEHAR—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—PROCLAMATION ANNOUNCING GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BY THE CROWN—DISCRETIONARY POWER VESTED IN LORD CLYDE—LORD CLYDE JOINS HIS CAMP—DISPOSITION OF TROOPS—LALL MADHO SUMMONED.

For some time past Sir Colin had been directing his attention to the organisation of native levies of horse and foot, which he intended should, to a certain extent, supply the deficiency caused by the disappearance of the native army during the course of the revolt. In Oudh, under the superintendence of Captain Bruce, the former head of the intelligence department, a body of native military police was

in process of formation ; and during the month of July, that indefatigable officer had reported that he had 5000 men ready for employment. These levies, after attaining a sufficient amount of elementary instruction, were destined to assist the regular troops in the final subjugation of the province. As the columns advanced through the country, defeating the enemy in the field and ejecting him from his strongholds, these auxiliaries were to occupy the positions which had been won, and were to support the civil authority in the maintenance of order. Being satisfied of the "military safety" of the troops engaged in Oudh, Goruckpoor, and Behar, Central India, the Doab, and Rohilcund, Sir Colin made up his mind not to endanger the health of the regiments employed in Oudh and Behar until he was enabled "to move them on a general plan and with one common object." His design, therefore, was to wait until his preparations were complete ; and then, in his own words, "to break on the rebels simultaneously in each province, to leave them no loopholes for escape, and to prevent their travelling from one district to another, and so prolonging a miserable guerilla war. "I resisted," he adds, in the memorandum already quoted from, "much importunity from the civil servants, being confident that my resolution was right, in consequence of my experience of the inutility of isolated marches, as regarded the subjugation of the country and the reduction of rebellion. Through evil report, therefore, and good

report, this leading plan was steadily adhered to; while to meet particular contingencies which, in my judgment, did not admit of delay, certain detachments, both in Oudh and Behar, were put in motion."

The main cause of anxiety regarding the latter province arose from the necessity of keeping open the communication with Calcutta.

In Oudh, the position of Maun Singh, an influential *talookdar* or landowner, had become so serious as to render it imperative to intervene in his behalf. His allegiance for a long time had been more than doubtful; but seeing the tide beginning to turn in our favour, he had, in the month of June, declared for the British. The rebels, jealous of his intimate relations with our Government, had besieged him in his fort of Shahgunj, near Fyzabad. He had repulsed them on several occasions; but being hard pressed and short of provisions, he had appealed for assistance. To extricate him from his difficulty had become a point of honour and policy with the British Government, as he was a man of great territorial possessions, and exerted much influence in his part of the province. Sir Colin determined to relieve him, notwithstanding the rains were not yet over, and, at the same time, took the opportunity of beginning the occupation of Oudh, in accordance with the plan he intended carrying out on a large scale, as soon as he found himself in a position to take the field during the ensuing cold season. On the 22d July, Hope Grant left Nawabgunj, twenty



miles N.E of Lucknow, with the force which had garrisoned that post since its occupation in May. Some heavy guns accompanied it, and he had discretionary power to advance according to the state of the weather. The movement produced the intended effect. The rebels decamped on Grant approaching Fyzabad, and broke up into several bodies, two of which united again in the vicinity of Sultanpoor. Grant took undisputed possession of Fyzabad on the 29th, and, as a consequence, Maun Singh was relieved from his beleaguerment. On the 8th August, Sir Colin informed the Duke of Cambridge of the result of Hope Grant's advance : " The movement I had the honour to report to your Royal Highness as about to be made upon Fyzabad by Sir Hope Grant, in my letter of the 24th ultimo, has come off very successfully. Fyzabad is now occupied, a body of about 20,000 rebels having broken upon his approach from before Shahgunj, the stronghold of Rajah Maun Singh, who had been besieged for some time. The rebel force marched away in two parties—viz., one across the Ghogra at Fyzabad, the other towards Sultanpoor on the Goomtee. Sir H. Grant has been ordered to pursue the parties to Sultanpoor. That place will now be occupied by our troops. In due time the Goomtee will be bridged at that point, and the Ghogra at Fyzabad. But your Royal Highness will perceive that, although we have had no fighting, the most important strategical movement has been made since the siege of Lucknow towards the

reduction of Oudh. It is a great satisfaction to me that the troops have not suffered during their movement, the weather having been remarkably fine since the march began. Before committing Sir Hope Grant to this movement, I had already taken measures to support him from various points. The 88th Regiment was added to the force in Oudh from Cawnpore, and the 79th was brought down from Futtehghur to that place, and the 8th Regiment from Agra to Futtehghur. A regiment of native infantry was sent from Allahabad to Azimghur, to reinforce H.M.'s 34th at that place. I should not have been able to recommend the occupation of Fyzabad to Government, had it not been for the very rapid organisation of the military police, which has taken place at Lucknow to the number of 5000 men, under that very able officer Major Bruce of the Bombay army. He deserves the very greatest credit for what he has done. His new police was able to take the place of the battalions which moved to Fyzabad. Your Royal Highness will understand that Sir H. Grant's movement involved the pushing forward of every regiment in his division, with the exception of two corps which remained in Lucknow for the safety of that place. At the south-east corner of Oudh, immediately opposite to Allahabad, Brigadier Berkeley,<sup>1</sup> H.M.'s 32d, has been employed

<sup>1</sup> The late Colonel C. A. F. Berkeley, C.B., who for some time had officiated as chief of the staff to Sir James Outram. He died on the 25th September 1858.

with great success in clearing the country in that direction. His presence there has also aided considerably the movement upon Fyzabad; the rebels having imagined that an advance was being made upon them from two directions. As soon as I can reinforce him with a Sikh regiment which is now on its way to this place, it is probable he will be pushed farther forward. We are not out of our difficulties in Behar. The rebels stick tenaciously to their jungles and fortresses, but I hope ere long to drive them out of these places. Brigadier Douglas, 79th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Turner,<sup>1</sup> are remarkably active, and seem to understand how to meet the partisan warfare in which they are engaged. I have reinforced Colonel Turner with the camel corps, whose special duty is the care of the Great Trunk Road from Benares to Shergotty."

About the end of July a fresh disposition was made by Government relative to the military commands in Central India, the districts of which, owing to the paucity of troops and the non-existence of any police force, still remained in a very disturbed and unsatisfactory condition. Two divisions were created: one, embracing the districts of Saugor, Jubbulpoor, Bandah, Humeerpoor, and Calpee, constituted the Saugor division, and was intrusted to the command of General Whitlock, whose headquarters were at Saugor; the other, including Gwalior, Sipree, Goona, and Jhansi, formed the Gwalior division,

<sup>1</sup> The late Colonel Sir W. W. Turner, C.B., K.C.S.I.

under the command of Brigadier-General R. Napier, with its headquarters at Gwalior.

The main body of the rebels who, after the capture of Gwalior, had been defeated by Napier at Jowra Alipore, crossed the Chumbul into Rajpootana. They were led by Tantia Topee, the Rao Sahib, and the Nawab of Bandah. Whilst Tantia Topee discharged the duties of commander-in-chief, the Rao Sahib, the adopted son of the nephew of Bajee Rao, the last of the Peishwas—whose dynasty Nana Sahib affected to represent—assumed the office of political agent to the Nana. Numerous were the flying columns organised to co-operate in their pursuit.

One, under General Roberts, set out from Nusseerabad the last week in June, and made for Jyepoor, the capital of the State of that name, on which it was known the rebels had a design. By the rapidity of his movements, Roberts anticipated them at that point, whereupon Tantia Topee turned south and moved upon Tonk. Thither Roberts followed him, notwithstanding the heat, which told with great severity upon the Europeans, many of whom succumbed to sunstroke. Sending forward a light column under Colonel Holmes in advance of the main body, Roberts followed up the chase, though the difficulty, in the absence of any reliable information regarding the direction the rebels had taken, was very great. Leaving Tonk with Holmes at his heels, Tantia Topee found it impossible to cross the Chumbul, swollen by the rains, and carry out his

design of making for the Mahratta country south of the Nerbudda. He therefore moved upon Boondee ; but finding the gates of that town shut against him, he turned south and took a westerly direction by the Keena Pass, in the direction of the Aravelli range of hills. Roberts, on receiving this information, moved westward, for the purpose of covering Ajmeer, and halted till the country, which had been saturated with the rains, had become less impracticable. In the meantime, Brigadier Parke of the 72d Highlanders, commanding at Neemuch, had taken the field, with orders to head back the rebels and cover Oodeypoor. On the 5th August, Roberts was again in movement towards Neemuch, and on the 7th hit on the rebel force at Sanganeer, a town situated on the left bank of the Koturia, a small river in the province of Meywar. On the following day he brought them to action, and easily defeated them ; but from the exhaustion of his infantry after a forced march, and in the absence of his horse-artillery and the greater portion of his cavalry with Holmes's column, he was unable to follow up his victory. Holmès, who, in his pursuit of the rebels, had been describing the arc of a circle, whilst Roberts had moved along the chord, joined his general the next day, after a thirty-mile march, with the horses of his detachment tired out by their previous exertions. Roberts followed up the enemy with dogged perseverance, and making forced marches, eventually came up with and defeated him at Katoria, ten miles

north of Nathdwarra, capturing the few guns he had with him, and dispersing his force across the plain. Tantia Topee, whose course southward had been barred by the movement of Parke's brigade, now fled in a north-easterly direction. Roberts, who had been joined by Parke at Poonah, left the pursuit to the latter, who, with some fresh horses obtained from Neemuch for the detachment of the 8th Hussars with him, reached the left bank of the Chumbul only to find the rebels, who had crossed the river, which was rising rapidly, vanishing in the distance. Parke returned to Neemuch to refit. Tantia Topee now made for Jhalra Patun, the capital of the Maharajah of Jullawar, on which town he levied a large contribution, the troops of the native ruler fraternising with him. Here, also, he refitted himself with a fresh park of artillery obtained from the native arsenal. To cover Indore now became a paramount necessity, so as to prevent the possibility of the flames of rebellion being rekindled in the disaffected territories of Holkar, the Mahratta chieftain. Accordingly, a column under Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart of the 92d Highlanders was despatched from Mhow on the 22d August, in a northerly direction, followed by another column under Lieutenant-Colonel Hope, which left Indore the first week in September. On the junction of these two columns at Nulkheira, Major-General Michel<sup>1</sup>—who, on the removal of General Roberts to the civil and military command, of the

<sup>1</sup> Now General the Right Honourable Sir John Michel, G.C.B.

province of Gujerat, had been appointed to the division embracing Malwa and Rajpootana — assumed the command.

On leaving Jhalra Patun, Tantia Topee made for Rajgurh, at which point General Michel hit upon him. On the 15th September, Michel snatched an easy victory over the enemy, capturing 30 guns, without a single casualty in his own force. In the meantime Parke had reappeared with his column from Neemuch, and by covering Indore and Bhopal, materially assisted Michel in his efforts to come up with his slippery foe, whose movements were being watched towards the north by Smith's brigade from Sipree, and in a north-easterly direction by a column under Colonel Liddell. For some time the heaviness of the rains contributed to delay Michel's operations. After threading the jungles on both banks of the Betwa, and plundering the town of Essagurh, where they replenished themselves with some guns, the remnants of the Gwalior Contingent made an attempt on the fort of Chandairee, held by a garrison of Scindiah's troops, who repulsed them. Whilst a detachment of the rebels proceeded in the direction of Jhansi, the main body took an opposite course, and on the 9th October were encountered by Michel at Mungrowlee, and defeated with the loss of six guns.

Crossing the Betwa, the rebels, who were joined at Lulluthpore by the party which had been detached from Chandairee, penetrated the Jaclone jungles, followed by Michel. Precautions had already been

taken to place Brigadier Smith in a position to bar Tantia Topee's movements to the westward. Hitting on the rebels on the night of the 18th, Michel brought them to action on the following morning at Sindwaho, thirty miles east of the Betwa. After a short engagement they were beaten and dispersed, losing four guns and some four hundred killed. Checked by Colonel Liddell's party in his endeavour to cross the Betwa in a north-westerly direction, and finding himself hemmed in on all sides by the British columns, Tantia Topee determined to make a dash for the southward and cross the Nerbudda. On hearing from Brigadier Smith that he had hit upon the rebels on their march to the south, Michel, who had followed them up in a north-westerly direction, but had kept more to the westward for the purpose of covering the country to the south, now pressed the foe in hot pursuit. On the 25th, Tantia Topee was again surprised on his march by the Mhow column at Khorae, near Multhone, the result being that the right wing of his force, which bore the brunt of the British attack, was thoroughly beaten and finally dispersed, the leaders effecting their escape with the loss of one-half of their followers. Tantia Topee then made for the Nerbudda, but was met at Bagrode by a regiment of Beatson's Horse on its march to join Michel. After losing a number of his followers in the gallant attack which Colonel Becher, in spite of the rawness of his levies and the great superiority of the rebels in number, did not hesitate to deliver,



Tantia Topee pressed onwards to the Nerbudda, which he crossed about forty miles above Hoshungabad. This movement, which caused much alarm for the safety of the Nizam's territories and the Deccan, necessitated fresh precautions on the part of the Madras and Bombay Governments. The military authorities were placed on the alert, and arrangements made to guard against the irruption of the rebels into the countries south of the Nerbudda. After crossing this river, Tantia Topee made his way by Futtypoor to Mooltae, as if Nagpoor were his object; but on finding that his progress in that direction was barred by a force sent from thence, he turned westward and proceeded to Meil Ghât, where the presence of a British cavalry force rendered hopeless any intention he might have had of escaping through the range of hills which separated him from the Deccan. Crossing an arm of the Taptee, Tantia Topee took a north-westerly course by Kurgoon, and again made for the Nerbudda. In the meantime he had been followed by Michel, who, sending forward Parke to Hoshungabad, joined the latter at that place on the 19th November. From Hoshungabad Parke moved to Charwah, followed by Michel. For the purpose of watching the fords above Akbarpoor, where the Trunk Road crosses the river, detachments had been sent from Mhow. One of these, under Major Sutherland, which had been sent down the road to keep it clear, took post at Jeelwana. Informed of the proximity of the rebels, who had

plundered some carts proceeding up the road the previous day, Major Sutherland, with a small detachment of Europeans and sepoys, started in pursuit of them on the 24th November. He found that Tantia Topee, with two guns, had crossed the Great Trunk Road, making for Rajgurrh. Coming up with the enemy, he drove him from the position he had taken up across the road, and captured his two guns, the last Tantia Topee ever possessed. Freed from these impediments to their progress, the rebels made for the Nerbudda, followed by Major Sutherland, who, on reaching its left bank, found them across the river, which, owing to its breadth and the numbers opposed to him, he found it impossible to pass. General Michel, who had proceeded to Mhow, sent Parke to continue the pursuit. This he pressed with remarkable vigour. With a flying column, his infantry being mounted, Parke overtook the rebels, after an astonishing march of two hundred and forty miles in nine days, at Chota Oodeypoor, fifty miles east of Baroda, on the 1st December. The British attack produced the usual result. Tantia Topee was defeated, and fled with his followers into the B'answara jungles, in the province of Meywar. The close of the year found this nimble and ubiquitous rebel leader still at large.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The pursuit of Tantia Topee forms a memorable episode in the history of the Indian Mutiny. The length of the marches, made frequently under a burning sun and over ground saturated with rain, tried the endurance of our troops to the uttermost. The amount of ground covered by the pursuing columns was enormous. The writer

Meanwhile the troops of the Gwalior division, far from enjoying the rest they had earned, were obliged again to take the field, and were actively employed in the suppression of rebellion in various parts of Scindiah's dominions. A Rajpoot chief named Man Singh having, early in August, seized the fort of Paorie, not far from Sipree, Brigadier Smith moved from that station to dislodge him. Finding, on his arrival at Paorie, that his force was insufficient for the purpose, he applied to Gwalior for assistance. Thereupon General Napier proceeded to join him with some reinforcements and a few pieces of heavy artillery. The vertical fire poured into the fort, in combination with the breaching-batteries, produced the desired effect. After a bombardment of twenty-four hours, Man Singh and his followers evacuated the place, and made off in a southerly direction. Paorie being secured, a hastily-organised column, under the command of Colonel Robertson, started in pursuit of the rebels. Breaking up into several bodies, they made good their escape. General Napier, however, having organised a fresh column, Colonel Robertson again set out in quest of them, and came up with them on the 5th September.

of the "Pursuit of Tantia Topee," a most interesting article contributed to the August number of 'Blackwood's Magazine' for 1860, and to which I am indebted for the brief summary of the operations given in the text, computes the distance performed between the 20th June 1858 and the 1st March 1859, as more than 3000 miles. General Michel marched 1700, Parke 2000 miles. Captain Clowe's troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke all the time, and had marched 400 miles under General Roberts before joining him.

Taken by surprise, the rebels fled panic-stricken, and lost many of their numbers in their endeavours to escape.

In Bundelcund, the occupation of Bandah, followed by the fall of Calpee, had secured important results. The operations of General Whitlock against Kirwee had produced the surrender, in the first week in June, of the Mahratta chieftains Narain Rao and Madhoo Rao, who gave up their guns, a vast amount of ammunition, much treasure, and many valuable jewels. Calpee had been garrisoned by a force under Brigadier Macduff, which furnished a small movable column. Jalaon had been occupied, and though the province remained in a very unsettled condition, symptoms of a return to tranquillity were not wanting. Until a complete system of police had been established, it was not to be expected that the embers of insurrection would be finally extinguished. Still, however, as the autumn advanced, considerable progress had been made. By the end of October the reports from the military commanders confirmed the announcement by the civil authority of the gradual restoration of order in the province, of which the reopening of the trade of the Jumna afforded satisfactory evidence.

In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge of the 30th August, Sir Colin sums up the progress of affairs to that date, and impresses on his Royal Highness the necessity for strengthening his hands with additional European troops, wherewith to complete the subju-

gation of the provinces still in rebellion : "The forces in Behar have been swelled by the arrival of various regiments, till they have attained the number of about 7000 men. This has not been done without alienating troops from other quarters where they are much wanted, but it is an imperative necessity to give Behar the preference. The troops have been kept in a state of constant activity in that province, and the rebels have had but little rest. We are dealing with a popular insurrection, which is animated by the despair of the mutinous sepoys ; consequently we must make up our minds to a certain duration of time, which, whatever the efforts of the troops, cannot but elapse before a country in such a state can be reduced to order and tranquillity. I believe, however, that great progress has been made, and that the manner in which the troops are now disposed and worked is the right one. The rebels, who carry nothing, not even clothes, surpass our troops in marching, but the perseverance of the latter must conquer in the end ; and we hear nearly every day of a skirmish in some part or other, in which the rebels are invariably beaten, almost without loss to ourselves. In Oudh the operations for the eastern section of the province, including the whole line indicated by Fyzabad, Sultanpoor, Pertabgurh, have been silently prosecuted with very great success. These operations have taken place almost without the knowledge of the public, which of late have often been surprised to find the very things

accomplished for which it was clamouring.\* I think, I may say, that the state of affairs in Oudh is very favourable. The labour will have to be continued for many months; but I am sure of a successful issue without much bloodshed, if the course which has lately been pursued is steadily adhered to—viz., of an increasing pressure and constant advance, but without hazarding a forward movement until we are able to afford a real and efficient support. Bundelcund, in particular, has never been really subdued, and it is now going through a course to which the feudal chiefs have naturally a great objection. To put it right, the same number of troops is requisite as that now employed in Behar or Oudh. Still, we are gaining ground even there perceptibly, and the country is more in our power than it was at the date immediately subsequent to the victories of Sir Hugh Rose. In a political point of view, Bundelcund is in no respect so important as Behar and Oudh. This will be easily understood by any one turning his attention to the independent condition in which the Indian Government has always been content to leave the feudal chiefs of that province. I would earnestly venture to suggest to your Royal Highness that the course involving the best economy, and which will eventually most conduce to lighten the demands on your Royal Highness, is to throw as many troops as possible into India at present. I have a confident hope that, if it should be in our power to deal properly during the coming cold season

with Oudh and Bundelcund, the Government of India will be able to dispense with many regiments in the month of May next. Should my anticipations be right, the return of such corps through Central India to the port of Bombay, and from thence by the Suez route to England, will be the great practical announcement to the world that the Indian Mutiny is fairly at an end. It is with the greatest diffidence that I put these thoughts before your Royal Highness, as I am so painfully aware of the immense difficulties encountered by your Royal Highness in your anxious desire to support the Government of India, and that they may interfere in some measure with the plans laid down for the relief of certain corps; but that relief would, after all, only be postponed for a few months."

In anticipation of the winter campaign, and in his anxiety to maintain the efficiency of the troops which had been so much engaged in field-service, Sir Colin, ever mindful of the good effects of the regimental system, of which he was a master, drew the attention of the divisional and brigade commanders to the necessity of enforcing the rules and regulations affecting the interior economy of the European corps and detachments placed under their orders. Accordingly, a general order was issued, in which no detail was omitted that could in any way further the object in view. The examination of the regimental books, the completion of the soldiers' accounts, the inspection of the arms and ammuni-

tion, and the musketry instruction of the officer and soldier, were, together with many other things, all insisted upon. In like manner, provision was to be made for the occupation of the soldiers when off parade. The schools were to be re-established, and every encouragement held out to all ranks to study the Hindostani language. Attention was invited to the consideration of the diet and the comforts of the soldier. His amusements were to be catered for. The completion of his equipment was to be supplemented, in case of necessity, by such local aid as was obtainable; and whilst every exertion was to be used in securing the efficiency of the soldier, the greatest stress was laid on the maintenance of discipline, for which the example of the officer, in the rigid and punctual discharge of his duty, constituted the best guarantee.

To accompany the peerage which was about to be bestowed upon Sir Colin by the Crown, a grant of an annuity of £2000, derivable from the revenues of India, was made by the East India Company. It was one of the last acts of that body prior to the passing of the Act of Parliament, under the provisions of which the control of Indian affairs passed from it to the Crown. The news of it was conveyed to him in a letter from his old friend Sir Frederic Currie, with whom Sir Colin had been associated at Lahore in 1847-48, and who, since his return to England, had occupied a seat in the Court of Directors, of which he was now chairman.



“EAST INDIA HOUSE, *July 17, 1858.*

“MY DEAR SIR COLIN,—I regret exceedingly that I have time to-day for only a very few lines to you. Till this India Bill shall have finally passed, which it will most likely do on Monday night, I shall not have one moment's freedom from interruption and bother. I congratulate you most heartily on the success which has crowned all your operations, and on the recognition of your services which the Queen is bestowing upon you. Well have you deserved it at the hands of your country. It has been a most pleasing duty to me to propose to the Court of Directors and the Proprietors the grant of an annuity of £2000 to you, which has passed both Courts, and has received the sanction of the Board of Commissioners. I am not sure if an official intimation of this has been sent to you by this mail or not. We are doing all in our power to send more troops to India, but the War Office have them not to give. Two regiments are under orders from the Ionian Islands, to go overland as soon as vessels, which were ordered some time ago from Bombay, may be ready for them. We hope to have these regiments, one at Bombay, the other at Madras, early in October. The 6th Dragoons are to embark on the 30th of this month for Bombay in a fine screw-steamer, and a battery of artillery is also under despatch for the same Presidency. Drafts and recruits we are sending as fast as we can get them. About 7000 for H.M.'s regiments have started since

the 15th of last month, and 2000 more are about to embark. We shall get off what we promised before the close of the year—viz., at the rate of 2000 per month. This is a bad business at Jeddah.<sup>1</sup> We know no particulars. I fear it will have a very bad effect in India, where the tale will be told with the usual exaggeration, and it will be believed that all Christians in Arabia and Egypt have been destroyed!

“I am called away, and obliged to break off suddenly. Lady Currie would send you her kindest regards if she knew I was writing. We often talk of you and old days at Lahore.—Believe me, my dear Sir Colin, yours very sincerely, F. CURRIE.”

On the receipt of Sir Colin's letter acknowledging the proposed bestowal of the peerage, Lord Derby had taken steps to complete the measures for the issue of the patent. The title by which Sir Colin was to sit in the House of Lords was “Baron Clyde of Clydesdale.” When this intimation reached him, it was brought to his notice that Clydesdale was one of the titles borne by the Duke of Hamilton. He therefore communicated to Lord Derby his apprehension lest “he might have unwittingly touched on what might be disagreeable to his Grace; and suggested to his lordship that the title of ‘Lucknow’

<sup>1</sup> The port of Mecca, situated on the Red Sea, where, in the month of June, a fanatical outbreak of the Mohammedan population culminated in a savage attack on the French consul and his family, his wife being murdered, and he and his daughter seriously wounded.

should be substituted for that of 'Clyde.'" This drew from Lord Derby the following reply, the patent for the peerage having in the interval been completed and notified in the 'Gazette :—

"It would have given me great pleasure to comply with your lordship's wish to substitute the title of 'Lucknow for that of Clyde,' which you had announced to me your wish to adopt; but unfortunately, your subsequent instructions arrived too late to supersede, except at considerable inconvenience and expense, those which had been previously received. The fact is, that the public having been apprised of the fact, that a peerage had been offered to and accepted by your lordship, were naturally impatient to see it officially announced; and as much time had been necessarily lost in awaiting your lordship's choice of title, the moment I received it I gave directions for inserting the notification in the 'Gazette;' and when I received your lordship's second letter, I found that the change desired could hardly be made. I may perhaps be allowed to add that your lordship's original choice of the title of Clyde, to which, on my own responsibility, I was obliged to add 'of Clydesdale,' as an 'of' was, I found, essential, has met with very general approval; and whatever might have been the title by which your lordship had chosen to sit in the House of Lords, it is hardly necessary for me to say that, wherever the name of 'Lucknow' is heard, it will be inseparably connected with the brilliant

achievement of its final relief, and the perfect success with which Sir Colin Campbell completed the work of rescue, which had been so nobly commenced by Sir Henry Havelock.—I have the honour to be, my lord, your lordship's obedient servant, DERBY."

Lord Clyde—for we must drop the old familiar appellation—was very reluctant to make use of his new title. In his communications with his intimate friends—indeed, in the many letters he subsequently wrote to General Eyre or the writer of these pages—not one is to be found with the signature of "Clyde." They generally bear his initials, "C. C.," or "C. Campbell"—the way in which he had hitherto signed himself. In all these matters he observed the same simplicity which had been a marked feature of his character in the days of his comparative obscurity.

Many congratulations were received by Lord Clyde on the attainment of his new honours. On his hearing of the intention to bestow the peerage upon him, he had informed Sir John Lawrence of it, which drew from his old friend the following reply: "I am very happy to hear from yourself of her Majesty's gracious intentions towards you, and I heartily wish that you may live long to enjoy your honour, which you have so well won. Doubtless you do not care much for such things; still, as a mark of the appreciation of your services, they will be acceptable. I have not myself heard authoritatively that any such favours are intended for me. If they come, I

shall receive them with pleasure; otherwise, I am too much of a philosopher to vex myself. I have lived long enough and seen sufficient to teach me that the best reward any man can have is a feeling that he has done his duty to the best of his ability."

Having occasion to communicate with Sir James Outram upon a matter which had formed the subject of discussion in the Council at Calcutta, and regarding which Lord Clyde conceived a hasty judgment had been formed by some of his colleagues, he addressed himself to Sir James Outram, who had taken an opposite view. This letter reveals the spirit in which Lord Clyde endeavoured to work in unison with the civil authorities in the re-establishment of government in the revolted provinces, as also his readiness to assume the defensive, when he was of opinion that an inclination existed to put undue pressure on the troops in the execution of the harassing duty they were called upon to perform.

"ALLAHABAD, 14th September 1858.

"MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—I have been long intending to write to you, but owing to the numerous calls on me, have been prevented from time to time. We are doing very tolerably well, and are making preparation for what will, I hope, prove the early completion of the work in Oudh. It appears to me that there are visible signs of a break-up among the sepoys; and I trust that when that becomes more pronounced, the settlement of the country will pro-

ceed without very great difficulties. I have been lately amused, rather than otherwise, with the Council minutes with respect to —, in which — and — have fallen into mistakes in consequence of not having adopted your sage advice. The case is a very obvious one, and I am surprised they should have adopted the statement of a letter written in great anger, without having first, by a reference to me, ascertained its correctness. An answer has gone which, I am afraid, they will not like, although it is couched in most courteous terms. But a man, when he is attacked, must defend himself; and if gentlemen for whom I have the highest respect find fault without previous due inquiry, they compel me, very much against my will, to take my ground. I wish they would believe there is but one common cause, and that no military arrangements are made except for that one common cause—viz., the re-establishment of civil government throughout India. I do not admit the possibility of rival interests between civilians and military men—the only object before me being, as, I am sure, it is of my colleagues in the Council, so to dispose of all the resources of the State as may most tend to the advancement of the public service in all its branches. You and I, my dear Sir James, have had the happiness to serve in arms together. We know what can and what ought to be executed from officers and soldiers, and we also know where the limit of their exertions begins. You will serve me very much with your col-

leagues if you will point out, from time to time, that what may sometimes appear slowness to them is an imperative necessity, which cannot be affected by sudden or hasty measures ; and that officers who are, to the best of their ability, combating with all their might the difficulties of duty in the field, require all the encouragement which can be given them. A cold expression in high quarters is sure to be carried and exaggerated. The press is bad enough ; but if it gets abroad that their labours are undervalued or sneered at by the rulers of the land, you may rest assured the troops will at length really fail in the execution of their duty. It is about the only thing which upsets a British officer in the discharge of it."

Nothing could be more satisfactory to Lord Clyde's feelings than the prompt and hearty reply of his distinguished colleague and *quondam* lieutenant—a reply which set the subject of discussion at rest.

" CALCUTTA, 20th September 1858.

" MY DEAR LORD CLYDE,—I was much gratified by the receipt yesterday of your letter dated the 14th instant, and by finding that you approve of the course I pursued in the Council in the matter of —, the objection to which, I felt very sure, a reference to your lordship would prove was founded in error.

"This is the only occasion that I recollect, during the five months I have been in Council, on

which any measure emanating from your lordship has been called in question ; and in no instance, that I am aware of, out of the many propositions, recommendations, &c., constantly coming before Council under your support, has there been one which I have not found myself bound conscientiously to confirm.

“No one can be more sensible than myself of the great demands that have been made on the endurance and physical powers of officers and men of the British army in India during the past year, but especially during the hot season, when more was exacted from them, I do believe, than British troops ever were exposed to, except in the Crimea—certainly more than Europeans were ever heretofore exposed to in India. And I attribute the comparatively little loss our army has suffered, under such exposure, to your lordship’s most judicious arrangements, whereby every portion of that vast army has had to bear its proportion of the burden ; and much as they have had to bear beyond the usual burden, still, the share apportioned to all has been rendered bearable by the extreme care you have ever taken to ease the load, as far as the exigencies of the service would admit.

“It will be a marvel to future ages that British troops could have endured as they have done, under a tropical sun, all that they have gone through in India since your lordship assumed their control, without either destruction from the climate or deterioration in discipline. And that their exemption from



those evils, which otherwise must have followed on such hardships and exposure, if not carefully guarded against—results which must have lost our Indian empire—is entirely due to your lordship, future history must affirm, while at the same time giving credit for the complete success of every operation—of the many and complicated operations involved in the vast combination of military movements which characterised the campaign of the past year—conducted either by your lordship in person or under your direction and orders,—to be crowned, I confidently hope and trust, in the coming campaign, by the utter annihilation of all the hostile bands still at large, and the complete re-establishment of civil government throughout India.

“I believe that my colleagues in the Council are as strongly impressed as myself with the value of what has been done by your lordship, and with the confidence that what remains to be done will be effectually accomplished by you. I cannot doubt, therefore, that they will be as eager and proud as I am myself, cordially to support your measures to the utmost of their power.

“Permit me on this occasion, my dear lord, to offer the humble but hearty congratulations of one whose greatest pride was to serve under you, on the last tokens you have received of the approbation of her Majesty, our country, and our late rulers, to be followed, I trust, by further evidence of the appreciation of your great services on the completion of the

gigantic task which was confided to you.—Believe me to be, my dear Lord Clyde, very sincerely and gratefully yours,  
J. OUTRAM."

No less cordial were the felicitations which reached him from his friend and compatriot Sir Patrick Grant—generous words, prompted by a noble spirit, when it is remembered that Lord Clyde had displaced this distinguished officer, who had been summoned from Madras to Calcutta to take up the duties of Commander-in-chief on General Anson's death, and because his claims to the supreme command in India had been warmly advocated by influential portions of the English and Indian press, on its becoming known that Sir Colin Campbell had been preferred to him.

"OOTACAMUND, 11th September 1858.

"MY DEAR LORD CLYDE,—The 'London Gazette' announcing your elevation to a peerage has just reached us, and my prediction of many a year back has at length been fulfilled. Allow me to offer my most cordial congratulations on the event, and my earnest best wishes that you may long live to enjoy the proud distinction you have so nobly won. Every soldier will rejoice to see his profession thus honoured through you; and the united voice of the nation hails your elevation to this high dignity with genuine satisfaction and pride.

"For myself, I thank God that you are not only

a Scotchman, but a Highlander, and that I am, through my mother, of the old Duntroon family, half your clansman.—Believe me, my dear Lord Clyde, with unfeigned admiration and respect, yours very sincerely,  
PAT. GRANT."

During the session of the English Parliament, protracted discussions had taken place upon the Bill which had been introduced for the abolition of the East India Company, and the transfer of its possessions to the direct government of the Crown. In the second week in July it passed the Commons, and after a more rapid passage through the House of Lords, received the Royal assent and became law on the 2d August.

In the meantime, a great effort was being made by the military authorities at home to meet the demands for reinforcements in India, the requisitions from Bombay having been especially urgent, in consequence of the events that had taken place in Central India subsequent to the seizure of Gwalior by the rebels. To such an extent had the resources of the country already been strained, that of infantry only fourteen old regiments remained in the country, the presence of which was indispensable as a nucleus whereon to form the newly-created second battalions, and such militia regiments as had been embodied. By filling up the colonial garrisons with these second battalions or with militia regiments, specially invited to volunteer for that duty, and by calling on the militia to

volunteer for the line, the Commander-in-chief in England hoped, as he informed Lord Clyde, to "scrape together something like 8000 or 10,000 additional troops, some of them cavalry, in case that horses can be procured;" and he added, in the same letter, "We should have to give up for this year, I fear, the hope of getting home the four infantry regiments intended to be relieved. If to this force you add the 8000 drafts, partly embarked and to be embarked for their several regiments, we shall make out an additional force for you of about 17,000 men, which really ought to be ample to meet all your requirements of another cold-weather campaign, which now, it would appear, is inevitable. But, my dear friend, I need hardly assure you that this cannot be done without a very great effort, and without denuding ourselves both at home and in the colonies to an extent which I can neither consider prudent nor judicious, and which can only be justified by the very greatest emergency. I hope, therefore, that it may clearly be understood that this is only a temporary reinforcement, called for by the grave circumstances of the case, and that the very moment any of these corps can be dispensed with, some of the regiments longest in India may be sent home, as originally intended, for it will be utterly impossible to carry on the duties of the army permanently, if all the corps are out of the country. No man in the army will know and feel this more keenly than yourself, who, from your great experience as a com-

manding officer, are fully aware of the importance to discipline and general organisation for regiments being brought home and retained on the home service for a certain period."

By the third week in September, the measures which Lord Clyde had been directing towards the subjugation of Oudh had made considerable progress. Great care was observed in maintaining in secrecy the projected plans of operation. In a private letter addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay,<sup>1</sup> the Commissary-General, he writes: "The accompanying memo. will show you the points from whence it is hoped we may be able to gather the troops for operations in Oudh, together with the probable numbers we hope to collect, and the manner and direction in which it is proposed to employ them. On a perusal of this memo. I think you will find that the amount of carriage which Mansfield has stated his belief to be required, has not been over-estimated. No one has seen the enclosure except Mansfield, myself, and the military secretary, Sterling, who copied the original draft of the memo. I beg you to keep its contents a secret, as far as regards the particular corps and detachments it is proposed to employ. The memo. has not yet been submitted to Government. Major Fitzgerald and the other officers of the commissariat attached to the troops in the field were most efficient. Never were

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General Ramsay, for many years the able Commissary-General of the Bengal army.

troops better cared for or provided with better supplies. Major Fitzgerald<sup>1</sup> is a very superior person. The troops enumerated in the enclosure are not likely to be kept together as a whole for any time after they take the field. Each brigade, a little army in itself as to completeness in all arms, will most probably be employed independently. The whole force will require a good head, and each brigade an officer of some experience in the duties of the department."

The operations for the subjugation of Oudh were to be directed from two points simultaneously: 1st, from the frontier of Rohilcund, with the object of driving the rebels in a N.E. direction towards the Ghogra, and the reoccupation of Seetapoor; 2d, from the S.E. against the Baiswarra district, situated between the Ganges and the Goomtee, in which territory two powerful chiefs, Lall Madho of Amethee, and Beni Madho of Roy Bareilly and Shunkerpoor, exercised considerable influence—the latter having collected a large gathering of followers around him. The previous occupation of Fyzabad, Sultanpoor, Pertabghur, and Soraon, greatly facilitated the advance to be made from the line indicated by those posts.

Sir Thomas Seaton had been directed to organise two

<sup>1</sup> Major Fitzgerald, since deceased, was in principal commissariat charge of the army at Lucknow, and upon other occasions with Lord Clyde, and always received his unqualified approbation for the efficient way in which the duties of the department were conducted under circumstances of much difficulty.

columns,—one at Shahjehanpoor, to be placed under the command of Brigadier Troup,<sup>1</sup> hitherto commanding at Bareilly; the other and smaller one at Futtehghur, to be placed under the command of Colonel Hale of the 82d Foot. Brigadier Troup was to march on the 18th October—his object being to disperse the various bodies of rebels which had so long been infesting the Rohilcund frontier under the leadership of Khan Ali Khan, Khan Bahadoor Khan, and other insurgent chiefs. This accomplished, he was to reduce the country in the direction of the Ghogra and to the N.W. of Seetapoor. The forts were to be dismantled, and the country made safe to the Ghogra and the N.W. Establishing himself at Seetapoor, he was to act against such rebel chiefs as might hold out to the east and south of that station, within a radius of fifteen or twenty miles. Colonel Hale was instructed to move from Futtehghur to Sandee, reduce the country around, making free use of vertical fire against the forts, and to place himself in communication with Sir Thomas Seaton and Brigadier Troup. His force eventually was to fall under the command of Brigadier Barker,<sup>2</sup> who at an earlier date had moved from Lucknow to Sundeela, and had prosecuted some operations in that neighbourhood with great success.

Sir Thomas Seaton was authorised to use his dis-

<sup>1</sup> The late General Colin Troup, C.B., of the Bengal army.

<sup>2</sup> The late Colonel Sir George Barker, K.C.B., of the Royal Artillery.

cretion, according to the condition in which he found matters. In the event of Shahabad and Palee being still held by the rebels, he was to march on Shahabad with a small column, drive them thence, and, making a circuitous sweep, re-enter Shahjehanpoor. Should these places be evacuated, and Powaen still threatened, he was to proceed thither, expel the insurgents, and follow them up in close pursuit. If Powaen were clear, he was to remain at Shahjehanpoor, with its garrison as a column of reserve.

On the occupation of Sultanpoor at the end of August, which was a consequence of Hope Grant's advance upon Fyzabad, Brigadier Pinckney, commanding the Soraon field-force, had been directed to march on Pertabghur, and communicate from thence with Hope Grant at Sultanpoor. On his departure, Brigadier Wetherall<sup>1</sup> took command at Soraon.

Colonel Kelly,<sup>2</sup> commanding the Azimghur district, was instructed to leave a portion of his force at Azimghur, forming the remainder into a movable column, with which he was to advance across the Oudh frontier as far as Akbarpoor, and drive the rebels from that town. Tandah, on the Ghogra, was to be reoccupied. Colonel Kelly was enjoined to be careful in preventing, if possible, the rebels working round his right flank—the object being to drive them to the north and westward and secure Azimghur from an irruption of them. Colonel

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General Sir E. Wetherall, K.C.S.I., C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Kelly, K.C.B.



Kelly's movement was fixed for the 18th October. To aid him in his advance from Azimghur, Hope Grant was directed to make a flank march from Sultanpoor to Dhostpoor, with the object of clearing the country on the right bank of the Ghogra and in the direction of Azimghur. He was then to return to Sultanpoor, for the purpose of joining in the operations in the Baiswarra country.

The lines of road between Cawnpore and Lucknow, Lucknow and Fyzabad, Fyzabad, Sultanpoor, and Allâhabad, were all held in strength.

In consequence of the uneasiness prevailing in the southern part of Oudh, Futtehpore, on the railway in the southern Doab, was placed under the orders of Brigadier the Honourable Percy Herbert,<sup>1</sup> commanding at Cawnpore. On the other side of Cawnpore his command was to extend to Meerunke-Serai. A small column was formed at Futtehpore, as a demonstration to cross the Ganges at Dalamow; whilst a force from Lucknow established itself at Jubrowlee and Poorwah, after withstanding several attacks made by the enemy. From these two posts the very heart of Baiswarra was threatened; whilst it was also menaced from the south and west simultaneously with the attack about to be made from the east.

In the meantime the Begum's advisers had organised a general attack on the British position in the west of Oudh. Nawabgunj Barabunkee and Der-

<sup>1</sup> The late Major-General the Right Hon. Sir P. Herbert, K.C.B.

iabad were threatened, and their garrisons were compelled to attack the enemy. Sundeela was surrounded, and Sir Thomas Seaton had to act from Shahjehanpore. Brigadier Barker, whose headquarters were at Sundeela, was reinforced, and took the forts of Medowlee and Birwah—the latter place having offered a stout resistance. He was then instructed to move on Rooyah, the stronghold of Nurput Singh, which had again been rendered defensible after its dismantlement by Brigadier-General Walpole on his advance to Rohilcund. Colonel Eveleigh, of the 20th, stationed on the road between Cawnpore and Lucknow, and who had orders to drive the enemy from Bangermow, for the purpose of securing Brigadier Barker's left flank, successfully accomplished his object. Colonel Hale moved from Futtehghur on the 15th October, crossing both the Ganges and Ramgunga by bridges of boats, and in combination with Brigadier Barker advanced against Rooyah, which fell without resistance on the 28th October. The troops and police of the united force were then echeloned between Sundeela, Rooyah, and Sandee—the immediate effect of which operation was to reopen the navigation of the Ganges, which had been closed since the outbreak of the mutiny.

Brigadier Troup, carrying out his instructions, marched on Pusgaw, and after two successful affairs with Khan Ali Khan, drove him across the Ghogra. Colonel Kelly, aided by Hope Grant's movement, successfully accomplished his march, and

halted on the 30th October. During the latter's absence, Brigadier Horsford, who had been left at Sultanpoor, had an affair with the enemy, in which he captured their horse-artillery guns. Hope Grant returned to Sultanpoor on the 23d October, when he received orders to move up the right bank of the Goomtee to Jugdeespoor; then turning sharp to his left, to move southward by Jayes, and place himself between Purseedapoor and Amethee, with the object of dispersing any rebels he might come across. Brigadier Wetherall, leaving a small portion of his force at Soraon, was directed to move on the 25th to Dehaigne; and from thence to proceed, according to his judgment, either to Bhowanee-gunj or to Chourass, from whence he was to open communication with Brigadier Pinckney at Pertabghur. All officers in command of columns were instructed to give out that "every village which resisted or fired a single shot would be burned and plundered; whereas villages where no resistance was made would be protected from even the slightest damage."

On the cessation of the rains, active operations had been successfully prosecuted in Behar. The enemy, who had infested the entire tract of country from the Ganges to the Trunk Road, with the exception of the posts held by British garrisons, had been driven from spot to spot. As soon as Brigadier Douglas and Lieutenant-Colonel Turner could close in upon them, they were finally routed out of the

jungles near Jugdeespoor, to which they had so long and so tenaciously adhered. After losing many of their numbers in the pursuit which followed, the greater portion of the insurgents were driven away from the Sone to the westward, finding a refuge in the Kymor range of hills, where they were followed up and dispersed. The immediate result of the termination of the contest in South Behar was the liberation of an important body of troops, which became available for service in Goruckpoor.

In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge of the 2d October, Lord Clyde transmitted a memorandum detailing the arrangements then in progress for the forthcoming campaign in Oudh. "Your Royal Highness will observe," he writes, "that it is intended to operate in three quarters about the same time, it being necessary, if it can be done, to shut out the possibility of the more powerful rebels transporting themselves from one part of the province to another, after they shall have been compelled to abandon their estates. We are informed by the civil authorities, of almost countless guns being still in possession of the insurgents. For example, Mr Carnegie, Deputy Commissioner, now at Pertabghur, has reported officially that there are in Southern Oudh 60,000 men in arms, exclusive of the disbanded sepoys, and 300 guns scattered about in the numerous forts. I confess to being sceptical about the number of the guns, considering the vast numbers which have fallen into our hands during the last six

months. However, it is a fact that all the more considerable forts are more or less armed with ordnance, and the whole country is always ready to turn out and fight after a fashion in favour of the feudal holders. The most difficult part of the job of reduction is the fact that the larger forts are in the midst of very dense bamboo jungle, which must be regularly cut down in many places before a sight even can be obtained of the stronghold it conceals. These powerful jungles have been always grown and preserved with much care by the powerful *talookdars*, or great feudal landholders, as a special means of defence. Great progress has been made in the organisation of the Oudh police; and I am sanguine that, by Christmas, all the provinces south of the Ghogra will be so far reduced as to render to all subsequent operations a civil rather than a military character. That once accomplished, the country north of the Ghogra will be very easily settled. Owing to the malaria of those districts, it is not safe to enter them before the end of January. In Behar we are doing very well; and, I think, we may consider the campaigns there are very nearly at an end. In Bundelcund also, there is visible and marked improvement. General Michel has had a most successful hunt after Tantia Topee, the latter worthy having shown a marvellous activity. The country sympathises with him, which accounts for the singular manner in which, after he has dropped one train of guns, he succeeds in obtaining another. Fortunately

he does not know how to defend them ; but he is a great annoyance and source of alarm to the southern part of Central India, and it is to be hoped he will not be at large much longer."

The combinations detailed above had been executed with remarkable precision. By the end of October the several columns had reached the positions they were intended to assume, and everything was in readiness for the grand sweeping movement through Oudh, by which its pacification was to be effected.

Here it may be as well to preface, for the assistance of the reader, that the plan of campaign about to be initiated in Oudh, divided itself into two parts. During the first, Lord Clyde's object was to sweep the Baiswarra district, situated between the Ganges and the Goomtee, and to drive the rebels beyond the Ghogra ; during the second, to draw tighter the cordon by which they were being hemmed in, and force them back across the Raptree upon the frontier of Nepaul.

The headquarters set out from Allahabad for Soraon on the 31st October, Lord Clyde deferring his own departure until after the 1st November, on which day the proclamation announcing the direct government of the British possessions in India by the Crown, was made public at Allahabad and the other seats of Government. On that day a copy of this document was transmitted to Lord Clyde by Lord Canning, together with a letter stating his views

and wishes on certain points, regarding which it was deemed possible that doubts might arise in the application of the provisions of the proclamation, especially with reference to the treatment of the rebel leaders, and the distinction it was desirable should be drawn between different degrees of guilt. Great latitude was allowed to the Commander-in-chief in all cases where the circumstances admitted of leniency being extended; but in the event of undue hesitation being manifested by individuals to accept such terms as he might offer, he was empowered to enforce submission by arms. "If," Lord Canning added in his concluding remarks, "any case should arise for which this letter does not provide, the decision to which your Excellency's experience and judgment may lead you, will be accepted by me with complete confidence, and will receive my fullest support."

On the eve of his departure for the field, Lord Clyde replied to Sir Patrick Grant's letter to him of the 11th September:—

"ALLAHABAD, *November 1, 1858.*

"MY DEAR GRANT,—Your note of the 11th September reached me a few days ago. For the hearty congratulations contained in it I thank you heartily. I have indeed been highly honoured,—an honour won for me by the British soldier, whose indomitable perseverance has carried the nation through a very ticklish crisis—now, I trust, over.

"I enclose you a sketch of what we have been doing since July ; and you will see from that, that the circle is gradually closing around the Baiswarra district, in which the powerful chiefs Beni Madho and Lall Madho reside and have their strongholds, and from which district we received between 35,000 and 40,000 recruits for our regular army in the olden time—at least so the Commissioner, Mr Montgomery, informs me ; while the memo. will show you the progress being made to the north.

"The proclamation of her Majesty is to be read to the multitude of Allahabad this afternoon, and I go out during the night to join the troops at Pertabghur. Other advantages have been obtained since that memo. was written, or rather since the marginal notes were added to it ; but I have not time, with the preparations I have to make for leaving to-night, to relate them.

"I enclose a little sketch of Oudh, which will help to elucidate and make clear the memo. I send you enclosed. I send you also a distribution return, the examination of which will interest you when you have an idle moment. I send you also a memo. showing the number of troops collected for operations in the field, with the exception of the force under Colonel Kelly of H.M.'s 34th, who moved forward from Azimghur, and with the assistance of a strong detachment from Hope Grant, cleared the country in his front, and is now holding Tandah and Akbar-



poor, and is in communication with Brigadier Fischer at Fyzabad.

“Roughly and hastily written as the enclosures may be found, they will help to let you know what we have been doing. I will send the package to dear Balfour<sup>1</sup> for perusal, as I have not time to write to him, and he will forward it to you afterwards.

“With the exception of Mansfield, and two staff officers who copy the orders and instructions sent to the troops, there is not another officer at headquarters aware of the nature of any orders or instructions affecting the movement of troops until their publication to those to whom they have reference.—Believe me, my dear Grant, ever most sincerely yours,

“C. CAMPBELL.

“It is a great honour this title they have been pleased to confer upon me, and I warmly and gratefully appreciate the gracious kindness of her Majesty; but to you I must be known by my old name, which it would have been very grateful to me to have retained, with the rank I have been so fortunate as to obtain in the profession, without other rank or distinction. I have neither wife nor child: my means had made me independent of the income of my profession; besides which, I deem myself rich, because I have no wants. I should therefore have been very grateful to have been left without other rank than my professional one. C. C.”

<sup>1</sup> *Vide ante*, vol. i. p. 410.

On the morning of the 2d November, Lord Clyde rode out 35 miles from Allahabad, and joined his camp, which was pitched alongside that of Brigadier Pinckney at the Beylah cantonment near Pertabghur, one mile short of the Sye Nuddee. He occupied a small tent, not only as an example to his staff in the matter of baggage, the amount of which was of necessity limited, but because rapidity of movement was essential when moving from one column to superintend the conduct of another, and in enabling him to make long marches when the occasion demanded it.

The several columns in the Baiswarra district were at this time disposed as follows :—

Brigadier Wetherall, having with him the E troop Royal Horse-Artillery, a heavy field-battery R.A., the 1st Punjab Cavalry, the 79th Highlanders, the Belooch battalion, and a wing of the 9th Punjab Infantry, had advanced from Soraon, and moving through Chourass and Lalgunj, had carried by storm the fort of Rampoor Kussia on the river Sye, with a loss to himself of about 80 men killed and wounded.

Brigadier Pinckney's column, consisting of a company of Royal Engineers, the Delhi Pioneers, a light field-battery Royal Artillery, a heavy battery Bengal artillery, one squadron Carabineers, one regiment Oudh police cavalry, one squadron 6th Madras Cavalry, 250 sabres (Pathan horse), wing 5th Fusiliers, the 54th Foot, the 1st Sikh Infantry, and a

regiment of Oudh police infantry, held Pertabghur, having a post at Loolee on the Sultanpoor road, distant nine miles from Pertabghur.

Hope Grant's column, comprising two guns Q battery Royal Artillery, F troop R.H.A., heavy field-battery R.A., C company Madras Sappers, the 7th Hussars, one regiment of Hodson's Horse, the 32d Light Infantry, the second battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and the 5th Punjab Infantry, after its movement to Jugdeespoor and Jayes, had taken post at Uttehur, eight miles west of the fort of Amethee. From Uttehur it communicated by patrols with Wetherall's column at Rampoor Kussia.

Lord Clyde's first act on reaching the camp was to summon Lall Madho to make his submission, by means of a letter enclosing the Queen's proclamation. The Rajah was informed that "it was the earnest desire of the Commander-in-chief to save the further effusion of blood, and to give the greatest effect possible to the gracious intentions of the Queen, who had promised mercy and forgiveness to all men except those stained with the blackest crimes." In case this invitation were not acceded to, the Commander-in-chief would be compelled to close his forces round Amethee, when the Rajah would be liable to the fate which an endeavour was now being made, by order of the Queen, to avert from him, his family, and his followers. As Lall Madho had afforded protection to British fugitives at the out-

break of the rebellion, and had thereby established a claim to the consideration of Government, he was allowed till the 6th to make up his mind. If by that time he had not given token of his allegiance to the Queen, he was to understand that the Commander-in-chief would cross the Sye and act against him. The Commander-in-chief, moreover, gave his additional guarantee to the promises made by Major Barrow, the Deputy Commissioner appointed to act with headquarters, that the Rajah's proprietary rights would be recognised.

## CHAPTER XIX.

DISCONTENT OF LOCAL EUROPEANS ON TRANSFER TO THE CROWN  
 —CORRESPONDENCE THEREON—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAM-  
 BRIDGE—SURRENDER OF LALL MADHO—AMETHEE—ADVANCE  
 TO SHUNKERPOOR—ITS EVACUATION—HOPE GRANT MARCHES TO  
 FYZABAD—LORD CLYDE, JOINED BY BRIGADIER EVELEGH, FOI-  
 LOWS BENI MADHO—BENI MADHO ROUTED AT DOUNDEA-KHERA  
 —CLEARANCE OF BAISWARRA—SETTLEMENT OF COUNTRY—  
 LORD CLYDE MARCHES TO LUCKNOW—SUBSIDIARY OPERATIONS  
 —BYRAM GHÂT—FYZABAD—LETTER TO LORD CANNING—HEALTH  
 OF TROOPS—HOPE GRANT'S AND ROWCROFT'S OPERATIONS—  
 BARAITCH—BURGIDIAH—ROUT OF ENEMY—ACCIDENT TO LORD  
 CLYDE—ANECDOTE—MUSJIDIAH—ACTION AT BANKEE—REBELS  
 DRIVEN ACROSS THE RAPTEE—TOOLSEPOOR—DEFEAT OF BALA  
 RAO—COMPLETION OF LORD CLYDE'S OPERATIONS—RESULTS—  
 COLUMN LEFT TO WATCH REBELS—LORD CLYDE MARCHES BACK  
 TO LUCKNOW.

DURING the interval of grace accorded to Lall Madho, a matter affecting the interests and conduct of the European soldiers transferred by the provisions of the Act of Parliament from the service of the East India Company to that of the Crown, was brought to the notice of Lord Clyde. On hearing her Majesty's proclamation read, the soldiers of the 4th European Light Cavalry (one of the newly-raised regiments), serving at Lucknow, declared that they considered

themselves not bound to serve the Queen until they should be re-enlisted for that purpose, and should receive fresh bounty.

Lord Clyde lost no time in conveying his views in a private communication to the head of the Government. Writing to Lord Canning on the 4th, he remarks : "This is a very ticklish question, as the idea will probably run through all the European regiments. Enlistment is a personal matter, and I suspect that the men consider the law on their side, although the Acts may have been so framed as to leave a loophole for such a contingency as that which has actually occurred, but was certainly never anticipated. Anyhow, it is very important that the men should know how they stand. I am surprised that the point should have escaped attention at home. I am not aware that allusion has ever been made to it. There would be great awkwardness, if not indeed calamity, if any serious misunderstanding should arise. It appears to me that this can only be obviated by a general order from the Governor-General, promising an immediate reference to England, and that the question will be referred to the law officers of the Crown, supposing there be any doubt on it. I would earnestly recommend that a telegraphic message be sent to Mr Ritchie<sup>1</sup> for his opinion and advice, in case of the law not being sufficiently clear to the comprehension of the private soldier. If it be not quite clear, the men should, I think, be liberally dealt with, and

<sup>1</sup> The late Hon. William Ritchie, Advocate-General at Calcutta.

we must be prepared for many discharges. I am sorry to say that I cannot get in camp a copy of an attestation belonging to one of the Company's soldiers. Hence the reason for my not being able to give a more decided opinion." The same feeling manifested itself a few days later in the 1st Madras Fusiliers, with Hope Grant's column, some of the old soldiers of which regiments claimed their discharge.

In an official communication from the chief of the staff reporting this matter to the Government of India, the form of attestation was discussed, and great stress laid upon the "fact unknown except to military men, that in the old regiments of the Crown a man cannot be transferred from one to another without his free consent, he having enlisted to serve in a particular regiment," and that, notwithstanding the conditions of servitude are similar throughout the service, when volunteers are called for from one regiment to fill up the complement of another, they receive a bounty in consideration. Attention was requested "to the practical circumstances of a soldier's enlistment, and of the manner in which the soldier would view any attempt to deprive him of what he considers a right," and the difficulty pointed out "of making him understand any legal argument by which the very principle of his military existence might, in his opinion, be set aside." The Commander-in-chief earnestly suggested that "this very important matter should be so arranged as not to

alarm the men with regard to the point to which allusion had been made." It was proposed that the Company's European forces should be immediately re-enlisted, "in order to prevent the possibility of a feeling of irritation arising in the army, of a very inconvenient and perhaps dangerous tendency;" and the letter closed with an assurance to the Governor-General that, in "uttering this warning and recommendation, he would not hazard even a suggestion in the matter, were it not for his intimate acquaintance with British soldiers, and the manner in which they feel the rights they possess in common with other Englishmen."

To these views the Government of India took exception. The Governor-General considered that the recent enactment was so clear and explicit as to admit of no doubt of its meaning, and was satisfied that the soldiers of the East India Company, whatever be the sense given to their attestation oath, were not at liberty to refuse to serve her Majesty, and that the Government of India had no power to grant them their discharge." This view was supported by the opinion of the Advocate-General and by that of the Judge-Advocate-General—the latter officer, however, recommending the desirability of referring the matter to the Home authorities as being "one that might yet assume a more serious shape if the soldiers now seeking their discharge fail to be convinced that their claim to it is untenable." As an additional objection to the course proposed, it was



pointed out that the discharge of European soldiers in any numbers at such a time would not fail to attract the attention of the native soldiery—that an impression might be created that “the Government could not retain its English troops, and that differences existed between the State and the army.” Such an impression, in all probability exaggerated and distorted, would be most unfortunate, and calculated, more than anything else, “to revive the designs of our enemies, and to inspire dangerous thoughts into the minds of those who have hitherto served us faithfully.” Whilst the Governor-General entertained “the sincerest deference and respect for the Commander-in-chief’s opinion and authority upon a matter so thoroughly within his Excellency’s cognisance and experience as the position and feelings of the English soldier, “he considered that the law could not be questioned; that if the soldier’s rights as an Englishman had been invaded by an Act of the Legislature, the course of a loyal and dutiful subject was not to resist the law, but respectfully to represent his case to those in authority over him.” Any such representation would be transmitted to the Home Government. The circumstances would be reported forthwith to the Secretary of State, his lordship relying in the meantime “on the assistance of the Commander-in-chief in convincing the officers and soldiers of the local army of India that it is their bounden duty to pay implicit obedience to the paramount authority of the Queen and of Parlia-

ment, and in requiring every officer of her Majesty's service to enforce this obedience."<sup>1</sup>

To the Governor-General's ruling Lord Clyde deferred with his accustomed loyalty, notwithstanding the opinion he had at the outset formed of the necessity for dealing with the claimants in the most liberal manner remained unshaken. Subsequent events proved the soundness of his judgment. He kindly but firmly gave the applicants to understand that the Act of Parliament could not and must not be trifled with, and that they should not attempt to set their private judgment against an Act of Parliament, more particularly when it had been explained by persons competent to do so—viz., the lawyers of the Crown. No further claims for discharge were put forward, and the question for the moment was confined to discussions in the local Indian papers.

In reporting these occurrences to the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Clyde remarked: "Your Royal Highness knows the English soldier well—how he hangs his military existence on his attestation, and how tenacious he is of the terms of the bond of his enlistment. The matter for consideration appears to be, how a court-martial could act, in a case of a soldier being tried, who should put forward on his defence that he was no longer bound by his attestation. The officers composing the court-martial are both judges and

<sup>1</sup> The passages in inverted commas are extracted from the papers "in connection with the discontent among the local European troops," presented to Parliament in March 1860.

jury. They would probably think themselves called upon to examine the terms of the attestation; and it is not impossible that they might judge differently from the lawyers as to the powers of an *ex post facto* Act of Parliament. I do not pretend to give an opinion against that of the lawyers or that of the Government; I merely consider the point as one on which the soldiers may say that a new rule affecting the bond of a first enlistment has been passed, and which seems, according to them, at variance with that careful attention to the consent of the individual, which inspires all our acts of enlistment and the practice of the country—the latter being most familiar to the private soldier. He may say—and I rather suspect he does—that it is very strange that a man cannot be transferred from one regiment to another without his consent, whereas his oath of attestation can be set aside when it involves a change of service altogether. I will take care to speak to them in such a manner as to preserve good temper; and when I see my way a little more clearly than I do at present, I will address your Royal Highness again officially on the results obtained.”

On the day following the delivery of the summons to Lall Madho, a reply was received by the hands of a *vakeel*, expressive of the Rajah's desire to submit, but that he was apprehensive lest the sepoys who were with him would murder him if he attempted to do so. Thereupon an ultimatum was conveyed to him, to the effect that if he did not surrender on the

following day, a hostile advance would be made against Amethee. Lall Madho not having put in an appearance on the 6th November, the head-quarter column, dropping a detachment to hold Pertabghur, crossed the Sye on the morning of the 8th, and encamped a mile beyond Loolee, the detachment which had been holding that post joining headquarters. By a preconcerted arrangement the columns under Hope Grant and Wetherall had, simultaneously with the advance of that of the headquarters, invested the fort on the north and south faces, and had established themselves at a distance of about three miles respectively from the Commander-in-chief's column. They had orders to patrol well to their flanks, and to place themselves in communication with headquarters. The three columns were visible from the fort. Lall Madho, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, surrendered himself to the Commander-in-chief on the morning of the 10th, and agreed to give up his fort,—which, after preparations had been made to seize it on the following morning, was found to have been evacuated.

Oudh being a flat country, with no conformation of ground suitable for defensive purposes, and presenting no natural impediments beyond its rivers, its landholders, who in some respects held the position of feudal lords, had constructed fortified dwellings, in which they were enabled, as the occasion demanded, to “resist their neighbours or oppose the

authority of the king." These forts, large numbers of which were to be found in the province, constituted the principal military feature of the country. They formed no part of a general system of defence, but were simply strongholds or places of security to which their owners could retire in case of necessity. The general arrangements for defence appear to have been dictated by this requirement. To counteract the facilities of approach from the plain, "the proprietors of these forts had surrounded them, to a greater or less extent, with a dense jungle or thick growth of bamboos, thorny shrubs, trees, &c., the footpaths through which can only be passed in single file. By these means, and at small expense, an impediment was created, not only to the advance of an enemy, but, where the jungle was extensive, to such close investment as might prevent their escape when disinclined to persist in their defence." The ground-plan of these forts is almost invariably a rectilinear figure of four sides. It rarely presents any re-entering angles, and is so frequently a square with solid towers at the angles, that a square may be assumed to represent their general trace. Such places, so difficult of access, and so well suited for defensive posts, not likely to be exposed to vertical fire, "could not be carried by immediate assault. The surrounding jungle rendered a sufficient reconnaissance difficult, and often impracticable; the general direction of the faces could rarely be ascertained; their fire could sometimes only be replied to by

observing the smoke of the guns ; and, when mortars were available, the direction of the fire would be dependent on the information obtained with respect to the position in the fort of some object visible through the trees."

At Amethee and some of the larger forts, an important addition had been made to the defences by enclosing an area of about 200 acres, only partially covered by jungle, so as to form an intrenched camp sufficient for the accommodation of several thousand men, combining the advantage of free access to the country with that of retreat into the jungle.

Amethee, one of the forts, whose condition was found to be most perfect, possessed three separate lines of defence. The outer line presented a ditch varying from 20 to 40 feet in breadth, and from 19 to 30 feet in depth. In most places, when the fort was entered, there was not above 2 or 3 feet depth of water in it, except near the principal entrance, which adjoins the *jheel*, or lake, covering a part of the north-eastern portion of the fort. During the rains, it was said that the ditch contained 15 or 20 feet of water. The rampart was not continuous ; and although the edge of the counterscarp might generally be seen from some part of the works within the ditch, the bottom of the ditch was almost entirely unseen, and without flank defences. On the inner side of the lake there was an irregular line of earthen rampart rising from the water ; in other

places earthen towers, of small elevation, afforded positions for guns; whilst round the greater part of the fort, trenches had been formed immediately within the ditch to afford convenient positions for musketry. The country was flat, and on the east and north-east open. It was also open on a part of the south side; but the remainder was covered with jungle more or less thick—so thick on the west and south-west side, that the officers employed in sketching it reported the impossibility of following the ditch in that part. Within this enclosure, containing about 250 acres, is another of about 5 acres, formed by an earthen rampart and ditch, and presenting on every side, at some former period, a steep escarp and a good relief. The innermost enclosure was formed by the dwelling-house and its courtyards, and was only partially surrounded by a ditch. Its exterior wall, on the side towards the jungle, was of no great strength. As the roofs of the buildings of the inner enclosure were not bomb-proof, and no stores of gunpowder were found inside them, it was presumed that the garrison had no intention of defending them. Outside of them, however, three stores of gunpowder were found, and two mines completely prepared, with the hose laid; one under the causeway at the principal entrance—the other about 100 feet from it, along the west side of the lake.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The remarks on the forts of Oudh, and the description of Amethce, are abridged from the interesting report of Colonel (now General)

Leaving a strong post at Amethee to destroy the fort, and establishing as a temporary arrangement a military district, consisting of Sultanpoor, Amethee, and Pertabghur, which was placed under the command of Brigadier Pinckney, Lord Clyde moved without delay to Shunkerpoor, the stronghold of Beni Madho, whose standard, it was ascertained, the sepoy who had escaped from Rampoor Kussia and Amethee had joined. The advance was made in three parallel columns—the right under Hope Grant, the headquarter column in the centre, with Brigadier Wetherall's column on the left. The route lay through Purseedapoor, situated on the river Sye, and on the road to Roy Bareilly. On the 15th November, Hope Grant was ordered to march in the direction of Roy Bareilly, and when opposite Shunkerpoor to make a detour to his left and establish himself on the northern face of the fort; whilst the headquarters and Wetherall's columns, moving by the direct route to Shunkerpoor, took up their position on its southern and eastern faces respectively. Brigadier Eveleigh, who with his column had left Poorwah on the 8th November, had dispersed a body of rebels on that day, and on the following morning had stormed the fort of Simree. He had been instructed to move on Shunkerpoor from the north-west, for the purpose of completing the investment of that place; but having received the order too late, and finding a difficulty

Sir Henry Harness, K.C.B., R.E., who accompanied the headquarter column in the capacity of chief engineer.



in making his way by the cross-roads, he was not quite in time to fulfil his orders—consequently a loophole of escape was afforded to Beni Madho and his followers.

The circumference of the outer ditch of Shunkerpoor measured nearly eight miles, but was incomplete. Within the enclosure were four separate strongholds, the intervening space between them being covered with a dense jungle of thorns, here and there pierced by a narrow footpath. The principal one was the property of Beni Madho, who, on seeing that a cordon was being drawn around him, had previously attempted to break it by an unsuccessful attack of the posts established at Poorwah and Jubrowlee. On the works of the fort of Shunkerpoor, comprising an area of 5 acres, much care had been recently expended. Of the remaining three, the property of other *talookdars*, the one which belonged to Nurput Singh was the only one in a defensible state. As was the case with all the forts in Oudh, none of the dwelling-houses possessed bomb-proof cover; and “the large quantities of powder found distributed in the rooms of the fort of Shunkerpoor permitted the assumption that a few shells thrown into the fort would have produced an explosion.”

On the arrival of the headquarter column before Shunkerpoor, connection with Hope Grant on the right was resumed by means of patrols, and a picket was established about a mile and a half on the left to watch the southern face of the fort, care being

taken to keep the troops out of sight, so as to give no excuse for a conflict before the offer of terms had been made. Beni Madho, on being summoned, refused to lay down his arms, and at midnight of the 15th-16th, the rebel garrison, about 10,000 in number, evacuated the fort, taking with them nine or ten guns. Making a wide circuit to the westward, in order to avoid the pickets on Hope Grant's extreme right, they made for the jungle about three miles north-west of Roy Bareilly, with the ultimate intention of escaping across the Goomtee and the Ghogra. At 2 A.M. intelligence of the flight reached Lord Clyde, who forthwith directed Hope Grant to march at daybreak on Roy Bareilly. When the fort was occupied at daybreak, only one or two guns were found in it, the rest having been taken away or buried. On the same morning (the 16th), Brigadier Wetherall's brigade, now transferred to Colonel Taylor, 79th Highlanders, was directed to move by forced marches to Fyzabad, in order to continue the operations across the Ghogra as soon as the Baiswarra district had been cleared of rebels. Leaving a small force at Shunkerpoor to destroy the fort and cut down the jungle, the Commander-in-chief advanced on the night of the 18th with the headquarter column, now commanded by Colonel Jones, 6th Dragoon Guards, to Roy Bareilly. In the meantime, Hope Grant's column had been ordered to move towards Jugdeespoor and the Goomtee. On reaching Jugdeespoor, Hope Grant proceeded with a regi-


ment of Hodson's Horse to Fyzabad, where a bridge of boats was being constructed, in order to assume command of the forces about to operate in the trans-Ghogra country. On Brigadier Horsford<sup>1</sup> devolved the command of the column left at Jugdeespoor by Sir Hope Grant. Horsford had instructions to reduce the country on the right bank of the Goomtee between Jugdeespoor and Lucknow, and to destroy all such forts as he might come across on his leisurely advance towards the capital. On reaching Roy Bareilly, Lord Clyde sent forward a patrol to Peroo, with orders to feel for Brigadier Eveleigh's column, which had been instructed to advance to that point. It could not be found. During the night of the 19th, however, a letter was received from Brigadier Eveleigh, to the effect that he had been attacked at Bera on the 17th by a large body of the rebels, whom he had defeated, and that their course was in a westerly direction. He had therefore halted near Hajeeipoor, and awaited instructions. It was clear that Beni Madho had been headed by Hope Grant's movement towards Jugdeespoor. As it was ascertained that the rebels had taken the direction of Simree, Brigadier Eveleigh, who in the meantime had disencumbered himself of his sick, wounded, heavy guns and other impediments, which were consigned to a party of cavalry despatched from headquarters, was directed to make a night-march towards Simree, and harass the rebels in pursuit. Leaving a force to hold

<sup>1</sup> General Sir A. H. Horsford, G.C.B.

Roy Bareilly and guard the siege-train of the head-quarter column, as well as Evelegh's guns, which had reached that place, Lord Clyde marched at midnight of the 20th to Buchraon, twenty-two miles distant on the Lucknow road. From that point he was in readiness to act as circumstances might dictate. There information reached him that Beni Madho had taken up a position with his followers at Doundea-khera, a naturally strong position on the Ganges, with his force so disposed as to leave no doubt of his intention to try conclusions with his adversaries. Evelegh was at Nuggur, six miles distant, watching the rebels; and as he was weak in infantry, Lord Clyde determined to effect a junction with him and attack Beni Madho. This he accomplished on the 23d, having marched sixty miles since leaving Roy Bareilly. Near Simree the march was made through jungle, over a road sunk 10 or 12 feet deep, and so narrow that a cart breaking down would have blocked it up completely. Beni Madho was still in position, having his flanks *appuied* on two villages—the right on Buksur, the left on Doundea-khera—his rear resting on the Ganges, and his front covered by a thick thorny jungle, which was held by his skirmishers.

The tents having been struck, and the baggage packed and placed under a strong escort, Lord Clyde was in readiness to advance against the rebel position on the morning of the 24th. The force was in motion at 7 A.M., and before passing Nuggur was

divided into two separate columns, having an interval of half a mile between them. The right, led by Brigadier Eveleigh, was directed against Doundea-khera; the left, under the command of Colonel Jones, marched on Buksur. The columns marched in contiguous order, with the cavalry placed on either flank; and though, after leaving the village of Bidhaura, the



roads which they respectively took diverged from each other, a perfect communication was established between them by a line of skirmishers thrown out from each of them. On reaching Bidhaura, a summons was sent to Beni Madho, giving him a last chance of surrender; but after an interval of an hour and a half without any reply, the advance was

resumed. As the rebel position was neared, a short halt was made to enable it to be reconnoitred.

The enemy opened fire first, and our guns and skirmishers at once came into action. The brisk advance of the latter through the jungle was sufficient to break the rebel line. Such of the enemy as held it were forced into the smaller channel of the river, whilst those in occupation of the two villages on either flank were driven headlong out of them. It was not necessary to employ the main body of the column. The enemy suffered severely, but the greater portion of them escaped to their flanks up and down the river—not, however, without being roughly handled by the cavalry, which, especially on the right, pressed the pursuit with vigour till after dark. The rebels left between three and four hundred dead bodies on the ground, and abandoned all their guns, seven in number, which were captured. The column halted on the 25th, it being uncertain on what point the enemy, who had retreated in two directions, would concentrate. On the 26th, a small force under Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Royal Artillery, was detached in pursuit towards the Sye river. On its being ascertained that Beni Madho was making for the Goomtee, Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael was detached from Roy Bareilly on the 1st December with 4 guns light field-battery, a regiment of Oudh police cavalry, H.M.'s 32d Light Infantry, and the 19th Punjab Infantry, for the purpose of following him up and driving him across the Ghogra. This he

accomplished on the 5th December, the flight of the fugitives having been quickened by the action of Horsford's column, which came across them as they approached the Goomtee and drove them in confusion over that river. In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon had taken post at Roy Bareilly, the garrison of that place being strengthened by the arrival of a wing of the 54th Regiment from Shunkerpoor.

Lord Clyde having effected the clearance of the Baiswarra district, marched with the column to Lucknow, which he reached on the 28th November, detaching on the way Brigadier Eveleigh to pick up two guns of Bengal horse-artillery and the headquarters of H.M.'s 20th Regiment, which had been stationed at Nawabgunj.

Whilst such good effects had been produced by the movement of the columns under the personal direction of the Commander-in-chief, equally happy results had been obtained by the action of those which had been operating separately. Hope Grant, on reaching Fyzabad, found there Brigadier Taylor's column, which, together with the troops previously left at that station, gave him a strength of 4300 men. The bridge over the Ghogra having been completed under the direction of Captain Lothian Nicholson of the Royal Engineers, Hope Grant crossed that river on the 25th November, in the face of a rebel force under the Gonda Rajah ; and storming his position, whence he had caused much annoy-

ance during the construction of the bridge, defeated him with the loss of his guns. After a pursuit of twenty-four miles, Hope Grant returned with his force to the camp, which had in the meantime been established on the left bank of the Ghogra.

Brigadier Horsford's column having cleared the right bank of the Goomtee, made for Lucknow, reaching that place with the greater portion of his column on the 4th December, the remainder arriving two days later.

The column under Brigadier Barker, which had been joined by that of Colonel Hale after the abandonment of Rooyah (*vide ante*, p. 315), marched on Bangurmow—returning whence, he reduced the country by Kuchowna and Benugunj, arriving at Khyrabad on the 28th November, and at Biswah on the 3d December.

Brigadier Troup had advanced with the Shajchanpoor column on Nourungabad, and on the 8th November captured the fort of Mittowlee. He occupied it with a strong detachment, and then advanced on Aligunj, near which (at Mehndec) he had a smart skirmish with the rebels. He then moved down to Biswah, where he established himself on the 2d December near the right bank of the river Chouka.

Feroze Shah, the Delhi prince, who happened to be at that time at Memdabad with about 1500 or 2000 mounted followers, doubled back, and pushing rapidly past Baree and Sundeela, succeeded in crossing the Ganges near Meerun-ke-Serai. He caused



considerable alarm in the Doab, and in the vicinity of Etawah had a drawn engagement with some levies, at the head of which the magistrate of Etawah moved out to oppose him. In the meantime, the small movable force organised by Brigadier Percy Herbert at Cawnpore, started after Feroze Shah from that station, and drove him over the Jumna into Central India. Brigadier Herbert, owing to his weakness in cavalry, abstained from following him across the river, in the quicksands of which Feroze Shah lost many of his animals. As soon as Lord Clyde heard of Feroze Shah's movements, he directed Brigadier Troup to detach the bulk of his cavalry in pursuit; and this party was to be joined by two Madras horse - artillery guns. Feroze Shah, however, had too good a start to be overtaken. He was eventually encountered by Sir Robert Napier at Runnode, in the Gwalior territory, in the third week in December; and, on being defeated, made with his followers for Rajgurn, with the design of joining Tantia Topee.

On the 30th November a column was detached from Lucknow, under Brigadier Eveleigh, to reduce the fort of Oomeriah (about twenty miles distant), as well as to settle the country to the north-east, between that place and Futtehpore. Oomeriah fell into his hands on the 2d December.

Thus had one-half of the task of subjugating Oudh been happily accomplished. The plan, which had been elaborated with such care beforehand, and


which involved punctuality and precision in no ordinary degree, had borne its fruits. In no single instance had a deviation from it been made ; although, as Lord Clyde reported to the Governor-General, in the theatre of operations, “ extending over a length of more than 200 miles, each movement, and each apparently isolated attack, was made to defend and support what was going on to the right and left. The advance in line, stretching from the confines of Rohilcund to Allahabad and Azimghur, had put down everything like rebellion, in a large sense of the word, beyond the Ghogra.” Contemporary local critics found occasion to sneer at the tardiness of Lord Clyde’s movements,—with insufficient reason, however, when it is considered that his combinations necessitated, in many instances, long marches, and that he had a far greater object in view than the momentary dispersion of the rebel bands. Unless justified by some urgent military necessity, Lord Clyde was, on principle, averse to entering any district which could not be permanently occupied. A merely temporary occupation brought to the front all such of the residents as were inclined to sympathise with the British cause ; but no sooner had the troops taken their departure, than the ill-disposed seized the opportunity of plundering, maltreating, and even murdering those who had rendered any assistance. This had actually occurred in more than one district, where little or no disorder had shown itself prior to its temporary occupation by a British

force. To guard against such evils, Lord Clyde was determined to leave no portion of territory through which the columns moved, unfurnished with police posts under civil authority, and of sufficient strength to guarantee order for the future. In a word, he insisted on the permanent settlement of the country as he advanced.

Matters were now ripe for the prosecution of the campaign in the trans-Ghogra territory. On the 5th December, Lord Clyde marched to Nawabgunj Barabunkce with a column consisting of F troop Royal Horse-Artillery, heavy field-battery, two guns light field-battery, one squadron 6th Dragoon Guards, H.M.'s 7th Hussars, one squadron Lahore Light Horse, one squadron 6th Madras Cavalry, a regiment Oudh police cavalry, H.M.'s 20th Regiment, 2d battalion Rifle Brigade, a wing of H.M.'s 23d Fusiliers, the Belooch battalion, and two regiments of Oudh police infantry, under the command of Brigadier Horsford.

On reaching Nawabgunj the same day, the column was joined by the brigade under Brigadier Purnell—four guns light field-battery, a wing H.M.'s 23d Fusiliers, and H.M.'s 90th Light Infantry. On the following day, the 6th December, Lord Clyde had completed one march in the direction of Byram Ghât, when he heard that the enemy were still crossing the Ghogra a march ahead. He at once pushed on at a trot with the cavalry and four horse-artillery guns, on the waggons of which were placed a few of the Rifle Brigade, in the hopes of intercepting the

rebels, and possibly seizing some boats on the right bank of the river. On reaching it, however, he found that the whole of the enemy had crossed, and that there were no means immediately available for effecting the passage. As soon as the infantry brigade, which followed in support, came up, the force encamped near the village of Gunespoor, situ-



ated at the confluence of the Ghogra and Chouka rivers. At about two miles above their point of junction stands the fort of Bittowlee or Mittowlee, reported to be one of the most inaccessible strongholds in Oudh. It was held by Beni Madho's followers, who had been pursued by Colonel Carmichael's column from Roy Bareilly, and which was encamp-

ed within three miles of the headquarter column. Colonel Carmichael was ordered to retrace his steps on the following day.

Hope Grant, after his successful affair with the Rajah of Gonda on the 25th November, had, in accordance with instructions from headquarters, limited his advance to that point. It was necessary, in carrying out the combination, to give time to Brigadier Rowcroft, who was simultaneously advancing from the Goruckpoor district, to push forward across the Raptée to Heer, for the purpose of clearing out the rebels who had so long disturbed that portion of the frontier, and driving them into the Toolseepoor district of Oudh. A premature movement in advance of the line already taken up would have been attended with grave inconvenience, if it induced the rebels to pass round Hope Grant's right flank, and skirting the mountains, to invade the provinces of Tirhoot and Behar. Such a contingency, of all things, was most to be dreaded; and Hope Grant was accordingly warned "to use the greatest care to prevent such a catastrophe."

The headquarter column halted on the 7th. As all the boats were in the enemy's hands on the opposite side of the Ghogra, and as, with the exception of a few small canoes, no means were available for the passage of the river, which, at Byram Ghât, is a fine deep stream, 450 yards wide at its narrowest point, Hope Grant, who in the meantime had been operating to the eastward of Gonda, and had destroyed the

fort of Bunkussia, was directed to advance on Sec-rora. The result of this movement was to turn the enemy's position at Nawabgunj. The enemy, it was believed, abandoned the fort of Mittowlee on the 7th, as numerous armed men were observed crossing the Ghogra opposite Nawabgunj. Lord Clyde, anxious to prosecute the campaign without further delay, determined to proceed with Horsford's column to Fyzabad, leaving Brigadier Purnell at Byram Ghât with a squadron of Lahore Light Horse, a regiment of Oudh police cavalry, a heavy and light field-battery, a company of Royal Engineers, H.M.'s 23d Fusiliers, H.M.'s 90th Light Infantry, and a regiment of Oudh police infantry, to watch the Ghât, and collect boats and materials for the construction of the bridge. Brigadier Eveleigh, who had completed his work at Oomeriah, received orders by express to march to Fyzabad. Passing through Deriabad, at which place a small military post had been established, Lord Clyde reached Fyzabad on the 10th December, having accomplished three long marches of nearly twenty miles each. The route to the ancient capital of the kingdom lay through an unusually fertile and highly cultivated country. Colonel Christie followed the Commander-in-chief two marches in rear with the siege-train, which was accompanied by a troop of Bengal horse-artillery, a heavy field-battery, a detachment Hodson's Horse, a wing H.M.'s 80th Foot, the 5th Punjab Rifles, and the Kumaon battalion. Early the next day the

headquarter column began crossing the Ghogra by the newly constructed bridge, and marched to Nawabgunj, about seven miles distant on the left bank of the 'Tehree Nuddee, *en route* to Secrora, which was reached on the 14th—Lord Clyde, who had remained behind at Fyzabad for a day, overtaking the column on the 12th. On the 9th December, Lord Clyde informed Lord Canning of his proceedings: "I shall be at Fyzabad to-morrow, and cross the Ghogra the next day with a view to breaking up the last bodies of rebels which retain any organisation. Sir Hope Grant, according to native report, had an affair the day before yesterday at Bunkussia. This requires confirmation. The movement of the various columns towards the Ghogra had the effect of driving the greater part of the enemy across the river. The alarm caused by the marching through the interval between two of the columns by some parties of rebel cavalry has been very great; but, as far as Oudh is concerned, no mischief has been done. It is to be hoped that they will be well prepared in the Doab by the parties which have been moved after them. My object in coming by way of Fyzabad was to save time, a brigade having been left at Byram Ghât to complete a bridge, which will not be effected immediately, as the collection of boats sufficient for a work of such magnitude will take many days, even after both banks of the river have been cleared. I yesterday saw the officer commanding the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, and spoke to him about

the discharge question. His report was very satisfactory, and that his men had not moved in it. The flying column of cavalry under Colonel Brind has been ordered to stop at Cawnpore, if the rebels under Feroze Shah should have crossed the Jumna on its arrival there, unless your lordship shall please to give it any other orders. Brigadier Barker has been ordered to fix his headquarters at Sundeela, his advanced posts being across the Goomtee towards the Chouka ; and he commands all the troops belonging to the various columns in the Sectapoor district—viz., his own, Troup's, and Hale's. I hope his own presence at Sundeela will check the prevalence of panics at the report of small bodies of rebels moving from one point to another. The exaggeration of the native reports would be ludicrous if it was not so mischievous, and it affects Europeans and natives alike."

Writing on the following day to the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Clyde conveyed to his Royal Highness a most satisfactory report of the troops: "I never," he remarks, "saw an army in higher health and condition and better cared for than that now in the field. Their marching is most admirable. I may almost say that twenty miles a-day has come to be an average both with the troops immediately with me and those of the various columns which enter into the general combination. The same spirit animates the officers and men, and your Royal Highness has indeed reason to be gratified with them. It



is only by such a spirit and such exertions that this widespread struggle can be finally put an end to. I am very sanguine that this will now soon be accomplished."

The left bank of the Ghogra at Byram Ghât having been cleared by the advance of Hope Grant to Secrora, Brigadier Purnell was enabled to secure a number of boats for the construction of the bridge. Additional ones had been sent up by Lord Clyde from Fyzabad in charge of a steamer having a detachment of British troops on board. The bridge was being rapidly put together, and was finally completed on the 23d December. Brigadier Purnell was ordered to watch the *ghâts* on the Chouka, as far up as Jehangirabad, and prevent the crossing of any rebel bands. A like duty devolved upon Brigadier Troup, who guarded the line from that place up to the confines of Rohilcund, in which province also the various forces at Mohumdee, Shahjehanpoor, Pilleebheet, Madho Tandah, &c., were put on the alert with a similar object. A detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt, of the 23d Fusiliers, was thrown across the Chouka above Byram Ghât, and marched up the Mullapoor Doab. The police force attached to Brigadier Purnell's column was destined to hold Secrora. Brigadier Eveleigh's column, which had been directed on Fyzabad, was instructed to push forward and halt at Gonda, where it was "to form a reserve to the columns moving northwards, to settle the country, and level the forts."

On the morning of the 14th December, on which day the headquarter column reached Secrora, Hope Grant's force had set out for the purpose of aiding Brigadier Rowcroft in his advance on Toolseepoor, and driving the rebels beyond the British frontier, Grant himself remaining behind to confer with Lord Clyde, whilst his column made one march towards Bulrampoor on the right bank of the Raptee. The column under Brigadier Rowcroft, consisting of a light field-battery of Madras artillery, the Pearl's naval brigade under Captain Sotheby, the Bengal yeomanry cavalry, the headquarter Madras cavalry, H.M.'s 13th Light Infantry, the headquarters 53d Foot, the regiment of Ferozepore, and a wing of the 27th Madras Native Infantry, to which was subsequently added the 1st Punjab Cavalry, had advanced from Bustee, and, crossing the Raptee, was prosecuting its march to Toolseepoor, which place, it was believed, was held by Bala Rao, the brother of Nana Sahib, in considerable strength. With the object of preventing Brigadier Rowcroft's advance being turned to the eastward, a strong post, formed by H.M.'s 73d Regiment, the left wing of the 7th Punjab Infantry, and two bullock-guns, was established at Simree. After one or two affairs with the rebels, Toolseepoor was occupied by Brigadier Rowcroft on the 23d December. He was subsequently joined at that place by Hope Grant, who had previously detached from Bulrampoor a portion of the 1st Sikh Infantry, with a heavy battery and one company of the 53d

Regiment to Bhinga, for the purpose of constructing a bridge over the Raptée.

The objective point for which the headquarter column now made was Baraitch, which was held by the Nana Sahib and the Begum of Oudh, who still rallied to her cause the last remnant of the mutineers and insurgents occupying Boondée. As the Commander-in-chief advanced, these leaders fell back in the direction of the Nepaul frontier. On the 15th December, the headquarter column marched from Secrora by the road leading up the left bank of the Chota Surjoo, and reached Baraitch on the 17th. The town had been evacuated by the bulk of the rebels on the previous day. On the day of his arrival Lord Clyde wrote to Lord Canning: "I arrived at Baraitch this morning, the advanced-guard of the Oudh police cavalry having come by surprise on a picket of the rebels. The main body of the latter seem to be at Nanparah, which is about 20 miles off, the Begum being at a fort called Nichwa, which is a few *koss* to the N.W. of that place. It will be necessary for me to stop here a day or two because it is raining, and to give time to Sir Hope Grant, who arrived at Bulrampoor yesterday, in continuance of his movement of advance along the banks of the Raptée on Bhinga, which is also held by the rebels." On the 19th he continued his report: "I am still at Baraitch, having been detained by rain and the necessity for waiting for Sir Hope Grant's march to Bhinga. Had I pressed on before

he had made his circuitous march of the Raptée, there would have been danger of considerable bodies of the rebels slipping round my rear into the country through which I have lately advanced. No time, however, is lost, as necessary leisure is afforded by Major Barrow to induce the chiefs and sepoys to lay down their arms without more fighting. He was most anxious for a halt on this account, putting military considerations aside. Owing to the considerable number of Punjabee troops and police which have lately arrived in these parts, I would solicit your lordship's leave to use my discretion with respect to moving the Madras native infantry and cavalry, now north of the Jumna, back to their own Presidency at a very early date. Their pay is enormous; and it is expedient, both on economical and military grounds, that they should go as soon as possible. The excitement of war once over, the Sikhs will soon discover that the Madrassées are receiving 12 rupees *per mensem*, when they get only 7. . . . The Madras Fusiliers can very shortly be spared from Cawnpore. This regiment has done an immense deal of hard work during the last eighteen months. On the arrival of the 48th Regiment at Cawnpore, it might proceed in boats to Calcutta, and from thence by sea to Madras. I believe this may be done with perfect safety. The Adjutant-General H.M.'s forces has been desired by this post to wait on General Birch, and to inquire if your lordship would approve of the volunteering order for the

military train and the four infantry regiments being issued, the time fixed for it to begin being the 1st February. By that date, I am confident it will be in my power to dispense with them without risk, and to recommend the general location of the troops for the ensuing year. I hope the manner in which the troops are disposed will have the effect of guarding the country properly, while the last move against the insurgents is taking place in the direction of Nanparah and Churda by Sir Hope Grant and myself." Indications of disruption amongst the insurgents were now becoming apparent. On the 22d, while still at Baraitch, Lord Clyde again addressed Lord Canning: "I enclose a copy of an answer sent by me yesterday to the Begum, whose *vakeel* appeared in camp early in the day with an inquiry from her Highness as to what she might expect. The scouts say she has travelled north, and is already close to the hills of Nepaul. This is probably true; and I think it advisable, at any rate, to cause the troops to march forward, as I have this day heard from Sir Hope Grant that he will be able to-morrow to advance up the Raptree towards Bhinga. Brigadier Rowcroft has been much impeded by the natural difficulties of the country he has had to traverse; and Sir Hope, whose movement was combined with his, has been delayed in consequence. I shall be at Nanparah the day after to-morrow. I am happy to say that there is every appearance of a general break-up, the *vakeels* of all the rajahs and *talookdars* still 'out'

having shown themselves to Major Barrow. Bala Rao is not far from Toolseepoor, at which place Brigadier Rowcroft is directed to halt, for the purpose of operating in the district; and the Nana is said to be moving north. I believe there is nothing more to say about the present state of things in these parts. I am glad to see that Sir R. Napier came up with Feroze Shah's party. The accounts of Oudh generally are very satisfactory."

On the 21st, Colonel Christie, who in the meantime had joined the Commander-in-chief, was detached to Oorabce, near the left bank of the Surjoo, with orders to move parallel with the headquarter column, and prevent any rebels doubling round its left flank and crossing the Surjoo into the Mullapoor Doab.

Leaving a small mixed force of Europeans and native troops, as well as a body of police cavalry and infantry, to hold Baraitch, Lord Clyde marched on the 23d, with F troop Royal Horse-Artillery, a heavy field-battery Royal Artillery, a company of Royal Engineers, a squadron of the 6th Dragoon Guards, the 7th Hussars, a squadron Madras cavalry, a squadron of the Oudh police cavalry, eight companies H.M.'s 20th Foot, the 2d battalion Rifle Brigade, and the Belooch battalion, towards Nanparah. Passing through a wide expanse of grassy plain, and destroying Tiprah—a bamboo fort surrounded by a double fence of tall bamboos and a ditch, and which was impenetrable save by one entrance—

the camp was pitched at Deodutpoor, 15 miles from Baraitch. The enemy were reported to have abandoned Nanparah, and to be posted at Churda and Burgidiah. Guns were heard in the direction of the river Surjoo, which afterwards proved to be those of Colonel Christie's column engaged in skirmishing with the enemy. Heavy rain fell on the night of the 23d and during the 24th, rendering the tents too saturated to be packed, and the roads too slippery for marching. Accordingly, Christmas-day was celebrated in camp, on which, the clouds having cleared away, the snowy peaks of the Himalaya, which were lightened up by the glow of the morning sun, shone down, in apparently close proximity, with majestic grandeur. The advance to Burgidiah was resumed on the 26th. After passing Nanparah, which was found to be almost deserted, intelligence reached Lord Clyde that the enemy was in force at Burgidiah. After making a short halt, during which the baggage closed up compactly on the reserve, the column resumed its march, and when the eighteenth mile had been completed, the enemy's pickets were sighted falling back at a leisurely pace on the main body, which was drawn up in advance of a village opposite the left front of the British force. Halting for a few minutes to reconnoitre, Lord Clyde, though the afternoon was far advanced, immediately disposed his troops for action.

Four guns Royal Horse-Artillery, with the 7th Hussars on their left and a squadron of the 6th

Madras Cavalry on their right, were formed in advance. Two companies of Rifles and two of the Belooch battalion followed in support of the guns. The rest of the force formed up on its left rear—viz., 2d battalion Rifle Brigade on the right, two guns Royal Horse-Artillery, Belooch battalion, heavy field-battery, eight companies H.M.'s 20th Regiment, and a squadron of Carabineers. The 1st Punjab Cavalry, which arrived on the field (having made forced marches from Toolseepoor) after the affair had begun, formed up, one squadron on the right of the Rifles and two squadrons on the left of the Carabineers. Skirmishers were thrown out in front of the line, which was directed on the village held by the enemy.

The Commander-in-chief advanced to the front at a canter with the guns and cavalry of the advance-guard. On approaching within range of the enemy's guns, he took ground suddenly to his right for several hundred yards, and when opposite their extreme left he again advanced to his front up to within 600 yards, and brought the guns into action. The effect of the manœuvre was instantancous; the enemy's flank was turned, and breaking in disorder, he fled across the plain in the direction of Burgidiah and Churdah. The pursuit was carried on until nightfall. The enemy, who numbered about 4000 men, abandoned all their guns (six), which fell into the hands of their pursuers.

During the affair, Lord Clyde, when galloping to



point out the proper direction for pursuit to the officer in command of the horse-artillery, met with a serious accident. His horse fell, throwing him violently on the ground. Mackinnon, his surgeon, who happened to be immediately behind his chief, rode up, and dismounting, found him sitting up in great pain, with blood trickling down his cheek. Mackinnon at first imagined that a stray shot from the enemy in retreat might have produced the flow of blood, but, on examination, found that it was caused by his head coming in contact with a hard projection on the ground. He further ascertained that a shoulder was put out and a rib broken. Lord Clyde, on learning the nature of the injury, was very much disconcerted, remarking, "How unlucky it was for him to be disabled in this manner, just as he was on the point of bringing the war to a conclusion." Notwithstanding, however, this accident, he did not abrogate his functions, but continued, as hitherto, the personal superintendence of the operations in progress.

A circumstance, characteristic of Lord Clyde, occurred this evening. Dr Russell, himself an eyewitness of it, thus vividly portrays the scene: "On returning to camp it was quite dark; not a tent was pitched; the baggage was coming up in darkness and in storms of angry voices. As the night was cold, the men made blazing fires of the straw and grass of the houses of the neighbouring hamlet, in which Nana Sahib's followers had long been quar-

tered. At one of those fires, surrounded by Beloochees, Lord Clyde sat, with his arm in a sling, on a *charpoy*, which had been brought out to feed the flames. Once, as he rose up to give some orders for the disposition of the troops, a tired Beloochee flung himself full length on the crazy bedstead, and was jerked off in a moment by one of his comrades,—‘Don’t you see, you fool, that you are on the Lord Sahib’s *charpoy*?’ Lord Clyde interposed—‘Let him lie there; don’t interfere with his rest,’ and took his seat on a billet of wood.” Under medical treatment the dislocation was rapidly reduced; and after some weeks’ rest on his return to Lucknow, Lord Clyde was pretty well again, though subsequently he suffered from a slight attack of pleuro-pneumonia, the effects of the injury to his rib.

The camp was pitched late around the fort of Burgidiah.

The next day (the 27th) the headquarter column marched on the fort of Musjidiah, situated about six miles distant in a north-westerly direction. To this stronghold a large portion of the rebels had taken themselves on the previous day.

The *enceinte* of the fort of Musjidiah is of small extent in comparison with the forts of Baiswarra, but it was considered by the engineers to be the most complete and the strongest fort which had yet been seen in Oudh. “Its profile”—so runs the report of Colonel Harness—“was very strong in almost every part, the ditch being generally 20 feet in depth and

25 feet in breadth, with very steep slopes to the escarp and counterscarp, and the ramparts having generally a height of 15 feet. In addition to this strong *enceinte*, a very thick and well-formed abatis, impenetrable by troops under well-directed fire, more than half surrounded the work, including the whole of that part which was not concealed by the jungle. The jungle, which extended round the north, the west, and the south-west sides of the fort, was very thick, but nowhere apparently impenetrable by infantry. The other sides of the fort were so far covered by underwood as to render it impossible to form an accurate opinion of the defence by reconnaissance."

The headquarter column, advancing from the southward, halted nearly in front of the north-east face of the fort, at a distance of from 1000 to 1500 yards. The heavy guns with the force—viz., one 18-pounder and one 8-inch howitzer—were ordered up, and taken to the front by a circuitous path through the jungle, and placed in position on the east side of the fort, within 350 yards of the entrance-towers. They were accompanied by a strong guard of infantry. Two 8-inch mortars with the force were brought into action simultaneously at a distance of about 800 yards on the south-west side of the fort. The flanks were covered by the cavalry and the field-artillery, whilst the skirmishers, pushing through the underwood and broken ground, approached to within 300 yards of the works, so as to

fire with certainty through the embrasures. After a vertical fire of not quite three hours' duration, the enemy's guns ceased to reply ; and a soldier, creeping stealthily up to the ditch, discovered that the place was abandoned. The enemy had escaped into the dense jungle at the back of the fort, leaving their guns, ammunition, and grain behind them.

The camp had been pitched whilst the bombardment was being carried on ; so that before sunset all the force, with the exception of an adequate garrison to hold the fort, had returned to it. The loss on this and the previous day was very trifling, amounting to only thirteen men wounded, one of whom subsequently died.

A halt was made on the 28th December. Leaving fifty men of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and a wing of the Belooch battalion to destroy the fort of Musjidiah, Lord Clyde marched back to Nanparah, as at that spot he judged he would be in a more central and advantageous position to watch the enemy's movements.

Lieutenant-Colonel Christie's column, which had been moving parallel with the headquarter column, was directed to continue its advance northward on Durmapoor and Pudnaha on the 31st December. Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt's column, which had marched up the Mullapoor Doab, crossed the river Surjoo at Khyree Ghât near Mullapoor, and was ordered to move on Nanparah. A portion of Brigadier Troup's column, detached under Colonel Dennis, and con-

sisting of two guns Bengal horse-artillery, a detachment irregular cavalry, and the 1st battalion H.M.'s 60th Rifles, had been thrown across the Chouka and Dour rivers, with orders to sweep the country up to the Khyreegurh jungles.

On the 29th the headquarter column halted. During the afternoon of the next day intelligence reached the camp through scouts that the rebels had collected in force near Bankee. Orders were issued thereupon for the troops to parade without bugle-sound at 8 P.M. The camp was left standing, and placed in charge of a wing of H.M.'s 20th Regiment. The infantry were placed on elephants, as many of these animals as were available having been collected for the purpose. The night was pitch-dark. A lantern fastened to a howdah on the back of an elephant moved at the head of the column and served as a guide to the troops in rear; but notwithstanding this precaution, the squadron of the 6th Madras Cavalry lost its way at starting, and did not rejoin the column till the following day. After a march of fifteen miles in the dark, a halt was made about 3 A.M., when within two or three miles of the enemy's supposed position. Soon after dawn the column continued its advance, and after proceeding two miles and a half, the enemy's vedettes appeared in sight with the rebel force beyond them. They were posted within about three-quarters of a mile of a belt of jungle which runs almost parallel with, and about three miles distant from, the river Raptee.

Their position was well chosen, for its close proximity to the forest enabled them to withdraw from the field of battle with little chance of molestation from the guns and cavalry opposed to them. Subsequent examination of the ground showed that two roads ran through the forest, leading towards the Raptée and the pass by which the Soonar valley in Nepaul is reached. The enemy's line occupied the space between these roads. The cavalry and horse-artillery were moved up rapidly to the front, the troop of horse-artillery in the centre flanked on the right by a squadron of the Carabincers and a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry; on the left, by the 7th Hussars and another squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. Though the enemy's force was about two miles distant, the steady advance of the British over rough ground brought them within range in about seven or eight minutes. After a few shots the rebels turned and fled. Two guns, with the 7th Hussars and a squadron of the Punjab Cavalry, pursued that portion of the enemy which retired by the road leading into the jungle in rear of their right. Four guns, a squadron of Carabincers, and a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, followed those who took the road in rear of their left. The enemy gained the jungle, abandoning two of their guns in the open. On reaching cover, they brought a gun into action, around which some of their sharpshooters rallied. This gun, concealed amidst the trees, was so well handled, that it was deemed advisable to

retire the artillery and cavalry out of action until the infantry came up. The guns and cavalry on the left having joined those on the right, three companies of Rifles were thrown into skirmishing order, and entered the wood. The gun was abandoned and captured. The remainder of the Rifles, with a wing of the Belooch battalion, pressed on in pursuit through the forest, followed by the troop of horse-artillery and cavalry. On emerging from the jungle, which was a mile in breadth, the rebels were observed in position on some rising ground about 800 yards ahead, on the opposite side of a deeply embedded nullah. They likewise held the wood on the right of the rising ground. The Rifles were at once formed on the left, with skirmishers thrown out, and advanced briskly toward the wood. The horse-artillery and cavalry crossed the nullah by a difficult ford a few hundred yards lower down. Two only of the guns were able to cross. As the cavalry gained the opposite bank, they were formed up in squadrons. On ascending the rising ground, the enemy's cavalry and infantry were observed slowly retiring along the edge of the forest towards the Raptee. A squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry, supported by three squadrons of the 7th Hussars, charged straight down towards the Raptee, in the direction of a lower ford, for which a portion of the rebels were making. The last squadron of Hussars which came up was directed on the main body of the enemy on the edge of the wood, and orders were

simultaneously sent for the other three squadrons of the regiment to change their direction and support the single squadron.

As the three supporting squadrons swept along the banks of the Raptee, six guns opened on them from the jungle on the opposite side, and ploughed up the ground between them for four or five hundred yards. The pace was good, and they ran the gauntlet without sustaining loss. The leading squadron was 800 yards in advance, and drove four or five hundred of the enemy's cavalry headlong across the Raptee. Several were sabred before they reached the river, and a number were drowned or killed in the Raptee. Unfortunately, Major Horne, who was leading the left wing of the 7th Hussars, and two men, were drowned when crossing the river. Captain Stisted, who led the first squadron, narrowly escaped the same fate. Four guns were taken during the day, and two more were found abandoned in the forest on the following day. The camp and baggage having come up from Nanparah during this affair, the troops joined it in the evening, after a long and fatiguing march.

By intelligence received in camp on the following day, it was ascertained that the several bodies of rebels who fell back on the appearance of the head-quarter column at Byram Ghât, had yielded to the pressure of the advancing line, and had either surrendered or passed the Nepaulese frontier, beyond which the Commander-in-chief was unauthorised to act.



The force halted at Bankee and in its vicinity till the 5th January. During the interval the detachment sent to destroy the fort of Musjidiah, as also that dropped at Nanparah, which had been relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt's column, returned to camp. The column under Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, which had made a circuit by Pudnaha, also rejoined headquarters.

Information now reached the Commander-in-chief that the remnant of the rebels were encamped in the Soonar valley, between the first and second range of hills within Nepaulese territory. Thereupon Lord Clyde advanced with the force from Bankee nearly six miles, to Sidinhia Ghât, the scene of the action of the 31st December, where the camp was pitched on the right bank of the Raptée, the site having been selected as the most favourable for watching the pass leading into Nepaul. The troops took up their position in a most picturesque spot facing the hills, the slopes of the lower ranges of which were clothed with gigantic forest-trees. The front of the position faced the hills, the left flank being thrown back so as to observe a dense forest, the right flank being likewise refused on the open ground sloping down to the Raptée. The passage by the gorge of the Raptée was believed to be one of the least accessible entrances into Nepaul.

On the 7th January, the Nawab of Furrukhabad and Mehndee Hussein surrendered themselves to the civil authority in camp—the former, who in the early

stage of the revolt had rendered himself notorious by his treachery and open countenance of the mutineers, being immediately transferred to Lucknow under the guard of a wing of H.M.'s 80th Regiment.

After Hope Grant had joined Brigadier Rowcroft at Toolseepoor, he found it necessary, as had been foreseen by the Commander-in-chief, to take measures to prevent Bala Rao creeping round his right flank into the Goruckpoor district. He therefore provided for the security of Toolseepoor by leaving Brigadier Taylor to hold that place ; and taking with him his cavalry and Brigadier Rowcroft's column, set out on the 25th December. Making forced marches in a south-easterly direction, he passed through Heer, and then skirting Simree on his left hand, made a circuit in a north-westerly direction, and anticipated the rebels by hitting on Bala Rao's force at Kumdah-Kote, close under the hills, about thirteen miles distant in a north-easterly direction from Toolseepoor. Hope Grant attacked him on the 4th January, driving his followers into the neighbouring hills and capturing fifteen guns. Like his brother the Nana, Bala Rao sought refuge in Nepaul.

The task Lord Clyde had set himself to perform was now accomplished. By means of the sweeping advance initiated in October, the three wide provinces of Oudh, Behar, and Goruckpoor—which, to use his own words, “till that time had been in a state of downright insurrection—were absolutely cleared of even the semblance of rebellion.” “The

march of each column, the commencement of each attack, was guided from headquarters, and watched with the utmost care and accuracy. The different commanders of the various columns were apparently directing independent campaigns; but in point of fact, they all depended the one on the other, and their movements were respectively ordered and arranged accordingly. Although from the nature of the contest there were no great battles, the number of small affairs was very considerable; and the endeavour was made successfully so to combine the various columns, that on no occasion did it happen that any commander was under the necessity of fighting against odds, which he could not easily overcome. I myself moved, as occasion seemed to require, from one column to another, and at times was rapidly marching with a very slender escort, while the public gave me credit for being immediately at the head of a large force on which every sort of authority might draw without reserve.”<sup>1</sup> In Oudh alone 150,000 armed men, of whom at least 35,000 were sepoys of the old native army, succumbed to the power of the British arms. Authority was re-established, and by the presence of the newly-organised police force confidence was restored to the inhabitants. About 150 guns were captured in fight. Many more guns and 350,000 arms of different descriptions had, according to the official report, been collected, and

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum on the War in India since the fall of Lucknow, 26th July 1859.

more than 300 forts had been destroyed. The disarmament of the country was at length enabled to be taken systematically in hand; and on its completion by the civil authorities some months later, Lord Clyde was enabled to record that "700 additional guns had been recovered from the various forts, more than 1100 of which had been razed to the ground."<sup>1</sup>

Owing to the precautions which had been adopted to provide each column with heavy ordnance, as well as mortars for the purpose of bringing vertical fire to bear on such of the forts as it was found necessary to bombard, the casualties incurred in the several affairs with the enemy, since Lord Clyde assumed personal command of the force on the 2d November, did not exceed 18 killed and 84 wounded—an insignificant loss, and one wholly disproportionate to the importance of the results obtained.

The Commander-in-chief having no authority to cross the frontier, now made arrangements for leaving a force to watch the pass leading into Nepaul, so as to guard against any irruption of the rebels from that quarter. Accordingly, a column composed of 4 guns Royal Horse-Artillery, the 7th Hussars, two squadrons 1st Punjab Cavalry, the 2d battalion Rifle Brigade, the 5th Punjab Infantry, and a wing of the Belooch battalion, was directed to remain under the command of Brigadier Horsford at Sidinhia Ghât. Lord Clyde, with the remainder of the headquarter column, set

<sup>1</sup> Idem.

out on the return march to Lucknow on the 8th January, conferring on the way with Hope Grant, who was placed in command of the whole force in Oudh, and who for the present remained to watch matters on the frontier. Hostile operations having ceased, Lord Clyde was enabled to exchange the rough motions of an elephant—from the back of which, since his accident, he had directed the movements of the troops—for the more easy conveyance of a *dhoolie*; and in this manner, passing by Baraitch, and crossing the Ghogra by the bridge at Byram Ghât, he reached Lucknow on the 17th January. .

## CHAPTER XX.

LORD CANNING'S CONGRATULATIONS—CLAIMS OF LOCAL EUROPEAN TROOPS—LORD CLYDE'S REPLY—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD CANNING—REPORT TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—ILLNESS—HORSFORD ENTERS NEPAUL—LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS—HORSFORD RE-ENTERS OUDH—LETTER FROM LORD CANNING—MEASURES AGAINST IRRUPTION OF REBELS INTO TIRHOOT—LORD CLYDE PROCEEDS TO SIMLA—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—NOTIFICATION OF RESIGNATION TO LORD CANNING—JUNG BAHADOOR—BUNDELCUND—GWALIOR—PURSUIT AND CAPTURE OF TANTIA TOPEE—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—SUBMISSION OF RESIGNATION—FINAL LETTER REGARDING THE REBELLION TO LORD CANNING—CLAIMS OF EUROPEAN TROOPS DECIDED AGAINST THEM—ACTION OF THE MALCONTENTS—SERIOUS EMERGENCY—MEASURES TO MEET IT—COURTS OF INQUIRY—DISCHARGES—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—LORD CLYDE'S REASONS IN FAVOUR OF AMALGAMATION.

DURING the recent operations, Lord Clyde had received several communications from Lord Canning expressing his pleasure at the turn events were taking. On hearing of the success in Baiswarra, he wrote on the 28th November: "I wish you joy sincerely of the new success of all these last operations. It has been more speedy and more complete than I had ventured to hope. Beni Madho's escape

is provoking; but it is the only drawback, and not likely to be an important one, now that he is so thoroughly stripped of his guns, and shut out from the country where he has most influence. Is it true that he replied to the offers made to him by vaunting that he was the subject of the ex-king, and would stick to his allegiance? I have heard this reported (but not upon very good authority); and if true, it is remarkable. The same tone has been taken by Mahomed Hussein, as you will see by a letter from Mr Wingfield, which I enclose. . . . I do not feel so confident of Bundelcund as you do; but I have heard nothing amiss from there lately.

“I hope to hear from you respecting the claim of the Company’s European soldiers in a day or two. I forgot to say that the shape in which I suggested to Lord Stanley that a concession should be made to the men who do not desire to leave, is that of a year or two of service, not that of a bounty. I think the former preferable, as being less likely to excite the cupidity of other troops whose engagement was made under the Company, and whose pretensions, however justly they might be resisted, it is not desirable to raise. Do you think the suggestion a good one? If any objection occurs to you, I can correct it by the outgoing mail if you will send me word by telegraph.

“The ‘Delhi Gazette’ of the 25th has in it a letter from Colonel Sherwill of the 2d Bengal Fusiliers, which speaks well for the temper of that regiment

in the matter of these claims. I wish that the Madras men and the Bengal regiments may take example from it; but I wish it more than I expect it."

To the suggestion referred to above, Lord Clyde telegraphed the following reply: "With respect to your lordship's proposal to Lord Stanley, I would venture to submit that the case is one which admits of no compromise. If the men are wrong in their demand, they must abide by the law, and there should be no semblance of concession. If they should be deemed to be right, they should have the benefit of the mistake which may have been made, according to the custom of the service. I do not anticipate any difficulty, having particularly noticed the manner in which some very interested parties received my address on this subject the other day. I spoke to them in the sense of the draft of a general order submitted to your lordship by the Adjutant-General. You will know who those parties are, having referred to them in your letter of the 28th instant."

On the 28th December, Lord Canning wrote in acknowledgment of Lord Clyde's letter of the 22d, previously quoted:—

"I am delighted at the steadily continuous good news which comes in from all sides of the province; and I am sure that you must feel satisfied with your work. I was for one night last week at Cawnpore, where Mr Montgomery met me. His accounts of



the social settling down, even in some parts where opposition has been strongest, is very encouraging.

“My first impression upon receiving your proposals for the stationing of troops was, that these would not give us strength enough beyond the Ghogra. Mr Montgomery thinks it will be difficult to find any healthy localities on that side from which to choose, and is disposed to trust mainly to a large force at Fyzabad. A good deal as regards the necessity of garrisoning strongly the trans-Ghogra districts will depend upon the manner in which hostilities there close. If a large body of rebels and sepoys, and a few of the bitterest leaders, take resolutely to the jungles or to the Nepaul hills, we shall scarcely be able to keep the districts in safety without a station of Europeans farther northward and eastward than Secrora. . . . This makes me desirous to see the trans-Ghogra, if not occupied, at least well watched by a European force,—if this can be done without thrusting our English troops into pestilence. From what you wrote to me on the 17th, I hope to hear from you again on this subject. If there should be a really general submission of the rebels or of the chief leaders, the difficulty will be much diminished.

“Pray do as you propose in regard to the Madras native infantry and cavalry now on this side of the Jumna. There need not be a day’s delay in moving them across that river, or by way of Rewah towards Saugur and Jubbulpoor, as soon as you can spare

them. I cannot say, however, that when they get across, it may not be necessary to retain them for a time in the south of Bundelcund, or on the borders of Central India, before letting them pass into their own Presidency : that part of the country has never been thoroughly quieted. The Saugur garrison has not been strong enough to do much at a distance from its walls. . . . If we do not show ourselves in strength there, and for a longer time, than by merely marching through, there will be trouble in the hot weather. Rewah is still in a very inflammable state, and the Rajah himself has come very lamely out of an ugly case of treason, which I have had to bring up against him within the last few weeks. The *thakoors* are actually asking for large grants of land as the price of their accepting the amnesty. It is a part of the country which must be thoroughly intimidated before we shall have peace. Over a large tract of it a European soldier has not been seen for thirty years.

“There is also another large district in which we ought to show English troops, as soon as any can be spared for it and whilst the season is healthy, and that is Palamow and Chota Nagpoor. A half-hearted smouldering rebellion and resistance is going on there, rather increasing than diminishing, which it would be very imprudent to allow to grow to a head. I think it probable that an advance from Hazareebagh to Ranchee, and the presence there for a time of three or four companies of Europeans, would enable the civil

officer to bring Chota Nagpoor into order. Of Palamow I shall hear more in a day or two.

“The Madras Fusiliers have a right to every indulgence that can be invented for them. It will be quite right that they should travel down in boats like gentlemen.

“I shall not be able to get to Lucknow. A few days ago it was probable that I should have to return to Calcutta in the first days of January ; but I do not at present think of moving before the 15th of that month.”

During the return march to Lucknow, Lord Clyde resumed his correspondence with Lord Canning, which had been interrupted by his accident. Writing from Baraitch on the 11th January, he says : “Although not quite recovered, I am still well enough to take a pen once more, and to thank your lordship in person for your great kindness on hearing of my accident. I assure you I am quite touched by your expression of kind regard. It is a great pleasure to me to be able to congratulate you on the war of Oudh being fairly and thoroughly at an end. The enclosed correspondence will explain to your lordship the arrangements I have already made to meet the requirements of the service in Rewah, Gwalior, and Palamow. I trust every point is provided for, and that in the course of the next few weeks tranquillity may be assured in all places, now that we are able to withdraw troops from Oudh, which has for so long absorbed so large a share of our resources.

Your lordship's orders respecting the frontier had been exactly anticipated, as shown by the enclosed copies of instructions given to Brigadier Horsford. Sir Hope Grant was cautioned in like manner. That officer is now with us; and the permanent arrangements for Oudh will be settled to-day, subject to your lordship's approval."

On the 14th January he again addressed Lord Canning: "I enclose a memo. showing the arrangements which, I think, should be made with a view to allaying alarm once and for all in the Saugur and Nerbudda territories. If your lordship approves of the suggestion, would you kindly issue the necessary orders for the erection of cover, in anticipation of the official appeal which will be sent to the Secretary in the Military Department, Calcutta?"

"I think, with the means now placed at his disposal, Major-General Whitlock ought to be able to insure tranquillity and reduction of all the country comprised in his division. From all accounts, Gonda appears by far the healthiest station in the trans-Ghogra district. It is central, and better placed as regards the Raptee than Baraitch, though the latter is farther north. But at Baraitch there should be one native infantry regiment, with a strong police force at Bankee and Toolseepoor. One native regiment, perhaps, also might be finally left at the healthiest spot which can be found in the neighbourhood of Khyreegurh. But for the present, Brigadiers Horsford and Taylor will remain watching the

position, while all other brigades will be broken up."

The letter from Lord Canning to Lord Clyde on the subject of the latter's accident, is not forthcoming; but there is one from Lady Canning, written on the 15th January, in reply to the announcement conveyed to her by Lord Clyde, of the conclusion of operations :

"MY DEAR LORD CLYDE,—I thank you with all my heart for your most welcome letter of good news, as well as your friendly expressions and high appreciation of Lord Canning, which makes me very proud. But it is you who should be congratulated on your most happy and successful campaign, and this joyful return to peace. Indeed it is a subject of most intense thankfulness. How happy it will make the Queen and all at home of every degree!

"I was delighted to see your handwriting again, and to know of your recovering, for you must have suffered very much from your bad accident. It made Lord Canning and me very anxious, and it is a great comfort to know that you are already getting over the effects of it.

"It was a great disappointment not to get to Lucknow, but I hope this visit will take place at a future and more convenient time.

"I am on the point of getting into my carriage to begin my journey to Calcutta, and Lord Canning goes there on Thursday next.

"I hope, as peace is nearly restored, you will join

us again before long.—Believe me, my dear Lord Clyde, yours very sincerely, C. CANNING.

“Pray remember me to Sir William Mansfield. His prophecies of a two months’ campaign in Oudh have been exactly fulfilled.”

The correspondence with the Duke of Cambridge, which had been interrupted since his accident, was resumed on the 19th January. On that date Lord Clyde addressed his Royal Highness:—

“I regret extremely that, in consequence of my late accident, I should have failed in addressing your Royal Highness during the last month. I begged Colonel Sterling to write to Major-General Forster on the subject when I was disabled from writing. I feel sure, however, that H.M.’s Ministers will have kept your Royal Highness fully acquainted with the progress made in this country from Lord Canning’s despatch, and that your Royal Highness will have become aware that the campaign in Oudh is fairly at an end. Since the beginning of this year my attention has been directed towards reinforcing Bundelcund largely, in the hope of producing as speedy a settlement in that quarter as has taken place in Oudh. Thus the 97th Foot has been directed from Lucknow to Bandah; the 43d Foot will take post at Saugur—the 48th Foot replacing the latter at Calpee; and the Madras infantry, cavalry, and artillery have been moved to Futtehpoor

and Goruckpoor, *en route* to Bundelcund and Rewah. A Sikh cavalry regiment has also been sent to the same destination. It has also appeared advisable to reinforce Agra and Rajpootana. The Carabineers and a troop of horse-artillery have therefore been moved to Muttra, and the 3d battalion Rifle Brigade is on the march to Agra. The 64th Foot will march through by Mhow to the Bombay Presidency to re-join its depot. The camel corps has also left Oudh, and will ultimately take post at Goona, on the confines of Rajpootana. Two or three regiments—viz., the 79th Highlanders, Bengal Fusiliers, and 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry—are intended to reinforce the Punjab. In addition to these movements, five infantry regiments have been ordered to volunteer with a view to their speedy return to England—viz., the 10th, 32d, 78th, 84th, and 86th Regiments. . . .

“I have already had the honour to assure your Royal Highness that, though I advocate the necessity of entertaining for a time what has been called a European army, it has always been my opinion that it should form part and parcel of the army under the control of your Royal Highness; but what proportion the local force should bear towards the regular army of the Crown has appeared to me a question of expediency, which I could not answer, it being one that could alone be resolved by H.M.’s Government. I conceive it absolutely necessary, for the sake of discipline and example, that all the arms

of H.M.'s regular army should be largely represented in India. As regards the purposes of war, there cannot be a doubt that the regular army is quite competent to meet all the demands. If there were not a large body of officers to provide for, with whom H.M.'s Government is bound to keep faith, it would be a simple matter to say that there should be but one army, and that the regular army of the Crown; but it must be borne in mind that, independent of the officers belonging to the European establishments of the late Company, there are the officers of seventy-four sepoy battalions to provide for. According to the bond undertaken by the late Company with them, and to which Parliament has subscribed, these officers cannot be put aside or be deprived of their career. When I arrived in Calcutta in 1857, I recommended that the vacancies caused by death, in consequence of the war, should not be filled up, as the result of the regiment being defunct in the matter of the sepoys. To this proposal the Government objected on various grounds of what was due to the individuals composing the service. The only vacancies, therefore, now remaining, are those at the bottom of the lists of cornets and ensigns. Your Royal Highness will recollect that the officers of the Indian army cannot be put on half-pay, as might happen in analogous circumstances in H.M.'s service. If, therefore, we are to have no regular native army in future, it would seem that nothing remains for us but to embody a certain number of



European local corps in order to give employment to the present generation of Indian officers, excepting those in civil employ or on the staff. All the latter, I think, might be included in an unattached list, to which should be consigned officers who might be declared inefficient from any cause whatever. At the same time, I would recommend freedom of exchange between the officers of these local corps and of the regulars, as well as of transfers as regards the private soldiers. The same order of discipline and organisation would, as a matter of course, pervade the whole of her Majesty's service, which in such case would not consist of two armies, but of one only, a small portion of which would be localised to meet particular circumstances. I see no just cause why the measure should not be considered one of transition, the period of which might terminate with the present generation of officers. But this must be a matter for after consideration, and is not just now very pressing. The problem for us to consider being, as I understand it, how best to amalgamate the two services with due regard to efficiency and the claims of those parties who have lately been transferred from the East India Company to the immediate service of the Crown, I would venture now once more to repeat, that the number of local corps, if such corps should be sanctioned, is one of mere expediency, on which, with the data before me, I am hardly competent to give an opinion."

A few days subsequent to the despatch of this letter, Lord Clyde, whose progress towards recovery had been thus far very satisfactory, sickened with a slight attack of pleuro-pneumonia. He had engaged himself to be present at an entertainment which Maun Singh had prepared in his honour, but was unable to leave his bed. For some days he was very ill, causing anxiety to his doctor, who for several nights was obliged to sit up with him and watch him carefully. He abhorred medicine; so that it was only by means of his personal influence with him that Mackinnon induced him to take it. Under the influence of fever he became irritable, and it was with great difficulty he was induced to remain quietly in bed. With careful treatment, however, and rest, the attack passed away, though it was not till the end of the first week in February that he was enabled to resume his correspondence.

In the meantime Oudh remained perfectly quiet; but Jung Bahadoor, being inconvenienced by the presence of the tail of the rebels in his territory, was desirous that the British troops should cross the frontier with the object of dispersing what remained of the enemy. Lord Canning, in the first instance, withheld his consent; whereupon Jung Bahadoor transmitted an urgent request that his proposal should be entertained. Certain conditions were attached to it. No executions were to be carried out in Nepal; the slaughter of kine, which was an offence to the religious feelings of the inhabitants

was forbidden; and it was to be understood that there was to be no interference with the women, who had taken refuge in the hills. Lord Canning having decided that the demand for British assistance was made in such terms as would justify his consent, Brigadier Horsford was reinforced, and entering the valley situated between the two first ranges of hills, cleared it of the enemy, taking the whole of their guns, thirteen in number. Brigadier Horsford having fulfilled his instructions, recrossed the frontier, to the regret of the inhabitants, who for a fortnight had experienced the most considerate treatment at the hands of their European allies.

A few days subsequent to his arrival at Lucknow, Lord Clyde had broached the subject of the location of the headquarters during the ensuing summer, and, in a letter to Lord Canning, had requested his pleasure on the subject. In discussing the question with the Commander-in-chief, Mr Montgomery was inclined to the opinion that the presence of the former was required at Lucknow for the present, Calcutta being at too great a distance; and that for the next month or two, and until excitement had quite subsided, it would be expedient for him to remain at a central point. At Lucknow the head-quarter establishment could be housed, which could not be managed at any other point excepting the hill-stations. Lord Clyde therefore requested the head of the Government to decide, remarking "that he had no personal predilection, and was quite ready

to go, or remain, wherever it might appear most expedient to Lord Canning."

In a subsequent letter of the 7th February, Lord Clyde recurred to this question, which still remained pending: "I am happy to say that I am so much recovered from my attack of influenza as to be able to get up to-day and again attend to all my business, which has been difficult for some time past. When I had the pleasure of addressing your lordship on the subject of my future headquarters, the point which principally occurred to me was the military inconvenience which might follow on my remaining in the upper provinces. It appears now to me, after perusing your lordship's letter of the 2d February, that I may have made an omission in not proposing to come to Calcutta to take my share in the deliberations which must ensue very shortly on the reconstruction of the army. Perhaps it might be asked what I could be doing at Simla while your lordship was engaged at Calcutta in the consideration of the great army question. Indeed, the authorities at home might have some reason in putting such a query. Under these circumstances, I trust you will not allow any personal consideration for me and my health to weigh with you. My object in addressing your lordship on the subject was to obtain timely notice of what you might think the best for the public service, so that the gentlemen and subordinates attached to the headquarter establishment might be enabled to provide themselves with houses.

No thought of myself entered my head ; and I should be full of regret if my absence at Simla should prove hereafter a source of inconvenience or delay to the public service, as it occurs to me, on consideration, that a great deal of time may be saved in the early settlement of the details of the new scheme, whatever it may be, by my presence in Calcutta, in close neighbourhood to your lordship, instead of trusting altogether to distant correspondence. I repeat again, I have no personal predilection, and that I only wish to be where my presence will be deemed most useful. I fully appreciate what your lordship says about too military an appearance being maintained in Lucknow after the necessity for it has ceased. It certainly would be inexpedient, as being likely to cause a belief in the public mind that affairs have not been so thoroughly settled in this province as is really the case. At any rate, however, I propose to remain here till Brigadier Horsford is back again across the Raptée from Nepaul. . . .”

Again, in a letter to Lord Canning of the 20th February, in which he reports on the state of the frontier, Lord Clyde refers to the same subject : “I have but little to relate since my last letter was written. Brigadier Horsford was to have returned to our side of the border on the 17th, the Soonar valley being reported quite clear of rebels. There is still a body of some number, it is reported, in the hills above Toolseepoor. I cannot ascertain anything exact about it. The Toolseepoor district itself has

been but little disturbed, but it has been twice visited by small bodies of plunderers during the last week. Mr Wingfield says it is absolutely necessary that the troops should be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the hills in the course of two or three weeks. This I can well believe, though at present the men under Brigadier Horsford, and in Toolseepoor, remain remarkably healthy. Many regiments of different sorts are now *en route* to their quarters for the summer; and I hope in a short time the Oudh garrison will consist only of what is permanently to remain there. I shall be glad of a change myself, either up or down country, as I am still annoyed by slight attacks of intermittent fever, for which change of air is the most effectual remedy. I shall therefore be very thankful to your lordship for an answer to my last letter, as, in consequence of my having written it, I should not be justified in making any movement either towards or from Calcutta, till I had again heard from you in answer to the points which had occurred to me affecting my residence during the summer in your neighbourhood."

This drew from Lord Canning the following reply :

"CALCUTTA, Feb. 27, 1859.

"MY DEAR LORD CLYDE,—I was greatly concerned at hearing a few days ago that your recovery has not been so complete as I supposed, and this is confirmed by a letter which I received from you yesterday. Upon the main point of that letter I have sent you

an answer by telegraph. I hope you will not delay to act upon it, and to make your preparations for moving, whether it is to Simla or elsewhere. Any little inconvenience—and I assure you sincerely that I anticipate none worth mentioning—which may arise from your being at a distance of a few days' post from Calcutta is not worth consideration. I say this with the more confidence, because it is pretty clear, from what Lord Stanley writes to me of the Commission, that there is no intention to cross-examine you or me from England; and that when the Commission and the Government at home have once delivered themselves of such instructions as seem good to them, we in India shall be left to work out our business for ourselves. If this be so, there will really be no need whatever for your presence in Calcutta. I do beg you therefore, my dear Lord Clyde, to have no scruple in deciding at once in favour of the hills. I will be answerable not only for consenting to, but for urging your absence from Calcutta. Two mails ago I told Lord Stanley that I should do it in the interests of the public service, and I then wrote under the impression that you had completely shaken off the fever. I trust it is not a return of your old Walcheren enemy.—Ever, my dear Lord Clyde, sincerely yours,

CANNING."

After the dispersion of the rebels in the Soonar valley of Nepaul by Brigadier Horsford, and their consequent movement to the eastern portion of that

territory, Jung Bahadoor had proposed that this body of fugitives should be allowed to proceed as far as the Gunduk river, and that, on delivering up their arms to his troops, they should be furnished with passes by the British Resident in Nepaul, and be then led down in bodies of a thousand to Soogowlee, for the purpose of being sent to their homes under the direction of the British authorities. The plan was accepted by the Government; as also a suggestion made by Jung Bahadoor, that a body of British troops should move through Goruckpoor to the passes of the Gunduk, in readiness to co-operate with the Nepaulese troops in case of need, as also to guard against the contingency of an irruption of the "sepoy rabble" into the rich district of Tirhoot. Accordingly, a brigade consisting of Murray's Jat Horse, a light field-battery Royal Artillery, the left wing of the 13th Light Infantry, the 34th Foot, the 3d Regiment Sikh Infantry, and the 7th Punjab Infantry, was collected at Ramnuggur, beyond the Gunduk, to the north of Soogowlee, and there took post under the command of Colonel Kelly, 34th Foot. A European regiment (the 19th) was held in readiness to cross the Ganges and act as a reserve in the event of its services being required. The posts established in the north of the Goruckpoor and the trans-Ghogra districts were reinforced, whilst certain corps destined for other quarters remained on the frontier as a further precautionary measure.

Having completed his dispositions for the protec-



tion of the border adjacent to Nepaul, Lord Clyde left Lucknow with the headquarters on the 1st March, proceeding by regular marches to Cawnpore, and thence, *viâ* Agra and Delhi, to Simla. On the eve of his departure he resumed his correspondence with the Duke of Cambridge, which had been interrupted by his illness. After enumerating several additional regiments for return to England, and expressing his belief that after a short interval the Indian Government would be in a position to part with more, he adds: "I am happy to say the tranquillity of the country is everywhere becoming more and more solid, and the Government has every cause for congratulation on this account. Within my own experience, I have never known India more quiet than it now is. The fugitives from Oudh are in Nepaul. There seems to be some coquetting going on with Jung Bahadoor. He manages, however, according to his Eastern fashion, and we cannot look for more prompt action. I take it, the upshot will be, that the principal rebel leaders will remain in Nepaul for the rest of their lives; and to this, even if he would, I do not believe he could object, according to the customs of his country. In respect of the regular army of India, I have quite made up my mind that a regular native army is not wanted. All that we want in the way of natives is an extended military police, of which each great section or division should be established in its own province. Such police battalions, while performing the *bond fide* duty

of police, and being drilled as soldiers, should be liable to serve in time of war as military bodies. Such has been the system initiated in many parts of India, not only in Scinde, from the time of Sir Charles Napier, but also in the Punjab partially, and lastly in Oudh. It works capitally, and the men are never idle, either in peace or war. I have arrived at this opinion in consequence of what has passed before my eyes, during this last campaign. The half-trained police have fought just as well as our highly-trained soldiery of former days. The ultimate economy cannot but be considerable, as, if fairly worked out, many idle hands, to be numbered by tens of thousands, of former days, must be dispensed with both among native soldiers and police. On the other hand, the British standing army of all arms must always be kept up for the Presidency of Bengal at 60,000 men.

"I am about to march to Simla, where I shall arrive in the middle of April. Lord Canning has been so urgent with me to avoid the ensuing hot weather in Calcutta, that I have yielded to his advice, although not without some misgiving of being absent from his lordship's side. He assures me, however, he cannot anticipate any business arising, which may not be settled by correspondence, as well as by conversation. That being the case, I venture to hope your Royal Highness will approve of the step I have taken."

The time had now arrived when Lord Clyde felt that he was enabled, without detriment to the public

service, to take the first step towards seeking, in retirement, the repose in which for so many years he had cherished the hope of passing the evening of his life. Accordingly, in a letter addressed to Lord Can-ning from his camp at Goosaigunj, on the 14th March, he thus approached the question: "The many rumours which have been flying about respecting my early return to England may possibly have prepared your lordship for the communication of my plans for the future, although as yet, with the exception of Mansfield, I have opened myself to no one. I am, in truth, desirous of rest, for which my age and long service give me some claim to ask. There being no prospect of a further demand on me for active employment in the field, I propose shortly to request the Duke of Cambridge to accept my resignation, with a view to my being relieved at the end of the year. It would not have been disagreeable to me to have managed my return to England in the beginning of summer; but I conceive that to have acted up to my wishes in this respect might have been construed as a bad example for the army, and consequently might have given cause of umbrage to his Royal Highness. It has appeared to me that I am in duty bound to your lordship to give you the earliest notice of my intention, so that you may be able to take your own measures with regard to my successor before I announce my proposed retirement in official quarters at home. I shall indeed esteem it a happy sequel to our cordial intercourse during

the late eventful period, if, by thus giving timely notice to you, I should be able to contribute to the convenience of your lordship's Government. I need not again assure you of the sincere and perfect satisfaction with which I look back on the time passed by me in the execution of your lordship's orders. I shall ever preserve the most grateful remembrance of that kind and friendly consideration which has rendered the execution of my office comparatively easy, notwithstanding the difficulties with which we have had to contend. I am now marching towards Simla, and shall be at Agra on the 22d."

Notwithstanding Jung Bahadoor's voluntary engagement in the matter of the disarmament of the Begum's troops, it soon became evident that he was either indisposed or unable to carry out his promises. To put an end to this vacillation necessitated prompt action, in order to save, if possible, the British troops posted along the Nepaulese frontier from exposure during the hot season. The measures Lord Clyde adopted are set forth in a letter of the 23d March, which he addressed to Lord Canning from Agra: "I know your lordship has been much occupied with affairs of the very highest importance. This consideration has prevented me from troubling you with a letter, as I had nothing of any very vital consequence to convey to you; and as Mansfield was with you, he would, of course, tell you anything which might interest you, or which it was necessary you should know. I do not consider that Jung Bahadoor

has acted fairly towards us, or that he has maintained his promises. He undertook to cause the Begum and her followers to move to the Gunduk, and there to lay down their arms; but he was so slow in his action, that they only arrived there when it was almost too late in the season for us to attack them, and then he declared that he could not make them lay down their arms. This conduct of his will compel us, I fear, to keep troops out on the verge of the 'Terai' watching the enemy, at a great risk to the health of the soldiers, unless I can succeed in breaking up and dispersing the rabble, which is stated to have assembled at Bootul, before the weather forbids us acting at all. . . . As soon as I understood from Colonel Ramsay [the British Resident] that Jung Bahadoor permitted us to enter Nepaul for the purpose of attacking the enemy, I sent to Colonel Kelly a telegram, dated 12th March, which your lordship has seen, desiring him to cross the border and attack the rebels, provided the information he had on the spot led him to suppose he could finish the operation in a reasonable time, or before the Terai should have become too unhealthy for our troops to enter it. He has, I believe, crossed the frontier, and I hope to hear he has succeeded in coming up with and dispersing the enemy. He had only thirty-six miles to go from Lotun, where he expected to be on the 17th. I thought it necessary to show the rebels that they could not remain together with impunity even in the Terai and its

borders, and I hope your lordship will approve of what I have done. I have ordered straw and means for choppering in the tents at different places close to the frontier, in case we should be compelled to have troops exposed during the hot weather."

The ample reinforcements sent by Lord Clyde to General Whitlock and Sir Robert Napier, on the cessation of hostilities in Oudh, enabled them to commence in earnest the work of subjugation in Bundelcund and the Gwalior district.

Since his discomfiture by Parke at Chota Oodeypoor, the pursuit of Tantia Topee had been pressed with unabated vigour. The rebels, finding their approach to Oodeypoor, the capital of Meywar, barred by a force sent from Neemuch, turned south, followed by Parke, and, emerging from the jungle at Pertabghur, made their way in an easterly direction to Zeerapoor, near Rajgurh. To the last-named place, Feroze Shah, the Delhi prince, had proceeded with the remnant of his followers after his defeat by General Napier at Runnode. On finding that Brigadier Smith was in movement from Seronge against him, Feroze Shah crossed the Chumbul to Indurgurh. In the meantime, a flying column despatched from Mhow, under Brigadier Somerset, but previously commanded by Colonel Benson of the 17th Lancers, and which had marched at the rate of thirty-five miles a-day between the 25th and 29th of December, hit upon Tantia Topee's force at Zeerapoor, and again

at Burrode, driving it on each occasion from the field. Tantia Topee, whose pursuit was now taken up by Brigadier Smith, effected a junction with Feroze Shah at Indurgurh. Notwithstanding the active measures adopted by General Michel, who had left Mhow to direct operations, the rebels, on finding themselves hemmed in by the various columns in movement against them, eluded the grasp of their pursuers by moving rapidly to the northern extremity of Rajpootana. On their way they were surprised on the 15th January at Dewassa by a flying column under Brigadier Showers from Agra, which captured the last two elephants they possessed. Again, on the 21st January, Colonel Holmes, in command of a flying column from Nusseerabad, whither General Michel had moved, surprised Tantia Topee's camp at Seekur, after an extraordinary march of "fifty-four miles through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-four hours." In consequence of this disaster, Tantia Topee separated himself from the main body of his force, and, with a small detachment of followers, made for Seronge; whilst the remnant of the rebels pierced the cordon which was closing around them, and fled south through the Joodpore territory, pursued by Brigadier Honner's column from Nusseerabad, which overtook and beat them at Kosance on the 20th February. Thence they escaped through the Chutterbhooj pass of the Aravelli range, which separates the territory of Joodpore from that of Oodeypoor, into the Banswara

jungles, closely followed by Brigadier Somerset. Here they finally broke up and dispersed.

For some time Tantia Topee eluded capture; but having been betrayed by Maun Singh of Paorie, who, likewise a fugitive in the jungles, had surrendered himself to Major Meade, was captured by that officer on the 8th April. This was the final blow to the cause of rebellion in Central India. A few days after his capture, Tantia Topee was arraigned before a court-martial, and having been found guilty, was hanged, according to the sentence of the court.

The news of Tantia Topee's capture reached Lord Clyde at Delhi, at which place he spent several days, viewing the scene of the memorable struggle, and everything connected with the operations before that fortress, with the keenest interest. Before reaching Umbala, he reviewed, in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge, the state of affairs up to the middle of April: "A little alarm has been excited in Oudh, in consequence of the descent into that province, from the Terai and mountains of Nepaul, of those bodies of rebels which have been harboured in that country since the termination of the campaign. The sweeping movement of Colonel Kelly from the Gunduk to the confines of Toolseepoor along the Terai, was successful in all that was proposed—viz., doing away with a menace to our rich provinces of Tirhoot, &c., and in showing to the last remnant of the rebels that they were nowhere safe. Having been beaten twice in good style by Colonel Kelly, they have broken



from the hills, having passed through the line of posts established by Brigadier Horsford. The troops are now after them, and, by my desire, Sir Hope Grant has left Lucknow for Fyzabad, to take personal charge of the petty operations which have become necessary. I do not much regret the incident, although, at first sight, it might appear to be annoying. Had this body of rebels been permanently established in Nepaul, it is easy to see that we should have been exposed to a lasting and disgraceful threat, to meet which strongly we are forbidden by our policy, as was the case last January, when the policy of the Government towards an ally prevented me from finally concluding matters in a thoroughly complete and satisfactory manner. To that policy it was not for me to object; but I do not regret that the course pursued by the Nepaulese Government at length compelled it to solicit our aid: hence Colonel Kelly's advance into Nepaul at a time almost too late for operations. The complete success of that movement seems to have been distasteful to the Nepaulese, the commanders of whose troops have, with the exception of Jung Bahadoor, behaved ill to us, and have been as obstructive as they well could, without firing at us. Colonel Kelly has managed remarkably well, and shown much prudence and determination, as well as implicit obedience to his instructions, in the execution of a very difficult and delicate duty. I enclose a copy of a message received from the Chief Commissioner

of Oudh (Wingfield), which shows how the present affair is viewed by that functionary, who has the best means of judging the whole business.

“It is a subject of congratulation that Tantia Topce and other chiefs have fallen into the hands of the forces in Central India. This is the more satisfactory, as the rebels who have lately broken from Nepaul had given out that they were bent on joining the Tantia. In short, taking into consideration the late little campaign on the edge of Nepaul, the successes of Colonel de Salis and others in Central India, and the effective series of marches which have taken place in Bundelcund and Rewah, I think we may assume that we are now dealing with the last embers of the late almost universal conflagration. The most obstinate of the rebel chiefs are giving themselves up in all parts, many of them having been the source of vast trouble during the last sixteen months, whose names were not known out of India, or perhaps of the provinces which were the scene of their depredations. . . .”

Passing through Umbala, where he reviewed the troops, Lord Clyde reached Simla in the last week of April. He took up his residence at “Barnes Court,” having, in the meantime, received the most satisfactory reports from the Oudh frontier. Writing to the Duke of Cambridge two days after his arrival, he informs his Royal Highness “that the final dispersion of the rebels, who, as I have lately reported, had returned into the northern district of Oudh from

Nepaul, is proceeding in a satisfactory manner, according to my expressed expectation. The troops in that quarter are still in the field, but Sir Hope Grant seems to think that their work is nearly over. In consequence of the irruption from Nepaul, the 53d Foot, which had been ordered to Calcutta with a view to embarkation for England, has been detained; and although it may probably reach Chinsurah in a month or two for the sake of quarters, I am afraid the season is so far advanced that it will be impossible for that regiment to embark till the autumn, or after the monsoon. The reports from Central India are as good as those from Oudh, and the troops in that country are being rapidly put under cover for the season. In short, we may hope that the rebels have now become in every direction fitting subjects for police treatment, with but little chance of future demand on the troops. This being the case, I venture to submit to your Royal Highness that, if her gracious Majesty should be pleased to accept my resignation of the command intrusted to me in 1857, it would be agreeable to me to be relieved in the beginning of next year. I have avoided giving effect to my desire in this respect, until I became thoroughly convinced that the insurrection had been absolutely quelled throughout India. That being the case, I trust your Royal Highness will graciously consider that I am not evading any duty when preferring this request to be allowed to retire for a time from military command, which, after my long ser-

vice and the fatigues of the last few years, if not positively required by my health, will certainly be most grateful to me. I would further, with the utmost respect to your Royal Highness, beg permission once more to return my sincere and hearty thanks for your unceasing kindness during the time I have held command in India. I can never forget the cordial support and assistance I have invariably received from your Royal Highness, or the gracious favour with which they have been afforded. Since the above was written, I have received two telegrams from Sir Hope Grant, giving an account of three petty successes achieved by three of his columns, and speaking most confidently in the sense of the early part of this letter, and of the immediate break-up of the remnant of rebels now trying to hide in the jungles in northern Oudh."

Demoralised by fatigue and starvation, the remnant of the rebels broke up into small fractions, which were unremittingly pursued by the various parties acting under the direction of Sir Hope Grant. Many of them, including their leaders, gave themselves up—the largest body which had held together having been driven by Brigadier Horsford, with great loss, in the direction of the Khyreegurh jungles. With the following letter of the 1st May to Lord Canning, terminated Lord Clyde's correspondence on the subject of the Mutiny, which, after a struggle of two years' duration, ended in the complete vindication of British supremacy:—

“ I have delayed addressing you for some time on military affairs, as I was aware that you received frequent messages from Sir Hope Grant on the progress he was making in the completion of his instructions. It is a matter of much satisfaction to me to be able to congratulate your lordship on the success which has attended the arrangements made in January and February to meet a contingency which has actually occurred—namely, the irruption of the last remnant of the rebels from Nepaul, in consequence of the difficulty they experienced in procuring food, and the pressure kept on Jung Bahadoor by your lordship’s representative at his court. That which to the uninitiated, and perhaps to the public at large, might appear a subject of annoyance, is indeed to me just the reverse, as there cannot be a doubt that we are now finally disposing of what would, under the circumstances of the previous three months, have proved a standing threat, and possibly have eventually involved us in war with Nepaul, notwithstanding the wishes of Jung Bahadoor in our favour. I have strongly impressed on Sir Hope Grant the necessity of the greatest energy and rapidity on the part of the officers in command of posts and small columns, with a view to bringing the contest to a close as quickly as possible. He is quite alive to the importance of this, and has instructed Brigadier Horsford and the other officers in that sense. The thing seems to be so nearly over, that I am sanguine we shall very shortly have all his troops

in quarters, such as they are, for the season. . . . Colonel Turner, on the Great Trunk Road, reports in the most favourable manner, and says it is unnecessary to replace the Madras infantry, which has been ordered to Bundelcund, under instructions from your lordship."

His great work accomplished, Lord Clyde flattered himself that there was an end to the cares and anxieties which, so long as the rebellion existed, had pressed so heavily upon him. In the bracing climate of the hills, he looked forward to a perfect recovery from his illness, doubtless aggravated by his accident, and the reaction consequent on the excitement of service in the field. But the thought which pre-occupied his mind, and which he regarded as the best restorative, was the approaching realisation of his long-cherished hope of spending the last few years of his life in the society of his friends in England. He had barely been a week at Simla before news reached him of a nature to demand the exercise of all the moral courage and discretion he could bring to bear, in the face of a grave and unexpected danger, which the Government of India was called upon suddenly to confront. It will be remembered that, on the announcement of the proclamation transferring the possessions of the East India Company to the Crown on the 1st November of the previous year, some of the soldiers of the Company's European force had set up a claim for a free discharge, or a bounty on re-enlistment. Lord Clyde's recom-

mendation that a concession should be made was overruled by the Government of India, who referred the matter home. The subject was thereupon brought under the consideration of her Majesty's Government, who, on reference to the law officers of the Crown, finally decided that the men's claim was inadmissible; and an announcement to this effect was made to the European soldiers of her Majesty's Indian forces in an order of Government dated the 8th April.

On the 3d May, when returning from his walk, which he was in the daily habit of taking with Metcalfe, his aide-de-camp, Lord Clyde had a telegram put into his hand from Major-General Bradford, commanding the Meerut division, to the effect that the Bengal artillery and cavalry stationed at that place had shown a bad spirit in regard to the transfer to the Crown; that meetings had been held counselling resistance to authority; that in view of the serious aspect of affairs, two squadrons of the Carabineers had been ordered from Muttra to Meerut; and that necessary precautions had been taken to resist any overt act on the part of the malcontents against authority. So serious did Lord Clyde consider the emergency, that his first impulse was to proceed forthwith to Meerut; but as such a measure might have had the effect of attaching more importance than was desirable to the occurrences at that place, he decided on leaving at once for Kussowlie. At this point he would be in immediate communication

with the Government, and in readiness to proceed to Meerut, or any other station where the local European troops were quartered, in case he found such a course necessary. The great point was to avoid collision ; and General Bradford, whose judicious measures met with the Commander-in-chief's fullest approbation, was instructed to use every exertion to ward off such a catastrophe. In a few hours Lord Clyde was on his way to Kussowlie. In the meantime he had communicated by telegraph with the Government at Calcutta, who had received direct intimation from Meerut of what had taken place, and solicited instructions as to the extent he might exercise his judgment in dealing with the crisis, not only as regarded Meerut, but all such stations where it was to be expected a similar feeling would manifest itself. The Governor-General replied that no concession in the shape of re-enlistment or bounty was, in his opinion, possible ; but that if collision, which was full of danger, could be warded off by giving discharges to some of the least guilty, such discharges might be granted : that Lord Clyde was not to consider himself tied by this opinion, but that he might rely upon being supported in whatever course his own judgment recommended.

The reports which reached the Commander-in-chief at Kussowlie all tended to show that a widespread combination had for some time existed, and that it had either manifested itself openly or been actually traced at many other stations besides



Meerut, the ground taken up by the malcontents being the same—viz., dissatisfaction with the transfer of their services in virtue of an Act of Parliament, but without their consent.

Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson,<sup>1</sup> Assistant Adjutant-General of the Bengal artillery, who had been sent from Meerut to Kussowlie to make a personal report of what had occurred to the Commander-in-chief, confirmed the previous accounts, as well as the belief entertained by the authorities at that station of the imminence of armed resistance, in case force were resorted to. Despatching that officer to Calcutta in order that the Government might learn from an eye-witness the actual state of the case, Lord Clyde lost no time in giving effect to the only measure he considered it was possible to adopt with the view of calming the existing excitement. As he informed Lord Canning, “no one could tell what would be the effect of a collision on the remainder of the local army and in the native mind throughout India. We might see all our work of last year undone in an instant, under very much worse circumstances than before.” His knowledge of the service led him to the conclusion that if the soldier had the opportunity of stating his grievance in an orderly and respectful manner, in accordance with customary rule, he would become amenable to reason; and that even if the services of the men who considered themselves aggrieved should be ultimately lost to the State, “the

<sup>1</sup> General Sir E. B. Johnson, K.C.B., C.I.E.

crisis of desperate armed resistance, considered to be so imminent at Meerut, would at least be obviated." Accordingly, a special Board of Inquiry was directed to be convened at Meerut, under the conduct of the Judge-Advocate-General, the order for which was conveyed by Colonel Johnson as he passed through on his way to Calcutta. In this order, which was dated the 5th May, and was published to the troops at Meerut, as also subsequently at all other stations at which local European troops were stationed, the Commander-in-chief, after alluding to the disquiet which had affected the minds of the local European force at that station, and observing that the demeanour of the men towards the officers had been properly respectful, desired that such soldiers of the Bengal artillery and 2d Light Cavalry as had been struck off duty might return to it. They were informed that if a soldier has a complaint to make or considers himself in any manner aggrieved, it is his right to make a proper and respectful representation, through the usual channels, to superior authority, and to ask for redress ; but when this representation has been made, the soldier must be at his duty, and he must wait with due deference, patience, and obedience for the ultimate decision." They were told that the fullest possible evidence would be taken. " Each man," the order ran, " will be called upon to state whether he has any grievance ; and if so, what that grievance is, and what are the grounds of it. It is only by such means the Commander-in-chief can arrive at the real

merits of the case as considered by the men ; and in this manner assurance will be conveyed to them, that every man's sentiments will become known to the highest authority, and that due consideration will be given to them. With regard to the question at issue—viz., the transfer to the Crown of the late Company's army, which has caused so much excitement—the men will perceive that it affects them in common with their officers and all the services of this country, including the civil service. There is no distinction drawn between the ranks, and they are called on alike to obey an Act of Parliament. But if any party feels himself aggrieved by an Act of Parliament, he is at liberty to petition respectfully against it. It is on this ground his Excellency has ordered the Court of Inquiry—viz., to enable the men who consider themselves aggrieved by the late Act to give expression to their own views, or in other words to petition against what they conceive to be a hardship, in a soldierlike and regular manner, which they understand themselves."

Fortunately, though considerable excitement prevailed at Meerut, the interval between the 3d and 7th passed off, to Lord Clyde's intense relief, without any disturbance. On the latter day General Bradford reported "that things were looking better, consequent on the promulgation of the order by the Commander-in-chief, and that the men relieved from duty had been directed to return to it." Lord Clyde's measure had proved successful. He had

established what he termed the "tranquillity of expectation" in lieu of open discontent; and notwithstanding the reports from Allahabad were of so disquieting a nature as to necessitate the presence of additional Queen's troops at that station, a collision was avoided. The uneasy feeling was allayed; and in a message to the Governor-General of the 10th May, Lord Clyde reported that he was of opinion "there was now no cause for real alarm anywhere;" and in proof of it, suggested that the order issued by the Supreme Government for the recall of the 9th Lancers and other troops, which had cleared the sandheads on their voyage to England, should be revoked. It was manifest, however, from the reports received from the several stations at which troops of the late Company's European force were serving, that the feeling of dissatisfaction was general, and that the combination to resist authority had not been discovered a moment too soon. Indeed it was only by the exercise of great prudence on the part of officers commanding at various stations and acting under the general instructions of Lord Clyde, that an actual outbreak was avoided. It should not, however, be overlooked that the large majority of the Company's European troops in Bengal were practically untrained soldiers—three out of the six infantry regiments, and all five regiments of cavalry, having been recently formed from bodies of recruits, and commanded by officers belonging to disbanded native regiments, alike unacquainted with their men and

inexperienced in dealing with European troops. Nevertheless, so anxious was the Supreme Government in regard to the effect this movement might produce on the native mind, that the Governor of Bombay was requested to detain certain regiments of the line, which were on the point of embarking for England.

The telegraph-wire having been completed to Simla, Lord Clyde returned thither on the 11th, in order to assume his superintendence of the executive details of the army, which he found it inconvenient to transact apart from the headquarter establishment.

The Government, seeing how widespread the agitation had become, were convinced of the necessity of extending the grant of discharges to every man who wished for it, provided he had not misconducted himself. Lord Clyde concurred in this proposal, but recommended the postponement of its announcement in general orders until after the Court of Inquiry had sat. In the meantime, courts of inquiry similar to that at Meerut were convened at all stations where men of the local European force were quartered. It soon became apparent that large numbers of men would take advantage of the offer of discharge to quit the service; and in order to make good the vacancies in the artillery consequent thereon, Lord Clyde obtained the sanction of the Government to call for volunteers from H.M.'s regiments of cavalry and infantry. The appeal was well met.

A few weeks later on, Lord Clyde was enabled to inform the Duke of Cambridge that "the troops remain perfectly quiet everywhere, in expectation of the orders of Government, which will now be published very shortly, conceding discharges to all men who enlisted to serve the Company, but decline the transfer to the immediate service of the Crown. They are to take their discharge or not, but will not be requested to stay. I think that this is the best way out of a very disagreeable difficulty; and that, to a certain extent, the dignity of authority is thus saved. I take the liberty of enclosing for your Royal Highness's consideration a copy of the confidential instructions sent to general officers commanding divisions, in anticipation of the orders of Government. Your Royal Highness will observe that immediate measures have been taken for rendering the troops and batteries of artillery effective, as we cannot afford to have our guns inefficient for want of gunners. As to the cavalry and infantry, excepting the inconvenience and expense of parting with a good many men, thus causing the retention of one or two battalions which might otherwise have gone to England, India will not suffer. But it is a grief to reflect that any arrangement deemed expedient by your Royal Highness on account of the state of Europe,<sup>1</sup> should be interfered with by the untoward occurrences which it has lately

<sup>1</sup> In allusion to the hostilities at this time in active progress between France allied with Piedmont against Austria.

been my unpleasant duty to report to your\* Royal Highness."

The large number of men who ultimately elected to take their discharge (those from the Bengal Presidency alone amounting to nearly seven thousand men), justified in a remarkable manner the wisdom of the temperate course adopted towards them at the outset. One false step might have produced a simultaneous collision in some of the larger stations, the consequences of which no one could tell. It was a fortunate circumstance that, at such a juncture, the Government was enabled to extend its full measure of confidence to its Commander-in-chief, on whose judgment it could rely, and to whom it could turn for counsel under the pressure of a military difficulty as grave as it was unexpected.

The course adopted by the Government of Calcutta met with the approval of her Majesty's Government; and Sir Charles Wood,<sup>1</sup> who, on a change of Ministry, had succeeded Lord Stanley as Indian Secretary, instructed the Governor-General in Council to convey to Lord Clyde "their approbation of the prompt and judicious measures he had taken."

During the time Lord Clyde's attention had been concentrated on the events which have been described above, the little campaign in Oudh came to an end. The remnant of the rebels, fairly worn out and reduced to a piteous physical and moral condition, finally broke up. By the end of May matters

<sup>1</sup> Now Viscount Halifax, G.C.B.

were in such a position as to enable the European troops—who, in spite of the heat, had not suffered in health—to remit the care of the frontier mainly to the police. The last embers of the rebellion had been extinguished, and the various provinces of India which, for the preceding two years, had been the scene of so much lawlessness and disturbance, were daily subsiding into a state of profound tranquillity.

Whilst occupied with the requisite measures for the discharge and despatch to England of those men of the local European force who elected to take it, Lord Clyde received the Duke of Cambridge's reply to the letter announcing his wish to resign: "I regret much to find that you are anxious to be relieved from the great and important command, intrusted to you by her Majesty, at the beginning of next year. I regret the resolve deeply, as I know how important it is to have an able and distinguished man like yourself at the head of the army in India, and that it will be, indeed, difficult to find another officer to replace you; but, at the same time, I cannot be surprised at your wish, after your anxieties and severe bodily and mental labours, to enjoy some quiet and repose in your native land. I have not failed to make your wishes known in the highest quarters, and no doubt arrangements will be made at an early period to make the necessary selection of your successor. I cannot conclude this subject, however, without assuring you again and again that I



am much and sincerely gratified by the expressions of regard and attachment which you have evinced towards myself. I have endeavoured, as far as it was in my power to do so, to give every support to your views and wishes from the day you left us to undertake the arduous duty upon which you have been engaged; and I rejoice to find that you fully approve my efforts in this direction, which only makes me regret the more that I shall soon be deprived of your valuable and important assistance."

The serious disaffection of the local European troops, as set forth in the preceding pages, made the deepest impression on Lord Clyde. Though he had previously contemplated the expediency of maintaining the establishment of the local European force, at any rate for some time, after its transfer from the service of the East India Company to that of the Crown, recent events convinced him of the absolute necessity of guarding against the possibility of our Indian empire being ever again made liable to such a danger. To effect this object, he strenuously urged an immediate amalgamation of the two forces into one imperial army.

One or two extracts from his correspondence will be sufficient to show the views he expressed on the subject.

On the 11th May he wrote to the Duke of Cambridge: "As your Royal Highness knows, I have always been strongly of opinion that it is impossible, as shown by practice and experience, to maintain

discipline in local corps, such as we expect in those of her Majesty's service ; but it did not occur to me that the loyalty of local corps might suffer. Recent events have shown that we cannot depend on that ; and that, at any time, we are liable to have to meet dangerous combinations against our authority, to the prejudice of discipline and the intimidation of Government. . . . It is clear, from what we have now seen, that it is dangerous to trust to local corps, and that we can alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated by a return to England, and the presence of officers with their regiments, who look on them as their homes. It is therefore a subject for deep consideration and inquiry, whether, after what has recently taken place, it is expedient or secure to increase the local European army ; and if, in the largest sense of the word military safety, it has not become a necessity that for the future all European corps, of whatever arm, serving in India, should undergo the process of relief."

To Lord Canning he remarked: "I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that henceforth it will be dangerous to the State to maintain a European local army. I believe that, after this most recent experience, it will be unsafe to have any European forces which do not undergo the regular process of relief, and that this consideration must be held to be paramount to all others. . . . We cannot afford to attend to any other considerations than those of dis-

cipline and loyalty, which may be constantly renovated by the periodical return to England of all the regiments in every branch of the service."

The fact of such a large exodus of the local European force from India confirmed Lord Clyde in this opinion; and in anticipation of the concurrence of the Home authorities in this view, he prepared a minute for the Horse Guards, suggesting that the officers of her Majesty's service should be invited to prepare themselves, by the acquisition of the Hindostanee language, for the new duties now opening on them, and that encouragement should be held out to such of their numbers as might prefer a permanent Indian career to a return to England with their regiments.

## CHAPTER XXI.

ILLNESS—POSTPONEMENT OF RESIGNATION—AFFAIRS IN CHINA—  
 CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD CANNING REGARDING TROOPS FOR  
 CHINA — EXPEDITION DETERMINED UPON — LORD CANNING DE-  
 CIDES ON GOING TO THE HILLS—LORD CLYDE CONGRATULATES  
 LADY CANNING ON LORD CANNING'S EARLDOM—MEETS VICE-  
 REGAL PARTY AT CAWNPORE—LUCKNOW—LORD CANNING DESIRES  
 TO DETAIN LORD CLYDE IN INDIA—CHINA EXPEDITION—SIR  
 HIOPE GRANT COMMANDS—PROGRESS UP COUNTRY—LORD CLYDE  
 ACCOMPANIES LORD CANNING TO PESHAWUR—KANGRA—SIMLA—  
 AMALGAMATION—LORD CLYDE FOLLOWS LORD CANNING TO CAL-  
 CUTTA—PROMISES LORD CANNING TO SIT FOR HIS PORTRAIT  
 —FAREWELL ORDER—LEAVES CALCUTTA—LETTER FROM LORD  
 CANNING—REPLY—PARIS—COLONELCY OF COLDSTREAM GUARDS  
 —RECEPTION IN ENGLAND—ANECDOTE—VICHY—DEATH OF LORD  
 CLYDE'S FATHER—CHATHAM—THE MANSION HOUSE—THANKS OF  
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS—PARIS—TOUR IN ITALY—INCIPIENT SIGNS  
 OF ILL-HEALTH—BERLIN—MANŒUVRES—COLONEL VON BLUMEN-  
 THAL—INVESTED G.C.S.I.—DEATH OF LADY CANNING—ILLNESS  
 —AFFAIR OF THE TRENT—DISPOSITION OF MEANS—VISIT TO  
 NORTHUMBERLAND—REVIEW OF VOLUNTEERS AT BRIGHTON—  
 RETURN OF LORD CANNING—PARIS—DEATH OF LORD CANNING  
 —VISIT OF GENERAL AND MADAME VINOY—DEATH OF SIR R.  
 DOHERTY—COMPLETION OF SEVENTIETH YEAR—GAZETTED FIELD-  
 MARSHAL—HOUSE IN BERKELEY SQUARE.

AFTER his return from Kussowlie to Simla, a marked change was observable in the habits of Lord Clyde. He began to slacken in his custom of early rising,

and seemed less disposed to take his morning walk. In the middle of July he caught another severe cold, to which affection he seemed to have become more liable than before his accident. It resulted in a sharp attack of influenza, accompanied by a good deal of fever and inflammation of the eyes. He was not, however, incapacitated from attention to business, which at this time pressed heavily upon him, in consequence of the constant references to headquarters, and the correspondence with the Supreme Government, regarding the measures necessary for the removal down country and the embarkation of the discharged men of the local European force. He had hoped, in the event of his resignation being accepted, to be able to quit India at the end of January 1860; but foreseeing early in August that he would not be able to leave quite so soon as he had intended, he explained to the Duke of Cambridge his reasons for suggesting the postponement of his departure: "It has occurred to me that it would be very desirable for me to visit as many stations as possible on my way down country, in order to see the troops as Commander-in-chief, after the unfortunate excitement of the last three months. To do this properly would take me rather longer than I first counted on, when I had the honour to address your Royal Highness on the subject of my resignation, before the discontent declared itself among the local troops. If your Royal Highness should be pleased to acquiesce in the views

I have taken, it would be advisable, perhaps, that I should not be relieved till the close of February, instead of January, as I had originally proposed. If my stopping a month or so longer on this account can be of advantage to H.M.'s service, your Royal Highness will believe in my perfect readiness to shape my private arrangements accordingly, in obedience to any commands your Royal Highness may be graciously pleased to give me."

In the meantime events had occurred elsewhere, of such a nature as to materially affect the arrangements Lord Clyde had suggested for his return to England. Affairs had taken an adverse turn in China.

In consequence of the force destined for operations in that country in 1857 having been diverted to Calcutta to meet the emergency of the Indian revolt, the plenipotentiaries of France and England were not in a position to press with effect the demands of their Governments until December of that year. Operations were then directed against Canton, which fell into the hands of the allies—Yeh, the Chinese commissioner, being captured and deported to Calcutta. To hasten the negotiations, an allied force was left in occupation of Canton; whilst the plenipotentiaries, escorted by their respective squadrons, proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, which was reached in May of the following year. The entrance to the river was barred by the forts of Ta-koo; but after a smart cannonade, which silenced

the Chinese fire, they were captured without difficulty and occupied by detachments landed from the ships. Other impediments being removed, the plenipotentiaries continued their progress up the river to Tientsin, where they were met by two High Commissioners, who finally agreed to the terms of a treaty, which was signed on the 26th June 1858.

Lord Elgin, after proceeding to Japan and negotiating a treaty with that country, returned to England. In the spring of 1859, Mr Frederick Bruce,<sup>1</sup> Lord Elgin's brother, was appointed English Minister at the Court of Peking, whither he was instructed to proceed in company with his French colleague Monsieur de Bourboulon, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of the previous year. Finding, on their arrival at Shanghai, that the Chinese Government was raising obstacles to their presence in the capital, the plenipotentiaries, escorted by the combined naval squadrons, proceeded to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. Their patience being exhausted by the continued evasions of the authorities at Tientsin, who were evidently averse to the progress of the mission, the plenipotentiaries placed the matter in the hands of the officer commanding the British naval forces in Chinese waters. On the 24th June, an attempt to force the barriers constructed at the mouth of the Peiho, as also a *coup de main* on the forts commanding the passage, were repulsed with

<sup>1</sup> *Vide ante*, vol. i. p. 130.

such heavy loss to the assailants as to necessitate the withdrawal of the expedition to Shanghae.

On the receipt of this intelligence, and in anticipation of instructions from the Home Government, Lord Canning took measures to ascertain what troops could be spared from India to meet the changed aspect of our relations with China. The bad faith displayed by the Chinese Government, and the insult offered to the flags of England and France, demanded instant reparation, the enforcement of which would undoubtedly necessitate an expedition on a large scale. In the critical position of European affairs, and with the slender military resources at this juncture disposable at home, it was pretty certain that few, if any, troops could be spared from England; but the tranquillity of India, which was daily becoming more confirmed, led Lord Canning to the conclusion that a body of troops sufficient for the purpose could be drawn without inconvenience from that country. For such a contingency he prepared Lord Clyde, of whose experience regarding the climate and resources of China he was glad to avail himself. They were soon in communication on the subject. "I have much pleasure," wrote Lord Clyde, "in communicating to your lordship the results of my former stay in the China seas. It seems evident that H.M.'s Government will not be able to put up quietly with the last instance of treachery and insult, to which Mr Bruce and our forces have been so unhappily exposed. If that be



so, it will be necessary to take the Peiho forts according to rule, by which means such a result will be obtained, in all probability with ease and without much loss. As I know the Peiho is not navigable for large shipping, supposing the Government to determine maintaining the treaty, it will be necessary for the troops to march on Peking along the banks of the river, in immediate communication with a fleet of gun and store boats. Such a design will, as a matter of course, comprehend an expedition of very considerable magnitude, involving much previous arrangement and combination. The Government will have to recollect that, unless the expedition be conveyed altogether by powerful screw-steamers—which, according to our means in the Indian and Chinese seas, I assume to be out of the question—the expedition cannot leave the Malacca Straits before the setting in of the south-west monsoon, or about the middle of May, and consequently cannot commence offensive operations on the Peiho before the month of July or August following, about twelve months subsequent to the date of the late unfortunate business. In short, all operations must be combined with a due regard to the prevailing wind, as sailing transports, and in all probability the ordinary steam-gunboats, can make no way against the north-east monsoon. It appears to me that some Sikh regiments would be more useful for such an undertaking, as auxiliary to the British corps, than either Hindostanees or Madrassesees. . . . Large

stores of warm and waterproof clothing should be sent to Hong-Kong from home, for the use of any troops despatched from this country, long boots, blankets woollen and waterproof, flannel shirts, &c. In Calcutta such things cannot be procured, and in the river and China seas troops are cut down immediately by the cold and wet if insufficiently clad. It might be well to send a hint home to this effect immediately, as the troops will, I presume, be furnished from this country, whether British or native. Food and provisions and preserved vegetables are also indispensable for the troops during their long confinement on board ship, and should come from home. There are plenty of people who know all about this in England, if the hint be given. I am preparing a careful memorandum, according to my experience, on every matter connected with such an expedition as that which has been alluded to. This I propose to forward to your lordship when the details have been carefully considered. I would recommend you not to lose a mail in advising the Home authorities to prepare the store at Hong-Kong immediately, of preserved provisions, warm clothing, and the new Enfield ammunition; for I assume, owing to the state of affairs in Europe, that the expedition both in men and material must be found from this country."

Lord Clyde's anticipations proved true. The orders from home contemplated a joint expedition on a large scale, to be undertaken by France and

England. The troops and material of the latter Power were to be supplied mainly from India, and the Governor-General was empowered to make all the arrangements in concert with the Commander-in-chief.

It being the intention of Lord Canning to make a progress through the North-western Provinces and the Punjab in the ensuing cold season, Lord Canning consulted Lord Clyde as to the arrangements for his escort, as also as to the propriety of including Bundelcund in the programme. "You will see," he wrote, "that I look to the hills next summer. I intend it, and hope it, but should be very sorry to back myself to get there. The state of things here as regards the Council is vexatious. Sir C. Wood, like his predecessor, is disposed to knock it on the head. But for this an Act of Parliament is necessary; and he tells me that meanwhile I must make the best of things—that is, I must go on doing as I have done for the last three or four months, working the cumbrous system which the law imposes upon the Government of India, with only two coadjutors to share the heavy and useless weight of detail which has all but broken my back. If I had not been much less ailing than last year, it would have done for me. As it is, I am well enough, but I have no fancy for a fifth hot season in the plains; and therefore I shall make a push for the hills, even with the probability of having to come back to launch the new system.

“You would be surprised to see how eager Outram is for the extinction of the Council. He is desirous to resign at once, if this would facilitate its dissolution (anyhow, I believe he will go home before the next hot weather); but in truth, nobody who is not an Indian-bred civilian, and who does not live for the sake of ‘recording opinions,’ can have much affection for it. I have succeeded in reducing the number of ‘minutes’ written by about 90 per cent, but still it has an innate tendency to be a gigantic essay-club.”

In Lord Clyde’s opinion, Bundelcund was hardly yet in a sufficiently tranquillised condition to admit of a visit from the Governor-General. A certain amount of irritation still pervaded the districts of that territory. Indeed at that moment, in consequence of the alarm caused to the petty rajahs by the plundering of numerous bands of marauders, who were roaming about seeking the means of subsistence, measures were in progress for increasing the Saugur force, so as to sweep the whole country from Saugur to the eastward, and effectually clear the Jubbulpoor line of railway. The idea of Bundelcund, therefore, was renounced, and it was finally arranged that Lord Clyde should join the Governor-General’s camp at Cawnpore in the second week in October.

In the meantime, news had reached Simla of a nature to afford Lord Clyde the liveliest satisfaction. The cause of it is explained in the following

letter to Lady Canning: "I daresay you have received from your numerous friends many letters of congratulation on the advancement of Lord Canning to an earldom: if my little tribute has not come so soon, believe me it is not because I do not wish heartily to congratulate both yourself and Lord Canning on this recognition by the nation of his services to the State during the last two perilous and eventful years. His kind consideration for my health placed me at a distance from him, when I could gladly have been near to have taken his orders, and as far as possible to have assisted him during this unpleasant business with the local corps. If there was not such an army of officers and clerks belonging to my headquarters, who must all march when I do so, I certainly should have tried to get down to Calcutta, so as to be at hand. However, it could not be so; so I must content myself with writing my best wishes for your health and happiness."

Leaving Simla at the end of the first week in October, Lord Clyde visited Subathoo, Umbala, Delhi, and Meerut, at each of which places he inspected the troops, and on the 13th arrived at Cawnpore, where the camp of the Governor-General and his own were formed. From Cawnpore the two camps crossed the Ganges into Oudh, and marched together to Lucknow, which was entered in state. Lady Canning accompanied her husband; and under Lord Clyde's guidance, the viceregal party visited the ground on which the relief took place, as well as the

many objects of interest connected with the recent struggle to be found in that city. From Lucknow the Governor-General marched back to Cawnpore, and continued his progress up the Delhi and Agra road to the North-western Provinces—Lord Clyde, with the headquarters of the army, accompanying him.

Before leaving Simla, Lord Clyde had received an intimation from the Duke of Cambridge that he was to be succeeded in the chief command by Sir Hugh Rose; but as that officer happened to be serving in India, it was left to Lord Clyde's discretion to decide upon the period of his return to England. He still hoped to be able to leave at the end of February. Preparations were in progress for the China expedition, to the command of which Sir Hope Grant had been nominated. In all its details Lord Canning depended on the counsel and recommendations of Lord Clyde—the result of his acquaintance with that country; and he was loath to part with his old Commander-in-chief, at a time when he considered he could ill spare his services. He made a personal appeal to him to postpone his departure, allusion to which is made in a letter from Lord Clyde to the Duke of Cambridge: "A few days ago Lord Canning, in conversation, told me he regretted I was going to leave India so soon as I proposed, and requested to know whether, if he found it practicable to make arrangements at home which would be more suitable, I would remain Commander-in-chief some

months longer. I told his Excellency that I was very much gratified by finding that I had carried on the duties of my office to his satisfaction, and that if I had known it was his wish I should remain, I would not have sent in my resignation at the time I did. I had notified my intention to Lord Canning a month before my letter to your Royal Highness. However, I said it was impossible for me to address your Royal Highness again on the subject. Lord Canning has informed me that it is his intention by this mail to apply to the Home Government with a view to retaining me here for the present. . . . Of course, if the Governor-General wishes it, and thinks I can be useful to his Excellency by remaining a little longer than I had intended, I will do so, should the Government at home and your Royal Highness deem such a course expedient. . . .”

As was to be surmised, no difficulty was made by the authorities in meeting Lord Canning's wishes. “I can perfectly understand,” wrote the Duke of Cambridge in reply to the letter just quoted, “Lord Canning's feelings in this respect, and it is most natural that he should have the most perfect reliance on your knowledge and experience in so important an undertaking, especially as regards a country [China] so little known to others, but of which you possess so thorough a knowledge. Feeling, therefore, that the request is not an unreasonable one on Lord Canning's part, and seeing how strongly he feels on the subject in a letter he has himself addressed to

Sir Charles Wood, I am empowered by the new Secretaries of State, Sir Charles Wood and Mr Sidney Herbert, and have the consent of her Majesty, to whom the proposition has been submitted, to authorise your remaining in your important command in India for the present."

From Agra, where the Governor-General remained some time, Lord Clyde paid a flying visit to Gwalior. Here he became the guest of his old friend Sir Robert Napier; and after making an inspection of the troops in garrison, visiting the fort, and examining the site for a proposed new cantonment, he proceeded on to Jhansi. At this place also he inspected the troops, as well as the fort and ground, the scene of Sir Hugh Rose's attack. From Jhansi he made his way back by Gwalior to Agra. From Agra the combined camps moved to Meerut, which was reached just before Christmas. When at Meerut, Lord Clyde seized the opportunity of visiting Roorkee, where he viewed with great interest the college and workshops of the engineering establishment, as also the pontoons and the magnificent works of the Ganges canal.

In the meantime, the details of the troops to be despatched to China, which had formed the subject of a lively correspondence with the Home authorities and much consultation with the Governor-General, were finally determined. Notwithstanding the sensible reduction of the European strength, caused by the exodus of so large a proportion of the local force,



as well as by the withdrawal of the battalions of the line destined for the expeditionary force, Lord Clyde had the satisfaction of informing the Duke of Cambridge that he had been authorised by Lord Canning to arrange for the return to England of three more battalions—an undeniable proof of the pacification of the country. At the same time, he was enabled to report that “the arrangements for the settlement of Bundelcund had been successful. In consequence of the measures adopted to sweep that country with troops, there had been no serious resistance, and very little fighting; the province had been given up to the police, and the troops had been withdrawn to their quarters.”

The next point of the Governor-General's progress was Delhi, where Lord Clyde made a minute inspection of the defences. Leaving that station on the 4th January, and proceeding by Umbala, Loodiana, and Umritsur, Lahore was reached in the second week in February. Writing from that place to the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Clyde informs him that Lord Canning was about to proceed to Peshawur: “He has determined to see the country himself. It appears that Sir John Lawrence has advanced it as his opinion that it would be advisable to withdraw the troops from the Peshawur valley and the right bank of the Indus. Many other persons, and I among the number, do not agree with him. The occupation of the cantonment of Peshawur completely commands the Khyber Pass, and prevents

the Affghans issuing from it and taking possession of the valley of Peshawur, and, when once established there, making further inroads into our territory. As I know the ground well, having served there and carried on war among the hills to the northward, the Governor-General expressed his wish that I should accompany him ; and as Sir Hope Grant and Sir R. Napier<sup>1</sup> are both at Calcutta, I considered that it was not very necessary for me to go there, and that I might be more usefully employed in accompanying Lord Canning to Peshawur."

On the return of Lord and Lady Canning from Peshawur, Lord Clyde rejoined the headquarter camp at Sealkote, whence he accompanied the viceregal party to Kangra. During the march up country he had shown a disinclination to riding exercise, preferring to be driven by Metcalfe, his aide-de-camp, in a wheeled vehicle ; but the lassitude, of which he had previously shown symptoms, seemed to have passed away. The beautiful scenery of the hills in the neighbourhood of Kangra told with an invigorating effect upon him, and he returned to Simla in the company of Lord and Lady Canning in the second week of April, having laid in a fresh stock of health.

India had relapsed into a profound state of peace and security ; the Chinese expedition had embarked ; and, his work having been accomplished, Lord Clyde

<sup>1</sup> Sir R. Napier had been appointed to the command of one of the divisions of the China expeditionary force.

looked forward to an early emancipation from his command. One burning question, however, was as yet unsolved. The proposed amalgamation of the Queen's and local services had been the subject of animated discussion in the Indian Council, one member of which — Sir James Outram — had from the first opposed the project. In a letter to Lord Canining written on the 28th April, Lord Clyde expressed his views: "I have the pleasure of returning to your lordship the minutes which you sent me, by Sir James Outram, Sir Bartle Frere, and Mr Wilson. These minutes all have reference to the first or protest minute of Sir James Outram. That is an immense subject, upon which I have now no time to enter. I may say that I do not concur with Sir James in his strong anti-amalgamation feeling. Indeed I am disposed to believe that amalgamation would be the best policy, always taking care that the vested rights of the local officers should be respected. With all the propositions of Sir J. Outram regarding the comforts and management of the soldiers—their instruction and amusement, both mental and bodily—I quite agree, if it be possible to carry such schemes into execution; but I fear the erection of a quantity of additional buildings in barracks, when bare cover itself for the soldiers has been attained in a very imperfect manner, would be at present impossible on account of the expense. All good commanding officers; during my experience, have systematically endeavoured to give their men

rational amusements, and, so far as it lay in their power, to provide decent accommodation for the wives and children; but the discussion must, after all, be resolved into a question of expense: the better and more comfortable the barrack is made, so much the better will be the health and general conduct of the men."

It had been the intention of Lord Canning, who was himself deriving benefit from a sojourn in the hills, not to leave Simla till the first week in July, and to retain Lord Clyde's services until he reached the Presidency; but the news of Sir James Outram's severe illness compelled him to alter his plans, and hurry down to Calcutta in the first days of May. Lord Clyde followed him thither immediately, and on his arrival became a guest at Government House. Sir William Mansfield had parted from Lord Clyde some time previously, and had proceeded to Bombay, in anticipation of his succession to the command of that Presidency; Colonel Norman had been compelled by his health to seek change of air in England; several other members of the staff had left to join the China expedition; and but two of his former personal staff—Colonel Sterling, his military secretary, and Colonel Metcalfe, his aide-de-camp—remained with him to the last. The details of the command, which were never to his taste, had become irksome to him in consequence of these changes, and he was delighted with the prospect of his approaching emancipation. But there was one drawback to these

pleasurable feelings. The kindness he had experienced at the hands of Lord and Lady Canning, from the first moment of his landing in Calcutta to the last hour of his departure, had taught him to look upon them as dear friends, the parting from whom cost him much.

As a proof of his regard for his Commander-in-chief, who had assisted him in restoring tranquillity to India, Lord Canning extracted from Lord Clyde a promise to sit for his portrait to Mr F. Grant;<sup>1</sup> and on his departure, Lord Clyde left in Lord Canning's hands the sword which he had worn in the Crimea and India, as a *souvenir* of himself.

The estimation in which Lord Clyde throughout his career held discipline, has been repeatedly demonstrated in the course of this biography; but his parting words to the army, expressive of his opinion on this subject, are couched in such solemn accents as to require no excuse for their reproduction in any notice of his life. "On leaving this country,"—so ran his farewell order,—“I take the opportunity of thanking the officers and soldiers of the two services for their valour and endurance, so severely tried, especially in the early part of the insurrection.

“History does not furnish a more valuable exhibition of heroic resistance to many adverse circumstances than was shown by the British troops during these mutinies.

“The memory of their constancy and daring will

<sup>1</sup> The late Sir Francis Grant, President of the Royal Academy.

never die out in India ; and the natives must feel that, while Britain contains such sons, the rule of the British sovereign must last undisputed.

“Soldiers, both English and native, I bid you farewell ; and I record as my latest word, that the bravery and endurance, of which I have spoken with admiration, could not alone have insured success.

“That success was owing in a great measure to your discipline, the foundation of all military virtue, which, I trust, will never be relaxed.”

After holding a farewell levee, and attending a ball given by the residents of Calcutta in his honour, he handed over the command to Sir Hugh Rose. Then came the final leave-taking with Lord Canning. Frequently, after his return to England, would Lord Clyde dwell on this scene, and acknowledge the effort it cost him to subdue his feelings.

Lord Clyde left Calcutta on the 4th June. At Madras he received a note from Lord Canning, written on the day of his departure, and sent by the after-packet, in which he reminds Lord Clyde of his promise : “Don’t forget my two requests—to see my sister, and to sit to Frank Grant in your old blue jacket. The sitting is a serious matter, but I think you will do it for me. Metcalfe, too, has a little packet, which I asked you to leave for Lady Sydney. Sydney will save you all trouble (except the sitting) with Grant. I have asked him to do so. And now, once more, good-bye, my dear and valued friend. God bless and protect you! Amongst

the many happinesses of returning home, there are few to which, when the good time arrives, I shall look forward with more intense delight than that of seeing you once more."

From Madras, where he became the guest of Sir Patrick Grant for one night, Lord Clyde replied to Lord Canning's letter: "The after-packet brought me your very kind and most grateful letter; and I cannot leave Madras without thanking you for the friendly, and indeed affectionate, tone in which you have written. Believe me, the parting from your Excellency, after so many proofs as you have shown of personal kind feeling towards me, is the only drawback from the pleasure I look forward to in reposing after so long service and so many anxieties. I consider that your good opinion, and the friendship so plainly spoken in your letter, is a very high reward for any assistance I may have been able to afford in carrying on the public business. I shall have great pleasure in complying with your Excellency's wish that I should sit to Mr Grant for my portrait; and I hope that when you return, you will not think it unreasonable that I should ask you to sit also to the same painter, in order that I may have present in my room the likeness of a statesman, who so triumphantly succeeded in settling India, and who, in all the labours of his arduous office, has never forgotten a kind word and deed for his Commander-in-chief. Pray in your letter remember me to dear Lady Canning. I shall be one of the

first on the shore to greet you both on your return to England."

Lord Clyde reached Paris on the 13th July. Here he remained several days, meeting at the table of the British Ambassador (Lord Cowley) Marshal Pelissier and other French officers of his acquaintance. He was also honoured by an audience with the Emperor. General Vinoy, with whom he had maintained a regular correspondence during his absence in India, was at this time holding a command in the provinces. Lord Clyde was anxious to see him, and for this purpose contemplated prolonging his stay in France; but his plans were disarranged by an earnest appeal from the Duke of Cambridge to expedite his return to England. "I hope this letter," wrote his Royal Highness, "will meet you at Paris, where you have arrived safely after a prosperous journey. I am anxious to be the first to announce to you that, consequent upon the death of our poor friend Lord Strafford, and the vacancy that has occurred in the Coldstream regiment of Foot Guards, her Majesty has graciously selected you for the high honour of becoming the colonel of this distinguished regiment—a distinction which, I am confident, you will appreciate as it is intended. . I would also express a hope that you should come over to England as soon as you can conveniently do so. The Indian army question is now pending. I believe we may say with confidence that it will pass through Parliament. Your presence,



however, with a view of aiding us in getting it through Parliament, would be of importance to us; and I therefore do hope that you will come over, even should you return afterwards with a view to seeing your friends over the water. I need hardly assure you with what pleasure I shall welcome you home; and your reception in this country is sure to be a most hearty one,—so pray come as soon as you possibly can. . . .”

Having paid a hurried visit to General Vinoy, Lord Clyde hastened his departure from Paris, reaching London in time to take his seat in the House of Lords, and speak and vote in favour of the Bill for amalgamating the armies of India, which measure was carried through Parliament and became law.

The Duke of Cambridge's anticipations were verified. Nothing could be more flattering than Lord Clyde's reception by all classes of his countrymen, from her Majesty downwards; but with the retiring modesty which characterised him at all times, especially in prosperity, and which caused him to abhor anything approaching to lionisation, he shrank from all manifestation of applause, or attempt to make him an object of popularity. Arrived in London, he found himself a prisoner there for some time. Numerous questions connected with the amalgamation of the forces in India were submitted to him for his opinion; and constant references in the matter of promotion, and rewards to officers for services rendered in the recent cam-

paigns, monopolised every hour of the day. Sometimes the application would be supplemented by the personal appeal of an interested friend or relative, and, on more than one occasion, in such terms as to try the old soldier's patience. One of these visitors advancing, as a ground for consideration, that his son had been in a position of considerable danger, Lord Clyde rose from his chair, and, with marked emphasis of tone and manner, replied, "So he was in a position of danger, was he? I tell you what, sir! your son was very favoured and most fortunate to be placed in such a position. We soldiers consider it the best thing that can happen to us, and we value it as much, if not more, than promotion."

As soon as he was able to release himself from this irksome occupation, he repaired to Vichy, where, in the company of General Vinoy, he obtained the repose for which he had so ardently longed, and which the state of his health rendered necessary. Increasing years, and the toil and anxiety he had undergone, had told on his iron frame; and though he still retained an unusual amount of bodily vigour for a man of his age, his friends could not fail to detect a visible change in his appearance.

During his last absence in India, Lord Clyde's father had moved from Mull (Argyle), where he had long been resident, to Portobello, near Edinburgh. There tended by his daughter, he died at a ripe

old age in January 1859. Having established Miss Campbell in a home of her own in London, Lord Clyde, on his return from Vichy, settled himself in chambers in the Albany. These he made his headquarters; but as General Eyre was at that time holding the command at Chatham, he paid frequent visits to his family, coming and going as it suited him, and never feeling so much at home as when in the society of these attached friends, in whose presence he was freed from all restraint, whose children were a constant source of interest to him, and where he was enabled to indulge the strong domestic feelings to which he was by nature inclined.

In the autumn of 1858 the freedom of the city of London had been conferred upon him by a vote of the Court of Common Council; and in the December following his return, he attended, in company with Sir James Outram, to whom a similar compliment had been paid, the ceremony of the presentation of a sword of honour, followed by a banquet at the Mansion House. Proud as he was of the estimation in which his services were held by his country, it was an effort to Lord Clyde to face an assembly of this kind, in which he found himself one of the principal objects of interest, and was compelled, in spite of himself, to receive and reply to compliments of a personal nature. Nevertheless he could, when the occasion required it, acquit himself as it became him, though not, perhaps, with

the same ease and fluency as when haranguing his troops. When, a few weeks later, the thanks of the House of Lords were voted to the force employed in China for the successful result of its operations, whereby a favourable peace had been concluded with that country, Lord Clyde refused to receive the compliments paid him for the care and foresight he had displayed in the preparation of the expedition, without sharing them with Lord Canning. To this act Lady Canning, in her correspondence with Lord Clyde, gracefully alludes in warm terms of gratitude.

Early in April 1861, he was on his way to Paris, glad to escape from the claims which society imposes upon its favourites, and fortified with an excuse for declining various tokens of respect of a public nature, which his fame and popularity invited. General Vinoy happened to be in Paris, and in his society he spent a month before continuing his journey to Italy. From the entries in his journal, which he recommenced in 1861, he appears to have suffered at times from a recurrence of his old attacks of fever and ague, one of which seized him before leaving Paris. Passing through Turin, he made his way to Magenta, the scene of the conflict in the campaign of 1859. "*Journal, 10th May.*—Visited the field of battle. So enclosed and covered with vines and trees and cultivation, that I now comprehend the difficulty of the Austrians acting in a close line, and of the advantage to the French in the employment

of so large a proportion of the infantry in skirmishing order. Vinoy told me the number so employed by the French were always greater than the Austrians, and that they therefore broke through, and assailed the supports and reserves of their opponents, which were in column." At Milan, Lord Clyde found in command his old friend and comrade of the Crimea, General della Marmora, from whom and his English wife he met with a hearty welcome. At their table he renewed acquaintance with several officers who had accompanied the Sardinian force to the East, and he dwells in his journal on the friendliness exhibited to him by all. General della Marmora paid him the compliment of having the troops out for his inspection, and Lord Clyde comments on "their stout and hardy appearance, as well as their steadiness under arms." Before he left Milan, General Cialdini,<sup>1</sup> another Crimean friend, who happened at that time to be holding a command at Bologna, came up from thence to pay him a visit, which afforded him great pleasure. Not having seen the Italian lakes, Lord Clyde took the opportunity of being in their neighbourhood to make a rapid excursion to them. Embarking at Como, and proceeding up the lake, with the beauty of the scenery of which he was much impressed, he crossed to Lugano, and thence to Maggiore. Maggiore, he remarks in his journal, "though larger, is not so pleasing as Como. The Borromean islands are

<sup>1</sup> Now Italian Ambassador to the French Republic.

pretty objects, but not equal to the scenery in the Yang-tsze-kiang, with its golden and silver islands."

Passing through Milan, he stopped at Desenzano, for the purpose of examining the battle-field of Solferino. "*Journal, 19th May.*—Went to Solferino heights *viâ* San Martino, Madonna Scoperlo, and Pozzolengo. From the heights of Solferino the whole of this very extensive field of battle may be seen. The French army were evidently in hand; and I conceive the Emperor Louis Napoleon to have been better informed of the movements and objects of the Austrians on that day, than the latter were of those of the French. From what I heard from Vinoy, the whole of the regiments, with the exception of a couple of companies of each as a reserve, were employed in attack. They formed a loose line in skirmishing order, each man acting for himself in this sense, and independently, when he thought fit, although in fact in line, but quite out of hand for any formation. The numbers thus employed were far more numerous than the Austrian line of skirmishers, and their numerical superiority enabled the French to break through the Austrian line of skirmishers, and to envelop the troops formed in rear in support. Thus the long range of the French artillery enabled it to punish and disorganise the reserve of all arms. La Marmora spoke most favourably of the Austrian soldier. He was brave and well instructed; but somehow or other his superior officers were at fault

throughout the whole campaign, and he fought always at a disadvantage."

After examining the position of San Martino, Lord Clyde proceeded to Verona, where, under the guidance of one of General Benedek's aides-de-camp, he inspected the heights which command the town. Thence he made his way to Venice, with the beauty of which city, as also its works of art, he appears to have been duly impressed. From Venice he returned to England by the Brenner Pass and Munich, where he notes that he was "not very well: a feeling of weakness comes over me for which I cannot well account, unless it be old age, which cannot be expected to improve with advancing years." By the second week in June he found himself reinstalled in his old quarters at the Albany.

The feeling of weakness alluded to above was doubtless one of the incipient symptoms of the insidious malady, which at this time had begun to undermine Lord Clyde's constitution, and eventually caused his death. Ever since his return from India, those who were much in his society had remarked in him a nervous excitability, as also a tendency to brood over matters, which in ruder health he probably would have regarded with comparative unconcern. One moment he would be uneasy under the weight of the honours which, in his judgment, had been lavished upon him. At another he would trouble himself concerning the distribution of the Central India prize-money, his claim to which had been con-

tested,—“not,” as he said, “that he cared for the money —if he got it,<sup>1</sup> it would be a trouble to him : he could not carry it with him to the grave, and his sister, thank God, was already provided for,”—but because he was apprehensive lest, by his right being ignored, the troops, whose due he conceived it was to share it with him, should be deprived of it. Be this as it may, the effect upon him was such as at times to seriously interfere with his peace of mind. Unquestionably it was a sign of failing health. Even at this period he was not exempted from physical suffering. An ominous pain in the left region of the chest would cause him to stop short when walking with a companion, bear with all his weight upon him, and even sometimes force him to groan aloud. Yet he could not bear to be considered ill, and never mentioned it, or allowed it to be observed, if he could help it.

At the close of the summer of 1861, Lord Clyde was selected by the military authorities to represent the British service at the manœuvres about to be held by portions of the Prussian army. Whilst the *corps d'armée* destined for this purpose were assembling in the vicinity of Cologne, Lord Clyde was specially invited to Berlin to witness the manœuvres of the Guards, which were to be conducted in the neighbourhood of the capital, no other foreign officers being present. Thither Lord Clyde and his party, of

<sup>1</sup> Lord Clyde's claim was eventually recognised, though the money was not paid over to his estate until after his death.



whom General Eyre was one, proceeded in the first week in September. Colonel von Blumenthal,<sup>1</sup> commanding the 3d Regiment of Thuringian Infantry, was deputed to receive the English officers, and spared no pains in rendering them the most friendly and active assistance by anticipating their wants in every possible manner. Their reception by the King, the Crown Prince and Princess, and all the Royal family, was most gracious and hospitable—an example followed by all classes, and acknowledged by Lord Clyde in ample terms in his journal. The smart appearance of the troops, the steadiness and precision of their formations and movements, the perfect knowledge of their duties in the field, satisfied him that no pains had been spared to perfect the soldiers in their training. Nor did his practised eye fail to detect the celerity of the infantry-fire with the breech-loading rifle, at that time a novelty to the armies of Europe, and which the Prussians had been the first to adopt. It was the constant theme of his conversation with those who were associated with him on this occasion; and his remarks left an enduring impression on the mind of General von Blumenthal, who, in speaking, in a recent letter, of Lord Clyde's presence at the Prussian manœuvres of 1861, remarks: "I can say I profited a great deal by his conversation. He was

<sup>1</sup> Now General von Blumenthal, of European celebrity, who accompanied the Crown Prince of Prussia as chief of the staff in the Prusso-Austrian campaign of 1866, and again in the same capacity in the Franco-German war of 1870-71.

always kind, friendly, and clear in what he said to me. He expressed a high opinion of our army almost in every respect, and I have often thought of him and his praises and good advice in the midst of battles. How I wished he could have seen our fighting! As well as I remember, there were only three remarks about our tactics in which he did not agree with us. First, that we fought too much in column instead of line; and now, since the firearms are become so murderous, we shall mostly fight in line. Secondly, that we always formed square with our battalions against cavalry, instead of receiving the attack in line. He was also right in that. In the Austrian, and particularly in the French war (at Sedan), we received the cavalry in line. Thirdly, that our cavalry too often attacked the enemy when in cover. This had been the case at the manœuvres, but it was no fault of our tactics—rather that of the leading officers, who were too eager to attack.”

From Lord Clyde's journal we learn that on the termination of the Guards' manœuvres he was received by the Prussian Royal family at Brühl—"The King, Queen, and our most amiable Princess (wife of the Crown Prince), full of kindness and civility." The remainder of the autumn was spent by Lord Clyde between London and Chatham.

On the 1st November he accompanied Sir John Lawrence to Windsor, on the occasion of the first Chapter of the newly established order of the Star of India being held by her Majesty. "*Journal*, 1st

*November.*—Installed as a Knight of the Star of India by her Majesty. Dined at the Castle. Her Majesty and the Prince Consort most amiable in their manner to me upon this as on every other occasion."

Since his departure from India, Lord Clyde had maintained his correspondence with Lady Canning. A few days subsequent to his visit to Windsor, he notes in his journal the despatch of a letter, he had written. But it was not destined to reach her. On her way back from a hurried visit to Darjeeling, made whilst Lord Canning was absent on duty in the upper provinces, that amiable lady contracted a fever. Her constitution, much impaired by the climate, and the anxiety which she had suffered since her arrival in India, was unable to resist the attack, which terminated fatally. The acknowledgment of the letter devolved upon Lord Canning, who, in a few touching words, remarked "how cordially she, whom he had lost, reciprocated the regard Lord Clyde entertained for her."

Shortly after the despatch of his letter to Lady Canning, Lord Clyde himself experienced a serious attack of illness. He had been dining out, and, as was his habit, was walking home (it was a cold November night), when he was seized with a violent return of the pain, to which on many previous occasions he had been subjected. With the assistance of a conveyance he reached his chambers, and in consequence of the serious symptoms which

supervened, sought medical advice. He was confined to his room for the best part of a fortnight; and though the attack yielded to treatment, he alludes in his journal to the state of prostration in which he found himself, after the feverish feeling had left him and he had been pronounced convalescent. As soon as he was permitted to leave the house, Lord Clyde repaired to Chatham, where he spent the greater portion of the month of December with his friends the Eyres. Whilst on this visit, news of the arrest of Messrs Slidell and Mason, the commissioners of the Southern States of America, and their secretaries, on board an English passenger-steamer, by an armed party of a frigate of the United States navy, reached England. Consequent on the excitement produced in the country by this affair, and in view of the contingent possibility of a rupture between Great Britain and the United States, public opinion pointed to Lord Clyde as one whose services might be required in command of the troops in Canada, whom it was deemed prudent by the Government to reinforce without delay. Grave anxiety marked the close of the year, on which an additional gloom was cast by the unexpected and lamented death of the Prince Consort.

On the 2d January, Lord Clyde, who had returned to London from a visit which he had been paying at Cheshunt to his old and attached friend Mr Gledstanes, notes in his journal: "Opinion doubtful as to the American Government giving up the gentle-

men, Messrs Slidell and Mason, taken from the Trent; and I find much conjecture respecting my being sent to Canada in case of war. I have no desire or ambition to be further employed. Personal ambition has left me. I have none. If asked to go, I am quite ready." All doubt on the matter was, however, solved by the adoption of temperate counsels on the part of the American Government, which, after a few weeks' interval of suspense, conceded the demands of the British Government and released the captured passengers.

Though it is a subject on which Lord Clyde himself would have preferred silence to have been maintained, yet his remarkable open-handedness in the disposition of his means demands notice, with a view to the just elucidation of his character. Possessed as he was at this time of a handsome income, the saving of money, which for so many years of his life he had practised with rigid self-denial in the interest of others, had ceased to be an object with him. In the society of his intimates he spoke of his money as "dross which he could not carry with him to the other world;" and his pleasure was in devising excuses for distributing it amongst those of his friends to whom, at the moment, he considered it would be most acceptable. A single extract from his diary will suffice. On the 18th January he notes: "I have given so many presents in money during the course of the year, that I find I must discontinue the indulgence of this pleasure for some time to come." Then

follows the enumeration of the items—amounting, exclusive of the handsome annual allowance made to his sister, to a total of £6792.

In the beginning of the year, he appears to have again suffered from the effects of the night air. In his desire to give pleasure to the younger members of a family with which he was intimate, he had accompanied a party to the theatre to see a pantomime. The next day he notes the consequence, and remarks that he is “too old now to go to such places.” Nevertheless, in the third week of January he was sufficiently well to undertake a flying visit to Northumberland, where he took the opportunity of renewing his acquaintance with some of his old friends in that county. Amongst them he specially mentions his “dear old friend” Colonel Coulson and his family: “all had been most kind to me when quartered with my regiment the 98th in that district in 1839-40 and -41.” He appears, however, to have recognised the necessity of care; for, on his return to London, he declined an invitation to dinner with one of his most attached friends,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The late Mr John Crawford, F.R.S., a distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service, in which capacity he rendered important service at the head of a diplomatic mission to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, with the object of opening out commercial relations with India. He afterwards became President of the Ethnological Society, and as a Vice-President of the Geographical Society, took a leading part in the proceedings of that body. He was also for many years a writer in the ‘Examiner’ newspaper, under the brilliant editorship of the late Mr Fonblanque. Himself an Islay man, Mr Crawford was intimately acquainted with Lord Clyde and his connection with that island. They were fast friends through life, and

assigning as his reason, "the night air pinches my chest and gives me pain, which distresses me—a warning to be more prudent in taking care of myself."

On the 27th February he records in his journal : "Despatched a letter of thanks to Lord Breadalbane for the handsome dirk he presented to me in the name of the Highlanders of Glenorchy, Breadalbane, and Nether Lorne."

This was not the only compliment of the kind paid to him by his admiring compatriots. Consequent upon his visit to Scotland in 1856, the ladies of Argyleshire subscribed for a handsome Cairngorm brooch, in order to commemorate his connection with that county, in which Islay, whence the veteran soldier's family sprang, is situated.

This mark of their esteem was presented by the late Duchess of Argyll, on behalf of the donors, at a dinner given at the Duke's house in London, on Lord Clyde's return from India. On his death the brooch was handed over to the Duke and Duchess of Argyll, by whom Lord Clyde was regarded as a valued and intimate friend, and is now at Inverary.

At the instance of the authorities, Lord Clyde consented to command at a review of the Volunteers, which was arranged to be held at Brighton on Easter Monday of this year. Before proceeding thither he paid a visit to Strathfieldsaye.

to Mr Crawford Lord Clyde more than once pointed as the biographer of his choice, in case any memoir of him were undertaken.

“*Journal, April 16th.*—The Duke of Wellington showed me all over the house: the room in which the great Duke slept and wrote; his bed a simple stretcher, without curtains, and on which a chintz covering was placed during the day, and thus had the appearance of and served as a sofa. The furniture of the apartment was just such as you would see in the barrack-room of a regimental field-officer or a captain in a barrack in England.”

The review, which was intended to test the practicability of collecting at a given point on the coast a *corps d'armée* for defensive purposes, fulfilled its object to the satisfaction of all concerned. In a few hours some 20,000 men were assembled, the majority of whom were brought by rail at an early hour from London, the remainder being furnished from Dover, the Isle of Wight, and other places along the coast. “They” (the Volunteers), remarks Lord Clyde in a letter written a few days later, “surprised me not a little by their wonderful steadiness and intelligence. It was not merely a simple affair of marching round and saluting, but a readiness of movement and facility of changing position, which is not always surpassed by the oldest and most practised troops.” It was the last occasion of his appearing at the head of troops in the field.

Just at this period Lord Canning returned to England. Leaving India in apparent health, he had begun to complain of some discomfort upon landing at Marseilles. He was, however, well



enough to walk down to the Albany before breakfast the morning after his arrival, and thank Lord Clyde for the redemption of his promise to sit for his portrait.

At the end of May, Lord Clyde was on his way to Paris, where he remained three weeks, spending his time most agreeably in the society of General and Madame Vinoy and their friends. The open-air life of the French metropolis was very congenial to him, and he notes in his journal the pleasure it gave him to meet "his old friend Marshal Canrobert," General Mollard, and other officers, whom he had known in the Crimea. Nor was he forgetful of those who had passed away. "*Journal, June 2d.*—Attended a religious ceremony observed at the church of La Trinité on the anniversary of the death of General Espinasse, killed at the battle of Magenta. The father and brother of Madame Espinasse called and left their cards on me afterwards, to mark their appreciation of the respect I desired to show to the memory of their relation."

"*June 15th.*—Breakfasted with Vinoy. Went afterwards with Madame and himself to Versailles, where I had not been since 1816, forty-six years ago. All those who held possession of my affections at that period have been removed. . . . Saw the gallery of modern paintings collected by Louis Philippe. Vinoy could not help calling my attention to the absence of all notice of the English in the pictures of those scenes in which we were united and took

a part, such as the battles of Alma and Inkerman. He observed that all artists, of whatsoever country, did the same, their national feeling leading them to represent every honour as having been gained by their own soldiers. It was evident that my good friend felt ashamed at this kind of monopoly on the part of the French artists, of all credit in these battles being given to the French army, while it was agreeable to the national vanity of the people."

In the meantime Lord Clyde had arranged with General and Madame Vinoy to pay a visit to London, for the purpose of seeing the International Exhibition, at this time the great object of attraction. He undertook to precede them thither, for the purpose of procuring them apartments, and, before quitting Paris, was enabled to announce to his friend that, in anticipation of his arrival, the Athenæum Club had elected him an honorary member by acclamation.

The pleasure in store for Lord Clyde was, however, materially affected by the news which awaited his return. On the day of his arrival, Lord Canning, on whose constitution, enfeebled by climate and the toil and anxiety of his labours in India, disease had made rapid inroads, breathed his last. He was buried in Westminster Abbey, in a grave near that of his illustrious father; and of the many friends and admirers who followed his remains to their last resting-place, none mourned him more sincerely than his former Commander-in-chief, who had received such signal proofs of the late Viceroy's confidence

and friendship, when associated with him in the triumph of restoring British ascendancy in India, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the sepoy army. It is a noteworthy circumstance that on this occasion Lord Clyde lent his arm to Sir James Outram, who was then in failing health, and whose remains, together with his own, were destined to be laid, at no long interval, under the same pile which was then receiving those of their honoured chief.<sup>1</sup>

London was full of visitors, to meet whom Lord Clyde had no lack of invitations; yet he wearied of the life, complaining in his journal "of doing nothing, and idling without any definite object." Nevertheless there are several entries at this time of pleasurable visits paid to Rosebank, near Fulham, the residence of Colonel and Mrs M'Murdo,<sup>2</sup> the latter being the daughter of Sir Charles Napier. With these friends Lord Clyde, since his return to England, had become very intimate; and it may be imagined with what delight he reverted, in their presence, to the memory of his revered commander.

The visit of the Vinoys having been postponed for some weeks, Lord Clyde was enabled to spend a portion of the time at Chatham, where, he notes, he amused himself by sitting or walking in the garden all day, and where he enjoyed the society of Sir

<sup>1</sup> Sir James Outram died in the following spring, Lord Clyde, amongst other friends and comrades, attending his funeral on the 25th March 1863.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel M'Murdo, at that time holding the appointment of Inspector-General of Volunteers; now General W. M. S. M'Murdo, C.B.

Henry Harness, speaking of him in his journal "as an amiable and good man, very sensible in his military views, and for whom I have a warm regard."

In the second week in July the Vinoys arrived, and remained a week in London, during which time Lord Clyde spared no exertion to render their stay agreeable, accompanying them to the Exhibition, the Tower, Windsor, and other places of interest, and introducing them to his friends, by whom they were warmly welcomed.

"*Journal, July 20th.*—Vinoy and Madame left this morning, seemingly very much pleased with their visit and their reception in London, and all the attention it had been in my power to show them." The day following the Vinoys' departure, Lord Clyde escorted Mrs Eyre to Northumberland, in order to attend the marriage of her brother,<sup>1</sup> who had rendered important service on the headquarter staff during the Indian Mutiny. Whilst at Hexham, Lord Clyde did not omit the opportunity of paying a visit to his valued friends the Coulsons of Blenkinsopp—"the old colonel, who rarely received any visitors, being full of kindness."

On his return to London he complained in his journal of "not being well: a heavy and tired feeling, which can only be ascribed to advancing years. I fight against it, and not without success, so that I have no right to complain."

Lord Clyde had been repeatedly urged by his

<sup>1</sup> Now Major-General G. Allgood, C.B., late Bengal Staff Corps.

medical adviser to proceed to a German bath, for the purpose of recruiting his health. He, however, tarried in England, for reasons which showed his readiness to prefer the interests of others to his own.

His claim to a share in the Bandah and Kirwee prize-money was undisputed by the Treasury; not so that of Sir Hugh Rose and the troops of the Central India field-force.

In a letter to a friend whom he had been desirous of joining in Germany, in case he found himself in a position to leave London, he thus alludes to his detention: "The Treasury have not yet come to any decision regarding the claim of the officers and soldiers of the column under Sir Hugh Rose to share in the booty taken at Kirwee; and I think I may possibly be able to serve their interests by remaining in town until the Treasury have arrived at a decision. I shall be content to remain until the question has been settled. The French have a proverb, '*Qu'il vaut mieux toujours s'adresser au grand Dieu qu'à ses saints*;' and I wrote a letter to Lord Palmerston a few days ago, which I feel confident will command his lordship's attention, and lead him to give a decision speedily, if it rest with him to do so."

In August he paid a visit to the late Lord Herbert at Wilton, and on his return attended a marriage in the family of Mr R. Clutterbuck at Watford. When at Wilton, he had met Count Strzelecki, and had arranged to proceed with him to one of the

baths in Bohemia ; but this plan was deranged, owing to an unforeseen circumstance, explained in the following extract from his journal : “ *September 3d.*—Heard this day of the death yesterday of my dear and good old friend Sir Richard Doherty, who served with me in the 21st Regiment upwards of nine years, when in the rank of captain and major. He was truly good, upright, and just-minded, and we were ever on cordial and intimate terms. I cannot avoid paying the last mark of respect to his memory by attending his funeral ; and in so doing, I must be content to give up the intention of visiting Marienbad this year, and to write in this sense to Count Strzelecki.<sup>1</sup> The weather has become wintry in feeling ; and with the pain which cold produces in my chest, I should be foolish to incur the risk of being laid up, besides passing a month of certain discomfort.” “ *September 6th.*—Attended this day the funeral of my dear old friend and comrade Sir R. Doherty. . . . I grieve sincerely for his loss. Sutherland, our mutual friend and brother officer in the same corps, was also at the funeral.”

In the following month he records the pleasure he derived from a visit paid to Sir Frederick and Lady Currie at their residence in Kent, and remarks on the kindness they had shown him when stationed at Lahore in 1848.

“ *Journal, October 20th.* — Returned from Sir

<sup>1</sup> Pronounced Streleski—a well-known member and favourite of London society.

Frederick Currie's country-house with him to town. Completed my 70th year of age this day. Considering all that I have gone through in the shape of hard work and exposure to bad climates for a long continuance of years, I have much reason to be thankful in being so well and feeling so strong and active as I do, after 54 years' service as a soldier, together with feelings of sincere gratitude for the wonderful fortune which has attended me in my career through life."

One further honour, however, was in store for him.

"*Journal, November 9th.*—Heard this morning at the Horse Guards that my name, with those of Blakeney, Gough, and also of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, would appear in an extraordinary 'Gazette' as Field-Marshal this evening (the twenty-first anniversary of the birth of the Prince of Wales). I would have been far better pleased to have escaped this honour. I have had so many conferred on one so humble, that it would have been agreeable to me to have avoided receiving any further honours."•

If he had toiled long and patiently (45 years) to attain the rank of major-general, his promotion since that time had been extraordinarily rapid, for it only took him eight years to run through the list of general officers and gain the topmost rung of the military ladder.

Lord Clyde, who had been for some time intending to leave his quarters in the Albany for a residence

of his own, succeeded in November in finding a house suitable to his requirements. By the end of the year the transaction was completed, and he became the possessor of the lease of No. 10 Berkeley Square. It was, however, some months before the house was ready to receive him.



## CHAPTER XXII.

LORD CLYDE'S HEALTH AT THE BEGINNING OF 1863—HE TAKES POSSESSION OF HIS HOUSE—WEAKNESS AND FAILING EYESIGHT—EXAMINED BY MR LONGMORE—LAST ENTRY IN JOURNAL—SERIOUS ILLNESS—VISIT TO CHATHAM—LAST ILLNESS—REMEMBERS HIS HIGHLANDERS—THE QUEEN'S SYMPATHETIC MESSAGE—LETTER WRITTEN BY HER MAJESTY'S COMMAND TO LORD CLYDE—ANXIETY TO SEE HIS SISTER—MISS CAMPBELL ARRIVES—DEATH OF LORD CLYDE—REGRET OF THE NATION—LETTER FROM LORD GRANVILLE—FUNERAL IN WESTMINSTER ABBEY—INSCRIPTION ON TOMBSTONE—SUMMARY OF CHARACTER—LETTER FROM GENERAL VINOY—EXTRACT FROM THE 'TIMES'—CONCLUSION—MEMORIALS IN LONDON AND GLASGOW.

THE New Year found Lord Clyde in the Albany, weak and ailing from a sharp attack of fever, which seized him when spending Christmas with Lord and Lady Donegal at their seat in Berkshire. He, however, soon rallied, and for some weeks to come busied himself with the details for the occupation of his house in Berkeley Square. This took some time, so that it was not till March that he found himself installed in his own home. Amongst the pleasures which he anticipated from his new possession was the possibility of receiving his friends from Chatham; and he did not consider his arrangements complete

until he had commissioned General Eyre "to tell the dear children that he had two nice little iron beds, of the same size and form, put up in the room above the one destined for their father and mother."

In the meantime the feeling of weakness, and the exertion of seeing and talking with people, continued irksome to him, resulting in an undue amount of fatigue. Reading small print had for a long time been difficult with him. Ever since the beginning of the struggle between the Northern and Southern States of America, Lord Clyde had watched the progress of the war with absorbing interest. He kept himself well informed of the various operations of the contending armies; and if, as was frequently the case, his eyes were too weak to scan the accounts published in the newspapers, he gladly availed himself of the assistance of a friend to read them to him.

Lord Clyde had been in the habit of consulting Dr, now Sir Thomas, Watson; but on the occasion of a visit from his friend Mr Longmore<sup>1</sup> early in the year, he submitted himself to a minute examination by that gentleman. Although no indications of any distinct organic lesion of the heart's structure could be detected, Mr Longmore was led to fear that this organ was seriously affected; and he arrived at the conclusion that derangement of

<sup>1</sup> Surgeon-General T. Longmore, C.B., Professor of Military Surgery in the Army Medical School at Chatham, now removed to Netley; in 1863, Deputy Inspector-General.

the circulation, as a result of the weakened condition of the heart, was the chief cause of the symptoms from which the patient was suffering. He therefore advised that all disturbance of the heart's action by mental emotion, or other means, should be prevented as far as possible; and as exposure to the cold air troubled Lord Clyde severely on leaving his club to return home at night, he was urged to give up his ordinary habit of walking, and to use a closed carriage instead.

His journal, which he had kept with more or less regularity since the beginning of 1861, came to an abrupt conclusion in the third week in January. The last entry was dated on the 18th of that month: "Major Bowie kindly accompanied me yesterday to the house of the late Lord Canning in Grosvenor Square, where I was shown the swords he had brought from India. I discovered the regulation sword I had worn as a general officer in the Crimea and India, and which I gave him as a little keepsake and *souvenir* of the old soldier, who had so much pleasure in serving under his orders in the overthrow and suppression of the Mutiny of the native army, and restoration of order and tranquillity of India."

On the 16th May, whilst General and Mrs Eyre were with him on a short visit, Lord Clyde complained of being unwell. A gouty sensation caused him pain in the foot; but as no serious symptoms supervened, his friends left him and returned to

Chatham. On the following day General Eyre was telegraphed for to Berkeley Square, and found Lord Clyde, who had expressed anxiety to see him, seriously ill. It was such an alarming attack, that his medical adviser recommended him to put his affairs in order.

In the first week of June, Lord Clyde, to the surprise of General Eyre, reappeared at Chatham. His visit was quite unexpected, inasmuch as, when his friend left him, he had expressed his intention of remaining in town for some time, to enable him to complete his business with his lawyer. No doubt he was anxious to escape being made an object of interest ; for in spite of every precaution to the contrary, the inquiries for him were overwhelming. All London was at his door. He remained at Chatham a fortnight in a state of great debility, and with his eyesight seriously impaired. He then returned to London for a few days, and came back to Chatham on the 23d June, having in the interval caught a cold. He never left again.

From the beginning of his last attack, Lord Clyde realised his precarious condition, and prepared himself in all humility for the end. "Mind this, Eyre," he impressed upon his friend at an early stage of his illness, "I die at peace with all the world." He would frequently ask Mrs Eyre to join with him in prayer, and derived much consolation in hearing passages from the Scriptures and sacred poetry read to him by her or a member of her family. He pre-

ferred to have the Bible read in French, making his comments in the same language. His taste for Scotch poetry remained undiminished to the last; and when reverting to the memory of his early days, he would endeavour to repeat passages from the "Deeside." To sit in an easy-chair in the garden, or to be taken an airing in a carriage driven at an easy pace, was his chief solace, until early in July, when the paroxysms of pain in the region of the heart, accompanied with great difficulty of breathing, became so frequent, as to oblige him to confine himself to his room.

In the first fortnight of July, Lord Clyde experienced several attacks, attended with such alarming symptoms, as to necessitate further advice being called in. Dr Watson was summoned from London, and on several occasions slept in the house. In the intervals of pain Lord Clyde was quite himself, his memory and judgment as clear as ever, and he was much interested in talking to Dr Watson about old Peninsular days. His nervous system had, however, become much deranged, and its irritation was further increased by the want of sleep. Perfect quiet was enjoined by his medical attendants.<sup>1</sup> At times he became very excitable; and on hearing the sound of the bugle in the adjoining square, he would jump up from his chair,

<sup>1</sup> Surgeon-Major J. Summers, M.D., Royal Engineers, and Assistant-Surgeon H. L. Randell, M.R.C.S., Royal Engineers, who were assiduous in their attentions to Lord Clyde.

exclaiming, "I'm ready." On another occasion, when rallying from a paroxysm of pain, he sighed, "Oh for the pure air of heaven, that I might be laid in rest and peace on the lap of the Almighty." By the third week in July the patient's general strength had rapidly declined. Other symptoms, too, supervened, which only too plainly showed that the disease, in which they had originated, was making a fatal advance. As the circulation became more enfeebled, he was subjected to delusions of sight and imagination; and disturbing sleeplessness, which the usual remedies failed to relieve, augmented his sufferings. Although at times quite natural and submissive, he often became the subject of intense delirium. He longed for his release; but on the 24th July he said to General Eyre, "I should like to live till to-morrow, because it is the anniversary of St Sebastian, which is perhaps a fitting day for the old soldier to die." At the same time, he desired to be remembered to "Sutherland, his old comrade of the 21st; and to good Haythorne,<sup>1</sup> brave Haythorne, as modest as he is brave."

His memory, too, would frequently dwell on his faithful Highlanders, and find expression in terms of gratitude for the trust they had reposed in the chief, who loved them so well. Some account of the Alma which had recently appeared in a periodical had not rendered them the justice which, in his opinion, they deserved; and on learning that a former member of

<sup>1</sup> *Vide ante*, vol. i. p. 123.

his staff was expected at Chatham, he became excited, and said, "When —— comes down, get him to assist you in drawing up a statement for me to sign. I should like to see it and sign it myself." On being reminded that he had promised not to speak any more on such subjects, he grasped General Eyre's hand and replied, "Well, I will obey orders ; but, my dear friend, it is not on my account—it's for the sake of those noble soldiers, who expect it from me."

Numerous and feeling were the inquiries made regarding him ; and though many intimate friends repaired to Chatham, some of them from long distances, it was deemed advisable that he should not run the risk of excitement consequent on an interview. Lord Clyde himself shrank from seeing any but those who ministered to him. Even his sister, who remained under the same roof with him for several days, on the chance of being admitted, returned to London without having accomplished her purpose.

As soon as the news of his illness reached the Queen, Sir Charles Phipps communicated to General Eyre the grief her Majesty experienced at hearing it ; and he was directed "in her name to say everything to her old loyal faithful servant that can be said of sympathy and sincere regard." "He was," Sir Charles Phipps added, "a very great favourite of her Majesty ; and if he still can listen to such expressions, it may soothe him to hear how deep is the Queen's feeling for him."

This was followed by a letter, which her Majesty desired to be written to Lord Clyde himself:—

“OSBORNE, *July 20, 1863.*

“MY DEAR LORD CLYDE,—The Queen has just heard of your serious illness, and has directed me to write to you to express her sincere sympathy, and her anxious hope that it may please God to grant you recovery from your sufferings.

“You are well aware of the high appreciation of her Majesty of your invariable and unbounded devotion to duty, which has rendered your life so glorious and so valuable to your Queen and country.

“Her Majesty cannot but hope that it must be a consolation to you, amidst all that you have to undergo, to look back to such a life, and to recall that from your earliest youth to your respected and honoured old age you have freely dedicated yourself to the service of your country.

“The Queen hopes that it may be still soothing to you to know how deeply your Sovereign feels for you, and how entirely you have secured to yourself her esteem and respect.

“She prays that a merciful God may lessen your sufferings and grant you peace,—Sincerely yours,

“C. B. PHIPPS.”

In his enfeebled state Lord Clyde was unable to acknowledge otherwise than vicariously this high token of her Majesty's regard. From day to day



he continued in the same suffering condition, restless, and at times delirious, but in the intervals calm and gentle as a child, longing for the rest which was denied him for some weeks to come. His originally robust frame and healthy constitution alone enabled him to resist the rapid encroachment of the fatal disease, which was gradually sapping his strength.

On the 1st August he expressed an earnest desire to see his sister. In the hope that sooner or later this would be the case, General and Mrs Eyre had induced Miss Campbell to pay a second visit to Chatham; and she was already in the house, waiting for her brother's consent to the interview, whenever the longed-for opportunity might occur. Once he had resolved to see her, he was impatient until he had realised his wish. He was even anxious to take a stimulant, in order, he said, "to give me strength to go down a few steps to meet the old sister when she comes, that I may embrace her before to-night, before I die." Such, indeed, was the excitement produced by the anticipation of her arrival, that it was not till the evening she was permitted to see him. Most touching was their interview.

Finding that her brother derived comfort from her presence, Miss Campbell remained at Chatham till the last. Though she was physically unable to minister to his wants, he was glad to have her with him during his intervals of consciousness and freedom from pain. When she could not be in his room, she

watched patiently outside his door. For some days, increasing weakness had compelled Lord Clyde to renounce his habit of wandering from one room to the other of the suite reserved for his use, and by the 10th August he was no longer able to sit up in his chair. He either lay on the sofa or on a mattress on the floor, taking daily less and less nourishment, and at times relapsing into such a state of faintness, as to warrant the belief that the end was imminent. Still he rallied, and during the next few days dozed and slept more than usual. On the 13th August his sister had sat by his side watching him all the night through. Early in the morning he recognised her and told her to go to bed. A few minutes past noon of the 14th it became evident that Lord Clyde was sinking fast. Miss Campbell was promptly summoned; and half an hour later, whilst his sister, General and Mrs Eyre, and his faithful servant White, knelt around him, he calmly passed to his rest.

The news of Lord Clyde's death was received throughout the country with a general feeling of sorrow, which was echoed by the press, and proved how deep was the hold he had on the affections of his countrymen. The nation, which had recently and ungrudgingly acquiesced in the honours conferred upon him, would have been well pleased to have seen him spared for a longer time to enjoy them, and mourned the loss of the gallant veteran, whose deeds were still fresh in its memory, and

whom it had learned to regard as one of its most trusted and honoured servants.

From Coburg, Lord Granville, who was in attendance on her Majesty, wrote to General Eyre :—

“COBURG, *August 20, 1863.*

“SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge with thanks your two letters. The Queen heard with great sorrow the death of Lord Clyde.

“I received her Majesty’s order to express to the Duke of Cambridge her Majesty’s grief, and to say ‘that the great military services of Lord Clyde in different parts of the world, the success with which in most trying circumstances he restored peace to her Majesty’s empire in India, and the personal regard which the Queen and her beloved Consort entertained for his high and honourable character, make her Majesty deeply deplore the loss which the Queen, in common with her Majesty’s subjects, has sustained.’<sup>1</sup>

“The Queen also desired me to express her Majesty’s hope that some suitable mark of respect will be paid to the memory of one who so well represented the great qualities of a British soldier.

“I shall be much obliged if you will communicate to Miss Campbell the Queen’s sentiments on this sad occasion.

“I have had the honour of laying before the

<sup>1</sup> These words were embodied in a general order published to the army on the 22d August 1863.

Queen the copy of the letter in which you explain to the Duke of Cambridge the wishes of Lord Clyde respecting his own funeral.—Yours sincerely,

“GRANVILLE.

“*P.S.*—I should be extremely obliged to you if you would take an opportunity of offering my respectful condolences to Miss Campbell. I entertained the feelings of admiration for Lord Clyde which are held by all Englishmen; but in addition to these, his devoted friendship to my poor friends Lord and Lady Canning, inspired me with particular regard for him.”

Consistent with the modesty which had uniformly marked his career, Lord Clyde had enjoined on General Eyre his desire that his funeral should be conducted as simply and as free from ostentation as that of a country gentleman. In accordance, therefore, with his wishes, steps were taken with a view to his interment in Kensal Green Cemetery. On the action, however, of Lord de Grey (now Marquess of Ripon), Secretary of State for War for the time being, who rightly interpreted the public feeling, the Government intervened, and resolved to pay a national tribute to Lord Clyde's memory by according to his remains the honour of a resting-place in Westminster Abbey. Thither, with as little pomp as was consistent with the idea of a private funeral, all that was mortal of him who

had died the foremost soldier of England, was borne on the 22d August; and with every demonstration of respect from the highest and noblest in the land, and in the presence of a number of his attached friends and followers, Lord Clyde was laid in the grave, there to rest in the company of the statesmen, warriors, and other illustrious men who sleep around him.

A plain stone marking the spot where he lies is inscribed with these words:—

BENEATH THIS STONE  
REST THE REMAINS OF  
COLIN CAMPBELL, LORD CLYDE,  
WHO, BY HIS OWN DESERTS,  
THROUGH FIFTY YEARS OF ARDUOUS SERVICE,  
FROM THE EARLIEST BATTLES IN THE PENINSULAR WAR  
TO THE PACIFICATION OF INDIA IN 1858,  
ROSE TO THE RANK OF FIELD-MARSHAL AND THE PEERAGE.  
HE DIED LAMENTED  
BY THE QUEEN, THE ARMY, AND THE PEOPLE,  
14TH AUGUST 1863,  
IN THE 71ST YEAR OF HIS AGE.

The story of Lord Clyde's life has been told. It has been seen how, beginning life without means or interest, and in spite of long waiting and sore discouragements, he eventually attained "fame, rank,

and fortune," the summit of a soldier's ambition—and what was even of greater value in his eyes, the regard of his Sovereign and the respect of his fellow-countrymen. He was not gifted with extraordinary powers. He had no pretensions to genius. He had faults, from which man's erring nature is never exempt. What, then, was the secret of his success? Possessing solid abilities, and in the enjoyment of a robust constitution, with which he never tampered, he devoted himself, from the first hour of his entry into the service, to the study of his profession, no detail of which, especially where it concerned the wellbeing and comfort of the soldier, was beneath his notice. "Duty," unbounded devotion to "duty," was the pole-star of his career. Patient during the long years when fortune frowned upon him, he bided his time; and when the opportunity presented itself, he set about the great task imposed upon him with an energy belying his years. When crowned with success, and in the enjoyment of wealth, rank, and honours, he was unchanged—the same warm, constant friend to his inferiors, and to those whom he had out-distanced in the race. His friendships were many, his resentments few.

Imbued with strong regimental feelings,<sup>1</sup> the result

<sup>1</sup> Lord Clyde, throughout his career, made no concealment of his preference of regimental to staff officers. Indeed, his impatience of or readiness to resent what he considered undue interference on the part of staff officers with his own regiment, or any body of troops confided to his care, was a marked feature in him, almost amounting to an idiosyncrasy.

of his early training in the system introduced by Sir John Moore, his ideas were not cramped by attention to the details of the barrack-square. He welcomed with eagerness the introduction of such innovations as tended to advance the theoretical and practical instruction of all ranks of the service; and when in positions of command, he seconded with all his energy the efforts of the authorities to this end. On one point, however, he held the most decided opinion. He placed unbounded faith in the old soldier, whose presence in the ranks, whether as an example of discipline to his younger comrade, or a support to him in the hour of trial, he regarded as the basis of his calculation in determining the physical and tactical value of the forces at his disposal. Those who were by Lord Clyde's side during the Indian Mutiny, will have in their recollection the relief he felt at seeing a battalion of seasoned and experienced soldiers, weak though their members might be, join his force, which was so largely composed of young regiments.

Though naturally of a quick and excitable temperament, he was, in the presence of the enemy, calm and collected, rapidly taking in the features of the ground, and in an instant accommodating himself to the varying phases of the fight. War was his element. His aptitude for it won for him from Sir Charles Napier the *sobriquet* of the "war-bred Sir Colin."<sup>1</sup> He was successful in all he undertook.

<sup>1</sup> Defects, Civil and Military, of the Indian Government. By Lieutenant-General Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B. P. 126.

Knowing the value of the British soldier, and the costly material of which our army is composed, he was careful to economise the lives of his troops; yet when the necessity demanded it, he was daring in his efforts to accomplish his purpose. All his plans were laid with deliberate care, so that when the blow fell it fell heavily.

Nevertheless there have not been wanting critics who have censured him for acting with undue caution, especially in not following up, during the repression of the Indian Mutiny, the discomfited foe with greater promptitude, under the belief that the destruction of a few thousands of the enemy, more or less, would have brought the struggle to an end. But the appellation of old "Kuberdar—Take care," so far from being a reproach to his memory, proves that he was a master of his art. It does not require a soldier's training to accept the maxim that "conquest is twice achieved when the achiever brings home full numbers." His antagonists, who were no match for his troops in the open, became formidable when under cover or in broken ground. For these reasons, and actuated by the dictates of humanity towards the foe, Lord Clyde on principle refrained from risking his troops in an unequal encounter of arms, or from exposing them unduly to the climate, for an object which he regarded as alone attainable by the occupation and gradual settlement of the revolted districts.

The consciousness of this on the part of his troops,



contributed in no small degree to the confidence they reposed in their leader; and without venturing to designate the particular niche which Lord Clyde will occupy in the temple of fame, this quality, undoubtedly one of the most important factors which produce success in war, cannot but enhance his reputation as a commander.

In estimating his value in this capacity, the peculiar circumstances under which the campaigns for the suppression of the Indian Mutiny were conducted must be borne in mind. Lord Clyde controlled the direction of a large number of columns operating over a vast area of country. These columns were often separated far from each other, and were of a constantly varying strength, since it often happened that two or three of them had to be concentrated into one force, or that one had to be broken up into several fractions. At no time did he succeed in manœuvring under his personal guidance a body of troops equal in strength to that of an English army-corps of the present day.<sup>1</sup> He had therefore no opportunity of testing his tactical powers upon fields as wide as those in which our greatest generals have secured their renown.

Any summary of Lord Clyde's character would be wanting without the insertion in these pages of the following letter from General Vinoy,<sup>2</sup> showing the

<sup>1</sup> The strength of an English army-corps is fixed at 36,993 of all ranks. For the operations against Lucknow in March 1858, Lord Clyde had assembled 31,000, inclusive of the Goorkha force under Jung Bahadoor.

<sup>2</sup> Whilst these pages are being penned, General Vinoy has passed

estimate formed by the latter of his friend and comrade of the Crimea. It was written in reply to a letter from the writer of this biography, when the idea of putting it forth was first mooted.

“PARIS, *Octobre* 12, 1878.

“MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—C'est avec une agréable surprise et un bien grand plaisir que j'ai reçu la

away. Born in 1800, he was educated for the priesthood, but changing his views, entered the army. In 1830, he was promoted from the ranks for service in the Algerian campaign, and rose to the command of the 2d Regiment of Zouaves. In 1854, he joined the army of the Crimea as general of brigade. After the capture of the Malakoff, he was promoted to the rank of general of division, and in that capacity served in the Italian campaign of 1859 with the army-corps of Marshal Niel. He was created Senator in 1865. On the breaking out of the Franco-German war in 1870, he sought active service, and was nominated to the command of the 13th Corps, concentrated at Mézières. After Sedan he retreated on Paris, where his corps, which was intact, became the nucleus of the forces which defended the capital. He eventually became Commander-in-chief of the Army of Paris, and in that capacity it fell to his lot to sign the capitulation. He, however, remained at the head of 12,000 men, who were permitted to retain their arms.

Failing on the 18th March 1871 in his endeavours, as commander of the forces in Paris, to retake the guns at Montmartre, which had been seized by the insurrectionists, he quitted the capital, and was charged with the duty of guarding the National Assembly. Subsequently he was appointed to the command of the Army of Reserve, engaged in the operations on the left bank of the Seine. On the 23d May, he re-entered Paris at the head of his troops. He was then nominated “Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour,” and in that capacity opened a subscription for the reconstruction of the Palace of the Order, which had been burned by the insurgents. Only members of the Order contributed, and the sum realised amounted to 1,200,000 francs (=£48,000). On the accession of the De Freycinet Ministry, General Vinoy was removed from the post of Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, in favour of General Faidherbe. He died shortly afterwards in the spring of this year (1880).

lettre, où vous me parlez de notre cher ami Sir Colin Campbell, de glorieuse mémoire.

“ La publication de ses mémoires est une bonne pensée, dont tout le monde saura gré au Général Eyre, car c’est donner en exemple la vie d’un homme de bien et d’un vaillant général, qui portait haut le drapeau de son pays.

“ Les circonstances qui m’ont fait connaître le Général Campbell sont pour moi un souvenir toujours vivant, et j’ai regardé comme une bonne fortune pour moi d’avoir été désigné par le Général Canrobert d’accord avec Lord Raglan pour aller coopérer avec notre ami et ses braves Ecossais à la défense de Balaklava. C’est là où j’ai pu apprécier le vrai type de l’homme de guerre, chef actif et prévoyant, s’occupant sans cesse du bien-être de ses soldats plus que de lui-même ; les initiant avec patience au service du bivouac comme à celui des avant-postes ; toujours le premier debout et le dernier couché. Voilà ce que j’ai été à même de remarquer pendant le terrible hiver de 1854-55, où nous avons vécu, pour ainsi dire, côte à côte, causant quelquefois de nos campagnes diverses, souvent de la France et de l’Angleterre, sans oublier les mesures à prendre contre l’ennemi que nous avions à combattre ensemble, ce qui s’est présenté plus d’une fois, notamment dans la matinée du 20 février 1855, où, toutes les colonnes de l’attaque projetées contre l’ennemi s’étant trouvées arrêtées dans leur mouvement par cette tempête de neige, dont vous avez dû con-

server souvenir comme moi, le Général Campbell, qui n'avait pu recevoir le contre ordre, se crût obligé de marcher malgré la tourmente, et s'était engagé seul contre lui; mais au premier coup de fusil ma brigade partait le rejoindre au pas gymnastique, et nous eûmes bien vite obligé les Russes à se replier.

“ Plus tard, quand il fut nommé au Commandement de l'armée des Indes, il m'en informa par dépêche, et s'arrêta à Paris pour me voir. Chaque courrier m'apportait ensuite des nouvelles de ses opérations, qui, conduites avec la vigueur et cette intelligence de la guerre que je lui connaissais, terminèrent promptement l'effervescence de ce soulèvement, qui pouvait avoir des résultats si désastreux pour vos possessions dans l'Inde.

“ Après son retour en Europe, le Général Campbell vint souvent me voir à Paris. J'allais aussi le visiter en Angleterre, et nos relations n'ont fini qu'avec la mort de ce cher ami toujours bien regretté.

“ Veuillez, mon cher Shadwell, offrir mes meilleurs compliments au Général Eyre, et croire à l'assurance de mes sentiments affectueux et dévoués.

“ GAL. VINOY.”

*Translation.*

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,—It was an agreeable surprise and a very great pleasure to me to receive your letter, in which you speak of our dear friend Sir Colin Campbell, of glorious memory. The pub-

lication of his memoirs is a good idea, for which every one will be grateful to General Eyre, for it will be the means of giving to the world an example of the life of a good man and brave general, who nobly upheld the honour of his country's flag.

“The circumstances under which I made the acquaintance of General Campbell will ever live in my memory; and I always considered myself fortunate to have been selected both by Marshal Canrobert and Lord Raglan to go and co-operate with my friend and his brave Scotchmen in the defence of Balaklava. It was thus that I learned to appreciate the true type of the soldier, the active and foreseeing chief, ever busied with the wellbeing of his men more than with his own; patiently initiating them in the duties of camp-life and the service of outposts; always himself the first to be up and the last to lie down. This is what I was in a position to observe during the terrible winter of 1854-55, during which we lived, so to speak, side by side, often talking over our different campaigns, and often about France and England, not neglecting the necessary measures to be taken against an enemy, whom it was our joint duty to resist—a duty we were more than once called upon to perform; especially on the morning of the 20th February 1855, when, in the projected attack upon the enemy, all the columns finding themselves checked in their advance by that terrible snowstorm, which you must recollect as well as I do, General Campbell, who had received no

countermanding order, thought it his duty to advance in spite of the storm, and had engaged the enemy singly; but at the first shot fired my brigade hastened to his assistance at the double, and we soon forced the Russians to retire.

"In later years, when he was appointed Commander-in-chief of the army in India, he sent me notice of his appointment by telegraph, and stopped in Paris to see me. Each post afterwards brought me news of his operations, which, conducted with that vigour and knowledge of war which I knew him to possess, promptly terminated that insurrection, which might have had such disastrous results for your Indian possessions.

"After his return to Europe, General Campbell often came to see me in Paris. I also visited him in England, and our connection only terminated with the death of this dear and ever-regretted friend.

"Be so good, my dear Shadwell, as to offer my best compliments to General Eyre, and receive the assurance of my devoted affection.

"GAL. VINOY."

At the conclusion of a notice of Lord Clyde's life which appeared in the 'Times' the day after his decease, the writer gracefully remarked: "Such a life, so simple, so true, so independent of all artificial, and even of all extraordinary advantages, is more honourable than more brilliant and less steady careers, and has a far higher value to Englishmen. This coun-

try has never been wanting in men of great genius at critical periods of its history, and our great names may match with those of any country and any time; but our greatness as a nation is due more to the steady ability and true integrity which are spread so largely among all classes, than to the power of extraordinary and occasional genius. The qualities which in a superior degree raised Lord Clyde to his high position are those which have been always most highly valued by Englishmen, and which every one in his degree may imitate."

Let those of the junior officers of our army whose eyes may rest on these pages, take these words to heart, recollecting that patience and common-sense—in short, the application of Lord Clyde's motto, as exemplified in his own career—command the road to success. If the contemplation of this record of Lord Clyde's life should stimulate any of them to follow in his footsteps, the biographer's labour, which has been one of love, will have met with its reward.

Immediately after Lord Clyde's death, a movement was set on foot to establish in London a memorial of his services. A general subscription, to which the armies in England and India alike contributed, resulted in the statue by the late Baron Marochetti, R.A., which stands in the gardens of Carlton House Terrace, in close proximity to the United Service Club.

His fellow-townsmen of Glasgow, in like manner,

have paid honour to his memory. A statue from the hands of the late Mr Foley, R.A., has been erected in George Square in that city, and is appropriately situated a short distance from that of Sir John Moore, himself a native of Glasgow, and of the traditions of whose school Lord Clyde was in practice so faithful an exponent.

Both are characteristic likenesses of the veteran soldier, and represent him in the simple dress he was in the habit of using in the field during the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, and in which his portrait was taken by Sir Francis Grant for Lord Canning.

THE END.







